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Abstract 
This study argues for the necessity of a psychoanalytic perspective in the study 
of colonization, while recognizing the complicity of psychoanalysis in the colonial 
project. My first chapter situates the Oedipal subject as a historic effect and attempts to 
trace some of the conditions of its emergence. In this way, I seek to call into question 
the universal status that Freud attributed to the Oedipal subject. From this historicized 
perspective, I then read Freud's Totem and Taboo, and its construction of the `savage', 
as an effect of displacement, and in so doing, suggest a relation between the Oedipalized 
subject and the colonizing subject. 
The following three chapters are comprised of detailed readings of specific 
events and texts in Australian cultural history. All of these chapters focus on Aboriginal 
writers, and argue that the texts they have produced can be read as challenging, in a 
variety of ways, the naturalized construction of the patriarchal nuclear family in the 
colonial context, and the Oedipalized subject that supports it. The first of these 
contextualizes the life and work of David Ilnaipon, and argues for a more positive 
reassessment of his work that takes into consideration modes of Oedipalized 
subjectification operative in the colonial domain. The following chapter focuses on 
Sally Morgan's My Place, Australia's best-selling, Aboriginal autobiography, and 
suggests that its overwhelming popularity masks profound anxieties about the intimate 
and sexualized nature of colonial exploitation as manifest in the settler family home. 
The final chapter considers recent allegations that Mudrooroo, Australia's most well- 
known and prolific Aboriginal writer, is actually an African American. This chapter 
suggests that a re-reading of his novels, Master of the Ghost Dreaming and Doctor 
Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World, provide possible ways 
of rethinking simplistic notions of identity and theirgrounding in Oedipalized 
identifications. All three textual events act as imperatives to remember the legacy of 
colonialism that continues to pervade contemporary Australian culture. 
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Introduction 
This thesis was motivated by a sense of unease which accompanied my 
burgeoning interest in Aboriginal Australian literature some years ago. My subsequent 
examination of critical responses to Aboriginal literature opened up the vast and 
proliferating field of what we know of as postcolonial studies. It was some time before I 
realized that many of the concepts that I was thinking with drew upon psychoanalytic 
theory, the work of Homi Bhabha being the most well-known and difficult 
exemplification of this. I distinctly remember reading an article on the emergence and 
proliferation of Aboriginal literature, although I can no longer remember where or by 
whom, that described this emergence as the `Return of the Repressed'. Even at the time, 
having never read Freud, I had a vague understanding that the notion of the repressed 
signalled the repression of things unacceptable to consciousness in the unconscious. 
What worried me about this formulation was its unacknowledged designation of 
Aboriginality to the repressed unconscious of white Australia. Aboriginal writing, in 
this formulation, becomes the self-consolidating other of the white Australian self. 
Yet, my consequent exploration of psychoanalysis has reaffirmed, in spite of 
this, its importance in an analysis of colonialism. What I mean is, analyses of 
colonization which focus on the economic, the political, and even the ideological, do 
not seem to me to explain sufficiently the causes and motivations of colonialism. Is it 
really possible to think about colonial practices without concepts like fantasy and desire, 
projection and displacement? Is it possible, moreover, to challenge colonialism and its 
contemporary effects without putting into question the status of the subject? It is, 
perhaps, the most important insight of psychoanalysis that we cannot treat the subject as 
rational. This, in turn, suggests that the rationalist episteme and the colonial knowledges 
it produces, which locate the cogito as the privileged holder of truth, knowledge and 
being, is simultaneously open to question. To take a psychoanalytic perspective is to 
work with the assumption that the subject is alienated from itself, and has a variety of 
mechanisms for repressing that alienation. Psychoanalysis, as a comprehensive theory 
of subjectivity, enables us to think about the psychic and phantasmatic motivations of 
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colonization, a perspective which seems to me to be an important and necessary 
contribution to studies of colonialism. It is with this in mind that the first part of my title 
is `Psychoanalyzing Colonialism'. 
Freud's discussion of the instinctive inclination to aggression in Civilization and 
its Discontents is one way of thinking about colonial violence. Freud claims that people 
experience their neighbour not only as `a potential helper or sexual object, but also 
someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity 
for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his 
possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him'. ' Freud 
suggests, in this passage, that the subject's internal alienation from itself is displaced on 
to intersubjective relations, and it is this suggestion that provides one way of thinking 
about colonial domination and subordination. Colonialism, from this perspective, can be 
thought of as the displaced enactment of intra-subjective fantasies of control and 
mastery. 
The desire for mastery, however, can be extended to the production of 
knowledge as well. This, even more than the often uncomfortable and painful 
propositions of psychoanalysis, is the source of my unease. For, although I would argue 
for the necessity of psychoanalysis in the study of colonialism, there seems to me to be 
little doubt that psychoanalysis itself is complicit in the colonial project, as part of its 
extensive and all-encompassing epistemological apparatus. Freud's universalization of 
psychoanalysis ensured that he would attempt to use it to explain other cultures in 
evolutionary terms. This is where I find psychoanalysis at its most problematic, but 
also, and this is just as important, at its most symptomatic. Freud certainly took for 
granted some of the most fundamental assumptions of the Enlightenment, its 
universalism and its belief in the progress of human knowledge and reason which are, 
themselves, fantasies of mastery that were used to justify and facilitate colonial 
conquests. 
'Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents(1930 [1929]), in the Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 12, 
ed. Albert Dickson, trans. James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 302. All future references to 
Freud, unless otherwise indicated, are from this Penguin Freud Library edition, and are included in 
parentheses in the text. 
Using psychoanalysis as a conceptual tool to think about these questions is even 
more complicated by my argument that psychoanalysis does not only produce certain 
kinds of objects of psychoanalytic and anthropological knowledge, the concept of the 
savage being one of these, but it also, like any discursive formation, contributes to the 
production of a certain kind of subject, a word I use, not in its psychoanalytic sense, a 
sense that was barely used by Freud and only came into vogue with Lacan, but rather, as 
Michel Foucault did, in its double sense: `subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge'. 
In an article entitled `Inventing Aborigines', the Australian historian Bob Reece 
points to this form of subject-constitution when he argues that `[i]n an important sense, 
Aborigines are both an invention and a product of European civilisation'. This suggests 
that colonization is not just a territorial project, but one that acts to constitute certain 
colonial subjects. Colonialism, at least on its psychic level, can be thought of as a 
project that seeks to reproduce in the colonies the psychic configuration that, I will 
argue, was a fundamental part of the impetus for colonization in the first place. This 
configuration can be thought of, following Freud, as the Oedipal subject. As Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari asserted in the Anti-Oedipus, `Oedipus is always 
colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony'. The modes of 
subjectification that psychoanalysis describes and produces are thus intimately linked 
with the colonial project, as an effect of regimes of power/knowledge. 5 This is, I think, 
in spite of its difficulties, the central insight of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. 
Obviously, the sustained experiment that is the Anti-Oedipus is not easily utilized in a 
project of this kind, that requires careful reasoning and theoretical justification. 
However, this thesis does follow Deleuze and Guattari (and Freud) to the extent that it 
works with the assumption that desire is contingent, variable and polymorphous, that it 
2 Michel Foucault, `A$erword: The Subject and Power', in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, by Hubert L. Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. 212 
3 Bob Reece, `Inventing Aborigines', Aboriginal History, 11.1 (1987), 14. 
4 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 170. Future references are to this edition, and are 
included in parentheses in the text. 
s See Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. and trans. 
Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) 
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does not have an specific aim and object, and that it is not localized in the operation of 
the genitals. Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Freud suggests that the Oedipus complex 
was a radical insight, the implications of which Freud refused to acknowledge. In so 
doing, his insight about the socialization of desire-was repressed, and the Oedipus 
complex and its resolution were made fundamental to so-called normal development. In 
this way, the patriarchal nuclear family took on a universal and necessary form. I want 
to stress, however, that I do not wish to privilege psychic repression over other kinds of 
repression- On the contrary, by historicizing psychoanalytic theory, I want to suggest 
that the psychic repression that Freud identified and analyzed is itself a socio-historical 
effect. 
Anti-Oedipus also examines the relations between capitalism and psychoanalysis 
and, by extension, the relations of both these historical phenomena to colonialism, 
which is no longer conceived of as merely economic and territorial, but also as libidinal. 
The nuclear family is the family structure that emerged out of a capitalist political 
economy, and such an economy relies on and desires a specific and fixed identity. This 
functions to produce restricted identifications (daddy-mummy, man-woman, oppressor- 
oppressed) that can also be thought of as one of the conditions for racialized or 
colonialist identifications. This may explain my chiastic title, where the `colonizing' 
that precedes `psychoanalysis' can be thought of as an adjective as well as a verb. This 
chiastic structure signals that ambivalence that constitutes this thesis. 
This thesis, then, somewhat problematically, hopes to retain psychoanalysis as a 
set of conceptual tools to think about colonialism, and simultaneously considers it as 
part of the colonial project. Like the Anti-Oedipus, this thesis refuses `to play "take it or 
leave it"' with psychoanalysis (117). My project is not exempt from the difficulties 
facing any meta-study, and it is important to state that I do not see myself as occupying 
some kind of neutral zone untouched by the fields of study that I am analyzing. I 
consider myself as an effect of both colonization and psychoanalysis, and my study as 
being both enabled and constrained by the discourses of these, and many other, 
practices. The question inevitably emerges: Is it possible to use psychoanalysis to 
analyze psychoanalysis? For the reasons I set out below, I think that it is. 
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Psychoanalysis, like all sciences, disciplines and epistemologies, emerged out of 
a certain set of historical circumstances. In this sense, not only does psychoanalysis 
reflect a certain historical epoch, it simultaneously reproduces it, and the subjectivity 
that supports it. Freud, moreover, was not merely a product of his time, but a brilliant 
analyst of it, and psychoanalysis, for all its situatedness (a situatedness that Freud did 
not pay enough attention to) is an important conceptual tool for understanding the 
psychic world of the colonizing Western subject and its effects. Psychoanalysis, then, 
can be seen as an effect of the Enlightenment in at least two ways. First, the 
Enlightenment belief in the power of knowledge and rationality inevitably produced a 
science of the psyche, psychoanalysis as an epistemological tool. Second, the limiting of 
individual identifications to within the nuclear family, and the repression of alternative 
modes of subjectivity not assimilable to the rational cogito, can perhaps be thought of as 
producing the very symptoms that psychoanalysis, as therapeutic practice, sought to 
cure. As Joel Kovel has asserted: `The moment of psychoanalysis came when the west 
could not contain its own otherness within the prevailing system of rationalization. " If 
one of psychoanalysis' central insights is the primary repression that for Freud 
constituted the Oedipus complex, its universalizing displacement, under the guise of 
evolutionary anthropology, on to the colonized other, can be thought about 
symptomatically as that which psychoanalysis seeks to understand.. 
It is this ambivalence within psychoanalytic discourse that can be exploited and 
explored in an analysis of colonialism. Even as Freud maintains a belief in the rational 
progress of science, he takes as his object of study that which is inaccessible to rational 
thought. Psychoanalysis, then, is haunted by more than just the constitutive instabilities 
that inhabit any form of discourse; it must also acknowledge the incomplete nature and 
the instability of the very knowledges it attempts to produce, inevitably disrupting its 
own premises. It is the disruptive potential of psychoanalysis that I am working with in 
this thesis. In this sense, I am less interested in clarifying my position in relation to 
psychoanalysis, or even in arguing for the existence or truth of certain psychoanalytic 
b Joel Kovel, `On Racism and Psychoanalysis', in Psychoanalysis in Contexts, ed. Anthony Elliott and 
Stephen Frosh (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 205. 
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concepts than in activating the very uncertainties within psychoanalysis to think through 
possibilities that could not otherwise be conceptualized. I have no desire, or intention, to 
remain faithful to Freud and his legacy. Rather, I am following that train in Freud's own 
thinking that was speculative and contradictory, suggestive and uncertain. From this 
perspective, psychoanalysis can be thought of as authorizing itself and simultaneously 
authorizing its own de-authorization. 
Finally, to assume that Freud's own adherence to a racist economy based around 
the notion of the savage removes the unconscious or psychic motivation from analysis 
would be understandable, but also, I think, misguided. Such a rejection would require 
the re-assumption that the rational precepts of consciousness can and will explain 
everything, an assumption that, I will argue, can be thought of as a motivating factor in 
the drive to colonize. What is perhaps by now obvious is that this thesis has an 
extremely ambivalent attitude to_ psychoanalytic theory, and this ambivalence moves, 
unresolved, through the entire work. The extent to which psychoanalysis is used or 
repudiated varies considerably, and I think of this as one of the strengths of the thesis. 
In order to attempt to avoid this desire to produce an imperialistic, all- 
encompassing form of knowledge, this thesis rather than being a `grand narrative' of 
the intersection of colonialism and psychoanalysis is, instead, an attempt to produce 
detailed, yet quite speculative, re-readings of specific pockets of knowledge in the case 
of the colonization of Australia, and even more specifically, certain events and texts that 
can be seen as important watersheds in Australian cultural history in the context of 
Aboriginality. This does not claim to be, and cannot be, an overarching study; the work 
of many important theorists has not been included, and there is still a great deal of work 
to be done. 7 
7'l am thinking here in particular of Frantz F'anon, and-especiallyBrZaick' n, - White Masks, trans. Charles 
Lam Markmann (London: Paladin, 1970); Geza Roheim, Australian Totemism: A Psychoanalytic Study in 
Anthropology (London-, 1925) and Children of the Desert: The Western Tribes of Central Australia, ed. 
Werner Muensterberger (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Ashis Nandy, The Savage Freud and Other 
Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves (Delhi and London_ Oxford University Press, _ 
1995) and The 
Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (Delhi and London: Oxford University 
Press, 1983); George Devereux, Ethnopsyichoanalysis: Psychoanalysis andAnthropology as 
Complementary Frames ofReference (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Octave Mannoni, 
Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, trans. Pamela Powesland (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1990); Gananath Obeyeskere, Medusa's Hair: an Essay on Personal Symbols and 
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My first chapter attempts to historicize psychoanalysis and its emergence at the 
zenith of modem imperialism. Totem and Taboo: Some Points ofAgreement Between 
the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, marks the first intersection of the newly 
emerging sciences, or pseudo-sciences, that we call anthropology and psychoanalysis. 
My reading of Totem and Taboo situates it in the context of the evolutionary 
anthropology that Freud drew upon in his analysis of the so-called savage. The Oedipus 
complex, in this conception, is an historic effect and this thesis tries to trace the 
historical, social, political and economic conditions of its emergence, although it does 
so in a way that is fundamentally different from Deleuze and Guattari's genealogy, and 
is perhaps more traditionally historical in its focus. Nonetheless, I would insert myself 
in the `we' of Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that: `We never dreamed of saying that 
psychoanalysis invented Oedipus. Everything points in the opposite direction: the 
subjects of psychoanalysis arrive already Oedipalized. '8 
While this might seem to move away from the specificity of the Australian 
context that I have claimed for this project, it was, for me, a disturbing discovery to find 
that on the first page of Freud's first foray into anthropology, a comparison between 
what he calls `savages' and `neurotics', he states: 
I shall select as the basis of this comparison the tribes which have 
been described by anthropologists as the most backward and miserable 
of savages, the aborigines of Australia, the youngest continent, in 
whose fauna, too, we can still observe much that is archaic and that 
has perished elsewhere. 
The Australian Aborigine, taken as Freud's prime example, is the location from which 
the intersection between psychoanalysis and anthropology first takes place. 
The following chapters, all focusing on Aboriginal writers and texts, explore the 
relation between colonization and the subjects produced by and through it. All of these 
texts are, I will argue, disruptive interventions that produce anxiety in the Australian 
Religious Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) and The Work of Culture: Symbolic 
Transformation in psychoanalysis and Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
' Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 121. 
9 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points ofAgreement Between the Mental Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics (1912-13), trans. James Strachey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 1. Future 
references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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context because they rupture the naturalized status of the patriarchal nuclear family, and 
the fixed subject that supports it. In so doing, they question the universalization of the 
Oedipus complex, and the authority of the father/colonizer at its centre. 
The first of these chapters on specific Aboriginal writers deals with the life and 
work of David Unaipon, perhaps Australia's most important Aboriginal figure in the 
first two decades of this century, and the most neglected now. Unaipon rose to fame as a 
successfully accultured Christian Aborigine in the early 1900s. Not only was he a 
brilliant scientist and inventor, he was also the producer of a number of Aboriginal 
myths that remain only in manuscript form. Versions of these myths have since 
appeared, under the signature of an anthropologist, William Ramsay Smith. Unaipon's 
neglect can be ascribed to the way in which he is now conceived of as an Aborigine 
who betrayed his own people or, in Fanonian terms, as a man `in whose soul an 
inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of [his] local cultural 
originality'. 10 Although these arguments may or may not be the case, my chapter argues 
for a historicized re-reading of his work in the context of modes of objectification and 
subjectification of Aborigines in Australia at the time he was writing. Such a re-reading 
will, I hope, point to the importance of a contemporary recognition of Unaipon, and the 
necessity of remembering him. 
The third chapter focuses on Sally Morgan's My Place, published in 1987, 
which, in marked contrast to the contemporary neglect of Unaipon, is Australia's most 
internationally renowned and best-selling popular autobiography. " Morgan's life 
narrative has been claimed as a moment of national triumph, and, as a result, has found 
itself dismissed by cultural critics (both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) as a 
complicitous whitewash. While I think there are good reasons to be wary of the 
hyperbolic admiration that Morgan's story seems to inspire, this wariness has always 
been directed against Morgan and her text, making her fully responsible for the ways in 
which it has been read. Ironically, these textually-minded critics tend to reproduce 
10 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Marlanann (London: Paladin, 1970), p. 14. " Sally Morgan, My Place (South Fremantle, WA: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1987). Future page 
references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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author-centred readings of My Place that turn a text that, for me, is extremely disturbing 
into something sentimental and uncontentious. This chapter re-reads both My Place and 
its overwhelming acceptance as concealing-revealing profound anxieties generated by 
its implications, implications that its critics have ignored. 
The final chapter takes as its starting point, recent allegations about Mudrooroo, 
perhaps Australia's most well-known and prolific Aboriginal writer. In July 1996, the 
Australian Magazine published an article entitled `Identity Crisis' calling into question 
his status as Aboriginal Australian, and claiming that he was, in fact, the descendent of 
an African American. 12 My chapter argues for a re-reading of Mudrooroo's rewritings, 
in the light of these allegations, particularly his 1991 novel Master of the Ghost 
Dreaming, itself an unstable reiteration of the earlier Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription 
for Enduring the Ending of the World. 13 I hope to show the way in which Mudrooroo's 
fictional writings provide one way of thinking about the question of identity that is now 
dominating Mudrooroo criticism. 
All three writers/texts subvert the naturalization of the Aboriginal subject, 
especially in its etymological sense, as being from the origin, which constitutes a 
fundamental assumption in both Freud's Totem and Taboo and in contemporary 
responses to the texts/writers in question. The Aboriginal subject, far from being 
`natural' or `authentic', is deeply implicated in authorized and authorizing colonial 
knowledges. It is for this reason that this thesis tries to displace a simple and valorized 
concept of identity, and prefers to focus on non-identitarian claims, or at least more 
ambivalent and complicated identifications and disidentifications. 
Bringing Them Home is the recently published report prepared by the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission from material gathered during the National 
Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their 
Families. The Inquiry's first term of reference was to trace `laws, practices and policies 
12 Laurie, `Identity Crisis', Australian Magazine, 20-21 July, 1996, pp. 28-32. Future page references are 
to this article, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
13 Mudrooroo, Dr Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World (Sydney: Hyland 
House, 1983) and Master of the Ghost Dreaming (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1991). Future page 
references are to these editions, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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which resulted in the separation of Indigenous children from their families by 
compulsion, duress or undue influence'. In December 1997, the Federal Government's 
formal response did not include, in spite of the urgent wishes of Indigenous people, a 
statement of apology. The report, which documents `grief and loss' as well as `tenacity 
and survival' 14, found that the histories traced `were complex and pervasive. Most 
significantly the actions of the past resonate in the present and will continue to do so in 
the future'. 15 These resonances operate in the work of the Aboriginal writers that I am 
focusing on, all of whom were effected by these policies in different ways. The 
`complex and pervasive' histories traced both in this report, and in the texts I am 
considering, suggest that calls for a simple identification with Aboriginality are not only 
becoming increasingly pointless, but also increasingly politically dubious. 
This thesis moves from a general argument about psychoanalysis and 
colonialism towards something more specific in its focus, and whether or not my 
approach can be applied more generally remains to be seen. Certainly, patterns of 
colonization differed according to different colonizers at different times. The 
colonization of Australia was, even in terms of modem British colonialism, quite unique 
in its aims and effects. As a penal colony, Australia already had an unpaid and unfree 
labour force out of which to establish the colony, and it was territory that early colonial 
administrators were primarily interested in. There were, moreover, variations in patterns 
of colonization in different parts of Australia, and these will be elaborated upon in the 
relevant chapters. 
Although the early part of the thesis attempts to locate both modem colonialism 
and psychoanalysis in the context of the history of ideas; I am not a trained philosopher, 
and this thesis often moves outside of my own area of specialization. Certainly, there 
are a number of risks associated with this approach. Yet, the process of thinking through 
and writing up this thesis has convinced me of the necessity of breaking down the 
'4 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, `The Inquiry', Bringing Them Home: Report of the 
National Inquiry into the Separation ofAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their 
families [online], Available: htty: //www. austlii. edu. au/au/special/rsinroiect/rsilibrarv/hreoc/stolen/ 
stolen03. html (19 July, 1999) 
H3 uman Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home. 
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increasing compartmentalization of knowledge that marks our epistemological epoch. 
Such taxonomies were crucial in the production of colonial knowledges where 
increasing differentiation masked an anxiety about the impossibility of a space of 
undifferentiation, a_ fantasy of wholeness- that both psychoanalysis and anthropology had 
a great deal invested in. This project both attempts to blur disciplinary boundaries, and 
is committed to the necessity of inter-disciplinary approaches, as a means of challenging 
and questioning colonial knowledges. If part of my project is to think about the potential 
production of alternative and resistant subjectivities under colonial conditions, this 
blurring of boundaries is perhaps one way of attempting such a transformation. This is 
nottasay that such an approach can and should replace other economic, political, 
historical or even social analyses of colonialism; on the contrary, these are the very texts 
Lhave. drawn upon in writing this thesis. 
Rather, it is a different kind of response that I attempting. The recent election of 
John Howard's Liberal Government in Australia, and the popularity of Pauline 
Hanson's One Nation Party, suggest that we need as many ways of thinking about these 
issues as possible because of the persistence and permutations of right-wing and racist 
politics. It is important to note that not only did these politicians and the parties and 
policies they represent come to power through appeals to a racist ideologyframed in 
terms of equality and nationalism, but they quite explicitly invoked that tired old 
formulation,. `family values'. This is part of a global re-emergence of `family values' 
which, to my mind, reinforces the necessity and timely importance of an analysis of 
processes of Oedipalization. 
It was- in order-to produce such Oedipalized subjects that mostly_ mixed-race 
children were taken from their mothers (generally) and put into white families and 
institutions, and the stated objectives of these policies were the gradual absorption of 
Aborigines into white society. The aim of this `breeding out' was not only to eliminate a 
race of people, but also to institute a way of forgetting, the invasion of Australia and the 
dispossession of its inhabitants. The texts and writers that I am considering in this thesis 
remind us of the necessity of remembering. 
12 
The term `mixed-race' inevitably evokes the extremely complicated question of 
race. As Charles Shepherdson argues, `appeals to race, as a biological concept have 
been subject to strenuous criticism, not only because of the history that has bound 
scientific definitions of race. to eugenics, colonialism and the Holocaust, but also 
because biological definitions of race cannot be sustained even on scientific grounds . 
16 
In spite of this, debates continue to rage about whether human diversity is due to 
cultural or biological factors. One solution, especially in what might be termed cultural 
criticism, has been to introduce the term. `ethnicity' to replace `race', a term that focuses 
on the socio-cultural rather than the biological. Many of the cultural critics whose work 
I examine in this thesis claim not to endorse the concept of race, yet continue to use 
words like `Aborigine' or `mixed-race' as mere discursive constructs, or representations 
that they only adhere to for ease of explanation. '7 This is not to say that theories of the 
body are not always embedded-in- discoursenor-eventhat-scientific accounts can 
provide adequate neutral descriptions of reality. Rather, I would like to suggest that we 
(as cultural critics) need to think about race in a more complicated way, rather than 
abandoning the debate to science. To say that something is embedded in prejudicial 
representations. is, notto say that it does not exist outside its representations. As 
Shepherdson writes: 
Like sexual difference, our racial differences are also bound up with 
the most heavily invested symbolic values, but they cannot be 
regarded as the invention of a particular culture or the product of a 
specific historical moment. This does not mean that we can construe 
race or sexual difference as natural phenomena, reducible to biological 
facts. But it does mean that we cannot adequately conceptualize race 
or sexual difference if. we treat them precisely like laws, theories of 
selfhood, or economic policies. Like sexual difference, race is not a 
human- invention, and there is a sense in which arguments for social 
construction - insofar as they fail to theorize these distinctions - 
remain bound to a humanistic tradition in which `man is the maker of 
all things '. 18 1 
16 Charles Shepherdson, `Human Diversity and the Sexual Relation , 
iii The Psyehoana(ysls of9ace, ed. 
Christopher Lane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 41. Shepherdson's article explores in 
detail the complexity and the importance of the issues at stake in this debate. 
" This conceptual problem was brought to my attention when watching a television documentary on the 
Human Genome Diversity Project in May 1999. Apparently, scientists are not far from producing a 
weapon that could target specific racial genes, thereby eliminating the major factor in the restricted use, to 
date, of biological weapons. I could not help thinking what a horrifying scenario it would be to see people 
being mass-murdered on the basis of their race, while cultural critics continued to claim that the concept 
of race is a purely discursive construct 
18 Shepherdson, p. _45. 
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Although the aim of this thesis is not to resolve this dilemma, which is, in any case, 
undecidable, I do not see how the question can be resolved on either side of the 
naturelculture debate, and I am not going to present meaningless disclaimers for my 
reasons for using a term like mixed-race. This thesis hopes to retain the complexity of 
the question, and certainly not reduce it to the question (and politics) of the extent to 
which certain people- are or are not Aboriginal. The conclusion to my final chapter will 
suggest why it is insufficient and ahistorical to reproduce these kinds of debates. 
The question of Aboriginality has dominated political debates in Australia of 
late, and my project attempts to be a series of re-readings of this question in the light of 
certain texts and events- Iwould like to emphasize the `re-' of re-readings here in the 
sense that, rather than seek to find the `truth' or absolute meanings of these texts and 
events, this thesis enacts repetitions. J. Hillis Miller argues that there are two-ways of 
thinking about repetition. For ease of explanation, he defines these as the Platonic, 
which thinks of difference on the basis of a preestablished similitude where all 
repetitions are destined to be corrupted copies of the original, and the Nietzschean 
which_thinka of similitude, or even identity, as the product of a fundamental disparity. 
This latter way of thinking about repetition presents the world itself as phantasmatic. It 
posits a world based on difference. Because this version- of repetition does not assume 
an original, there is something ghostly about the effects of this second kind of 
repetition-Hillis Miller argues that this second form of repetition is dependent on and 
grounded in the first logical form, it is `not the negation or opposite of the first, but its 
"counterpart'_', 
_ 
in a_strangerelation_whereby the second is the subversive ghost of the 
first, always already present within it as a possibility which hollows it out'. 19 It is from 
this perspective that I am thinking-about the re-readings which each of my chapters 
enacts. 
Repetition also plays a crucial role in psychoanalytic theorizing, particularly 
since the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920. Repetition, for Freud, 
19 J. Hillis Miller, Fiction and Repetition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 9 
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may serve the pleasure principle, or may be a mechanism of working through, but it 
may also be a manifestation of the death instinct: 
The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat... exhibit to a high 
degree an instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the 
pleasure principle, give the appearance of some `daemonic' force at 
work. In the case of children's play we seemed to see that children 
repeat unpleasurable experiences for the additional reason that they 
can master a powerful impression far more thoroughly by being active 
than they could by merely experiencing it passively. Each fresh 
repetition-seems to strengthen the mastery they are in search of Nor 
can children have their experiences repeated often enough, and they 
are inexorable in their insistence that the repetition shall be an 
identical. 20 
Freud speculates that repetition, in its re-enactment of sameness, may offer mastery over 
a state of loss and anxiety. Arrestingly, Freud uses an analogy with re-reading to 
differentiate the child's fixated-'compulsion-to repeat' from, one supposes, the 
`normally developed' adult: `it is hardly possible to persuade an adult who has very 
much enjoyed reading a book to re-read it immediately. ' 21 Freud seems to be suggesting 
here that `re-reading' necessarily involves a re-reading of the same in all its identicality, 
an innately conservative gesture that succumbs to stasis and fixation, a manifestation of 
the death drive. My re-readings hope to challenge-Freud's assertion, -and 
demonstrate 
the way in which re-readings can be manifestations of difference, can even unsettle, in 
the way, that Hillis Miller suggests, the difference between identity and difference. From 
this perspective, re-reading is not merely a repetition of sameness but can also produce 
variation, _innovation, even improvizationrthat 
ist difference. 
Yet Freud's exploration of mastery in the face of anxiety is important to keep in 
mind in a project of this kind. After all, the whole point of a doctoral thesis produced 
within an academic institution, and in academic discourse, is to demonstrate one's' 
mastery (most definitely in the face of anxiety), and for all its passionately held anti- 
colonial sentiment, it seems to me that this thesis cannot help, in some senses, but be 
complicit with that which it is hoping to challenge and subvert. Colonization is the 
2Ö Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), PFL 11, p. 307. See also `Remembering, Repeating and 
Working Through' (1914), Vol. 12 of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud ed. and trans. James Strachey, 24 Vols. (London: Hogarth press, 1937-74), pp. 145-56. 21 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 307. 
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institutional condition of my being here. The Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowship scheme, of which I am a grateful recipient, was designed to bring people 
from the colonies, to educate them, and then return them to their homelands to 
reproduce this colonial educational regime. This is not to say that such designs cannot 
be subverted, nor that other kinds of knowledges cannot be produced along the way, but 
it is to suggest that such a project must proceed with caution and awareness, and 
perhaps, in the midst of excitement, not overstate its claims. 
My discussions do not attempt to offer definitive readings from which a single 
meaning of the texts can be formed. Rather, they will take up the challenge posed by the 
texts and enter into an ongoing dialogue between the texts (and some of their possible 
interpretations) and their readers. The formula of Xavier Pons who claims that writing 
Aboriginality, `that is to say in a mode that is acceptable both to European and to 
Aboriginal readers, remains a challenge'22, can be transformed into the challenge of 
reading Aboriginality as a practice that examines texts not as objects of study, but as 
agents of transformation, a politicized provisional practice that attempts to examine its 
own premises. 
u Xavier Pons, 'Writing Koori: Mudrooroo Narogin and Aboriginal Fiction', in The Making of a Pluralist 
Australia-1950-1990, ed. Werner Senn and Giovanna Capone (Berne: Peter Lang, 1992), p. 110. 
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Chapter 1: Situating Totem and Taboo 
Spectres of Savagery 
Sigmund Freud's Totem and Taboo was originally published in 4 volumes over 
two years (1912-13) with the somewhat less alliterative title of Some Points of 
Agreement Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics. This event marked the 
first convergence of the two newly emerging disciplines (and series of disciplinary 
procedures) that we know of as anthropology and psychoanalysis. Both disciplines, in 
their attempt to be all-encompassing modes of knowledge by humans about humans, 
reflect that historical change that Foucault outlines in his early work where human 
beings came to be both knowing subjects and simultaneous objects of their own 
knowledge. ' 
Freud reasoned in Totem and Taboo that `a comparison between the psychology of 
primitive peoples, as it is taught by social anthropology, and the psychology of 
neurotics, as it has been revealed by psycho-analysis, will be bound to show numerous 
points of agreement and will throw new light upon familiar facts in both sciences'(1). 
The future passive construction, however, masks the subject that is doing the binding, 
the subject that is throwing the light, that is, Freud himself. In this way, Freud 
undertakes what amounts to a collective case-study of `the most backward and 
miserable of savages, the aborigines of Australia'(1). 
It is difficult not to respond to Freud's hypothesis with abhorrence. Yet if 
psychoanalysis can be said to open up possibilities, the most productive of these is the 
potential of both countering and encountering such reactions with alternative questions. 
The instinctual and metaphysical reaction of disgust, with its logic of contamination, 
elimination and purification, is what I hope to call into question. This aversion can then 
1 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1972) and The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: 
Tavistock, 1970). For a clear discussion of this process of simultaneous subjectification and 
objectification, as well as an exploration of some of the problems of Foucault's position, see Hubert L. 
Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (London: 
Harvester Press, 1982). Future references are to these editions, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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function as, and be transformed by, historicization and reconceptualization, which is 
what my re-reading of Totem and Taboo in this chapter attempts to do. 
The most subversive contribution of psychoanalysis is arguably its theorization of 
human subjectivity that interrogates and decentres the individual's pretensions to self- 
knowledge and its concomitant claims to represent reason and reality. This presents a 
paradox: psychoanalysis staked out its epistemological claim in the realm of 
unknowability-the unconscious-a realm that, according to Freud, can only leave 
traces of its existence. Freudian psychoanalysis confronts this paradox insufficiently. 
While displacing the self-mastery of the subject, Freud maintains a teleological belief in 
the all-encompassing possibilities of science where the mastery and unity of the 
Cartesian cogito would return to a split subjectivity through the accumulation of 
biological knowledge. `The deficiencies in our description would probably vanish', 
Freud asserts, `if we were already in a position to replace the psychological terms by 
physiological or chemical ones... Biology is truly a land of unlimited possibilities'. 
This is an assertion that Freud reiterated at the end of his life when he claimed that `for 
the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying 
bedrock'. 
Freud's faith in science, however, cannot detract from the radicalness of his own 
proposition that the subject is inevitably inhabited by an unknowable otherness. Or, to 
extend Freud's metaphor, the subject can no longer be said to be master of what is, in 
effect, a haunted house. 4 It is within this haunted psychic configuration that I will 
continue to use the word `savage' as a signifier without a referent. It is in the search for 
the referent that I am locating the nexus of anthropology and psychoanalysis. Such a 
search is, from the outset, fraught with difficulty. It presupposes the possibility of 
looking, of seeing. Yet the savage is that which, although it might be looked for, can 
2 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 334. 
3 Sigmund Freud, `Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1938), SE, 23, p. 252. 
4 See Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, trans. Catherine Porter (London: Macmillan, 1987). 
Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. Borch-Jacobsen's detailed 
and suggestive reading of Freud follows through the implications of Freud's concept of the unconscious 
to argue that the Freudian unconscious is another thinking subject, a cogitatio, existing within the 
conscious subject, but which the conscious subject has no access to: `Perhaps the ego is not "master in its 
own house" in Freud's phrase; the fact remains that its house is haunted, its property inhabited by 
something ` other"'(6). 
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never be seen. The savage is always a spectre, which is to say, following the Oxford 
English Dictionary's definition, that it is nothing other than `a phantasm of the brain'. 5 
This phantasmatic gap between looking and seeing is both exposed and masked by 
Freud on the opening page of Totem and Taboo. He argues that the savage is, in a 
certain sense, `our' contemporary: 
There are men still living who, as we believe, stand very near to 
primitive man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore regard 
as his direct heirs and representatives. Such is our view of those 
whom we describe as savages or half-savages; and their mental life 
must have a peculiar interest for us if we are right in seeing it as a 
well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own development (1; 
Emphasis added). 
For Freud, then, the savage is spectral, and can only be perceived hauntingly through a 
complex series of relationships to indigenous Australians who are made to stand near to, 
in for (represent), and be a well-preserved image of the savagery of Europe's prior 
selves, savage selves who are clearly not quite there at all. In other words, in Totem and 
Taboo, Freud constitutes the Australian Aborigine as a referent for a spectral signifier. 
The absence of the so-called savage was not a phenomenon unique to Freud, nor 
was it particularly new. As Henrika Kuklick demonstrates, phantasmatic descriptions 
had long been circulating in Europe about the inhabitants of places outside Europe 
before those inhabitants were even seen: `Explorers expected to find extraordinarily 
backward peoples in the remote regions of the Antipodes, where deprived and depraved 
societies had been imagined from ancient times. '6 The absence of the object being 
described is also true of Rousseau's later construction of the `noble savage' in the 
`Discourse on Inequality', the contradictory significations of which are well- 
established. 7 Rousseau's `savage', moreover, was embedded within transformations in 
s The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2 Vols., 3" ed., rev. and ed. C. T. Onions (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1973), p. 2068. 
6 Henrika Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology 1885-1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 280. Future page references are to this edition, and 
are included in parentheses in the text. 
7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, `A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality', in The Social Contract and the 
Discourses, rev. ed., trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman's Library, 1973), pp. 31-125, esp. pp. 52-80. 
For readings of Rousseau that focus on these contradictions, see George W. Stocking, Victorian 
Anthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1982), esp. Chapter 1; also Simon During, `Rousseau's 
Patrimony: Primitivism, Romance and Becoming Other', in Colonial Discourse/Postcolonfal Theory, ed. 
Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iverson (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1994), pp. 47-71. 
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Europe involving shifting relations between family members, the individual and the 
state, and the private and public domains. These transformations took place at a time 
when Europe was beginning to conceive of itself in global terms. Rousseau's 
temporalizing conviction that humanity had both degenerated and progressed from a 
state of nature to a state of culture or civilization was displaced onto a geographical 
plane, whereby those living outside Europe - particularly Aboriginal Australians - were 
thought to live in the past. Such displacement enabled the past to haunt the present in 
the form of `others' who were thereby relegated to what Johannes Fabian calls an 
`allochronic' discursive space. 8 
In a broadly psychoanalytic framework, it can be argued that the spectre of the 
savage emerged out of and was structured around an ambivalent relation with the father 
which was instigated by a challenge to patriarchal authority as constitutive of self- 
identity. It is worth merely noting, at this stage, that this is the realm of neurosis, the 
very psychic domain_thatEreud's theory posits that Aboriginal people in Australia 
inhabit. 
I will now attempt to trace a range of historical- factors that can be thought of as 
contributing to the emergence of the Oedipalized subject as Freud conceptualized it. 
UnlikeFreud, however, I am locating this subject as a specific effect of an historical 
juncture. I will first consider changes in patterns of inheritance that were fundamental in 
organizing a notion of identity around the question of inheritances from the father. In so 
doing, I will also consider the effect these changes had on the position of women in the 
newly emerging patriarchal nuclear family, especially in response to shifting work 
practices, with the rise of industrialization, that witnessed an increasing division 
between the public and the private spheres. Finally, I will trace the spread not only of 
the technology of alphabetic literacy, but also the establishment of print technology that 
enabled-these changes to be stabilized, disseminated and reflected upon. It was the 
conjunction of these factors that led not only to the constitution of what we might think 
$ See Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: HowAnthropotogyMakes its Object (Newyork: Columbia 
University Press, 1983) for a discussion of the denial of co-evalness in the constitution of the 
anthropological object. 
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of as an Oedipal subject, but also to the co-incidental birth of the disciplines of 
psychoanalysis and anthropology that coalesced in Freud's Totem and Taboo. In this 
moment, the human being becomes both subject and object of its own knowledge. 
Structures of Inheritance 
Not only did Rousseau's savage represent a state of natural freedom from which 
civilization had degenerated, so-called savage societies were simultaneously conceived 
of as being structured around kinship and lineages which were considered inherently 
authoritarian and patriarchal. For Rousseau, and many of his contemporaries, a society 
was considered just in so far as it minimized the extent to which one's father's position 
determined one's own. The path from primitivity to civilization was, therefore, a path 
that moved both closer to and further away from both freedom and bondage. As Simon 
During has argued, the `contradictions embedded in this dual impulse to imagine 
primordial society as simultaneously a ground for natural law and as patriarchal are 
most clearly apparent in Rousseau, for whom the relations between nature and the 
family remain fluid' .9 It was a concern with structures of 
inheritance that marks 
Rousseau's contradictory conception of the noble savage, as both free from the bonds of 
civilization and bound by the authority of the father, an authority that a just and 
civilized society would necessarily outgrow. 
These contradictions can perhaps be seen as an effect of increasing tension and 
debate between classic patriarchy and emerging contract theory, of which Rousseau's 
The Social Contract is the best-known example. Certainly contract theory was 
considered a dangerous challenge to the authority of the father as the model for power 
in general at a time when the legal authority invested in the father was increasing: 
The legal authority invested in the father as head of the household 
increased throughout Europe from at least the sixteenth century on, 
though at different rates in different regions. Ecclesiastical law which 
had insisted on the publicity of marriage vows since the fourteenth 
century... was increasingly backed up by Roman and written law 
which emphasised paternal and husbandly power. 1° 
9 During, `Rousseau's Patrimony', pp. 53-54. 
10 During, `Rousseau's Patrimony' p. 51. 
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Carole Pateman, who has analyzed these seventeenth-century debates between 
patriarchalists and contract theorists, explores the way in which emergent 
Enlightenment philosophy adhered to the ideal of the power of the sovereign giving way 
to the sovereign and autonomous individual: 
Classic social contract theory and the broader argument that, ideally, 
all social relations should take a contractual form, derive from a 
revolutionary claim. The claim is that individuals are naturally free 
and equal to each other, or that individuals are born free and born 
equal. 1 
In this sense, contract theory, as it was articulated by men like Rousseau, came to be 
seen, according to Pateman, as `the emancipatory doctrine par excellence, promising 
that universal freedom was the principle of the modern era'(40). These debates relied 
upon conjectural histories, a term coined by Dugald Stewart in 1793, of the formation of 
civil society, that is, civilization-a term that came into general use towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, and was explicitly linked with the idea of human progress, and 
its cumulative achievements. 12 According to the contract theorists, a new form of 
political right is created through a contract that replaces paternal rule. This is the victory 
of reason over tyranny. In the story of the social contract, the father is killed, 
metaphorically, by the sons who transform the father's patriarchal right into civil 
government. Social contract narratives thereby assume that modern society is post- 
patriarchal and that patriarchy is pre-modern. 
Yet as Pateman argues of this standard interpretation of a victory of social 
contract theorists over the explicitly Biblical patriarchalists, the sons over the fathers, 
`the fact that the sons eagerly embrace part of the father's inheritance goes 
unnoticed'(86). Rousseau's claim that he wants to overthrow patriarchy does not 
acknowledge that he is `more than willing to accept the father's legacy of sex-right and 
to transform it and make it his own'. 13 The original political right, in Pateman's reading, 
" Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 40. Future page references 
are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. Pateman analyzes not only Rousseau, but 
the debates between Locke and Sir Robert Filmer in the 1680s and 1690s as well as the importance of 
Hobbes. It is significant that George Stocking argues in Victorian Anthropology that John Locke is a far 
more influential figure in the emergence of anthropology than is generally acknowledged (13). 
u For a detailed discussion of the history of the idea of civilization; its usage in both the British and 
French contexts; its relation to the German notion of culture; and the impact of the French Revolution in 
1792 on it, see Stocking, esp. Chapter 1. 
13 Pateman, p. 86. 
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must be a man's right to have sexual access to a woman's body so that he could become 
a father. 14 Pateman draws out the implications of the terms of the original contract to 
demonstrate how a sexual contract underlies the social contract, that men's freedom 
rests on women's subjection, and that the original contract is `a sexual-social pact, but 
the story of the sexual contract has been repressed'(1). As Pateman asserts: 
a great deal more than freedom is at stake. Men's domination over 
women, and the right of men to enjoy equal sexual access to women, 
is at issue in the making of the original pact. The social contract is a 
story of freedom; the sexual contract is a story of subjection.... Civil 
freedom is not universal. Civil freedom is a masculine attribute and 
depends on patriarchal right. The sons overturn paternal rule, not 
merely to gain their liberty but to secure women for themselves. (2) 
In other words, contractual society is far from being opposed to patriarchy; contract is 
the means through which modem fraternal patriarchy is constituted and it is this 
patriarchy that structures contemporary civil society. 15 The term `civilization' reflected 
modem patriarchy where impersonal contractual relations replaced the old, personal 
subjection of status or patriarchy: 
The classic patriarchalism of the seventeenth century was the last time 
that masculine political creativity appeared as a paternal power or that 
political right was seen as father-right. Classic contract theory is 
another story of the masculine genesis of political life, but it is a 
specifically modern tale, told over the dead political body of the 
father. In civil society the two dimensions of political right are no 
longer united in the figure of the father, and sex-right is separated 
from political right. 16 
If contract theory can be conceived of as an anxious effect of the increasing 
centralization of primogeniture, then the pseudo-separation of the political and the 
domestic spheres, which continues to characterize contractual, or what we might now 
think of as capitalist, relations, ensures that women remain in the same position that 
they had under the conjectured system of classic patriarchy. In other words, as Pateman 
14 As Pateman argues of Sir Robert Filmer's classically patriarchal and Biblical position: `If Adam was to 
be a father, Eve had to become a mother. In other words, sex-right or conjugal right must necessarily 
precede the right of fatherhood. The genesis of political power lies in Adam's sex-right or conjugal right, 
not in his fatherhood. Adam's political title is granted before he becomes a father'(87). 
's The importance of political economy in debates about the nature of civilization is absolutely crucial, 
although it will not be a point of focus for this thesis. See Pateman and Stocking. For an alternative 
feminist perspective, see Rosalind Coward, Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). 
1' Pateman, pp. 88-89. 
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suggests, women remain as `merely empty vessels for the exercise of men's sexual and 
procreative power'(87). This status is theoretically justified by arguing that women are 
tied to nature, subject to their biological functions, and unable to participate in the 
modes of reason and rationality that underpin the social contract. In spite of the contract 
theorists' political/civil concern with equality and freedom, all insist that men's right 
over women has a natural basis. Men pass back and forth between the realm of civil 
freedom, and the private subjection of women. Women, a perpetual source of disorder, 
must, in the words of Rousseau, `be subjected either to a man or to the judgements of 
men and they are never permitted to put themselves above these judgements'. '? 
According to Pateman, `Women are not party to the original contract through which 
men transform their natural freedom into the security of civil freedom. Women are the 
subject of the contract'(6). The effect of this on the family structure was that the family, 
and the concerns of reproduction were increasingly separated from the public domain 
which led to the extremely narrow and restricted identifications that are characteristic of 
the Oedipalized subject. 
These philosophical debates, and the conjectural histories that they are based on, 
however, are not necessarily located, as Rousseau would have us believe, in the 
primordial past. Rather, they can be seen as the effect of more recent historical 
transformations in Europe. Philip Barker argues that in north-west Europe, `perhaps up 
until the tenth century, there was no single system of inheritance and social 
identification; on the contrary, the situation was one of wide diversity, from those 
suggestive of maternal descent, to those of exchisively paternal descent'. 18 According to 
Barker, these different systems of inheritance `interacted in an unorganised way, 
varying from region to region'(90). However, from about the tenth century, what Barker 
refers to as the `so-called dawn of feudalism', economic problems caused by the 
partitioning of lands led to the consolidation of primogeniture as the dominant system of 
17 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. A. Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 
370. Future page references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
" Philip Barker, Michel Foucault: Subversions of the Subject (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 86. 
For a fuller discussion of these historical transformations, see especially chapter 3. Future page references 
are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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inheritance: `Feudalism brought about two significant changes: first the end of 
partability for patrimonial lands, and secondly, the uniform preference for inheritance 
along the male line only'(88). Barker elucidates the range of strategies that were used to 
support these changes: `strengthening the indissolubility of marriage, dissuading from 
concubinage, and encouraging the production of legitimate heirs from one socially 
sanctioned conjugal unit'(88). The church intervened to support these aims through the 
legitimization, and regulation of relationships, which led to the widespread restructuring 
of the family unit towards that of a patriarchal nuclear family: 
The introduction of monogamy changed the structure of the family 
and the descent of property, at least on the highest levels of society. 
The conjugal family, consisting of husband, wife and children, 
emerged as the dominant economic unit. Concubines did not have 
economic rights and children born out of wedlock were barred from 19 inheritance when there were legitimate offspring. 
Rousseau's argument, where the history of the family comes to be synonymous with the 
history of society, enables him to claim that `the oldest of all societies, and the only 
natural one, is that of the family. 20 What I have tried to suggest is that the nuclear 
family structure is an effect of more recent historical changes. 
These changes had an number of significant effects, perhaps the most important 
of which, from my perspective, is to anchor individuals geographically, genealogically 
and socially; in others words, to enable the fixing of secure identities through a structure 
of patrilinear heritage. A further effect, as Barker also notes, was `an intensive and 
excessive investment in the purity of procreative blood, which was reinforced by the 
conscious strategy of lineage building'(93): 
Legitimate lineage now became more important, and the blood of the 
mother herself must now be maintained in an unadulterated state and 
directed towards the primary object of ensuring the legitimacy of male 
succession. To this end, a woman's body was constructed as the 
container of this pure blood, awaiting the introduction of seed for the 
production of male heirs. (93) 
The extension and effects of such investments can be seen in Rousseau's declaration, in 
Emile, that an unfaithful wife `dissolves the family and breaks all the bonds of nature. In 
19 Cited in Barker, p. 88. 
20 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), bk 1, p. 50. 
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giving the man children which are not his, she betrays both. She joins perfidy to 
infidelity. I have difficulty in seeing what disorders and crimes do not flow from this 
one'(361). 
Such investments inevitably led to the monitoring, regulation and surveillance of 
sexual activity, as well as concomitant anxieties about sexual pleasure that perhaps 
contributed to the institution of private confession as the annual practice of all 
Christians after the fourth Lateran Council of 1215. This led to the creation of a 
dialogue with the self that focused specifically on the question of sexual pleasure. Like 
the psychoanalytic dialogue, of which the Christian confession can be seen as a 
precursor, the position of the priest is not conceived of as one side of the dialogue but is 
`a witness to it and ultimate arbiter of its meaning. '21 
Accompanying and enabling these political changes and personal dialogues in 
medieval Europe was an increase in alphabetic literacy and the interiorization of the 
technology of writing, a technology that played a significant part in the transformation 
of consciousness that is associated with the Modern Age. As Walter Ong has argued, 
the introduction of the technology of alphabetic literacy fundamentally restructures the 
way human beings think: -' 
Many of the features we have taken for granted in thought and 
expression in literature, philosophy and science, and even in oral 
discourse among literates, are not directly native to human existence 
as such but have come into being because of the resources which the 
technology of writing makes available to human consciousness. We 
have to revise-otm understanding of human- identity. 21- .- 
Although Ong acknowledges that all thought is, to some degree, analytic, he argues that 
the emergence o£a. lphabetic writing transformed modes of thought providing the 
conditions for extended abstract analysis and reasoning, classificatory and explanatory 
2` Barker, p. 96. 
22 Waltet Ong, Orahly andLiteräcy: The Technologizing of the, Word (Londonand New yorkL Methuen, 
1982), p. 1. Future page references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. Ong 
presents some incredible statistics to support his argument for the need to rethink conceptions of what it 
means to be human, conceptions, he argues, that are the direct result of the technology of writing: 
`Indeed, language is so overwhelmingly oral that of all the many thousands of languages - possibly tens 
of thousands - spoken in the course of human history only around 106 have ever been committed to 
writing-to a degree sufficient to have produced literature, and most have never been written at all'(7). 
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examination, definitions, and categorizations. 23 Ong's argument suggests that alphabetic 
writing may well emerge as one of the conditions for that change in historical 
consciousness that is so fundamental to my argument, where humanity becomes both 
subject and object of its own-knowledge- Ong makes explicit the conditions for personal 
disengagement or distancing that are an effect of writing. Because of the slowness of the 
process of-writing, moreover, -an_d the 
isolation of the writer, the emergence of 
alphabetic literacy fostered introspection: `By separating the knower from the known, 
writing_makes possible. increasingly articulate introspectivity, opening the psyche as 
never before to the external objective world quite distinct from itself but also to the 
interior self against whom the objective world is set_'(1O5). Given this intersection of 
confessional practices and literacy, it is not surprising that it is during this period that 
the first modem autobiographies start to be produced, an historical event that 1 will 
discuss in the following chapter. Suffice to say, the conditions for such an 
autobiographical self are being established during this period of European history. 
Of course, alphabetic writing predates medieval times, and contemporary 
conceptions of analysis and reason date back to ancient times. 24 The fundamental 
difference, however, between ancient and modern alphabetic literacy may well lie-in the 
centrality of the biblical text ('the ancient Greeks and Romans had no sacred texts, and 
their religions are virtually empty of formal theology'), 25 and the relation of self- 
reflective_technologies, that is, bothwriting and confessional practices, to the- systems of 
23 1 am using the-word `writing! herein its commonly accepted sense, and not in_the broader sense in 
which Jacques Derrida has applied it. Although Ong refers to primary oral cultures, 1 prefer to think in 
terms of_different kinds of textuality. The kind of writing I am referring to whenl speak of alphabetic 
writing is in the Saussurean sense of a one-to-one correspondence between visual symbols and units of 
sound-which is why Lam emphasizing alphabetic languages. This-is not to dismiss Demdas insights 
about the structure of differance, insights that I have drawn upon in the writing of this thesis, nor is it to 
argue-that so-called oral cultures have unmediated access to consciousness. It is to_suggest that Deuida's 
insights are necessarily located, as Derrida is well aware, within the tradition of Western metaphysics. It 
is also to suggest that different technologies of textualization produce different modes of thinking. See, 
Jacques Derrida Of Grammatolosy, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976).. Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) and 
Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981). I have found the most 
inr erecting discussion of Derrida's work to be in Geoffrey Bennington's `'Derridabase' in Jacques 
Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago and London: University of Chicago press, 1993). 24 knote n1yjjreigthe Sumerians, in Mesopotamia-which develop from around 
3500BC, although Ong argues that the introduction, in Ancient Greek, of an alphabet complete with 
vowels, by analyzing sound more abstractly into purely spatial. components, was-cnicial ipso far as it 
marked the `nearly total transformation of word from sound to sight'. Ong, p. 90. 
25Ong, p_157_ 
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primogeniture that I have outlined. It was this combination of technologies and socio- 
political changes that enabled the specifically modern technique of genealogy. 
These transformations were even more established by the seventeenth-century 
when print technology emerged allowing for the reproducibility and widespread 
circulation and dissemination of ideas, as well as the internalization of transformations 
in consciousness brought about the spread of alphabetic literacy. If, as Ong argues, 
alphabetic literacy facilitates categorical thought, sequential thinking and a far greater 
concern with the past and the future, then encounters with radically different cultures 
from the medieval period onwards could be readily defined in temporally progressive 
classificatory terms, out of which racial theory may well have emerged. 
By the time debates about the nature of civil society emerged in the late 
seventeenth-century, these changes were well-established. Central to the debates about 
civil society was the regulation of sexuality. The increasing faith in reason, as enabling 
social progress, was accompanied by a concomitant anxiety about sexuality, particularly 
women's sexuality. Sexuality, then, came to be seen as the antithesis of reason, and, 
because women's sexuality jeopardized the very terms of civil society, in so far as it 
destabilized the possibility of legitimate inheritance, it came to be thought of as the 
manifestation of irrationality and instinctuality. Rousseau's conjectured movement is 
not only a movement from the patriarchal authority of nature to the civil society of 
culture, nor just the movement from unreason to reason, but also the point at which 
culture controls and regulates both external nature and nature within, that is, the 
instincts. This is the point, moreover, at which culture, through modes of reason and 
knowing, strives to explain nature scientifically. That which modes of knowing cannot 
readily explain is categorized as irrational, as the antithesis of the rational, and that 
which the rational had the responsibility of controlling. 
As we have seen, women had already been excluded on the basis of their 
irrational natures. The subjection of colonial cultures took a different form. Because so- 
called savages were considered naturally primitive, in the sense of temporally prior, 
they were also considered inherently irrational and at the whim of their instinctive 
sexualities. In Stocking's words: `Just as the moral character of primitive man was 
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premised on a direct, unmediated expression of internal passional character, so was the 
intellectual character of primitive man premised on a direct, unmediated apprehension 
of external nature'(225). It was this which justified the incorporation and supercession 
of the savage, and enabled the emergence of a science dedicated to understanding and 
thereby regulating the savage. The savage, moreover, did not only come to be seen as 
the ghost of the father past. The savage, considered undeveloped and in need of 
benevolent regulation, was also perceived of as more child-like as well, a contradictory 
status that is reproduced in psychoanalytic formulations. The savage, then, is both father 
and child of the European post-Enlightenment man. 
What I am trying to suggest is that a range of intersecting socio-political changes 
can be thought of as beginning to constitute the conditions for what might be called an 
Oedipal subject. As Barker notes, under a system of primogeniture, inheritance became 
the central locus of disputes between fathers and sons: `There is nothing unconscious 
about this rebellion: to kill the father is an integral part of claiming an inheritance 
speedily from the moment of coming of age'(88). This, combined with emerging 
discourses of reason, one of the central functions of which was to regulate sexuality, 
and the interiorization of modes of consciousness enabled by literacy which, Ong argues 
is `a particularly pre-emptive and imperialist acti rity that tends to assimilate other 
things to itself (12), combined to constitute the Oedipal subject as, necessarily, a 
colonizing subject. Within the emerging nuclear family, moreover, identification has 
become restricted to such an extent that it is limited to the father and the mother, the 
prohibitor and the prohibited which can be readily transferred into the oppressor and the 
oppressed, a dichotomous structure that maps on to the emerging colonial structure. 
The Birth of Anthropology 
These factors, among others, converged in the discipline of anthropology at the 
end of the nineteenth-century. 26 Although the first wave of debates around patriarchy 
26 I have drawn upon a number of overviews of this period of intellectual history in order to write this 
chapter, the most important and useful of which have been Peter Bowler, The Invention of Progress: The 
Victorians and the Past (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); L. R. Hiatt, Arguments About Aborigines: 
Australia and the Evolution ofSocial Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Adam Kuper, The Invention of Primitive: Transformations of an Illusion (London and New York: 
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occurred at the end of the seventeenth century, a second wave took place almost two 
centuries later which had a much more direct connection to the emergence of 
anthropology. Although peripheral to emerging mainstream anthropology, Henry 
Maine's Ancient Law, published in 1861, established the method of comparative law, 
and characterized the transformation of the patriarchal family, and by extension, social 
organization, as, being `from Status to Contract'. 7 Maine was as much concerned with 
the historical study of property as with the study of the patriarchal family as political 
organization. 
In Britain, just prior to the publication of Ancient Law, the study of ethnology, 
represented most coherently by James Prichard's Researches into the Physical History 
of Mankind (1813), became, `the most general framework for the study of the linguistic, 
physical and cultural characteristics of dark-skinned, non-European, "uncivilized" 
peoples'(47). Ethnology was concerned with cultural and linguistic practices, but when 
the Enlightenment tendency to make humanity subject to natural laws interacted with 
the emerging bio-racial science of the nineteenth century, natural laws were suddenly 
rendered biological 2 Conjectural histories became scientific hypotheses. The cultural 
and linguistic focus of early ethnologists turned into a biological and anatomical focus. 
As Nancy Stepan has argued in The Idea of Race, `a shift had occurred in which culture 
and the social behaviour of man became epiphenomena of biology'. 9 The discipline of 
natural history, it could be argued, emerged out of the field of natural justice, and was 
Routledge, 1988); Russell McGregor, Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal Australians and the Doomed Race 
Theory, 1880-1938 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1997); Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race in 
Science: Great Britain 1800-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1982); George W. Stocking, Victorian 
Anthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1987); Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, 
Race and Culture (London: Routledge, 1995). Future references are to these editions, and are included in 
p7arentheses in the text. 
Henry Maine, Ancient Law: its connection with the early history of society and its relation with modern 
ideas (London: John Murray, 1861), p. 100. `Ancient', in this context, refers to Roman law rather than a 
conjectured prehistory, which was, according to Maine, non-historical, unverifiable and amounted to 
guessing. According to Stocking, Maine was keen to differentiate his work form `the school of so-called 
prehistoric inquiry'(126). For a discussion of Maine's ideas, and their relation to evolutionary 
anthropology, see Stocking, esp. 117-28. For a discussion of Maine's theories in the context of feminism, 
see Coward, esp. Chapter 2. 
28 One of the central debates in emerging racial theory was the question of whether inhabitants of places 
like Australia constituted another species, as the polygenetists argued, or whether all races of the earth 
constituted a single species. The terms of this debate were partly set by the theological question of, and 
challenge to, Biblical time. See Stocking and Young, esp. Chapter 1. 
29 Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science, p. 45-46. 
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concerned with structuring the relationship to the father, and inheritances from him, 
within a biologistic framework. 
This desire led to the solidification of the savage, as Europe's prior self 
inhabiting places outside Europe, with the emergence of anthropology as a discipline 
that made claims to scientificity in the 1860s and 1870s. Although the first published 
use of the word `anthropology' was in 1805 in the Edinburgh Review, by the late 
nineteenth-century anthropology had become an academic discipline that had achieved 
considerable credibility with the first university post in Britain being created for Edward 
Burnett Tylor in 1884. This was the same year that the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science conceded that the field of anthropology was entitled to a 
Section of it own (Section H) at its annual meeting. This was some thirteen years after 
the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, founded in 1871 as the 
Anthropological Institute, strove to assure the status of anthropology as a profession. 
In her history of British Anthropology, The Savage Within, Henrika Kuklick 
locates the emergence of anthropology as partly an effect of the widespread concern 
with the issue of inheritance, which was central to the ideology of meritocracy. In this 
sense, the early contract theorists can be thought of as a precondition for 
anthropological concerns. According to Kuklick, the increasing professionalization of 
anthropology was not an isolated phenomenon, but reflected the restructuring of the 
British class system and the rise of the middle classes as a result of the diffusion of 
meritocratic values, that is, `the belief that an individual's wealth, status and power 
should reflect the worth of their achievements rather than the social standing of their 
parents'(27). Anthropology is thereby linked to middle class values, rather than 
aristocratic ones, and is firmly associated with the idea of human productivity, that is, 
work. And productivity, like reason, was seen as an indicator of social progress. 
One of the main transformations that attended this restructuring was a sharp rise 
in attendance at universities, those institutionalized centres of reason- As Kuklick has 
demonstrated, in the national consciousness, `middle-class identity came to be denoted 
by a range of traits, but two inter-related components of middle-class status assumed 
great significance during the nineteenth century: specialized expertise as a property of 
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respected rank, and formal credentials as the hallmark of expertise'(35-6). These 
changes, of which anthropologists were among the beneficiaries, were then interpreted 
by anthropologists, who took social structures as part of their object of study, as an 
indicator, not of an historical shift, but of the truth of the general laws of social progress 
and the inevitability of historical development. It was in the accumulation of 
knowledge, it was claimed, that the possibility of the perfectability of human societies 
could be realized. Anthropologists, as producers of scientific knowledge about human 
societies, situated themselves at the pinnacle of this historical development. In this way, 
not only women and savages could be accounted for in terms of knowledge, but so too, 
increasingly, could the working classes, who also became objects of anthropological 
analysis. In this scenario, as Stocking notes, the mechanisms of upward mobility were 
conceived of as the mechanisms of civilized progress 30 
So not only did anthropology emerge out of anxieties about inheritance, framed 
in terms of a concern with meritocracy, it made the question of inheritance, as integral 
to the question of progress, its object of study. Given the centrality of the question of 
inheritance, it is hardly surprising that so many of the early contributors to the 
amorphous discipline of anthropology were lawyers, nor that the issues in anthropology 
that were conceived of as the great abiding issues of humanity were actually concerns of 
then contemporary legality-the development of law, the family, private property and 
the state. 
To make the leap from the cultural to the natural, or the legal and social to the 
biological, anthropology looked to Charles Darwin's evolutionary thesis posited in The 
Origin of Species published in 1859. Darwin himself had drawn upon a range of 
theorists of progress, including Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer and Alfred Russell 
Wallace to establish his argument 31 Although Darwin's theory emphasized variations 
which implied not the perfectability of progress but the unpredictability of process, the 
30 See Kuklick for a detailed discussion of this process; also Stocking, esp. Chapter 6. 
31 See Stocking, esp. Chapters 3,4 and 5 for a discussion of these three figures and their influence on 
Darwin. Spencer's role is particularly important here: `when the systematic study of Non-European 
peoples and the systematic study of the development of civilization... were integrated after 1860, it was in 
the context of Spencer's evolutionary associationism'(142). 
32 
idea of progressive development was sometimes explicit: `Hence we may look with 
some confidence to a secure future of... appreciable length. And as natural selection 
works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments 
will tend to progress toward perfection'. 2 Such appeals to progress meant that evolution 
would become closely tied to the problem of `race' and the concomitant question of 
savage and civilized societies, and Darwin's writings occasionally expressed an 
ambiguous racialism. In The Descent of Man, for example, Darwin claims that at `the 
present day civilized nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations' 33 
Just as the earlier socio-legal models had been concerned with the question of 
structures of inheritance, so too were the natural science models. The inheritance of 
acquired characteristics was an integral aspect of Darwin's hypothesis. Such a idea was 
not new, and is often associated with Lamarck who was writing some fifty years before 
the publication of The Origin of Species. However, Lucille Ritvo, in Darwin's Influence 
on Freud, claims that the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics `did not 
originate with Lamarck. It is an age-old folk belief found in the Old Testament and 
Greek mythology'. 4 Darwin's hypothesis differed from its previous incarnations in so 
far as, for Darwin, natural selection was a process of conflict and struggle, that 
happened gradually rather than in the leaps posited by Lamarck. But Darwin differs 
most from Lamarck around the question of the causes of evolution. For Lamarck, 
evolution happened as an act of will. It is the adaptation of the organism to its 
environment through its own efforts that distinguishes Lamarck's theory from Darwin's 
natural selection. 
Darwin had suggested that self-contained island communities isolated from 
Europe were particularly instructive models for understanding processes of evolution. It 
was for this reason that, from the very early days of the colony, Australia was 
32 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (1859), ed. Gillian Beer (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p. 395. 
33 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1901) p. 
283. 
'a Lucille B. Ritvo, Darwin's Influence on Freud. - A Tale of Two Sciences, (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1990), p. 31. Ritvo's fascinating study analyzes in detail the differences between 
Darwin and Lamarck and the popularization of Darwin in German by Haeckel, and traces this through the 
work of Freud. See also Stocking and McGregor. 
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considered a crucial anthropological laboratory. Freud suggests as much in his 
description of Australia on the first page of Totem and Taboo: `the youngeest continent, 
in whose fauna, too, we can observe much that is archaic and has perished 
elsewhere'(1). The contradictions surrounding_Australia, contradictions inherent in the 
concept of progress, are again revealed here. Australia was both the `youngest' and 
simultaneously the most `archaic',, dust_asAboriginaLAustralians. were. situated both 
fathers and sons of the European male. Australia occupied this anthropologically 
privileged position, even before any detailed ethnographic descriptions were produced 
in Australia, so the descriptions of Aboriginal `savages' that Freud quite explicitly 
based his psychoanalytic assertions upon were therefore haunted by absence. 
Island Communities 
One way of thinking about this absence is perhaps through the suggestion that 
Britain also fits Darwin's description-an island community separated from Europe. 
The post-Enlightenment unity that is often attributed to the United Kingdom, and the 
discourses of individual sovereignty that accompanied post-Enlightenment thought in 
Britain, were complicated-by the-very- term 'United Kingdom. ' with its_significations of 
a heterogeneous mixture of cultural identities brought together under the inherited 
1 
sovereignty ofthe_crown. Certainly. Britain's empire-building-phase necessitated a 
forced internal cohesion, a cohesion that is presently being renegotiated during 
the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. The sovereignty of the 
individual, moreover, so valued by Enlightenment thought is further complicated by) the 
ceding-of soverei&nty. on the part of Scotland as perhaps a condition of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. 35 Robert Young discusses these complexities when he argues that the 
unity attributed to Britain, or even England as its centre, is founded on a sense of lack: 
We shall see that even what is often considered a founding text of 
English culture, Matthew Arnold `s Culture and Anarchy (1869), is 
predicated on the fact that English culture is lacking, lacks something, 
and acts out an inner dissonance-that-constitutes its secret riven self. 
3,5 See Andrew S. Sk nnerý Tritroduction , in Tie (Trigins i nd Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, cd. 
RH. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), pp. 1-6. 
36 Young Colonial Desire, p. 3. 
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Young argues that it was `above all in France that civility had evolved into the 
idea of "civilization" in its dominant Enlightenment sense of the achieved but still 
progressive secular development of modern society'(32), and that, in Britain, `French 
progressive ideas of civilization had impact in the. city most closely affiliated to Parisian 
intellectual life: Edinburgh'(34). It could also be suggested that it was more than just 
Scotland's relationship to France that led to the impact of ideas of civilization on 
Scotland. After all, Scotland itself, and particularly the Highlands, were subject to the 
same oppositional metaphorical descriptions as Australian Aborigines. In British 
colonialist historiography, pre-Union Scotland was associated with an authoritarian 
darkness and savag_erybefore the emergence of post-Union, post-Enlightenment 
knowledge where the intellectual changes following the Union of parliaments were 
described as an `Army of Light' 37 Unsurprisingly, this basking in the newly-arrived 
light of autonomy and reason was accompanied by colonial expansion. In the light of 
this, it is significant that the key Scottish intellectuals from the post-Enlightenment that 
Freud draws upon in the opening page of Totem and Taboo to refer to `the tribes which 
have been described by anthropologists as the most backward and miserable of 
savages'(1) would be so influential in reproducing and projecting forms of knowledge, 
previously directed towards their own recent past, on to Australian Aborigines. 
Anthropological Investigations 
E. B. Tylor, the first professor of anthropology in Britain, and sometimes 
considered the `father' of anthropologyzpublished Researches into the Earl, History of 
Mankind and the Development of Civilization (1865), which was, according to 
`1 
Stocking, `a methodological exercise-an attempt-to see how far a study of cultural 
similarities might carry one toward reconstructing the actual early history of 
mankind' 38 This work was both ethnographic and evolutionary. It was followed by 
3' Craig Beveridge and Ronald Turnbull, c ipse b tishCiTüre (Ed hburgh Folygon, 1989), p. 
49. 
38 Stocking, p. 158. For an elaboration of Tylor's work, see Stocking, pp. 156-69, 
_ _ 
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Primitive Culture in 1871 which was concerned with the scientific study of `the world 
long evolution of civilization'. 39 
Tylor's contribution was to bring together technology, language, myth and belief, 
all pre-existing areas of study in the work of Max Müller, John Lubbock, Auguste 
Comte and James Prichard, to form a single entity-Culture or civilization. 40 The idea 
of culture was linked to a theory of primitive religion or animism, the belief that natural 
species and objects had souls that should be worshipped. The concerns of Primitive 
Culture can be seen from its very first line: `Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide 
ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any other capacities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society. )41 With the publication of Darwin's The Descent of Man in the same year as 
Primitive Culture, anthropologists increasingly came to apply biological evolutionary 
theory to the socio-cultural sphere. 
Perhaps the other most significant early British anthropologist, particularly for his 
`doctrine of survivals', which claimed that surviving forms or relics of the past could 
help to reconstruct the course of man's development, was John Ferguson McLennan. 
McLennan, from Inverness, would later recall his childhood surrounded by people 
whose lives were full of the violence and cruelty of `untutored savages'. 42 McLennan's 
work is particularly important in early anthropology and, _ according to 
Stocking, 
McLennan's article on `The Early History of Man' is: 
the best single summary view of the sociocultural evolutionary 
position as it emerged in the mid-1860s. McLennan dealt with the 
problem under three headings: `The Antiquity of Man, ' in which he 
attacked the biblical chronology; `The Primitive State, ' in which he 
argued against degeneration and for progress; and `The Method of 
Studying Early History, ' in which he explicated the comparative 
method and the doctrine of survivals. Taken together, these three 
headings provide a schematic summary of the emergence of 
"- E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development ofMythology, Philosophy, Religion, 
Language, Art and Custom, 2 Vols. (London: John Murray, 1891), Vol. 2, p. 443. 
40 For a discussion of Müller's comparative philology, and interest in language and mythology, as well as 
the relation between him and Tylor, see Stocking, esp. pp. 61-62. See Stocking also, pp. 150-56, for a 
discussion of the importance of Lubbock and his Prehistoric Times: as Illustrated byAncientRemains, 
and the Manners and Customs ofModern Savages (1865), and The Origin of Civilization (1870). 
Lubbock was particularly committed to a vision of socio-cultural evolution. Stocking briefly discusses 
Comte, pp. 27-9, the influence of whom can be seen in Freud's stadial theory. 
41 Tylor, Primitive Culture, VoL1, p; 1. 
42 Cited in Stocking, p. 164. 
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sociocultural evolutionism, both substantively and chronologically. 
(169) 
McLennan later published perhaps his most famous work, Primitive Marriage, in 1865, 
which: 
shows evidences that its argument was conditioned by the 
contemporary concern with problems of human sexuality and by the 
processes of social change affecting the institution of human marriage. 
Although McLennan offered no explicit definition of marriage, and 
showed a certain relativity in the recognition of its different `species, ' 
it is perfectly clear that `marriage proper' meant proper Victorian 
marriage. -Its purpose was 
to control human (and especially female) 
sexuality, so that there might be `certainty of male parentage. ' Its 
critical diagnostic features were `the appropriation of women to 
particular men' and-the `conception vfvonrugal fidelity'. -4 
In this sense, anthropology extended the anxieties of the earlier debates previously 
discussed, about `conjugal fidelity, and McLennan reproduced the idea of women as 
both irrational and sexual, in other words, instinctual. Certainly, his conception of an 
early stage of promiscuity followed by a stage of female kinship reflected more 
anxieties in his own society, because, as Stocking notes, his ethnographic evidence for a 
stage of promiscuity was `provided in a single ethnographic footnote'(202). In this. way, 
the "`grosser copartneries" of Victorian prostitution were an obvious model for 
primitive polyandrous marriage'(J202) For McLennan, just as for Rousseau before him 
(although he would not have expressed it in such explicitly evolutionary terms), the 
evolution upward from promiscuity and polyandry was the evolution towards the 
culmination of civilization in the mid-Victorian patriarchal nuclear family, and the 
monogamous sexual propriety that governed it. As McLennan suggested elsewhere, 
once the marriage system allowed a man to be certain of his parenthood of specific 
children, `nothing but the effect of custom' would prevent the system of descent along 
the female line from dying out: `Born to him in his own house; by blood and 
circumstance the nearest and dearest to him= all his natural feelings would prQmpt_him 
to leave them his wealth. '44 
For the emerging-field of anthropology, as for their philosophical forefathers, it 
is reason, science and knowledge that establish civilization, as exemplified by the 
43 Stocking, pp. 201-02. 
44 Cited in Stocking, p-203. 
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ability to confirm with certainty the connection between conception and paternity. Yet 
the certainty that McLennan and others claimed that marriage provided regarding 
paternity is, obviously, a certainty constantly haunted by doubt. Reason, then, as it has 
been conceived since even before Descartes and the assertion of the cogito, is constantly 
threatened by doubt, calling into question the very boundary between reason and 
unreason. 45 Reason, in the context of the question of paternity, can be seen as a 
technique for mastering that which lies outside its domain, a technique for reinstating a 
surety of identity and legitimacy that female sexuality can always call into doubt 46 
McLennan, through his interest in `primitive marriage' tried to link animism and 
exogamy (a term coined by McLennan to refer to marriage outside the group), and did 
so through the idea of totemism in `The Worship of Animals and Plants' written in 
1869-70.47 McLennan took Tylor's animistic thesis and added a sociological dimension. 
According to McLennan, totemism was the appropriation of a special fetish to what he 
termed a tribe, and the hereditary transmission of this totem through the mother. Most 
of McLennan's paper contained illustrations of totemism. According to McLennan, 
tribes in the totem stage believed themselves to be descended from some animal or plant 
which was their `symbol or emblem' and `religiously regarded' or `taboo', recognized 
kinship through the mother, and followed `exogamy as their marriage law'. 8 Although 
McLennan had given Australia a privileged place in his theory of totemism, he could 
only cite Sir George Grey's Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in North-Western 
45 See Rend Descartes, `First Meditation: About the Things we may Doubt', in Discourse on Method and 
the Meditations, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (Hannondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 95-101. For the 
debate between Foucault and Derrida on the question of doubt and its relation to reason in this 'First 
Meditation', see Foucault, Madness and Civilization, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Pantheon, 
1965). See also Derrida's response `Cogito and the History of Madness' in Writing and Difference, trans. 
Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990) pp. 31-63. I say 'even before Descartes' because it 
has been argued, most forcefully by Hans Blumenberg, that, although Descartes claims to be inaugurating 
methodological doubt, his own work attempts to conceal the traces of the history of methodological 
scepticism that pervaded medieval philosophy. According to Blumenberg, `Descartes painstakingly 
effaced and disavowed the traces of his historical background in order to constitute the myth of the radical 
beginning of reason. ' Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), p. 185. See also Barker, esp. pp. 160-72. 
46 Arrestingly, the question of whether Aboriginal people prior to invasion were aware of the connection 
between conception and paternity remains unresolved in contemporary anthropology. Hiatt refers to this 
issue as 'one of the agonistic evergreens of twentieth century anthropology. Why it had so much life in it 
is still not understood'(122). 
47 For a more detailed discussion of McLennan's ideas and their importance, see Stocking, pp. 164-69. 
48 Cited in Stocking, p. 297. 
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Australia published in 1841. The only mention of anything that might be related to the 
idea of totemism at all was a reference to a `kobong' which Grey defined as an animal 
or vegetable crest, and commented: `A certain mysterious connection exists between a 
family and its kobong so that a member of the family will never kill an animal of the 
species to which the kobong belongs. '49 From this `mysterious connection', 
McLennan's theory of totemism was born. 
William Robertson Smith, another Scot and a founding member of the Edinburgh 
Evening Club, used McLennan's work to apply McLennan's theories of totemism to the 
Old Testament. This perhaps influenced Freud's second `psychohistory', Moses and 
Monotheism, in which Freud openly defended his admiration of Robertson Smith, 
whom he calls `a man of genius', `in spite of the fact that more recent ethnologists have 
unanimously rejected [his] hypotheses'. S° In 1883, Robertson Smith became a reader in 
Arabic at Cambridge and it was here that he met his most important disciple and fellow 
Scot-James George Frazer. 51 In 1885, Robertson Smith asked Frazer to write the entry 
on `Totemism' for the T volume of Encyclopaedia Britannia, a 3-page entry that turned 
into a 13-volume book, a narrative which can be thought of as representing Frazer's all- 
consuming methodology which stands out as exemplary of the epistemological all- 
inclusiveness that characterized the Western faith in the accumulation of knowledge. 52 
49 Sir George Grey, Journals of two Expeditions of Discovery in North-Western Australia, 2 Vols. 
(London: Boone, 1841), Vol. 2, p. 226. As we will discover, Grey can be seen as an important precursor 
to the later anthropologist/administrators, like Baldwin Spencer. Stocking describes in detail the 
conditions under which Grey's expedition took place: `In 1836 Grey proposed to the Colonial Secretary 
and the Royal Geographical Society an exploration of northwestern Australia, hoping to open the interior 
for settlement... While writing up his material in England, Grey apparently came across a copy of Albert 
Gallatin's Synopsis of American Indian tribes that Prichard had presented to the library of the Royal 
Geographical Society; in it Grey found descriptions of matrilineal clans and "totams" that seemed 
remarkably similar [to the kobong]. But although he thereby juxtaposed for comparison social phenomena 
that were to preoccupy anthropologists on into the twentieth century, and in fact noted that "civilized 
nations, in their heraldic bearings, " preserved "traces of the same custom, " Grey was far from interpreting 
exogamous matrilineal kinship, totem, and tabu in social evolutionary terms'(82-83). Grey's 
interpretations, it should be noted, were strictly theological. 
50 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, PFL 13, p. 380. It is difficult, in retrospect, to conceive of just how 
disruptive Robertson-Smith's theories were. In 1878 he answered charges of heresy before the Church 
Assembly and in May 1880 he was cautioned. In June 1880, he published his 'Animal Tribes in the Old 
Testament', and he was removed from his Professorship in May 1881. 
51 See Robert Ackerman, J. G. Frazer: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). This biography not only examines Frazer's work in depth, but also traces the significance of his 
friendship with Robertson-Smith, and others, in Frazer's career. 
52 See Ackerman, p. 57, for a brief discussion of the `uncontrollable swelling' of Frazer's essay on Taboo. 
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This reached its apex in the publication of The Golden Bough in 1890, which was an 
astounding popular success. 
Frazer's Tylorian approach `sifted the arguments in every branch of the new 
discipline and asserted an orthodoxy'. 53 This approach assumed that the socio-cultural 
sphere is governed by laws that science can discover through the use of empirical 
reasoning. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, almost all the new specialists 
would have agreed that most primitive societies were structured around kinship 
relations, organized on the basis of descent groups which were exogamous and related 
by a series of exchange marriages. Furthermore, part of this orthodoxy entailed the odd 
belief, first postulated by Morgan, although drawing upon McLennan's Doctrine of 
Survivals, that, like extinct species, these primeval institutions were preserved in fossil 
form in ceremonies and kinship terminologies bearing witness to long dead practices. 54 
Contemporary Aborigines thus became objects of study, less for what they were at the 
time of investigation, than for what they could tell investigators about the investigators 
themselves. Rather than thinking about Aboriginal societies as different, or colonial 
contact as an encounter with alterity, Aborigines were incorporated into a European 
narrative of identity and sameness that enabled and justified their supercession. Given 
this, it could be argued that one of the primary debates in anthropology, which was how 
exogamous relations were structured, reflects more the concerns of nineteenth-century 
Europe, in particular its anxiety about incestuous relations set in motion by structures of 
inheritance, than the kinship structures of Aboriginal communities. After all, 
primogeniture, which led to the increasing dominance and normalization in Europe of 
the patriarchal family with sexual surveillance at its heart, was also concerned with 
keeping money and property within families. What I am suggesting is that the concern 
with exogamy reflects the late nineteenth-century European concern about how to retain 
33 Kuper, p. 6. 
54 Morgan first published this hypothesis in Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family 
in 1871. For a discussion of Morgan's position, and the subsequent debate between Morgan and 
McLennan, see Hiatt, esp. Chapter 2. See also the final chapter of Stocking. Morgan, also a lawyer, 
published Ancient Society: or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery, through 
Barbarism to Civilization in 1877. Morgan's ideas about kinship terminology had a profound impact 
upon successive anthropologists as well as being a major influence on Engels. Although interested in 
Morgan, Freud drew more heavily upon the work of Robertson-Smith, McLennan and Frazer for his 
argument in Totem and Taboo. 
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with exogamy reflects the late nineteenth-century European concern about how to retain 
money and property within a family while ensuring-that marriages_were not too closely 
consanguineous. 55 
At the end of the nineteenth century, two great anthropological studies of 
Australia were undertaken. The first, which took place in the 1870s, was the work of the 
missionary, Lorimer Fison, and the explorer and police magistrate, -Alfred 
Howitt. 
Fison, who had been in correspondence with Lewis Henry Morgan, was eager to 
validate, in spite of the shortage of ethnographic examples, Morgan's theories of 
descent and exogamy. Fison's aim revealed the overdeterminations that his research was 
motivated by: 
The chief object of this memoir is to trace the formation of exogamous 
intermarrying divisions which have been found among so many 
savage and barbaric tribes of the present day, and to show what the 
honourable Lewis H. Morgan calls the Punaluan family, with the 
Turanian system of kinship, logically results from them. The 
Australian classes are especially valuable for this purpose, because 
they give us what- seem tobe-the-earliest-stages of development; 56 
Fison, in a letter to Morgan, claimed that the laws of Turanian descent (descent through 
males) could be demonstrated from Australian materials by steps `as conclusive as any 
one of Euclid's demonstrations, if we can only establish three preliminary 
propositions'. " These were that marriage united groups; that each group was 
exogamous; and, the proposition most crucial to Morgan's argument, that kinship 
terminology identified these groups. The geometric eloquence of Morgan's model, 
however, depended on the evidence of the kinship terminology. This was not to be as 
simple as Fison had suggested, and Fison himself pointed to the difficulty he had 
relating these spectral models to the indigenous communities . that were 
functioning as a 
referent for the European idea of the savage: `When asked to define the relationship in 
which he stands to other persons, [the Australian Aborigine] frequently takes into 
This anxiety is most reflected in the controversy in mid-Victorian Britain about marriage to a deceased 
wife's sister. The issue was constantly before parliament from the 1840s onwards and the Prohibited 
Degrees of Marriage Act was not passed until 1907. 
s6 Lorimer Fison and A. W. Howitt, Kamilaroi and Kurnai: Group Marriage and Relationship and 
Marriage by Elopement, drawn chiefly from the usage of the Australian Aborigines, also the Kurnai 
tribe: Their Customs in Peace and War (Melbourne: George Robertson, 1880), p. 23. 
57 Cited in Kuper, p_95_ 
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terms of kinship. After years of inquiry into this matter, the humiliating confession must 
be made that I am hopelessly puzzled. '58 
This `humiliating confession' suggests the discursive nature of these cultural 
confrontations, and the extent to which the models repressed the encounter between 
ethnographers and Australian Aboriginal communities as a cross-cultural and cross- 
linguistic encounter with difference that Western models quickly recuperate into 
themselves. Furthermore, these models were the site from which anthropological 
knowledge was produced. That the Aborigines Fison approached often gave `words that 
are not specific terms of kinship' also suggests that the value the models placed on 
kinship terminology, and the value placed on it by Aboriginal communities were 
incommensurate. In spite of the conflicting and contradictory data provided by Howitt, 
and the field-work divergences from the model, `Fison's model, rather than Howitt's 
ethnography, was the leading influence on the next generation of Australian studies'. 59 
The second major anthropological expedition, undertaken in the 1890s, was 
directed by Frazer himself and was motivated to explore totemism. The expedition was 
undertaken by Baldwin Spencer, chair of biology at Melbourne University who had 
arrived in Australia from Oxford in 1887, and Frank Gillen who was the postmaster at 
Alice Springs and an amateur ethnographer. Spencer's career demonstrates the way in 
which the discipline of anthropology was closely connected to and often worked in the 
service of colonial administration. 60 In 1912, after establishing his reputation as an 
anthropologist, he took up the duties of Special Commissioner and Chief Protector of 
Aborigines in the Northern Territory, and had been involved in the drafting of the 
Aboriginals Ordinance of 1911. Spencer, about whom I will go into more detail in the 
next chapter, during his time as an administrator, advocated increasing control and 
surveillance over every aspect of Aboriginal people's lives. The alleged divide between 
the realm of pure and disinterested reason and that of practicality and administration is 
58 Fison and Howitt, p. 59. 59 Kuper, p. 98. 
60 See Talal Asad, `Introduction', in Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, ed. Asad (London: Ithaca 
Press, 1973), pp. 9-19. Most of the essays in this collection deal with the relationship between 
anthropology and colonialism. See also Stocking, esp. pp 81-87; and McGregor, pp. 71-99. 
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ruptured in the life of Spencer, and Sir George Grey before him, to be no more than a 
myth, a myth that, even today, discourses of reason continue to reproduce. It is in the 
life and work of Baldwin Spencer that the intersection between epistemological and 
administrative forms of regulation are, in the Australian context, at their most 
exemplary. It is in the photographic work of Spencer, moreover, as a part of his 
administrative work, that the connection between processes of civilization, and the 
Oedipalizing of Aboriginal subjects around the patriarchal nuclear family are clearly 
demonstrated (see Appendix 1). 
Spencer had come to the attention of Frazer via a letter which contained Spencer's 
observation that some Arunta tribesmen, from Central Australia, had eaten their totem 
in a ceremony called an `intichiuma'. This captured Frazer's interest because in The 
Religion of the Semites, his friend, Robertson-Smith, had claimed that in primitive 
times, totemic tribes sometimes ate their totem animal, which was otherwise considered 
taboo, as a sacrament. Robertson-Smith's problem had been, as is often the case, finding 
evidence. `Hence his excitement as Spencer's casual mention of the consumption of the 
totem animal by the Arunta tribesmen. Best of all, theoretically speaking, was that the 
observation was made among the Arunta because of all the Aborigines they had 
probably been least affected by outside influence. 61 
This instance, described by Spencer, remained the only evidence of Robertson- 
Smith's theory and was thus given pride of place in all reports of totemism, although, 
again, whether it occupied the same place in the Arunta community is another question 
altogether. This reveals the way in which anthropology privileges objects of discourse 
for the sake of its own epistemological narratives. Certainly, Frazer welcomed the 
`discovery' as: 
a very striking proof of the sagacity of my brilliant friend, whose rapid 
genius had outstripped our slower methods and anticipated what it was 
reserved for subsequent research positively to ascertain. Thus from 
being little more than an ingenious hypothesis the totem sacrament has 
become, at least in my opinion, a well-authenticated fact 62 
61 Ackerman, p. 154. For an informed discussion of the significance of the intichiuma, see esp. chapter 9. 62 James. G. Frazer, `Preface to the Second Edition', The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative 
Religions (London: Macmillan 1900), p. xix. 
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From here, a close working relationship was born between Spencer and Frazer. Spencer 
explained Howitt's failure to report on the religious aspects of totemism, writing to 
Frazer that `in those days with no work such as yours and Tylor's to guide him there 
was little to show him what to lookfor in this line.. '. 3 Fieldwork is determined by pre- 
existing anthropological models that predetermine both the way in which information 
gleaned in the field will be interpreted, and what information is even considered worth 
collecting for interpretation. while simultaneously masking the status of anthropology's 
empirical descriptions as interpretation. 
Freud's Totem and Taboo 
Although much of this anthropological work was already being called into 
question by 1910, it was from within this arena, and in particular from anthropological 
assertions about the significance of the `intichiuma', that Freud, in Totem and Taboo, 
assembled and authorized his own psychoanalytic interpretations of the models of 
anthropology provided by the Scottish triumvirate of Robertson-Smith, McLennan and 
Frazer. Frazer's Totemism and Exogamy, which took an evolutionistic approach to 
totemism and argued, among other things, that its origin lay in the ignorance of the role 
of the father in procreation, was particularly influential 64 Patrilineal transmission of the 
Totem was a later development and, according to Frazer, indicative of evolutionary 
progress. 65 
Behind these anthropological models, then, were the evolutionary assumptions of 
Darwin, whose theory of the centrality of conflict in the process of natural selection, 
which also included sexual selection, was reiterated by Freud, although on an intra- 
subjective level where the adaptive ego mediates the conflict between the instinctual id 
and the authoritarian super-ego. Similarly, Freud took Darwin's biological hypothesis of 
63 Baldwin Spencer, Spencer's Scientific Correspondence with Sir J. G. Frazer, ed. R. R. Marett and T. K. 
Penniman (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1932), p. 79. Emphasis added. 
64 It is interesting to speculate as to why Freud's Oedipus complex continues to be so influential, when the 
anthropology that it drew upon for its authority has been largely undermined. For a discussion of the 
importance of Totemism and Exogamy, and its influence on Freud, see Ackerman, esp. chapter 12. 65 In a footnote, Robert Ackerman describes Frazer's response to receiving a copy of Totem and Taboo 
from Freud: `I have got a new book Totemism and Taboo [sic], the translation of a book by a German or 
Austrian psychologist, who borrows most of his facts from me and tries to explain them by mental 
processes, especially the dreams of the insane! Not a hopeful procedure, it seems to me, though he seems 
to have a great vogue with some people'(n. 333-34). 
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the inheritance of acquired characteristics and applied it to the psychic realm. It is not 
surprising that Freud would consider his own epistemological revolution as important as 
Darwin's, nor that Ernest Jones, a Welsh psychoanalyst and close friend of Freud's who 
had introduced him to the work of British anthropology, would `bestow' on Freud `the 
title of the Darwin of the mind'. 
Like Spencer's approach, Freud's study was overdetermined by his pre-existing 
psychoanalytic models, and it is more than fortuitous that he would use exactly the same 
phrase as Spencer, an oft-repeated phrase in the Freudian oeuvre, to justify his 
theoretical approach, which also enacts the same denial of interpretation: `We can start 
an inquiry as to whether some of the hypotheses which we have carried over from 
neuroses to taboo or some of the results to which that procedure has led us may not be 
directly verifiable in the phenomena of taboo. But we must decide what we are to look 
for. '67 
From this decision came Freud's most famous and controversial hypothesis in 
Totem and Taboo, the concept of the primal horde, which emerged from a combination 
of these anthropological models and the work of both Darwin and J. Atkinson's Primal 
Law. In The Descent ofMan, Darwin posited the idea that early man lived in small 
communities each with a jealously guarded wife (or wives). When a young male 
matured he would be engaged in contest by the dominant male-either the old male was 
killed or the young expelled. Atkinson speculated that, in what he terms `cyclopean 
society', mothers would have eventually rebelled against the expulsion of their sons 
who would have been allowed to stay with the prohibition on incest being instituted to 
guarantee the old male's sexual monopoly of his spouses. Freud combined and extended 
these hypotheses, positing a 'primal horde' dominated by a powerful father who 
possessed all the available women. In rage and frustration, his sons, who united `had the 
66 Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: His Life and Mork, 3 Vols. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), Vol. 3, 
p. 326. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text For an extremely 
detailed and well-researched analysis of Darwin's influence on Freud, see Lucille B. Ritvo, Darwin's 
Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990). 
67 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 35; Emphasis added 
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courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them 
individually'(141), joined together and killed him. 
According to Freud, after the primal murder, a `fair amount of the power liberated 
by the removal of the father passed over to the women; there came a period of 
matriarchy' 68 Freud does not elaborate on this period of matriarchal authority except to 
claim that `a considerable time elapsed during which the brothers disputed with one 
another for their father's heritage, which each of them wanted for himself alone'. 9 The 
overthrow of the matriarchy comes about because of what Freud refers to, 
enigmatically, as `deferred obedience' which, with the ambivalent structure of the 
instincts, encouraged `a filial sense of guilt' in the post-parricide world70: `they hated 
their father, who presented such a formidable opposition to their craving for power and 
their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too'. 71 It is from this `deferred 
obedience' that Totemic religion arose. 
In a movement that Freud refers to in Moses and Monotheism `as a great step 
forward'(350), matriarchy `was succeeded by the re-establishment of a patriarchal 
order'(327). In this way, paternal authority was reinstated, although `the head of the 
family... was not by any means so absolute as the father of the primal horde had 
been'. 72 As a result, the family structure emerged which was `a restoration of the former 
primal horde and it gave back to fathers a large portion of their former rights'. 73 Freud 
further argues, again without elaborating, that it `is likely that the mother-goddesses 
originated at this time of the curtailment of the matriarchy, as a compensation for the 
slight upon the mothers'. 4 
To prevent a repetition of the primal situation, the brothers, under the shadow of 
the totem, imposed certain structuring rules on themselves, to regulate and restrict their 
relations and desires. They therefore instituted three laws. One was against parricide, or 
68 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 326. 
69 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 325. 
70 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 145. 
71 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 143. 
n Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 382. 
73 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 149. 
74 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 327. 
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the killing of the totem: `the first form of the father-surrogate'. 5 The second was the 
prohibition of incest which institutes exogamy as an orderly system of marriage, which 
involved, according to Freud in Moses and Monotheism, `the renunciation of the 
passionately desired mothers and sisters in the horde'. 76 
In Totem and Taboo, however, Freud does not specify the relation and, instead, 
argues that the sons `resign[ed] their claim to the women who had now been set 
free'(143). Yet, this seems to contradict the third law, a law only made explicit in Moses 
and Monotheism. The third law, often neglected by commentators, was set up in order 
to maintain this new state of affairs. After all, although `the brothers had banded 
together in order to overcome their father, they were all one another's rivals in regard to 
the women'. 77 This third law, then, granted `equal rights to all members of the fraternal 
alliance - that is, restricting the inclination to violent rivalry among them'. 
78 Although 
Freud does not state this explicitly, because the third law was about restricting rivalry, 
this does suggest that, under this law, the right to possess women ceases to be one 
man's right and becomes every man's right. In Freud's words in Totem and Taboo, `the 
brothers were declaring that no one of them must be treated by another as their father 
was treated by them all jointly'(146). 
The mechanism through which these laws were enforced was the incorporation of 
authority internally. It was the son's ambivalence that `set up the super-ego by 
identification with the father; it gave that agency the father's power'. 79 As with the 
development of the individual's superego, what had been an external authority became 
incorporated internally as a sense of legislative guilt. 80 Conscience, then, develops 
simultaneously with consciousness-the two are inextricable. 81 According to Freud, this 
75 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 148. 
76 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, pp. 366-67. 
n Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 146. 
78 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 367. 
79 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 325. 
80 This echoes Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin and anthropologist in his own right, in Inquiries 
in Human Faculty (1883). Galton argues that `inherited conscience' can be seen as the `organized result 
of social experiences of many generations. ' Cited in Kuklick, p. 82. 
81 `For what is "conscience"? On the evidence of language it is related to that of which one is "most 
certainly conscious". Indeed, in some languages the words for "conscience" and "consciousness" can 
scarcely be distinguished. ' Totem and Taboo, p. 68. 
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Oedipal moment, the moment that creates and destroys, the moment that others the self, 
also marks the beginnings of civilization through a fraternal pact. 82 
Although drawing on anthropological authority, Freud's account can be seen as 
being part of the social contract tradition about the overthrow of the father's authority, 
although the death, in Freud's account, is not merely metaphorical. Similarly, in Totem 
and Taboo, Freud makes explicit, in a way that the earlier contract theorists did not, 
that, for the primal sons, access to women was `their chief motive in despatching_their 
father'(144). Significantly, in Moses and Monotheism, Freud refers to this establishment 
of a civil community where women are shared between men as `a sort of social 
contract'(325). 
Freud's vision is remarkably similar to that of Rousseau, a vision that he 
elaborates on in Civilization and its Discontents. Freud argues that subsequent to this 
fraternal pact, `the work of civilization has become increasingly the business of men, it 
confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and compels them to carry out instinctual 
sublimations of which women are little capable'(293). In an account that echoes 
Rousseau's extremely contradictory view of women, it is women's natures that prevent 
them from being part of the contract, even if it was for the right to women that the 
contract came about in the first place. Although the claim is that women and their 
bodies must be controlled if the social order is to be established, the story of the primal 
horde seems to suggest that it is male sexual desire that needs to be regulated, rather 
than monopolized, for so-called civilization to come about. It is little wonder, then, that 
women, `forced into the background by the claims of civilization', would adopt `a 
wardsjt' 83 
The primal horde story is not only significant for the role it assigns to women, 
but also because it is a story of identification with the father through incorporation of 
the father's place. This is a story that, once Australian Aborigines are located as 
evolutionary forefathers, turns into the story of colonization. The role of 
cannibalization, in this scenario, is crucial here, as is the matter-of-factness with-which 
82 See Civilization and its Discontents, p. 329. 
83 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 293. 
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it is asserted. As Freud states: `Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying 
that they devoured their victim'. 84 Freud suggests, in Moses and Monotheism, that we 
can `understand the cannibalistic act as an attempt to ensure identification with him by 
incorporating a piece of him'(325). Hence the importance for Freud of Robertson Smith 
and the `intichiuma' ceremony. As Borch-Jacobsen argues of this struggle for 
subjectivity: `What is at stake in this struggle is now quite clear: the acquisition of an 
identity. Desire culminates in a murder and a cannibalistic sacrificial meal because it is 
directed towards the acquisition of an identity by means of the assimilation of the 
other. '85 
On the subject of Totem and Taboo, psychoanalysis in general has maintained a 
somewhat embarrassed, one might even say repressed, silence. This silence, like all 
forms of denial, engenders its own series of neuroses. It is the hypothesis of the primal 
horde which provides Freud, and psychoanalysis, with an historical grounding for the 
universal Oedipus complex which is, in psychoanalytic thought, a touchstone of 
orthodoxy. On the one hand, without the primal horde, there is no Oedipus complex; on 
the other, the hypothesis of the primal horde can be seen as phantasmatic extension and 
effect of the historically-situated Oedipus complex. And it is through the Oedipus 
complex that Freud addresses psychoanalysis' most fundamental question: how does the 
specifically Oedipal ordering of desire come about? The primal horde supplies the 
answer through an historical event. 
Freud, in Moses and Monotheism, uses his hypothesis to assert the ontological 
status of phylogenesis: `The behaviour of neurotic children towards their parents in the 
Oedipus and castration complex abounds in... reactions, which seem unjustifiable in the 
individual case and only become intelligible phylogenetically-by their connection with 
the experience of earlier generations'(344). The guilty memory of the murder of the 
primal father has `left indestructible traces upon the history of human descent'. These 86 
E4 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 142. 
85 Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, p. 190. Borch-Jacobsen suggests that it is not that the son wants 
to replace the father because of a desire for his mother, but rather the reverse, that the son desires the 
mother because he desires to be in the place of, that is, identify with, the father. Significantly, this reflects 
the order of events in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. 
86 Freud, `Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego', PFL 12, p. 154. 
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`indestructible traces' continue to haunt humanity, all of whom, according to Freud, are 
bearers of this transmitted and inherited act, and exist only residually and 
indeterminately in relation to the subject. These traces can never disappear, yet they are 
marked with an absence that produces ghostly neuroses. Psychoanalysis returns to the 
question of inheritance. The effects of the traces of this pseudo-historical event, which 
are not only other from themselves, but also constitute the psyche as other, are that 
which we all, apparently, inherit. 
Well, not quite all of us. Women's relationship to this inheritance is, as I have 
tried to indicate, deeply problematic. The relation of women to these traces, who had no 
involvement in the primal murder, but who were, indeed, the objects of desire murdered 
over, remains extremely uncertain. So too does Freud's account of the Oedipus complex 
as it is manifested in women which, he claims, is `certainly incomplete and fragmentary 
and does not always sound friendly. '87 Although Totem and Taboo provides no parallel 
primal story of women's sexual development, Freud's strange account of individual 
sexual development in `Femininity' ends with the following claim: `What I have been 
telling you may be described as the pre-history of women'(164). 
Yet, surely, for sons to murder fathers, women need to have become mothers. 
Pateman's reading of Totem and Taboo provides just such a reading of a possible `pre- 
history', playing with Freud's idea of the `primal scene' as elaborated in `From the 
History of an Infantile Neurosis', where the analysis of the wolf man's primal scene is a 
recollection and reinterpretation, as a child, of parental sexual intercourse which, 
87 Freud, `Femininity', PFL 2, p. 169. Future references are to this edition, and are included in 
parentheses in the text. In `Femininity', Freud argues that `a comparison with what happens with boys 
tells us that the development of a little girl into a normal woman is more difficult and more complicated, 
since it includes two extra tasks, to which there is nothing corresponding in the development of a 
man'(150). `In the course of time... a girl has to change her erotogenic zone and her object - both of 
which a boy retains'(152). Freud is here referring to the movement from the clitoral to the vaginal, and 
from the mother to the father. Freud's way of incorporating women into the Oedipal story is by thinking 
of the young girl as a young boy: `We are now obliged to recognize that the little girl is a little man'(151). 
In other words, it would seem, both the primal sons and daughters desired the primal mothers, although 
Freud does not and cannot say this because this would involve women in the formation of the fraternal 
pact, an involvement that the nature of the pact necessarily precludes. Once again, Freud's position is 
overdetermined by his assertion that if we knew what to look for, we would see the truth of his assertions: 
`Enough can be seen in the children if one knows how to look'(154). 
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according to Freud, `cannot fail to produce the impression of being a sadistic act'. 88 
According to Freud, the wolf man misinterprets normal, consensual sexual activity. 
As Pateman notes, Freud's analysis and interpretation depend on the assumption 
that consent can be clearly distinguished from enforced submission, although in most 
legal jurisdictions, especially at the time Freud was writing, the marriage contract gives 
the husband sexual access to his wife's body whether or not she has consented. As 
Pateman suggests: `The young wolf man may have accurately interpreted what he saw; 
we can never know'(106). For Freud, moreover, the wolf man's recollection is a primal 
phantasy, the phylogenetic inheritance from pre-history, producing a very different 
pre- 
history for women from the one Freud produces in `Femininity'. 
It is important merely to note at this stage, and I will expand on this point in 
more detail in the next chapter, that although Freud is ostensibly committed to historical 
process, the Oedipus complex is not an effect of such a process, it instigates it. Totem 
and Taboo claims to explain the history of the Oedipus complex, when it actually 
presupposes it. In this way, Freud tries to banish the history that produced the subject 
that produces historholding_out for the promise of the certainty-of truth and identity, a 
certainty that systems of primogeniture have a large investment in, and a certainty that 
Freud looks to a scientific Weltanschauung to provide. 89 The primal horde narrative 
returns to the origin in_order to understand, explain and, most significantly, control and 
validate the present, a present, I have argued, where sons are anxious about both the 
power of fathers, and access to sex. It is this return to the origin, this narration of the 
founding moment of the law, culture, language and the split psyche, that enables its 
universal application, constituting a subject that Julia Borossa refers to as the `Universal 
Homo Psychoanalyticus' 90 
In this way, other cultures are constructed as sharing this inheritance. Such a 
narrative cannot admit of the possibility of other kinds of subjects, because the modern 
Is Freud, From the mw of -an rnraj-, tEre-iqe-iir(isis -. SE, -r7, p., 45. 
89 `Psychoanalysis... is a part of science and can adhere to the scientific Weltanschauung. ' Freud, The 
Question of a Weltanschauung7 . 1933 [19321PFL 2, p 219. 
90 Julia Borossa, `The Migration of Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalyst as Migrant', Oxford Literary 
Review, 19 (1997), p. 81. 
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Western subject is conceived of as the effect of the unfolding of history from an 
originary point, a point that Aboriginal Australians are temporally closer to, which 
allows for their supercession. 91 In this way, the possibility of interpreting the neurosis 
that we call the Oedipus complex as an effect of civilization is foreclosed, because it is 
attributed to that which pre-existed civilization, that is, the primitive. An effect of 
civilization is thereby constructed as its cause. Likewise, the effect of a certain notion of 
history, or historical progress, is made into the cause of history. 
Freud's hypothesis of the Oedipus complex thereby forecloses the possibility of 
alternative non-Oedipalized subjects, and such foreclosure necessitates the effective 
denial of the possibility of other types of familial or socio-cultural arrangements. 2 The 
Oedipus complex is always centred around the patriarchal and nuclear family, a family 
that is, as it was in the work of Rousseau, strongly naturalized. As Freud asserts in 
Civilization and its Discontents: 
Whether one has killed one's father or has abstained from doing so is 
not really the decisive thing. One is bound to feel guilty in either 
case... This conflict is set going as soon as men are faced with the task 
of living together. So long as the community assumes no other form 
than the family, the conflict is bound to express itself in the Oedipus 
complex, to establish the conscience and create the first sense of guilt. 
(324-25) 
Certainly, the monogamous nuclear family was identified as one of the most important 
achievements of evolutionary advance, and the regulation and surveillance of sexual 
relations, as an effect of transformations towards primogeniture, came to be seen as 
equivalent to civilization, with sexuality (or the pleasure principle) being quite overtly 
linked to irrationality. An effect of this was the commonly held view, a view that Freud 
shared, that not only were savages irrational, they were highly instinctual, especially in 
the realm of sexuality, and that, as a result, Aboriginal cultures must necessarily not be 
aware of the connection between conception and paternity. 93 
91 The theoretical implications of this kind of universalizing can be seen at its most detailed and reductive 
in Allen Johnson and Douglass Price-Williams, Oedipus Ubiquitous: The Family Complex in World 
Literature (California: Stanford UP, 1996) 
92 For feminist discussions of the role of the family in anthropological theorizing, see Pateman and 
Coward. 
93 Cf. Frantz Fanon: The civilized white man retains an irrational longing for unusual eras of sexual 
licence, of orgiastic scenes, of unpunished rapes, of unrepressed instinct... Projecting his own desires on 
to the Negro, the white man behaves "as if' the Negro really had them. ' Black Skin, White Masks, p. 117. 
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Freud shares these assumptions in Totem and Taboo and draws, for his authority, 
on the work of anthropology, taking the status of `recorded facts' for granted: `If we 
submit the recorded facts to analysis, as though they formed part of the symptoms 
presented by a neurosis, our starting point must be the excessive apprehensiveness and 
solicitude which is put forward as the reason for the taboo ceremonials'(48-9). The 
`recorded facts' that Freud refers to, however, emerged out of anthropological 
knowledge, knowledge that I have tried to argue is itself symptomatic of neurosis, that 
is, the effect, partly, of an ambivalent relation to the father. This ambivalence was 
contained through its institutionalization in European discourses of legality and 
anthropology where, in a manoeuvre characteristic of neurosis, according to Freud, it 
was projected on to another object the savage. What I am suggesting is that the 
postulates themselves, `the recorded facts', can be thought about as symptomatic. 
The Work of Distortion 
Freud, in spite of himself, problematizes the whole project of Totem and Taboo 
and the possibility that `the recorded facts' will provide solutions in a footnote on the 
second page: 
Not only, however, is the theory of totemism a matter of dispute; the 
facts themselves are scarcely capable of being expressed in general 
terms... There is scarcely a statement that does not call for exceptions 
and contradictions. But it must not be forgotten that even the most 
primitive and conservative races are in some sense ancient races and 
have a long past history behind them during which their original 
conditions of life have been subject to much development and 
distortion. So it comes about that in those races in which totemism 
exists to-day, we may find it in various stages of decay and 
disintegration or in the process of transition to other social and 
religious institutions, or again in a stationary condition which may 
differ greatly from the original one. The difficulty in this last case is to 
decide whether we should regard the present state of things as a true 
picture of the significant features of the past or as a secondary 
distortion of them. (2n) 
This is the kind of detail that psychoanalysis cannot afford to ignore. This footnote, 
which we can think of quite literally as a textual parapraxis, has all the hallmarks of the 
process of dream interpretation. It suggests, moreover, that the, anthropological texts 
that he cites are perhaps characterized by the form of thinking peculiar to dreams and 
neuroses. Freud calls the raw material of dream its `latent content'. The dream, 
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however, is the product of the transformation of these materials, known as the `dream- 
work'. Freud lists the four techniques by which the psychic apparatus distorts the 
dream-thoughts (latent content) to produce the dream: condensation, displacement, 
considerations of representability_and secondary revision. The dream which is produced 
by this labour, the dream we actually remember, is termed by Freud the `manifest 
content'. The stage of the dreamwork known as 'secondary revision' or `elaboration' 
consists in the reorganization of the dream so as to present it in the form of a relatively 
consistent and comprehensible narrative. Secondary revision systemizes the dream, fills 
in its gaps and smoothes over its contradictions. 
The difficulty Freud expressed in this footnote is whether to examine the 
anthropological texts, and the savage that they posit, as a `true picture', or are they, like 
the `manifest content' of dreams, a distortion complete with a secondary elaboration 
that both systematizes and narrativizes 94 We would do well to remind ourselves, with 
Freud, that such distortion is extremely-plausible where the textual search for origi! ý is 
concerned. In Moses and Monotheism, the book that Freud describes as an extension of 
the project begun in Totem and Taboo, he asserts that the textual search for Moses 
undertaken by Jewish scholarship is characterized by just such distortion. Freud uses the 
word `distortion'(Entstellung) Nyith `the double meaning to which it has a claim but of 
which today it makes no use. It should mean not only "to change the appearance of 
something" but also "to put in another place, to displace"'. 95 
With this in mind, it is possible to suggest that the textual search for the savage 
as a point of origin as it is found in anthropological discourse, and in Freud's own 
Totem and Taboo, is also characterized by this distortive movement that camouflage its 
distortion with a representational facade. As we have seen, on the page before this 
telling_footnote, Australian Aborigines were interpreted as a representation and faithful 
reproduction ("well-preserved image") of the primal savage as a prior object. Yet we 
can rethink this, using Freud (in a way,. Qerhaps, he would not entirely approve of), 
94 This is a question that lyjoa rsö ask-ced: with ref`eience to tMTäs va haniänsý in-1893 THe wondered 
whether any contemporary tribe could stand as `living representatives of the early Stone Age'. Cited in 
Stocking, p. 176. 
95 Freud 
Moses andMonotheism, p. _283. 
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through the constitutive possibilities of interpretation as distorting gesture. Or, as 
Samuel Weber has argued, interpretation, as a movement of distortion, `must be 
conceived not as a more or less faithful reproduction or re-presentation of an antecedent, 
self-identical object, meaning or "presence, " but as a process of repetition and 
dislocation' 96 
Freud argues in Moses and Monotheism, that `in many instances of textual 
distortion, we may nevertheless count upon finding what has been suppressed and 
disavowed, hidden away somewhere else, though changed and torn from its context. 
Only it will not always be easy to recognise it'(283). If this is the case, and I am not 
sure that it is, one might ask what could be so unpleasant to the Western psyche that 
Aboriginal Australians are marked represented in this way? 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud claims that he has `arrived at the point of regarding a 
child's relation to his parents, dominated as it is by incestuous longings, as the nuclear 
complex of neurosis'(17). For the time being, it will suffice to say that, for Freud, 
neurosis is always a site of displacement and Aboriginal Australians can thereby be 
thought of as one of the sites that this modern, Western, Oedipal neurotic anxiety has 
been displaced on to. It is in this sense that we can begin to speak of the spectre of the 
savage as a symptom of a neurosis that not only inhabits Freud and his text, but the 
whole anthropological and broad epistemological discursive space that the savage 
inhabits. This neurosis, inherently colonizing, requiring as it does the incorporation of 
the other, is an historical effect of what is termed civilization. Yet, in a profoundly 
ahistorical manoeuvre, it is displaced on to that which pre-existed civilization. 
Savage Jews - Moses and Monotheism 
It was not just the pre-Union Scot and the Australian Aborigine that were placed 
within the discursive universe of the savage other. The Jew, also, as object of 
knowledge and exemplar of racial difference, occupied this place. In Austria, as in many 
other places at the turn of the century, institutionalized anti-Semitism was prevalent, 
96 Samuel Weber, Institution and Interpretation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 
80. 
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and Freud, as a Jew, may have perhaps expressed and repressed his emotional 
ambivalence towards the religion of his father in a particularly acute manner. 97 
Biological science, as we have seen, had a strong racial component with the biology of 
race constituting a vital part of the arguments of biological and medical science. The 
Jews served as an example in discussions on the role of racial difference and, as Sander 
Gilman has shown in his prodigiously researched work in the field, racial models of the 
Jews were `found not only in the "crackpot" pamphlet literature of the time; they are 
present in virtually all discussions of pathology published in 1880-1930'. 98 While Freud 
was practising and theorizing his `science' of psychoanalysis, the Jew was also an 
object of scientific knowledge. As Gilman claims, this placed a Jewish scientist like 
Freud in an ambiguous position: `Sigmund Freud, like any other Jewish scientist at the 
turn of the century, was faced with the double bind of the Jewish medical scientist: both 
physician and prospective patient, both scientist and Jew, both the observer and the 
observed. '99 
Gilman argues convincingly that Freud's `sense of inferiority' that resulted from 
this `was not dismissed from Freud's system, but rather transferred to another object, 
the woman'. 100 Gilman's own fairly straight-forward argument, however, is 
problematized by the elision of race and gender. While not directly opposing Gilman's 
position, I would argue that the figure of the Australian Aborigine also occupies an 
ambiguous position in Freud's work, and is a telling absence in Gilman's. Gilman 
makes four brief references to Totem and Taboo in Freud, Race and Gender and relates 
these to his broader argument on how anti-Semitism functions within racial 
categorizations. Although he claims that Freud is `haunted' by his own `suppressed 
"I am not the first to suggest that Freud's Jewishness may have influenced psychoanalysis as a system of 
thought, and there is a long history of interpretation of Freud's Moses in this vein. However, I would like 
to differentiate my position, and this will become clearer, from those readings of Freud and 
psychoanalysis that situate it as nothing other than a self-referential expression of Freud's own 
consciousness (or unconsciousness). Mary Balmany's Psychoanalyzing Psychoanalysis, trans. by Ned 
Lukacher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), is exemplary of this approach. 
's Sander Gilman, Freud Race and Gender (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. S. 
Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. See also The Jew's Body, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1991); Jewish Selj-Hatred (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); and The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the Fin de Siecle 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 
" Gilman, Freud Race and Gender, p. 12. 
100 Gilman, Freud Race and Gender, p. 23. 
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claims that Freud is `haunted' by his own `suppressed discourse of anti-Semitism"o' as 
articulated through his phylogenetic model, Gilman makes no reference to the possible 
displacement of this on to Australia's indigenous people through the category of the 
savage, the very point of origin, in Freudian terms, from which emotional ambivalence 
has evolved. Yet the ambivalence that Freud attributes to the savage in his relations with 
the taboo can also be read as being characteristic of Freud's relation to his own Judaism. 
It is in the light of this ambivalence, `suppressed anti-Semitism' being too 
unproblematic a term, that we can read Freud's internalization of this conception of the 
Jew as exemplary in his return to the project initiated by Totem and Taboo and his 
second extended quasi-anthropological meditation on his phylogenetic hypothesis, 
Moses and Monotheism, where he re-asserts his belief in Totem and Taboo: `anyone 
who is inclined to pronounce our construction of primaeval history purely imaginary 
would be gravely underestimating the wealth and evidential value of the material 
contained in it... There is nothing wholly fabricated in our construction, nothing which 
could not be supported on solid foundations'(328). 
Moses and Monotheism is marked by a profound ambivalence and Freud often 
asserted his dissatisfaction with it. 102 In Part II of the Third Essay, Freud wrote: `I 
determined to give it up but it tormented me like an unlaid ghost'(349). What this ghost 
might be, why it was a source of torment, and how it might relate to the spectre of 
savagery in Totem and Taboo are questions that I now hope to explore. Moses and 
Monotheism is comprised of three essays, the first two published in 1937, and the third 
in 1938. The first draft of the book carried the title, `The Man Moses, an historical 
novel'. These essays had been written earlier but in the Vienna of the 1930s Freud, who 
was being protected by the Catholic Church, `was afraid that the publication of my work 
would result in the loss of that protection'. 103 It was the German invasion of Austria, 
and Freud's `certainty that I should now be persecuted not only for my line of thought 
101 Gilman, Freud Race and Gender, p. 24. 
102 Seethe `Editor's Note' to Moses and Monotheism, PFL 13, pp. 239-41; see also Jones, Vol. 3, pp. 
231-2 and 240. 
103 Freud, Moses andMonotheism, p. 298. 
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the publication of Moses and Monotheism. In short, Moses and Monotheism argues that 
Moses, the founder of Judaism, was actually an Egyptian follower of Akhenaten, the 
first monotheistic pharoah. The people whom we now refer to as the Jews whom Moses 
led on their Exodus, in a repeat performance of the primal parricide, turned against his 
tyranny and murdered him. Or, as Freud puts it, `the savage semites took fate into their 
own hands and rid themselves of their tyrant'. '°5 
We can interpret Freud's use of the spectral signifier-`savage'-in the light of 
his own argument about the textual search for Moses, the father and law-maker of 
Judaism. Not only was Freud's search characterized by the double meaning of 
`distortion' (to change the appearance of something, and also to displace), but `almost 
everywhere noticeable gaps, disturbing repetitions and obvious contradictions have 
come about indications which reveal to us that which it was not intended to 
communicate. ' 106 
In order to participate in this necessarily distortive interpretative process, I will 
turn once again to the text that engendered Moses and Monotheism, that is, Totem and 
Taboo, which could be called its father, so to speak. Freud harks back to Totem and 
Taboo periodically in Moses and Monotheism, ambivalently, as a son might to a father. 
This turning of mine, however, is only a pretext from which to explore another pre- 
text-the second preface to the Hebrew edition of Totem and Taboo. This pre-text is 
explicitly addressed to the very sons of Moses whose ancestors committed the second 
parricide. 
The preface to the Hebrew edition inserts itself between the text of Totem and 
Taboo and its specific audience. It also inserts itself between the text and the first 
preface written by Freud in 1913. The Hebrew preface, written some twenty years later, 
institutes a temporal displacement of the two texts it resides between. At around the 
same time, Freud was also writing (and being haunted by) his book on the origins of 
Judaism, and the preface thereby stands in a complex relation of deferral to both of 
Freud's major speculative anthropological studies on the origin of religion. This preface 
los Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 288; Emphasis added. 
106 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 283. 
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then is a distorting movement, and it announces the impossibility of the text being 
identical with itself as an originary point; Totem and Taboo is reconstituted through this 
movement as something other than Totem and Taboo. This preface calls into question 
the origin that it gestures towards, not only the text of Totem and Taboo, but the very 
origin that the text Totem and Taboo was seeking to uncover. 
This ambiguous preface to the Hebrew edition of Totem and Taboo, which repeats 
the spectralization of savagery found in the text of Totem and Taboo, has been largely 
ignored by Freud scholars. It is not addressed to the Jews, but to what Freud calls the 
New Jewry: `This author hopes', Freud proclaims, `that he will be at one with his 
readers in the conviction that unprejudiced science cannot remain a stranger to the spirit 
of new Jewry'. 107 For Freud, the importance of this preface is clear, and enacts both an 
appeal and an apology which is further complicated by the fact that it was addressed to 
the sons of Moses, whom he hopes to be `at one with', by another son whose words 
were marked by translation. Freud suggests, however, that he is aware that the oneness 
he seeks to be part of is both impossible to identify and identify with: 
No reader of this book will find it easy to put himself in the emotional 
position of an author who is ignorant of holy writ, who is completely 
estranged from the religion of his fathers-as well as from every other 
religion-and who cannot take a share in nationalist ideals, but who 
has yet never repudiated his people, who feels that he is in his 
essential nature a Jew and who has no desire to alter that nature. (xi) 
In the preface, Freud projects on to the other (the reader? the sons of Moses? the New 
Jewry? ) a question that he puts to himself, thereby simultaneously asserting and 
dissolving the boundary between himself and that other: 
If the question were put to him: `Since you have abandoned all these 
common characteristics of your countrymen, what is there left to you 
that is Jewish? ' he would reply: `A very great deal and probably its 
very essence. ' He could not now express that essence clearly in words; 
but some day, no doubt, it will become accessible to the scientific 
mind. (xi) 
The claim that this essence cannot be expressed clearly in words, and the hope that it 
will be some day accessible is reminiscent of Freud's faith in biology, which will 
107 Freud, 'Preface to the Hebrew Edition', Totem and Taboo, p. xi. 
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ultimately uncover the workings of the unconscious. 108 Freud seems to be suggesting 
here that the `essence' of his Jewry is located in the realm of the unconscious. Freud's 
reference to new Jewry moreover implies that Judaism is also other to itself, with New 
Jewry being the conscious, scientific and civilized aspect of Jewish consciousness. The 
distinction between old Jewry (as the unsaid) and new Jewry refers, in the historical 
context of turn of the century Europe, to the distinction between Eastern European Jews 
and Western acculturated ones. As Gilman argues of this distinction: `All the 
stereotypical images of the Jew that were present in an undifferentiated manner in 
Central Europe, and that were applied to all Jews, Eastern and Western alike, came to be 
applied by acculturated Western Jews to Eastern European Jews. "09 Freud's own 
ambivalent identification and non-identification with old Jewry is revealed in Moses 
and Monotheism when Freud explains the initial non-publication of the text: `It did not 
seem attractive', Freud disclosed, `to find oneself classed with the schoolmen and 
Talmudists who delight in exhibiting their ingenuity without regard to how remote their 
thesis may be from reality'(254). 
This reference to the `schoolmen and Talmudists' can perhaps be read as 
reflecting Freud's own ambivalent attempt at assimilation into German culture. This 
process of acculturation, via the `unprejudiced science' that `cannot remain a stranger to 
the spirit of the New Jewry', began as early as Freud's years at secondary school when, 
in 1869 or 1870, he decided to change his first name on the records from the Jewish 
Sigismund to the German Sigmund. This act of identification and non-identification 
functions as a mode of self-othering which problematizes what the name refers to. For 
the adolescent Freud, Sigismund already had a troubling referent, for `the name 
"Sigismund" gained currency as a favourite term of abuse in anti-Semitic jokes. 110 
Freud's action was a rejection of the gift of his father, Jacob Freud, who had named 
`Sigismund' after the sixteenth century Polish monarch admired for his policy of 
108 You will recall the quotation used previously from Beyond the Pleasure Principle cited earlier: `The 
deficiencies in our description would probably vanish if we were already in a position to replace the 
psychological terms by physiological or chemical ones... Biology is truly a land of unlimited 
possibilities'(344). 
09 Gilman, Freu4 Race and Gender, p. 13. 
11° Dennis Klein, Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), p. 46. 
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toleration towards the Jews. l t1 Freud learnt in the most difficult way imaginable of the 
myth of the uniqueness of the proper name. This adolescent act underwrites the 
structure of difference that will later characterize the most subversive aspects of the 
Freudian project. It is an act, moreover, that would be replayed and reversed in the 
Preface to the Hebrew edition, addressed to the New Jewry in Hebrew translated from 
Freud's German. 
Freud's desire to be assimilated into the stream of civilization would perhaps have 
been further exacerbated by the increasing anti-Semitism that characterized his years at 
medical school. The young Freud had joined the radical German student society which 
represented German interests at the University. 112 In 1875, however, a crisis erupted in 
response to a 7-page passage in a document published as part of a lengthy examination 
of medical education at German universities. Theodor Billroth, one of the most 
prominent members of the medical faculty at the University of Vienna, questioned the 
ability of Jews to be physicians and articulated the fear that Vienna was being overrun 
by Jewish medical students, arguing that `even if they speak and think more beautifully 
and better in the German language than many teutons of the purest water [they] cannot 
be German'. 113 This document led to anti-Semitic violence and the removal of Jewish 
students from the faculty. Even assimilated Jews increasingly became the object of 
attack, and the German nationalist student society was dissolved by the Government in 
1878 when the students began to see German Jews as their enemies. 14 
This desire for assimilation into the German cultural stream was not uncommon 
among Jews of Freud's generation. Josef Breuer, who published Studies on Hysteria 
with Freud and whom Freud once claimed to be the father of psychoanalysis, 
commented on his own father's `metamorphosis' from `the student of the Talmud into a 
man of the nineteenth century' 15 where the East European Jew, like the savage, 
occupies an allochronic discursive space. 
"' See Klein, p. 46. 
112 Cited in Klein, p. 47. 
113 Cited in Gilman, Freud Race and Gender, p. 18. 
114 See Klein, p. 52. 
115 Josef Breuer, `Autobiography of Josef Breuer, ' International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 34 (1953): 
64-5. 
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Freud's relationship to his own Judaism can be recognized within his own theories 
about the ambivalence of neurotics, and the mechanisms of neuroses, denial and 
displacement. Clearly the relation to Judaism in the Hebrew preface to Totem and 
Taboo is marked, like the preface itself, by the psychic conflict of both homage and 
parricide. As Freud notes of this very conflict in Totem and Taboo, `The child finds 
relief from the conflict arising out of this double-sided, this ambivalent emotional 
attitude towards the father by displacing his hostile and fearful feelings on a substitute 
of his father'(129). The displacement that moves through the text of Totem and Taboo is 
the spectre of the savage. Freud's translated Hebrew preface repeats and re-enacts this 
displacement in the suggestion that the new Jewry has emerged (or metamorphosized) 
out of the old Jewry phylogenetically, just as the civilized has emerged from the savage. 
This metamorphosis is articulated most cogently in Totem and Taboo where Freud 
asserts: 
If we are prepared to accept the account... of the evolution of human 
views of the universe-an animistic phase followed by a religious 
phase and this in turn by a scientific one-it will not be difficult to 
follow the vicissitudes of the `omnipotence of thoughts' through these 
different phases. At the animistic phase men ascribe omnipotence to 
themselves. At the religious stage they transfer it to the gods but do 
not seriously abandon it themselves, for they reserve the power of 
influencing the gods in a variety if ways according to their wishes. 
The scientific view of the universe no longer affords any room for 
human omnipotence; men have acknowledged their smallness and 
submitted resignedly to death and to the other necessities of nature. 
None the less some of the primitive belief in omnipotence still 
survives in men's faith in the power of the human mind, taking 
account, as it does, of the laws of reality. (88) 
Thanatos: the Space of Undifferentiation 
But perhaps to psychoanalyze Freud in this way, although valid, is too reductive, 
too faithful, too hermeneutically closed. Rather, the question can be put in another way, 
that would suggest a different reading of the above passage. After all, one of the most 
interesting things about this passage is that Freud's assertion that the scientific view `no 
longer affords any room for human omnipotence' is called into question by his 
simultaneous assertion that science will eventually answer all questions, itself a 
powerful statement of human omnipotence, symptomatic of a drive for mastery. 
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Freud explores such a drive in that most speculative and anxiety-ridden of articles, 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. If, as I have already argued, reason can be thought of as 
technique for mastering, in the face of inevitable doubt, that which lies outside its 
domain, then Beyond the Pleasure Principle is an exercise in reason par excellence. 
This can be seen in Freud's assertion that, `The outcome may give an impression of 
mysticism or sham profundity; but we can feel quite innocent of having had any such 
purpose in view. We seek only the sober results of research or of reflection based on it; 
and we have no wish to find in those results any quality other than certainty'(3 10). This 
is followed by a footnote, added in 1925, in which Freud reminds the reader that she or 
he `should not overlook the fact that what follows is the development of an extreme line 
of thought'. 
For Freud, there was an instinct aimed at preserving living substances. 
Observation of his grandson's compulsive playing of the `fort-da' [gone/there] game led 
him to posit `another, contrary instinct'. 116 Freud speculates that this `compulsion to 
repeat' on the part of his grandson who, `by himself staging the disappearance and 
return of the objects within his reach'(285), was attempting to come to terms with the 
absence of his mother. Freud wonders whether these `efforts might be put down to an 
instinct for mastery that was acting independently of whether the memory was in itself 
pleasurable or not'(226). This discussion of staging, however, is reminiscent of a 
Freud's own staging of the first identificatory totem meal of the primal horde. In 
introducing his discussion in Totem and Taboo, Freud writes: `Let us call up the 
spectacle of a totem meal of the kind we have been discussing, amplified by a few 
probable features which we have not yet been able to consider'(140). This spectacle that 
Freud `calls up' can also be thought of as a staging, a staging of the death and return of 
the father, but also a staging of the point of origin and its perpetual re-establishment. To 
master the origin, to master the beginning of time and everything that has originated 
from it, is to master history in its totality. The motives that Freud attributes to his 
grandson could thereby be attributed also to Freud, the intrepid explorer into the realm 
16 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 310. I must say, in passing, that I have never been able to 
understand how the baby's `o-o-o-o' was able to be translated by Freud and his daughter as `fort'. 
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of the unknown, the unconscious: `At the outset he was in a passive situation - he was 
overwhelmed by the experience; but by repeating it... he took an active part'. ' 17 In its 
attempt to return to and narrate from the origin, Totem and Taboo can be thought of as 
representing the colonial drive for mastery that incorporates everything within its 
theoretical grasp through the mere power of thought, through which the stability of self 
is returned to Freud's subject (in both senses of the word). In Totem and Taboo, 
moreover, the limits of reason intersect with the realm of fantasy as articulated in the 
gendered and racialized metaphor of the `dark continent'. 
It is significant that this drive for mastery occurs on the very cusp of language 
which characterizes the child's incomplete grasp of language. Given that according to 
Freud, when `we look at the relation between the process of human civilization and the 
developmental or educative process of individual human beings... the two are very 
similar in nature' 118, the primal son's relation to language is worth mentioning. For 
Freud, the primal savage, prior to the murder of the primal father, has no unconscious; 
the savage's psyche inhabits a space that the death instinct presumably aims towards- 
undifferentiation. The savage, in Freud's account, exists prior to the splitting of the 
subject, and therefore prior to the inevitable loss by which subjectivity is haunted. Freud 
asserts that `[n]o impulses whatsoever came into existence except collective ones; there 
was only a common will, there were no single ones'. 119 Similarly, in `An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis', written in 1938, and published after his death, Freud wrote of what he 
refers to vaguely as `an initial state'(in time? in the individual life? ): 
We may picture an initial state as one in which the total available 
energy of Eros, which henceforward we shall speak of as `libido, ' is 
present in the still undifferentiated ego-id and serves to neutralize the 
destructive tendencies which are simultaneously present. 120 
The implication that the primal savage inhabits a space of psychic undifferentiation can 
be seen most clearly in the final paragraph of Totem and Taboo, and takes the form of 
"7 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 285. See also Derrida's reading of Freud's Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle in `Coming into One's Own', in Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text, ed. 
Geoffrey Hartmann (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 114-48. 
18 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 333. 
119 Freud, `Group Psychology', p. 155. 
120 Freud, `An Outline of Psychoanalysis'(1940) (London: Hogarth Press, 1963), p. 7. 
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the denial of mediation through language, a metaphysical proposition that the insights of 
psychoanalysis already call into question: 
Nor must we let ourselves be influenced too far in our judgment of 
primitive men by the analogy of neurotics. There are distinctions, too, 
which must be borne in mind. It is no doubt true that the sharp contrast 
that we make between thinking and doing is absent in both of them. 
But neurotics are above all inhibited in their actions: with them, the 
thought is a complete substitute for the deed. Primitive men, on the 
other hand, are uninhibited: thought passes directly into action. With 
them, it is rather the deed that is a substitute for the thought. And that 
is why, without laying claim to any finality of judgment, I think that in 
the case before us it may be safely assumed that `in the beginning was 
the Deed'. (161) 
In this metaphysical passage, Freud is attempting to dispense with language and arrive 
at the truth of origins where consciousness is present to itself through unmediated 
action. Like the psyche of the primal man who, Freud argues in Moses and Monotheism 
`had not advanced far in the development of speech'(324), the unconscious is also 
without language. As he writes in the metapsychological paper, `The Unconscious': 
We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a 
conscious and an unconscious presentation. The two are not as we 
supposed, different registrations of the same context in different 
psychical localities; nor yet different functional states of cathexis in 
the same locality, but the conscious representation comprises the 
representation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging 
to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the 
thing alone. 121 
Yet the unified self-presence of the savage prior to the murder of the primal 
father, where the beginning is not a word but a deed is also an absence-the deed here is 
as spectral as the savage, and only haunts modem subjectivity through the 
`indestructible trace'-the mark of both presence and absence. In this case, the 
supposedly unmediated deed is complicated by the fact that it is, like all Freud's 
assertions, totally textually constituted, and is already in a differential relation to the 
quotation from Goethe ('In the beginning was the Deed') which concludes Totem and 
Taboo. 
So, if it is the deed that is transferred phylogenetically down through the 
generations, it is language, as the subsequent history of the reception of Totem and 
121 Freud, `The Unconscious'(1915), PFL 11, p. 207. 
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Taboo makes clear, that complicates and unsettles the project. In `Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego', Freud refers to the primal horde as a `Just-So Story', a 
reference that is also marked by a series of textually differentiated relations. 122 Freud 
was quoting a review of the work by an American anthropologist A. L. Kroeber. 
Kroeber, whose name Freud misspelled (as Kroeger) in the first edition of `Group 
Psychology', had in fact quoted from another English anthropologist R. R. Marett. l23 As 
the reference to a `Just-So Story', set in colonial India, suggests, as well as the story of 
the reference to the Just-So Story, the past being searched for has never existed except 
as narrative: `always absent, that past continually threatens to reproduce itself as a felt 
lack... longing for an impossibly pure context of lived experience at a place of origin... 
The point of desire which the nostalgic seeks is in fact the absence that is the very 
generating mechanism of desire'. 124 This nostalgia, which always desires to fill its own 
lack through incorporation of the other, is distinctly colonial, as the reference to a 'Just- 
So Story' suggests. Freud's project then, in Totem and Taboo, replicates and perpetuates 
the infantile drive for mastery expressed in a return to beginnings and wholeness, prior 
to the alienation of the subject through repression and language. 
For Freud, this instinctive drive for mastery was peculiarly related to death, and 
through observation of the child's game, he concluded that this drive, the Death instinct, 
seeks to dissolve these units into their original state: `It seems, then, that an instinct is 
an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things. ' 125 Freud's thinking 
here seems to work against the postulation of progress that was so central to the 
Enlightenment project. Yet, as we have seen, both in the anthropological works 
examined, and in Freud's Totem and Taboo, there are the dual and contradictory themes 
of progress and stasis. This contradiction at the heart of Totem and Taboo is projected 
on to its subject matter in the form of a quasi-historical formulation of civilized and 
primitive societies. 
122 See Freud, `Group Psychology', p. 154. 
123 See the footnote in `Group Psychology' on p. 154; and also Jones, Vol. 2, pp. 346-7. 
124 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) p. 23. 
125 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 244. 
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examined, and in Freud's Totem and Taboo, there are the dual and contradictory themes 
of progress and stasis. This contradiction at the heart of Totem and Taboo is projected 
on to its subject matter in the form of a quasi-historical formulation of civilized and 
primitive societies. 
In this sense, the knowledge produced about the savage, in the realms of both 
psychoanalysis and anthropology, may be thought of as an expression and an example 
of the death drive. Totem and Taboo reproduces the nostalgic search for origins, as well 
as the desire for mastery in the form of self-certainty that Freud speculates characterizes 
the death drive. In this sense, we can think of the dual project of Totem and Taboo, in 
bringing together knowledges from psychoanalysis and anthropology, knowledges 
thought to be the culmination of civilized progress, as being exemplary of the death 
drive, an instinct that, for Freud, `seems more primitive, more elementary, more 
instinctual than the pleasure principle which it over-rides. ' 126 
Certainly, death occupies a central place in Freud's conjectural history, just as it 
has, since Plato, in certain conceptions of alphabetic textuality, the enabling technology 
for narratives like Freud's. 127 As both Borch-Jacobsen and Phillippe Van Haute point 
out, what is remarkable in the primal horde narrative is that the sons submit to the 
authority of the father, who prior to the primal parricide was not even their `father', only 
after the murder takes place. Freud's statement that `the dead father became stronger 
than the living had been', 128 leads to the paradox whereby: 
the father's taboos, and therefore human society, arise from anxiety - 
about what? About nothing, about no one. It is when the powerful 
male is dead and no longer there to prohibit anything at all that, in a 
perfectly disconcerting way, there emerge the alterity of duty and the 
debt of guilt, both of them all the more unbearable. The father 
emerges from his own death, the law emerges from its own absence - 
quite literally ex nihilo. 129 
126 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 232. 
127 I am referring here to the close association of writing with death, that paradoxically is the very 
technology that enables the trace of the deed, a death, to live on. 
128 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 143. 
129 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, 'The Freudian Subject' in The Emotional 71e: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis and 
Affect, trans. Richard Miller and X. P. Callahan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 31. Van 
Haute renders this in arrestingly similar terms: `it is just when there is no longer anyone around to forbid 
anything whatsoever that the law and guilt, ex nihilo so to speak, establish "themselves. "' Phillippe van 
Haute, 'Law, Guilt and Subjectivity: Reflections on Freud, Nancy and Derrida', in Deconstructive 
Subjectivities, ed. by Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: State University of New York, 1996), p. 
189. 
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existing law, but also, as Freud notes, because the attempt to take the place of the all- 
powerful father fails: `in consequence of the pressure exercised upon each participant as 
a whole, that wish [to become like him] could not be fulfilled'. 130 For Borch-Jacobsen, 
this failed identification is about `the unoccupiable place of the dead one, since death 
sets the absolute limit on identification' 131: 
Der tote who is resurrected and lives on eternally in the guilty 
memory of the sons represents death, represents their own 
unrepresentable death to them. Indeed, at the myth's extreme, we must 
imagine that the murderers, having devoured the other in order to 
appropriate his being, suddenly found themselves once again facing 
`themselves' - that is, facing no one. The other was dead, and so they 
themselves were dead. The identifying act of incorporation confronted 
them - brutally, dizzyingly - with what is preeminently unassimilable: 
their own death their own being dead, the very thing that eludes all 
appropriation. 
Freud's conjectural history can thereby be thought of as an attempted and failed 
identification with death, an attempted mastery and a failed identification through which 
the primal sons derive their identity. 133 Likewise, Totem and Taboo, in so far as it can 
be seen as a recuperative gesture of mastery through which otherness is both evoked and 
denied, violently identified with yet never absolutely assimilable to itself. This is the 
logic of colonization. 
130 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 148. 
131 Borch-Jacobsen, `The Freudian Subject', p. 34. 
132 Borch-Jacobsen, `The Freudian Subject', p. 34. Again van Haute argument reiterates Borch-Jacobsen's 
point: `But perhaps Freud is on the track of something more fundamental here. The identification fails 
because there is a limit to appropriation. The failure of the identification by the sons already reveals an 
unbridgeable limit. It discloses an alterity that I cannot appropriate and that makes the assimilation of the 
other inevitably fail. In the perspective of Freud's story, this alterity can be both other than death, the 
"absolute master, " or he who is dead'(191). For van Haute, death, the unthinkable, and `he who is dead' 
represents, for the sons, `their own inconceivable death'(191). 
133 Van Haute's reading, written some ten years after Borch-Jacobsen's, is uncannily similar to Borch- 
Jacobsen's reading. Van Haute claims that the `sons submit to the other (consequently, to themselves) 
insofar as the other escapes every identification: what the sons are gathering themselves around and what 
they are submitting themselves to is literally "nothing"-no subject, no Father, no leader-nothing but 
their own proper/improper inconceivable death their inability to be an absolute narcissist/subject. The 
`delayed' (nachträglich) obedience that founds the community is not a submission to a political power, 
but an ethical respect for what in the subject escapes the subject; it is a respect for what is "beyond the 
ego" (über-ich, in the sense of nonassimilable) in the ego'(192). Van Haute's notion of ethical respect for 
the other is profoundly problematized by the role of women, a role that van Haute does not refer to, as 
objects of exchange for the new civil community created after the murder of the primal father. Similarly, 
the fact that Totem and Taboo is situated in a long line of conjectural histories that assimilate and 
incorporate the colonized into itself, not as the `über-Ich' but as the `id', is cause for concern. Finally, van 
Haute's own attempted and unacknowledged incorporation of Borch-Jacobsen's prior ideas about an 
identification makes his own reading overly optimistic as an example of an ethical relation to otherness. 
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Civilization and its Discontents 
Freud is, in some very important senses, representative. In so far as he gestures 
toward the teleological where the future of civilization is characterized by the non- 
ambiguity of the end-point, when the subject once again will return to a state of unity, 
not with the instinctual force of the id, as it was prior to the primal parricide, but with 
the ego and the accumulated forces of reason, reality=civilization and scientific 
knowledge, Freud is reproducing the very hope of the Enlightenment. 
Freud conceived of the `barbarous' as `the opposite of civilized', but in the sense 
that the past is the opposite of the future. 134 He claims that the `influences of civilization 
cause an ever-increasing transformation of egoistic trends into altruistic and social ones 
by an admixture of erotic elements'. 135 Barbaric acts could always be attributed to 
archaic traces, of which certain peoples have a greater_proximity_to than others: `It must 
be granted that all the impulses that society condemns as evil - let us take as 
representative the selfish and cruel ones - are of this primitive kind. ' 
136 It is the 
primitive within us, the forces at work in the individual id, Freud argues,, that we need to 
guard against: `the primitive stages can always be re-established; the primitive mind is, 
in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable'. 137 
Freud maintains that neurosis is characterized by ambivalence. 138 If so, his own 
relation to what he calls civilization is a deeply, neurotic one. Freud always considered 
civilization as inherently paradoxical-thought to be the highest expression of human 
'34 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 281. 
135 Freud, `Thoughts for the Times on War and Death'(1915), PFL 12, p. 69. 
136 'War and Death', p. 68. 
137 'War and Death', p. 73. 
138 `Our assertion that taboo originated in a primeval prohibition imposed at one time or another by an 
external authority is obviously incapable of demonstration. What we shall rather endeavour to confirm, 
therefore, are the psychological determinants of taboo, which we have learnt to know from obsessional 
neuroses. How did we arrive at the knowledge of these psychological factors in the case of the neurosis? 
Through the analytical study of its symptoms, and particularly_ofobsessional acts, defensive measures 
and obsessional demands. We found that they showed every sign of being derived from ambivalent 
impulses, either corresponding simuitaneously to both a wish and a counter-wish or operating 
predominantly on behalf of one of the opposing trends. If, now, we could succeed in demonstrating that 
ambivalence, that is, the ascendancy-of-opposing trends, is also to be found in the observances of taboo, 
or if we could point to some of them which, like obsessional acts, give simultaneous expression to both 
currents, we should have established the psychological agreement between taboo and obsessional neurosis 
in what is perhaps their most important feature'(Totem and Taboo, pp. 35-36). This logically flawed 
argument suggests that if we can determine that taboo is caused by ambivalence, because we know that 
obsessional neurosis is caused by ambivalence, then obsessional neurosis is analogous to taboo. 
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existence, it is built upon the denial of everything we really want; it controls aggression 
and the chaos of instinct, but in so doing it produces psychic unhappiness and the 
perpetual revolt of the unconscious. Although the aim of the formation of civilization 
was to unite individuals against the threat posed by nature and by their own inclinations, 
in Civilization and its Discontents, Freud asserts: `It is impossible to overlook the extent 
to which civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes 
precisely the non-satisfaction... of powerful instincts'(286). 
This idea of ultimate civilization, as scientific knowledge which requires the 
repression of `atavistic vestiges', presents Freudian psychoanalysis with an 
epistemological contradiction, a dilemma that could, in Freudian terms, be thought of as 
consolation: `Each of us behaves in some respect like a paranoic, corrects some aspect 
of the world which is unbearable to him by the construction of a wish and introduces 
this delusion into reality. ' 139 In Freud's view, this defensive strategy, although 
understandable, represents the antithesis of the psychoanalytic project as production of 
knowledge within reality. The dilemma is that for Freud the terms science and 
civilization are virtually synonymous, and they work in a circle of closed logic that 
reinforce each other. If the notion of civilization as phylogenetic progress, however, is a 
neurotic delusion produced as an effect of so-called civilization (and I have tried to 
suggest that it is), what status can be given to the scientific knowledge which 
civilization produces including the positing of the idea of civilization itself? 
Freud's appeal to science as the mark of civilization is further problematized by 
Freud's own relation to civilization. For while `unprejudiced science' was the road to 
civilization, it was science's prejudices that undermined Freud's own claim to 
scientificity and civilization as a result of his Judaism. According to Gilman, `Freud was 
aware of the anti-Semitic association of the products of Jewish scientists with the nature 
of the Jewish mind'. 140 And as he told his friend and disciple Abraham Kardiner, he 
139 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 269. 
140 Gilman, Freud, Race and Gender, p. 33. 
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hated the idea that `Psychoanalysis would founder because it would go down in history 
as a "Jewish" science'. 141 
In spite of these problems, Freud continued his scientific exploration of the 
Oedipal complex as the mechanism by which, if successfully resolved, the work of 
civilization, where the instincts are repressed and the energy re-channelled into the work 
of culture, can be undertaken. It is through the repression produced in the Oedipal 
moment that the split subject, the subject divided from itself, emerges. Although Freud 
argues that it is civilization that controls and redirects the aggressive forces of the id, 
internalizing them and directing them towards the ego, the metaphors of colonial 
aggression that he uses to describe this process unsettle his formulation: `Civilization... 
obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and 
disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a 
conquered city. ' 142 Bearing in mind that the word `savage' comes from the Latin 
`sylva', meaning woods, that is those who lived in the woods rather than the cities, this 
image of occupied and garrisoned cities is a remarkable one. Civilization, here 
anthropomorphized, seeks to protect itself from aggression, yet a city had been 
conquered, presumably aggressively, in order for such protection to be established. Is 
the feared locus of aggression the conquered or the conqueror? 
Similarly, in `The Dissection of the Personality', Freud refers to the repressed as 
`foreign territory' and the purpose of psychoanalytic therapy is `to strengthen the ego, to 
make it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge 
its organisation, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there 
ego shall be'. 143 That civilization is associated with the ego, and sexuality with the id, in 
an imperial relation, is clear in Freud's assertion that civilization `behaves towards 
sexuality as a people or a stratum of its population does which has subjected another 
one to its exploitation'. 144 
141 Cited in Gilman, Freud, Race and Gender p. 33. 
142 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 316. 
143 Freud, 'Dissection of the Personality'(1933[1934]), PFL 2, p. 112. 
144 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, pp. 293-94. 
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It is perhaps for this reason that, for Freud, Rome was the symbol of what he 
desired to be and desired to conquer. He told his friend Wilhelm Fliess that `my longing 
for Rome is deeply neurotic. It is connected with my schoolboy enthusiasm for the 
Semitic hero Hannibal'. 145 This desire was reproduced in Freud's study where `above 
the chair where Freud sat listening to his patients, are two large framed fragments of 
Pompeiian-style wall paintings dominated by mythological figures: a centaur (half- 
man/half-horse) and Pan (half-man/half-goat). They represent aspects that are primitive, 
phallic and pleasure-seeking in human nature. Below these large framed fragments, on a 
pedestal, sits a dignified portrait head... It is "the Roman citizen, " symbol of a nation 
dedicated to the rule of law'. 146 Rome, the symbol of civilization, is an imperial state 
that both civilizes and colonizes. 
But if omnipotence, like Hannibal's, is characteristic of the forces of aggression, 
then it is surely the colonizing Oedipalized ego, and its all-encompassing rationality, 
that deserves to occupy this position. These forces, moreover, are not primeval traces, or 
atavistic vestiges, as Freud suggests, but are an effect of historical forces that it 
displaces on to prehistory. What I am suggesting, however, is that civilization, and the 
rational cogito that seeks to strengthen itself in the face of doubt, at the expense of what 
it deems irrational, prove to be the locus of aggression. It is civilization where the 
manifestation of the death drive and its desire for mastery operates at its most efficient. 
It is in the desire for a strong ego, for a surety and stability of identity, the very form of 
identity, you will recall, that systems of primogeniture require, that the threat of 
otherness must be extinguished. 
The Cartesian cogito that psychoanalysis is said to have displaced, the subject 
that psychoanalysis was produced by, returns through the psychoanalytic moment, 
where the aim of the civilized psyche is the co-option or appropriation of the id by the 
ego. It is hardly surprising that the psychoanalytic moment should emerge during the 
modem imperial one as a displacement mechanism of the intrapsychic otherness that 
145 Cited in Peter Gay, A Life for Our Time (London: Dent, 1988), p. 132. 
146 Cited in Marianna Torgovnich, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 196-97. 
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has been repressed. It was the contention (which Freud shared) that Aborigines were our 
prior primitive selves, dominated by the forces of instinct, and requiring rapid civilizing 
to control these forces, that functioned as a justification for the violent colonization of 
Australia. 
Within this configuration, Fieud's analysis of the causes of anti-Semitism are 
questionable. In Moses and Monotheism, Freud argues that anti-Semitism is the result of 
the refusal of Jewish people to participate in and accept the burden of guilt imposed by 
the murder of the primal father. Christians acknowledge their parricidal guilt by 
accepting Christ's sacrifice as atonement. It is for this reason, Freud asserts, that Jews 
have fuelled resentment and are presently suffering. I want to suggest that this argument 
is itself marked by a profound repression, and the repression is held in place by one of 
the most powerful taboos functioning in twentieth century Western societies: the taboo 
on calling into question the status of civilization as the highest attainment of reason, 
knowledge, truth and justice through which human beings, subject to the inexorable 
laws of progress, attain freedom and liberation. This is accompanied by the difficulty of 
calling into question the stable, coherent and unifed modern subject, itself an historical 
effect that justifies its colonial aggression through appeals to progress, civilization and 
freedom. With this in mind, it is possible to suggest that anti-Semitism, like the racism 
manifested in the aggressive colonial `drive'-territorially, psychically, and 
epistemologically, is a result of the logic of civilization itself. From this perspective, it 
could be argued that reason, knowledge and civilization are instigators of the savage 
violence they project on to others, as the after-effect of an imagined primitive past. 
How else, but as a result of repression, are we to explain the surprise Freud 
expresses in Moses and Monotheism: `We are living in a specially remarkable period. 
We find to our astonishment that progress has allied itself with barbarism'(295). Freud 
interprets the German participation in the First World War as an anomaly, rather than a 
logical conclusion of the civilizing process, and expresses dismay and astonishment at 
`the brutality shown by individuals whom, as participants in the highest human 
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civilization, one would not have thought capable of such behaviour'. 147 Yet, in 
Civilization and its Discontents, Freud suggests the way in which civilization is haunted 
by that which it disavows: `neither was it an unaccountable chance that the Dream of 
Germanic world-domination called for anti-Semitism as its complement'(305). It could 
be argued therefore that it was in the foreclosure of the other, in the simultaneous 
repression of otherness and desire to know and master otherness, that the necessity to 
institute sciences dedicated to exploring and annihilating, creating and destroying 
otherness emerged. Psychoanalysis, like anthropology, emerged as both a cause and an 
effect of what Freud calls civilization. 
In 1938, while Freud was in London, forced there as a result of anti-Semitism, 
moving towards the conclusion of the book that had haunted him, Moses and 
Monotheism, Germany was moving towards the historical rupture that we now call the 
Holocaust, an event haunted by the spectre of otherness that it sought to eliminate in the 
name of truth, homogeneity and civilization. The Holocaust is the culmination of the 
logic of Western Civilization, the logic of Enlightenment anthropology and the logic 
that Freud applied in his analysis of what he referred to as savages. From this 
perspective, civilization is not instituted by the resolution of the Oedipal complex, as 
Freud suggests in Totem and Taboo, but is an effect of the ongoing non-resolution of 
the Western Oedipal moment, where the split subject, infinitely at war with and in love 
with itself, incorporates otherness into itself and displaces its otherness on to others. 
Considered from this perspective, the colonization of Australia was a distinctly 
Oedipal act, and the removal of Aboriginal children from their communities and placing 
them in white institutions and homes, as reported in Bringing the Home was aimed at 
the elimination of the Aboriginal race altogether. As John Frow argues: 
the almost unspeakable word here is `genocide'. While seeking to 
remain strictly within the legal framework of the time and to avoid a 
retrospective moralism, the Report nevertheless concludes that a 
principal aim of the child removal policies was the elimination of 
indigenous cultures, and that in the sense given the word by thetas 
relevant international convention this aim constitutes genocide. 
1 47 Freud, 'War and Death', p. 67. 
1"s John Frow, A Politics of Stolen Time'[online], Australian Humanities Review, Available: 
http: //www. lib. latrobe. edu. au/AHR/archive/issue-February-1998/frowl. html (19 July 1999) 
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It is with this in mind that I will now consider three Aboriginal writers and the 
challenges they present to colonialist modes of Oedipalization, and the elimination of 
otherness that this process involves. 
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Chapter 2: Re-reading David Unaipon 
Myths and History 
My reading of Freud's Totem and Taboo in the previous chapter suggests that 
Freudian psychoanalysis is committed to a specific vision of history, and the emerging 
discipline of anthropology enabled this vision of history to be both theorized and 
simultaneously effaced. Part of the theorizing of myth involved determining what 
distinguishes myth and history, and part of the tension in Totem and Taboo is the way in 
which, in spite of Freud's denials, these categories are collapsed. Although Geoffrey 
Kirk claims that `[t]heories about the meaning of myths were propounded at least as 
early as the sixth century B. C'. 1, in the aftermath of Darwin's theory of evolution, the 
late nineteenth century saw a renewed interest in myth as an object of anthropological 
interest. Myth `became once again an object of rationalist scepticism albeit in the 
apparently more appreciative mode of scholarly investigation'. This attitude to myth 
has, according to Kirk, `been dominated in this century by the trends initiated by Sir 
James Frazer'(2), who described his monumental comparative study of myth, The 
Golden Bough, as a record of `the long march, the toilsome ascent, of humanity from 
savagery to civilization'. 
Yet, even in a strictly anthropological sense, the meaning of myth is extremely 
unclear. 4 One of the few things that can be said about myths, however you define them, 
is that they have come to be associated with the beginnings of civilization. Evolutionary 
anthropology looked at myths comparatively whereby cultures were placed in an 
evolutionary scale from least to most civilized. This ascent from savagery to civilization 
is accompanied by a concomitant movement from mythology to history, where history 
' Geoffrey Kirk, Myth and its Meaning in Ancient and Other Cultures (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), p. 1 
2 Michael Bell, Literature, Modernism and Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 13. 
3 James G. Frazer, `Preface to the Third Edition', The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative Religions 
Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1900), p. xxv. 
4 Biblical scholars, like Robertson-Smith and Frazer, claimed that myths are associated with, and even 
originated from, ritual. This assessment, however, has been widely challenged and, in its broadest 
anthropological sense, myth is not just to do with ritual, nor even with religious beliefs, feelings and 
practices. Ultimately, to differentiate between a myth, a legend and even folktale proves impossible. See 
Kirk; see also Stocking for a discussion of Max Mü1ler's work and its influence on Frazer and Tylor. 
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is conceived of as closer to a scientific and empirical notion of the truth. The fact of the 
production of history was understood to be an effect, as well as signifying the truth of, 
evolutionary progress. Anthropology, which can be thought of as a special branch of 
history, was the history of people without history, the history of Europe's own pre- 
history. As the savage is the forefather of the civilized, so mythology became the 
forefather of history leading to the assumption that mythology embodied the originary 
explanatory modes of humanity. 
Freud, like the anthropologists he drew upon for his version of history, was 
clearly interested in mythology. Like Frazer and Robertson-Smith, he saw mythology as 
a throwback to the infancy of civilization, and he extended his phylogenetic argument, 
examined in the previous chapter, into the realm of mythology. For Freud, in the same 
way as contemporary human beings retain the primitive trace of the murder of the 
primal father, objective, civilized history, retains the vestiges of primitive forms of 
history, or non-scientific history, that is mythology. As Freud argues in Civilization and 
its Discontents: `In the realm of the mind... what is primitive is so commonly preserved 
alongside of the transformed version which has arisen from it that it is unnecessary to 
give instance as evidence'(256). 
Similarly, for Freud, as the function of civilization was to incorporate primitivity 
into civilization as much as possible, the function of objective, civilized history was to 
incorporate and supercede primitive forms of history, that is, mythology. This involves, 
as I argued in my earlier discussion of Moses and Monotheism, the decoding of 
distortions, to produce truer, and more civilized forms of history. In order to produce 
historical truth, Freud argues `we must uncover... tendentious purposes. If we find 
means of recognizing the distortions produced by those purposes, we shall bring to light 
fresh fragments of the true state of things lying behind them'. 5 Freud not only gestures 
towards the possibility of an objective description of the past, he also suggests that the 
development of history out of mythology is linked to the development of civilization to 
which it is closely aligned. 
5 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, pp. 281-82. 
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In this sense, Freud's conception of mythology and its relation to history is 
inherently patriarchal, concerned, as it is, with the nature of inheritance. Myths are of 
interest because they provide clues about the way Europe's forefathers conceptualized 
the world they lived in. According to Mieke Bal, the Freudian argument `tries to explain 
structures by stories..., and the inherent subjectivity with the pseudo-objectivity of the 
"scientific myth" of phylogenetic explanation/beginning. The replacement of logical 
articulation by (non-falsifiable) origin is an attempt to impose, on notions that are alien 
to it, a family structure. Ideas, phantasies, get a father and become sons. s6 
For Freud, however, the mythological past is not merely to be dismissed. Rather, 
it is to be interpreted as a symptom of the inability to face up to the historical truth of 
civilization, which, like neurotic symptoms, can be reinterpreted in the light of the 
methodology of civilized history, thereby allowing the historian/analyst to 
retrospectively rediscover the objective truth lying behind the myth: 
Our knowledge of the historical worth of certain religious doctrines 
increases our respect for them, but does not invalidate our proposal 
that they should cease to be put forward as the reasons for the precepts 
of civilization. On the contrary! Those historical residues have helped 
us to view religious teachings, as it were, as neurotic relics, and we 
may now argue that the time has come, as it does in an analytic 
treatment, for replacing the effects of repression by the results of the 
rational operation of the intellect. 7 
This process of uncovering historical truth by decoding distortions is, in Freud, 
strangely racialized: `The study of these creations of racial psychology is in no way 
complete, but it seems extremely probable that myths, for example, are distorted 
vestiges of the wish-phantasies of whole nations-the age-long dreams of young 
humanity' .8 What Freud means by `racial psychology' 
here is unclear, as it is in his 
earlier reference to a `racial treasure-house of myths, legends and fairy-tales' .9 It does 
seem to suggest, however, that Freud's view of myth as archaic could be readily 
transferred, in racial terms, to what he elsewhere refers to as `savages'. 
6 Mieke Bal, `Myth A la lettre: Freud, Genesis and Rembrandt, and the Story of the Son', in Discourse in 
Psychoanalysis and Literature, ed. by Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (London and New York: Methuen, 
1987), p. 66. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
7 Freud, `Future of an Illusion', PFL 12, pp. 227-8. 
8 Freud, Collected Papers, IV, (London: Hogarth, 1925). p. 182. 
9 Freud, Collected Papers, IV, p. 182. 
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For Freud, not only are myths primitive, in the sense of archaic, they are also to 
be found in that part of civilized man in which the primitive has left its trace, and which 
is most pronounced in childhood. Freud's phylogenetic hypothesis, articulated in Totem 
and Taboo where the individual's life recapitulates the life of the species, is also evident 
in the child's propensity for mythical thought. The unconscious is a storehouse of the 
archaic heritage that is transmitted phylogenetically and from it `children in their 
fantasies are simply filling in the gaps in their individual truth with prehistoric truth'. '° 
Jo Labanyi argues that it is Freud's `concern with the origins of neurosis in 
childhood that makes him take his terminology-"Oedipus Complex", "Narcissism" = 
from Greek mythology, seen as embodying the mental life of "original" Western 
man'. " However, this produces a strange contradiction. Even as Freud conceived of 
mythology as `the age-long dreams of young humanity', psychoanalysis itself is 
produced out of and deduced from a series of myths, the most spectacular of which is 
Freud's evocation of the murder of the primal father which he raises to the status of 
historical fact. So Freud simultaneously draws upon mythologized thinking to construct 
and sustain his argument, which he elevates to the status of historical and scientific 
truth, even as he sees it as a remnant of a primitive past, a past which is itself a mythical 
construction. 
In this way, psychoanalysis, and the evolutionary anthropology from which it 
draws its authority, is characterized by the themes of progress and stasis. On the one 
hand, Freud is committed to historical and evolutionary progress; on the other, he can 
only conceive of the modem Oedipal subject as being, at its core, timeless and pre- 
historical, thus enabling its universality. In this way, a specific historical subject -the 
modem, Western man-is accorded a universal status. As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, the effects of civilization are given as its cause. 
This contradiction is analyzed by Mieke Bal who demonstrates the way in 
which, for Freud, myth shares something with his concept of the phantasy. `Phantasy' is 
10 Freud, `The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms', in Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, SE, 16, 
371. 
Jo Labanyi, Myth and History in the Contemporary Spanish Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), pp. 10-11. 
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defined by Laplanche and Pontalis in The Language of Psychoanalysis as the 
`Imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfilment of a 
wish (in the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that is distorted to a greater 
or lesser extent by defensive processes'. 12 This subjective and personal experience of 
phantasy, which is both distorted and imaginary, is in stark contrast to Freud's notion of 
the `Primal Phantasy': 
Typical phantasy structures (intra-uterine existence, primal scene, 
castration, seduction) which psychoanalysis reveals to be responsible 
for the organisation of phantasy life, regardless of the personal 
experiences of different subjects; according to Freud, the universality 
of these fantasies is explained by the fact that they constitute a 
phylogenetically transmitted inheritance. 13 
These two forms of phantasy encompass the contradictory meanings that inhabit the 
way Freud thinks about myth. Myths are like the phantasy in that they are imaginary, 
subjective and fictitious, while they share with the primal phantasy, that which is 
universal, explanatory and foundational. 
It is these opposing meanings which make the use of the term `myth' so 
problematic. One need only open a dictionary to examine the range of meanings the 
signifier `myth' lays claim to. The Oxford English Dictionary defines myth as: 
A traditional story, either wholly or partly fictitious, providing an 
explanation for or embodying some popular idea concerning some 
natural or historical phenomena, or some religious belief or ritual, esp. 
one involving supernatural persons, actions, or events... A widely- 
held (esp. untrue or discredited) popular story or belief; a 
misconception... a rumour; '4 
Myth thereby serves as both a foundational story of the origin, which relates the truth at 
the beginning, and also signifies a falsehood; in other words, while a myth may be 
foundational, it does not necessarily have its foundation in fact. Paradoxically, this lack 
of foundation in fact, moreover, does not necessarily remove the fictionality of myths 
from the realm of truth. 
12 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(London: Karnac Books, 1988), p. 314. 
13 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, p. 331. 
14 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2 Vols., ed. Leslie Brown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), Vol. 1, p. 1875. 
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It is perhaps this that has led to the Romantic and Modernist revivals of myth. 
According to Ong, the Romantic Movement marks `the beginning of the end of the old 
orality-grounded rhetoric'(158). The revived interest in myth can then be thought of as 
nostalgic desire, which may account for the criticism it has received in the latter half of 
this century. It was as early as 1953 that myth came to he opposed to history in an 
article by Philip Rahv, `The Myth and the Powerhouse': 
Myth, the appeal of which lies in precisely its archaism, promises 
above all to heal the wounds of time. For the one essential function of 
myth stressed by all writers is that in merging past and present it 
releases us from the flux of temporality ... hence the mythic is the 
polar opposite of what we mean by the historical, which stands for 
process, inexorable change, incessant permutation and innovation. 
Myth is reassuring in its stability; whereas history is the powerhouse 
of change which destroys custom and tradition in producing the future 
... In our time the movement of history 
has been so rapid that the mind 
longs for nothing so much as something permanent to steady it. 
Hence, what the craze for myth represents most of all is the fear of 
history. 15 
In this period, as Michael Bell has noted, the concept of myth came to be synonymous 
with ideology, and antonymous with history, perhaps most famously articulated by 
Barthes's claim that myth `transforms history into nature' 16 It is this timeless 
universality, the belief that, in the words of Bal, `a myth is a myth because, under the 
layers of dust of historically changing signifiers, it remains the same signifier- 
independent signified, a universal story'(59), that is, so to speak, the greatest myth of 
all. 
Both Rahv and Barthes provide important critiques of the Romantic view that 
myth puts beings in touch with their origins and subsequently, with timeless and eternal 
truths, where myth's `splendour is that of the original totality, the pristine unity of 
thought and action, word and deed'. '? However, the relationship between mythology 
and history, in both senses of the word (that is, both past events, and the narrativization 
of those events), is more complicated than they suggest. Like Freud, their Hegelian 
's Philip Rahv, `The Myth and the Powerhouse', Partisan Review, 20 (1953), p. 637. 
16 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (London: Paladin. 1972), p. 129. See also Bell, p. 
226. 
17 Rahe, p. 641 
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valourization of history, even if it acknowledges the fact of temporal change, also gives 
the impression of objectivity that conceals the voice that speaks. 
What these criticisms fail to recognize is that while what we call `history', 
which is a form of modern thought, does not call into question, through historicization, 
the status of the subject that produces history, it remains profoundly ahistorical. As 
Foucault has argued, the notion of historical causality which underlies the belief in 
historical progress, leads to an obsession with origins, an obsession that in turn leads to 
the production of history as a mode of understanding, a history that is then naturalized: 
It is no longer the origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity 
that, in its very fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin which 
must be both internal and foreign to it: like the virtual tip of a cone in 
which all differences, all dispersions, all discontinuites would be 
knitted together so as to form no more than a single point of identity, 
$ the impalpable figure of the Same, yet possessing a power 
nevertheless, to burst open upon itself and become Other. 
It is the discipline of history, and anthropology as the history of humanity, that `creates 
an origin, a place of birth, where what emerges is both a specific subject and the 
historical methodology that articulates and inaugurates it'. 19 In other words, the modern 
Western subject is an effect of, among other things, the discourses of history and 
anthropology which, in turn, produce certain kinds of subjects, subjects that desire to 
know themselves through an understanding of the past. The point is, as Barker has 
argued, `theories of history depend on, constitute and are constituted by modes of the 
subject'(71). 
This mode of subjectivity, and the universal status accorded to it, is, as I have 
already argued, deeply implicated in the colonial project. Evolutionary anthropology, 
refusing to acknowledge modes of subjectivity that it does not recognize in itself, 
situates other cultures as previous incarnations of itself, thereby providing the 
theoretical justification for their incorporation in the form of colonization. It is 
impossible to disentangle this epistemological desire from a phantasmatic one, where 
the colonized, in this case Aboriginal Australians, are conceived of as a site of 
18 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 329. 
19 Barker, p. 54. 
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wholeness that the dislocated and rational civilized subject seeks to inhabit. Mythology 
thereby becomes that which is both superceded by history, as well as a means by which 
man can be restored to his original state of wholeness, hence the nostalgia surrounding 
its revival. 
Kirk claims that myths `do not have a single form or act according to one simple 
set of rules, either from epoch to epoch or from culture to culture'(2). As he reminds us, 
for the Greeks, muthos simply meant a tale, or something one uttered, in a wide range of 
senses. For Kirk, the vagueness of this etymological point of departure is an unhelpful 
one. Although I do not presume to answer the impossible question of what myth 
actually is, this chapter hopes to retain a sense of vagueness and, through the 
contradictions encapsulated within both the terms `history' and `myth', attempts to ask 
alternative questions. 
The History of David Unaipon 
This discussion of mythology and history, and the ambivalences surrounding 
them, seems to me to be one way of introducing and thinking about the life and work of 
Australia's first, yet little-known, published Aboriginal writer, David Unaipon. 20 
Unaipon was born on 28 September 1872, the fourth of nine children. His father, James 
Ngunaitponi, was the first Aboriginal convert to the Aborigines' Friends' Association's 
(AFA) congregational mission, Point McLeay, in the Lower Murray region of South 
Australia. The AFA was an interdenominational movement formed in 1858. Unaipon's 
mother, Nymbulda, was the daughter of the rupulle, the elected leader and president of 
the Tendi, or democratically-elected body which governed each lakalinyeri, or clan 21 
20 The brief history that follows has been gleaned from a variety of sources: Australian Friends 
Association Annual Reports (Adelaide: Aborigines' Friends' Association, 1936-64); John Alexander, 
`Following David Unaipon's Footsteps', Journal ofAustralian Studies, 54/55 (1997), 22-29; John Beston, 
`David Unaipon: the First Aboriginal Writer (1873-1967)', Southerly, 39.3 (1979), 334-51; Graham 
Jenkin, Conquest of the Ngarrindjeri (Melbourne: Rigby, 1979); Philip Jones, `A Curve is a Line and a 
Line is a Curve: Some of the Truth about David Unaipon, Sydney Review, 14 (1989), p. 8 and the entry 
under Unaipon in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 11: 1891-1931 ed. Geoffrey Serle 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988), pp. 303-05; Andrew Markus (ed. ), Blood From a Stone: 
William Cooper and the Australian Aborigines League (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988) and Governing 
Savages (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990); Margaret Simons, `Nobody's Hero', Eureka Street, May, 
1994, pp. 18-20. Future references are to these editions, and are included in parentheses in the text. I have 
also referred to material on Unaipon in a range of newspaper articles that will be cited as they appear. 
21 See Jenkin, p. 20. As Jenkin notes in his history, almost all his information of Ngarrindjeri social 
organization comes from non-Aboriginal sources, and especially from Rev. George Taplin, the first 
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From age seven, Unaipon attended the mission school, and was consequently one of the 
first Ngarrindjeri (the indigenous community of the Lower Murray region) youths not to 
be initiated. 
In 1887, at age fifteen, Unaipon was taken from his birthplace, Raukkan, and 
placed, as a servant, in the home of C. P. Young, the first secretary of the AFA. 
Although Unaipon returned to Raukkan from time to time, he did not settle back 
permanently at Point McLeay until he was in his nineties. Young later wrote of his visit 
to Raukkan to collect Unaipon: 
I brought away with me ... a living proof of the excellent training of the children. I only wish the majority of white boys were as bright, 
intelligent, well-instructed and well-mannered, as the little fellow I am 
now takinn charge of. He is the son of our old friend, James 
Unaipon. 
Young encouraged Unaipon's interest in music, philosophy and science, attributes for 
which Unaipon would later become famous. It was from this early stage that Unaipon 
became interested in perpetual motion, to the quest for which he devoted his life. 
On 4 January, 1902, Unaipon married a Tangini woman from the Coorong, 
although little is known about the marriage. By 1908, he had suffered a rupture, and had 
to wear a truss for the rest of his life, making it difficult for him to perform manual 
labour, the only real employment option for Aboriginal people at that time. This was the 
same year his father, James Ngunaitponi, died at the age of seventy-four. Between 1909 
and 1944, Unaipon made nine patent applications, all of which lapsed. 
In October 1913, Unaipon was appointed a collector for the AFA. For fifty 
years, under the sponsorship of the AFA, he travelled South Eastern Australia, 
combining this work with lectures and sermons in churches and cathedrals of different 
denominations. His wife stayed at home while he travelled. Although successive 
governments controlled every aspect of Aboriginal life to well into the latter half of this 
century, Unaipon's connections and intellect enabled him to remain fairly free of the 
missionary of the AFA in to the lower Murray region, the Ngarrindjeri homelands. Not only did Taplin 
keep a detailed diary, he also wrote Folklore Manners, Customs and Languages of the South Australian 
Aborigines (Adelaide, 1878). 
22 Cited in Jenkin, p. 185. 
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usual legislative restraints that applied to Aborigines. In 1926, he appeared before a 
Royal Commission into the treatment of Aborigines. 
In 1928, the Commonwealth Government appointed J. W. Bleakley, the Chief 
Protector of Aborigines in Queensland, to investigate Aboriginal administration and 
welfare in the territory. Unaipon assisted with this investigation and the resulting report 
suggests that Unaipon was considered as a possible leader of a native state. According 
to the report, Unaipon condemned the idea as unworkable, arguing that `to press such a 
system upon them would only result in chaos, for the different tribes would not agree'. 23 
The subsequent report advocated increased control over Aboriginal lives. In 1934, 
Unaipon urged the Commonwealth to take over Aboriginal affairs and proposed that 
South Australia's Chief Protector of Aborigines be replaced by an independent board. 
This did not happen. 
In 1951, David Unaipon published a six-page article called `My Life Story' in 
the AFA Annual Report. In 1953, he wrote another article entitled `Leaves of Memory', 
again published in the AFA Annual Report. This was the same year that Unaipon 
received the Queen's Coronation Medal. In his nineties, Unaipon returned to Point 
McLeay to continue his quest for perpetual motion. He died in 1967, at the age of 
ninety-five, the same year that white Australia decided by referendum that Aborigines 
should become Australian citizens. 
This is necessarily a brief sketch of Unaipon's life, a sketch intent on keeping to 
the facts. To study David Unaipon, however, is to be confronted with the problem of the 
archive. Although there is a substantial number of historical documents that refer to 
him, they operate `on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that 
have been scratched over and recopied many times'. 24 The attempt to produce a 
narrative out of them involves, in the words of Foucault: 
the reconstitution, on the basis of what documents say, and sometimes 
merely hint at, of the past from which they emanate and which has 
now disappeared far behind them; the document was always treated as 
23 J. W. Bleakley, The Aboriginals and Half-Castes of CentralAustralia and North Australia (Victoria: 
Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1929), p. 30. 
24 Foucault, `Neitzsche, Genealogy, History', trans Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 76. 
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the language of the voice since reduced to silence, its fragile, but 
possibly decipherable trace. 25 
To begin with, almost all of David Unaipon's writings were financed and published by 
the AFA. The AFA, moreover, made possible his education, provided him with 
employment and financial assistance, and sponsored his travel and speaking 
arrangements. It was also his assistance from the AFA that enabled him to move around 
the southern states of Australia relatively unhindered at a time when general Aboriginal 
movement was kept under the strictest Government surveillance and control. One would 
imagine that it was therefore extremely important for Unaipon not to lose the support of 
the AFA. Given that his medical condition prevented him from undertaking much other 
work, it is difficult to see how Unaipon could have spoken against the AFA, even if he 
had wanted to. I am not trying to suggest that Unaipon did want to speak out against the 
AFA, but rather that he had a very limited place within the discursive field that he 
inhabited; and this field determined what it was possible for him, at least publicly, to 
say. These limitations, I would argue, must be borne in mind when attempting to think 
about Unaipon's work. 26 
An additional complication is that Unaipon was often referred to as a legend, 
and accounts of his life, even his own accounts, vary considerably. It is widely accepted 
that, as a boy, Unaipon read Isaac Newton's Laws of Physics and widely believed that 
Unaipon's first patent in 1907 adopted Newton's ideas of curvilinear motion which 
Unaipon converted into straight-line movement to invent the hinge that drives the 
modem sheep shears. Apparently, Unaipon patented the idea but did not get the funds to 
develop it, and eventually it was stolen from him and adopted without any money or 
credit. Graham Jenkin, author of Conquest of the Ngarrindjeri, investigates this story 
and claims that Unaipon took out provisional patent number 15624 entitled `Mechanical 
Motion' in 1909 and ratified it in 1910. Jenkin concludes: `If indeed the invention had 
been fully patented, there would still be drawings and specifications of it in the Patents 
u Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 6. 
26 For an elaboration of this position, see Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' in The Foucault 
Effect. - Studies in Governmentality, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 53-72. 
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Office, but as it was allowed to lapse, no such details exist. Thus the truth of the matter 
will probably never be known'(236). 
The Myth of David Unaipon 
Jenkin argues that because `he was such a legendary figure, many myths grew 
up, in turn, concerning David Ngunaitponi'? 7 Jenkin attempts to dispel some of these 
myths: `Amongst other pieces of misinformation to be found in print are that he 
attended St Peter's College, that he was an ordained clergyman, and that he went to 
England to meet the Queen-all of which, along with various other non-facts written 
about him, are quite erroneous'(234). Jenkin also refers to an article published in the 
Adelaide Register which reported an Easter service at Raukkan in 1907 in the following 
way: `The organ was faultlessly played by a pure black whose mother was queen of the 
tribe in days gone by. He is still regarded by the natives, though by circumstances 
deprived of his own position, as one who should not be expected to do rough work. ' As 
Jenkin responds : `Quite apart from the preposterous notion that because Pullum was the 
rupulle, his daughter, Nymbulda Ngunaitponi, must have been a queen, it is interesting 
to see that David's inability to undertake heavy labour (because of his rupture) is 
ascribed here to his alleged princely standing'(234). 
Philip Jones, a social anthropologist with the museum of South Australia and the 
person who wrote the entry on Unaipon in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
refers to Unaipon in another article, which, like Jenkin's, also sets out to dispel myths 
about Unaipon, including those propagated by Jenkin, as `an historical figure of almost 
mythic proportions'. 28 Jones includes aspects of Unaipon's life that had been left out of 
other biographies presumably because they worked against the `apparently 
uncontrollable compulsion to make a hero and martyr of the man'(8). These include the 
suggestion that he abused his wife, 29 that he was `parsimonious' towards his relatives, 
27 Jenkin, p. 234. Ngunaitponi seems to be an alternative Anglicized spelling for Unaipon which is clearly 
the simplified form. Unaipon's father, James, is generally referred to as Ngunaitponi, the meaning of 
which, according to Unaipon, is `I go'. David, on the other hand, is almost always referred to, and refers 
to himself as Unaipon. See `An Aboriginal Genius: Full-Blooded Native who is Philosopher, Inventor, 
Genius', Daily Herald [Adelaide] 1 June 1914, p. 11. 
28 Jones, `A Curve is a Line and a Line is a Curve', p. 8. 
29 See Simons, p. 20. 
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and, perhaps most damning of all, that he, with other Ngarrindjeri, had been involved in 
the historical re-enactment of the landing of the British in Tasmania. By 1910, when the 
re-enactment took place, there were, as a result of systematic extermination, no full- 
blood Aborigines left in Tasmania. 
Looking through newspaper articles from earlier this century, it does seem that 
Unaipon occupied a mythologized place in the Australian imagination. A selection of 
these will suffice to make the point. A 1907 article, entitled `An Ingenious Aboriginal', 
opens in the following way: 
Few people who have not made a special study of the native question 
are aware of the extent to which original talent is sometimes found 
among the aborigines. In a broad sense, it is no doubt true that the 
native mind is not apt to stray from the narrow and beaten paths that 
have been formed by generations of habit, but one sometimes comes 
across startling exceptions to the rule. One of these exceptions, Mr. 
David Unaipon... has lately been in Adelaide on a remarkable errand. 
He brought with him a neatly drawn design of a piece of mechanism 
which, he claims, can be attached to machinery and facilitate the 
attainment of perpetual motion 30 
Another article, published in 1925, titled `Aboriginal Intellectual: David Unaipon' 
begins in much the same vein: 
For a twentieth century citizen to be suddenly confronted with a man 
from the Stone Age would be an experience sufficiently piquant. But 
suppose, faced with the Stone Age man, he addressed you in cultured 
tones and proceeded to discuss the harnessing of gravity and the 
poetry of Milton? Your feelings would probably be somewhat similar 
to those of the reporter who interviewed David Unaipon on his visit to 
Adelaide this week. 
Adelaide's Daily Herald, in an article titled, `An Aboriginal Genius: Full-Blooded 
Native who is Philosopher, Inventor, Genius' begins in awe: 
Behold a Contradiction in human terms. An Australian native who is a 
Philosopher, Inventor and musician, and who devotes any spare time 
he may have to the study of evolution; a full-blooded aboriginal who 
can quote Newton, Huxley, Darwin, and other evolutionists and 
philosophers. There you have David Unaipon of Point McLeay. 32 
30 `An Ingenious Aborigine', Advertiser [Adelaide], 12 April 1907, p. 4. 
31 `Aboriginal Intellectual: David Unaipon', Observer [Adelaide], 10 October 1925, p. 46. 
32 `An Aboriginal Genius, p. 11. 
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It was not just newspaper articles that gushed about Unaipon in this way. In 
1931, Francis Garnett, who had been the superintendent of Raukkan from 1900 to 1906 
and was later Chief Protector of Aborigines, South Australia, wrote: 
At one end of the scale stands a poor blackfellow eating grubs: at the 
other end stands David Unaipon, the cleverest Native Australian ever 
known, the brainiest man in the whole black population of thirty 
thousand. David has astonished the professors of the universities of 
Sydney and Melbourne by the breadth of his intelligence and his 
capacity for absorbing knowledge... Like the great Hebrew king 
whose name he bears, David has a great love of music... he is a born 
orator and elocutionist... David refused to waste his time memorizing 
[literature of a light humorous character] and would only recite 
extracts from Milton's Paradise Lost or something equally impressive 
... Point McLeay at length became too small for our expanding genius, David's affinity is for the ways and thought of the white men, and for 
years he has travelled through the Australian states, lecturing and 
preaching. He is a great reader of books of science and philosophy, 
and he talks familiarly of evolution and anthropology. He has made 
collections of native legends ... He 
is a lover and champion of his own 
race, but his love of the intellectual life has made him a wanderer far 
from his kith and kin, and enabled him to make himself at home in the 
cities of white people. Of course, he is very human. Like many other 
men of note he is only a second rate financier. Some of the inevitable 
weaknesses of the self-made man can be easily seen in him. But he is 
careful concerning his appearance, pule in his language, courteous in 
his manner. He is a non-smoker and teetotaller. He is an Australian 
Aboriginal, but he also belongs to Nature's Aristocracy. 33 
After Unaipon died in 1967, Jim Robbin's eulogy in the Adelaide Advertiser simply 
stated: `David Unaipon was an inventor, a musician, a philosopher. A man who could 
quote Milton, Darwin, Huxley. A blackfellow. '34 
From these fragments, it seems that Unaipon occupied such a legendary place 
because he was the startling exception to the rule, the `Stone-Age' man that had 
travelled through time and arrived in the twentieth century, a `contradiction in human 
terms'. The scale that Garnett refers to that finds a poor blackfellow eating grubs at one 
end and Unaipon at the other is, of course, the evolutionary scale, and, as can be seen in 
a photograph in the AFA Annual Review in 1936, that the missionary enterprise could 
enable the Aborigines to take leaps along this scale was one of its proudest claims (See 
Appendix 2). 
33 Cited in Jenkin, p. 235. 
34 Jim Robbins, `Day By Day', Advertiser [Adelaide], 9 February 1967, p. 4. 
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It is easy to see why Unaipon was claimed by British Australians as the most 
important Aboriginal voice at the time, sharing, as he seemed to, with scientists and 
anthropologists, many of the assumptions about evolutionary anthropology that allowed 
colonization to continue without question. It was, perhaps, Unaipon's seeming 
commitment to assimilationist beliefs and policies, policies that are now seen as being 
largely responsible for the widespread destruction of Aboriginal communities, that has 
led, in this later period of so-called self-determination, to the contemporary neglect of 
Unaipon. In Margaret Simon's article, `Nobody's Hero', she quotes Fred Wandmaker, 
who had tried to make a movie of Unaipon's life, `but nothing had come of it': 
In the surge of interest in Aboriginal history during the bicentenary 
year, Wandmaker hoped the project would at last be picked up, but 
racists are not the only people discomfited by Unaipon's story. 
`Unaipon was a coconut, ' Wandmaker says. `You know what that 
means? White on the inside. Today's activists don't see him as 
someone to celebrate. ' (19) 
In this chapter, I hope to recuperate Unaipon as an important figure in Australian 
history and literature. I hope to avoid the pitfalls of heroization, but also to demonstrate 
the way in which a term like `coconut' is ahistorical, and does not take into account the 
context in which Unaipon's life was lived. This chapter, then, is an attempt at 
contextualization. It is important to remember that the terms in which debates about 
Aborigines were argued had already been set by the emerging discipline of evolutionary 
anthropology which had bestowed on itself the truth-status of science, leaving little 
room, within its own terms of reference, for challenging some of the basic assumptions 
that upheld it. As I have argued in my previous chapter, for anthropology (and 
psychoanalysis for that matter), Aborigines were representatives of the earliest stage in 
humanity's history. The belief in progress became enmeshed in nineteenth-century 
racial science leading to the almost universally held assumption that the Aboriginal was 
as close to archetypal man as existed. Australia's status as a primitive continent turned it 
into a scientific laboratory where early anthropologists could study man's progress from 
savagery to civilization, from tyranny to democracy, from superstition to reason and 
from indolence to work. 
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Anthropology in Australia 
Anthropology, as a discipline, became institutionalized in Australia with its 
inclusion as Section G at the first meeting of the Australasian Association for the 
Advancement of Science in 1880, some four years before it was institutionalized in 
Britain. As anthropology became established, so too did what Russell McGregor, in 
Imagined Destinies, refers to as the `doomed race' theory. 35 According to this theory, 
which was prevailing scientific opinion up until as late as the 1950s, the Aborigines 
were doomed to extinction. As McGregor's thorough analysis makes clear, `racial 
extinction most commonly appeared in the scientific literature as a bald statement of 
fact, unaccompanied by any explanation of how or why it could occur'(56-57). 
As I argued in the previous chapter, the idea of pi ogress was founded on the 
assumption that societies developed from a state of savagery to civilization, civilization 
being the goal, and this assumption about temporality was displaced on to a 
geographical axis. It was this displacement, or in McGregor's words, this `entanglement 
of the idea of progress with the concept of race that lent credibility to the prediction of 
inevitable extinction'(ix). The perceived inability of Aborigines to adapt to the 
conditions of invasion was interpreted as an inability to progress through the necessary 
stages to the point of civilization, and it was this perception that solidified the doomed 
race idea. It was Aboriginal primitivity, rather than, say, invasion, that was seen to be 
the cause of the demise of the Aborigines, an inevitability thereby attributed to the hand 
of nature. 
This was the discursive universe that Unaipon was forced to inhabit. To bring 
this into sharp relief, the anonymous reporter of the article, for example, that describes 
Unaipon as a `contradiction in human terms', goes on to explain how he: 
met this remarkable specimen of the human family at Dr. Herbert 
Basedow's rooms. It was most appropriate that the meeting should 
take place there. Than the doctor no one in Australia or for that matter 
in any part of the world, takes a keener or more practical interest in the 
welfare of the despised aboriginals. As proof of that interest he is now 
formulating a scheme for the preservation of the species, that is, the 
comparatively few tribes, or remnants of tribes that remain, which is 
gaining the support of scientific bodies of note. Dr Basedow is an 
35 See McGregor, esp. pp. ix-xii. 
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anthropologist of note, being chiefly known in scientific circles for his 
original research among Australian aboriginals 36 
This paragraph contains several popular assumptions worth noting. First, the 
reference to Unaipon as a specimen reflects the constitution of Aborigines as objects of 
anthropological knowledge. Second, that Aborigines are referred to as a `species' was, 
even in scientific circles at the time, quite incorrect. Third, that Aborigines were 
becoming extinct, hence the reference to `remnants' requiring preservation. Finally, and 
most crucial to my argument, was that anthropologists like Basedow, who subscribed to 
the doomed race theory, were seen and saw themselves, as McGregor has argued, not 
merely as men of science but as `men of strong humanitarian views, who were horrified 
by what they saw of the brutal treatment of Aboriginals'(17). In other words, men that 
are now considered to be racists were, at the time, considered to be and considered 
themselves as committed Aboriginal activists. 
Basedow's position, in regard to Aboriginal culture and development, is clearly 
revealed in this article. When the reporter asks about the `vexed problem' of the `Home 
of the first man', Basedow hypothesizes the existence of a large continent to the north 
of Australia: `All lines of migration are traceable from that portion of the earth. ' He 
continues to argue: 
In the Australian aboriginal you have a type of the original man-one 
who was, so to speak, isolated from the rest of the world. For 
anthropologically the Australian aboriginal is a full brother of ours, 
the Caucasian being a subsequent modification of the original 
Australoid. 7 
When the reporter then inquired of Basedow the `reason of the diversity between us in 
every way? ', he replied, presumably without irony, that the diversity is: 
due to the fact that those who migrated northward into Europe had to 
fight for their existence, which resulted in the survival of the fittest, 
the present-day Europeans, who through long ages have, by rivalry 
and subsequent competition in commerce and science, attained their 
present state of perfection. On the other hand, that section of the type 
which migrated southwards into Australia found a happy hunting 
ground. No need was there for them to fight for existence, hence no 
call for any special display of ability, the result being that they 
remained in their primitive condition. 
36 `An Aboriginal Genius', p. 11. 
37 `An Aboriginal Genius', p. 11. 
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The assumption was that Aboriginal customs were primitive in relation to European 
civilization and, furthermore, that European civilization was unquestioningly the 
already-achieved state of perfection, the goal towards which all cultures must, and 
would surely desire to, strive. 
Basedow's opinions represented both a scientific and welfare-oriented position, 
and only one of many possible positions (and, it should be noted, the most liberal- 
minded) within the vast array of opinions and debates which circulated about 
Aborigines. 8 The other broadly opposing view was what was known as 
degenerationism, whereby societies could move down as well as up the ladder of 
progress. For degenerationists, Aborigines were believed to be the debased remnants of 
a once civilized people, with extinction being a more certain and more deserved 
outcome. 
For the evolutionists, the primary question was whether or not Aborigines could 
`catch up' with European civilization; whether, in other words, it was possible to 
`civilize' them, civilization always and unequivocally being equated with 
Europeanization. Although there were strong voices on either side of this contested 
debate, there were certain shared assumptions that were enshrined in early evolutionary 
and anthropological science. At no stage was the right to colonize called into question. 
Although a small group of people could at least concede that Australia had once been 
-Aboriginal land, colonization itself was considered with the same kind of inevitability 
that characterized evolutionary theory. In this scenario, colonization is, quite simply, an 
effect of nature. Similarly, as can be seen from Basedow's comments, no one doubted 
the superiority of the European culture, its position at the vanguard of progress, and its 
right to remain there. There was, moreover, never any question of Aborigines surviving 
and thriving on their own terms, nor any question concerning the clear benefits of 
becoming civilized. As McGregor has argued, `[p]rogress was a law of nature, and those 
who had failed to elevate themselves would necessarily be swept aside in the universal 
38 For detailed discussion of these opinions and debates, see Hiatt, Stocking and McGregor. 
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struggle for survival'(58). As the twentieth century moved on, McGregor argues, fewer 
and fewer people believed that Aborigines could be civilized: 
As the Enlightenment vision of universal human progress faded, as 
attempts to civilise and convert failed, and as racial attitudes hardened, 
it came to be considered that the best that could be done for the 
Aboriginals was to protect them from overt injustice and brutality- 
for the short time they had left on this earth. If, as increasingly came 
to be taken for granted, the Aboriginals were incapable of attaining the 
status of civilisation, they were equally incapable of living within a 
civilised community. (18) 
For those who believed it was possible for Aborigines to progress, the question 
remained of the best way for such a project to be initiated. It was this question, always 
tied up with the role of missionaries in the civilizing process, that led to the increasing 
hostility between missionaries and Government administrators 39 
Intellectual Debates and Administrative Power 
These debates, however, were not conducted in an intellectual vacuum. The 
impact of the debates had material effects on the lives of Aboriginal people where the 
assumptions of evolutionary anthropology justified legal constraints. It is for this reason 
that accusations of apoliticism in the study of discourse are profoundly misplaced. On 
the contrary, the discursive universe that I have been attempting to outline and its 
political effects are inseparable. It is significant that many of Australia's early 
anthropologists were Government-appointed administrators of Aborigines who were not 
just recognized as experts, but also as activists and legislators on their behalf. Baldwin 
Spencer, whom I discussed in the previous chapter, is the prime example here, but 
Herbert Basedow also played an influential role. It is in this intersection of 
anthropology and legality that Foucault's notion of bio-power, where disciplinary 
technologies come in to play with normative social sciences, can be seen at its most 
effective. 
A brief look at varying legislations will suffice to make the point about 
techniques of power. John McCorquodale, who has done an exhaustive study of the 
39 The relation between anthropology, administration and Christianity is crucially important here. For a 
discussion of the tensions within these fields, see Stocking and McGregor. 
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legislative treatment of Aboriginal Australians, argues that a `bewildering array of legal 
definitions led to inconsistent legal treatment and arbitrary, unpredictable, and 
capricious administrative treatment' 40 McCorquodale's study found that there have 
been 700 separate pieces of legislation specifically dealing with Aborigines since 
colonization. The South Australian Government, whose jurisdiction Unaipon came 
under, passed a Northern Territory Aborigines Act on 7 December 1910, modelled or} 
the Aboriginal Acts of Queensland (1897) and Western Australia (1905). The major 
provisions concerned the regulation of employment, declaration of reserves and the 
restriction of sexual relations between races. The Act required the appointment of a 
Chief Protector, and the position was offered to Unaipon's friend, Herbert Basedow. 
Less than a month after the enactment of the legislation, the Northern Territory passed 
from the control of the South Australian Government into the hands of the 
Commonwealth Government. The 1910 Act became the basis for the Commonwealth 
administration for the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory. 
Although Basedow was considered a moderate, and a man who had the best 
interests of the Aborigines at heart, that did not prevent him from suggesting the use of 
`permanent individual identification' for effective `Aboriginal Protection and 
Control' 41 Following both the Queensland and Western Australian Acts, Basedow also 
suggested the removal of mixed-race children from camps and into homes or 
institutions. This suggestion was in line with the belief that full-bloods should be 
allowed to die out peacefully, and the mixed-race population should be absorbed into 
the white community. Biological absorption, as it was called, which even at the time 
was recognized as a euphemism for extinction, 42 of which Basedow was a proponent, 
was the basis of these Acts. These policies of assimilation, their causes and effects, are 
some of the issues that this thesis will focus on in greater depth in subsequent chapters. 
Suffice to say, for the moment, the sheer number of pieces of legislation, 67 of which 
40 John McCorquodale, `The Legal Classification of Race in Australia', Aboriginal History, 10.1 (1986), 
7-24. 
41 McGregor, p. 69. McGregor provides an informed and detailed discussion of the role of 
anthropological administrators in Australia, including Baldwin Spencer and Herbert Basedow. He does 
not mention George Grey, however, who could well be thought of as a precursor to these men. 
42 See McGregor, p. 179. 
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are only concerned with definitions of Aboriginality, point to the anxieties around 
identity, and the desire to fix it in law, that, as we have seen, is central to questions of 
inheritance and paternity. 
Although Basedow arrived in Darwin on 17 July 1911, he tendered his 
resignation 45 days later. He was subsequently replaced by Baldwin Spencer in January 
1912. Before his arrival, the Aboriginals Ordinance of 1911, which Spencer had been 
involved in drafting, extended the powers of the Chief Protector beyond those already 
granted under the 1910 Act, as did the 1918 Ordinance. The South Australian 
Aborigines Act became law on 7 December 1911, with additional regulations added in 
1917 and 1919, and its principal sections remained in force for over half a century. 
According to Jenkins, the Act: 
gave the Chief Protector of Aborigines and his delegates absolute 
power over every Aboriginal or part-Aboriginal's person; together 
with his children, his property, his money, his dwelling, his education, 
his employment, and in fact his whole life. Regulations under the Act, 
which were added in 1917 and 1919, further increased the powers of 
superintendents and further eroded what vestiges of human rights still 
remained with the Aborigines. Under these additional regulations, 
Aborigines could be summarily fined by the superintendent for not 
closing a gate, or for being untidily dressed-amongst the other 
`misdemeanours' listed. Even the times at which they had to rise in the 
morning were stipulated! (246) 
In 1912, Unaipon led an AFA-sponsored deputation to the South Australian 
Government requesting that `a Board be appointed by the Government to take control 
over the Aborigines of the State including the control of the Mission Stations, subject to 
the provision for the purely Missionary aims of the Association'. 3 This was partly in 
response to the dire fmancial situation that the mission was facing, which had been 
exacerbated by the embezzlement of funds. 44 In response to the deputation, the 
Government appointed a Royal Commission in 1913. Unaipon gave evidence at the 
Commission, although whether or not Aborigines were listened to is hard to ascertain, 
given that the Commission included questions such as: `Do you find half-castes more 
treacherous than full-bloods? ' and `Do you think you can make anything but a 
43 Cited in Jenkin, p. 259 
44 See Jenkin for an elaboration of this embezzlement, esp. pp. 215-21. 
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blackfellow out of a blackfellow? 45 The Aborigines Protection Board, a Commonwealth 
agency which was formed in 1909, and had been gradually taking over the 
administration of the missions, began to administer Raukkan in 1916. 
Such questions, and the legislation enacted, reveal the relation between the 
doomed race theory as an inevitability, and the proliferation of mixed-race children, 
which so unsettled the widely held notion of race as a distinct and bounded category. As 
McGregor claims, the doomed race argument `was premised on the notion that each 
race embodied a particular constellation of relatively stable physical, mental and 
cultural attributes. That race embodied fixed characteristics which were unable to be 
altered in the short term'(53). Certainly, an anxiety about miscegenation, that became 
known as the `half-caste problem', can be seen in the focus on the relative worth and 
capacity of full-bloods and so-called `half-caste' Aborigines. Once again, this was an 
extremely contested site. Although there was much discussion of hybrid inferiority, 
`most commonly expressed in the allegation that half-castes inherited all the vices of 
their progenitors and few of their virtues'46, the dominant anthropological view was that 
half-castes, because of their inheritance of white blood, were superior, more likely to 
progress, and therefore more adaptable to civilization. In 1934, Rev. Sexton, President 
of the AFA, the organization for which Unaipon worked, claimed that `the admixture of 
blood gives a half-caste superiority over his darker brother'. 7 Referring to 
miscegenation, Sexton argued that `the full-blooded native is declining and passing 
away. As a matter of fact, he withers away before the touch of civilization'. 8 This 
might explain why every single reference to Unaipon that I have come across opens 
with the fact that he is a full-blood Aborigine. 
Unaipon as exemplar 
A report in the AFA Annual Review, on the 1937 Conference of Aboriginal and 
State Aboriginal Authorities in Canberra, reveals the extent to which the distinction 
45 Cited in Jenkin, p. 260. 
46 McGregor, p. 139. 
4' Cited in McGregor, p. 140. 
48 Cited in McGregor, p. 133. 
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between full-blooded and mixed-race Aborigines was a central issue for discussion in 
determining legislation: 
The representatives at Canberra conference drew sharp distinctions 
between the full-blooded aborigines and their mixed descendants, and 
recommended different treatment for them. The full-blooded black is 
quite as intelligent as the half-caste, and in some cases more so, as can 
be proved by David Unaipon, who shows much greater intelligence 
than those with less Aboriginal blood in their veins. 49 
The contradictory nature of these debates can be seen in an article by the Rev Sexton, 
entitled `Has the Full-Blooded Aboriginal Sufficient Intelligence to Undertake the 
Responsibilities of Citizenship? ' Using Unaipon as one example, Sexton seems to have 
altered his position regarding the inevitable demise of full-blooded Aborigines: 
The lighter skin natives do not stand in the same category with the 
intelligent full-blooded aborigines. Think for a moment of the 
aborigines whose names have come before the public because of their 
gifts, you will find they are all full-bloods. James Unaipon, Mr 
Taplin's right-hand man, who taught him the native language, was a 
full-blooded aborigine; Matthew Kropinyeri, a gifted short-hand 
writer, was another; so is David Unaipon, with his musical gifts and 
inventive skill. 50 
Although Unaipon's reception is now read as a patronizing example of an 
Aborigine `made good', hence his contemporary neglect, it is important to bear in mind 
the kinds of constraints I have just outlined that determined Aboriginal possibilities and 
chances when rethinking Unaipon's life and work. As Unaipon was no doubt aware, at 
the time, the only chance of Aboriginal survival, let alone equality and citizenship, was 
assimilationist. As a full-blood Aborigine, to prove that one could become civilized, 
even if that was just another way of saying Europeanized, was perhaps the only, and 
even the most subversive, option. Unaipon represented, and seems to have set out to 
represent, what Aborigines could become if given the chance. From this perspective, 
Unaipon was not only an exception to the rule, but an exception that just might 
challenge it. Unaipon, by challenging the assumption that Aborigines could not become 
civilized, simultaneously challenged ideas that lent credibility to the doomed race idea, 
49 AFA Annual Review, 193 8, p. 8. 
S0 F. H. Sexton, `Has the Full-Blooded Aboriginal Sufficient Intelligence to Undertake the 
Responsibilities of Citizenship? ' AFA Annual Report, 1945, p. 24. 
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ideas that claimed that, because Aborigines were incapable of adaptation or civilization, 
they would die out. 
That Unaipon did challenge these perceptions, and used himself in that way, is 
apparent from the way in which he is discussed: 
People who are inclined to deprecate all efforts to educate the natives 
as unprofitable will do well to remember that Unaipon is a full- 
blooded native. The instance may be an exceptional one, but it is 
evidence that there are possibilities of no mean order with regard to 
the intellectual development of the Australian natives. 5 
Reverend F. H. L. Paton, writing of Unaipon in the AFA Annual Review argues much the 
same position: 
He often lapses into a brown study, and sits huddled up, lost in deep 
thought on some scientific problem. I have listened spellbound to his 
addresses, and have always marvelled at his vast knowledge and 
amazing versatility. Such men are, of course, exceptional, but they 
prove the aborigines have latent spiritual and intellectual powers of 
the very highest order. They only await the opportunity and the 
inspiration. ` 
Although the AFA can be seen as using Unaipon to prove the success of their own 
missionary project, it is also the case that such a success, necessarily had effects beyond 
those desired by the AFA, including entitlement to political rights, as the following 
anonymous argument makes clear: 
It is not without significance that [Unaipon] should emerge from 
mission stations where [he] received the Enlightenment and impetus 
necessary to develop [his] powers, and should come forth to show 
Australia that the Aborigines possess gifts and graces which justly 
entitle them to a much better status within the nation. 53 
Even Herbert Basedow, in his explication of racial theories through the now discredited 
science of phrenology, used Unaipon as an example of the heights to which Aboriginal 
people could rise. The result, as you will see, is that his own theoretical position, 
although articulated in scientific discourse to mask its deeply confused position, is 
thereby disturbed: 
51 `An Ingenious Aborigine', p. 4. 
52 F. H. L. Paton, `Two Outstanding Australian Aborigines', AFA Annual Review, 1938, pp. 28-9. 
Emphasis added. 
53 'The Intellectual and Artistic Gifts of Aborigines', AFA Annual Review, 1939, p. 42 
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`The aboriginal brain anatomically and physiologically in its primitive 
condition is quite as capable of acquiring the results of centuries of 
gradual study and development as is our own brain, which, by heredity, should be expected to have every advantage over the 
primitive brain of the blackfellow. Modern science and study has 
made the brain of the white man larger in its frontal lobes that that of 
the aboriginal, and it has more convolutions than the primitive brain. 
All the natural instincts are present in the aboriginal brain, however, 
and you will find that a native will rise to the occasion every time. 
You have an example before you in Unaipon. ' 
I agreed. Unaipon was a living example of the facts adduced by the 
doctor; a wonderful example of the degree of perfection to which the 
aboriginal brain could attain... 
The broad forehead, surmounted by a shock of black hair, silver 
streaked, the intelligent, deep-set eyes, the well-shaped head, proclaim 
David Unaipon an aborigine of more than ordinary intelligence. 5 
Even more than the uses to which Unaipon was put, it is his own notorious 
comments that have also led to his being rejected as an early Aboriginal spokesman. At 
times, Unaipon himself draws upon and perpetuates the assumptions of evolutionary 
theory: 
Look at me and you will see what the bible can do. Sixty or seventy 
years ago my people were wandering about with spears and 
boomerangs, living their wild and savage life; but the comings of the 
Gospel has changed all this, and I stand as one of the many who have 
been brought out of the darkness into light. My favourite hymn is `At 
Even, Ere the Sun was Set, ' and there is one line in it that I can prove 
to be true by myý own conversion. It is this: `Thy touch has still its 
ancient power. ' S 
In an interview, moreover, the tension between the primitive and the civilized is played 
out, and Unaipon's own views on civilization, and colonization, are indeed troubling: 
All his acquired culture has not taken away from David Unaipon his 
more primitive gifts. He can still spear fish, for instance, in the milky 
waters of the Murray. Asked whether he regarded civilization as a 
privilege or a disaster, he said he undoubtedly preferred his present 
state to the primitive life which would have been his lot but for the 
coming of the whites... `The coming of the white man was a blessing. 
We were isolated from the world's culture. It is true that my people 
could not adapt themselves to civilization, but that is because it came 
too suddenly for us. '56 
Certainly, such statements can be read, in Fanonian terms, as evidence of a deeply- 
ingrained inferiority complex, the result of alienation brought on by the violence of 
sa Quoted in `An Aboriginal Genius', p. 11. Emphasis added. 
55 David Unaipon, `Thy Touch Has Still its Ancient Power', AFA Annual Review, 1938, p. 31. 
56 `An Aboriginal Intellectual', p. 46 
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colonization. Yet, as Fanon noted, such `effective disalienation... entails a recognition 
of social and economic realities'(10). Following Fanon, I will think about Unaipon's 
writings as strategic recognitions, and their historical importance perhaps lies in the fact 
that, through Unaipon, we can also recognize these social and economic realities, the 
limited options for Aboriginal people which continue to this day, and their effects on 
Aboriginal subjectivity. In this light, one way of thinking about Unaipon's position is as 
a strategic attempt to be conciliatory, a plea to give Aborigines more time to get used to 
an invading force that clearly was not going to go away. Unaipon's expression of desire 
for civilization, as opposed to the `primitive life', a life that Unaipon, as someone 
brought up from birth in a mission, had never actually lived, can also be seen as 
evidence of a willingness to adapt, at a time when the only other alternative being 
presented was extinction. 
Unaipon's internalization of evolutionary anthropology can be seen in his most 
famous address, `An Aboriginal Pleads for his Race' (see Appendix 3): 
Civilisation has come to my people so suddenly that they have not 
been able to adapt themselves to it. Evolution is a process which takes 
time. Some people say the white man should leave the aborigine 
alone, should not interfere with his customs and his manner of living. 
The white man must not leave the aborigine alone. We cannot stand in 
the way of progress. The aborigine must not be left alone in the 
middle of civilization. That would be like an aborigine leaving a white 
man alone in the bush... 
This piece, Unaipon's most well-known, is striking in many ways, not the least of which 
is its adherence to evolutionary principles. Yet, when Unaipon pleads with the white 
man to not leave the Aborigine alone, a plea for interference which is now seen as one 
of the primary reasons for the destruction of traditional Aboriginal societies, it can also 
be thought of as a plea to take responsibility for the effects of colonization, a plea to not 
leave the aborigines alone to die, while also holding out against the prospect of 
complete government-supported biological absorption. Unaipon's analogy between `an 
aborigine leaving a white man alone in the bush', and the white man leaving an 
aborigine `in the middle of civilization' is a plea to whites to identify with the situation 
in which Aborigines have been placed, a plea that asks white Australians to put 
themselves in the place of the colonized other. It is a request to encounter otherness in 
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some of its unfamiliarity, fore-grounding adaptation rather than progress, while 
simultaneously alluding to the many recorded instances of Aborigines saving whites lost 
in the bush. 
Unaipon's most coherent disavowal of the inevitability of the doomed race 
concept appears in an article published in the Daily Telegraph in 1914, entitled `A 
Dying Race: Civilization and the Blacks'. It is a revealing interview, and worth quoting 
at length: 
David Unaipon, a full-blooded native from the Point McLeay mission 
station... in addressing the Royal Geographical Society in Melbourne 
on Friday night, said that he was thankful that Christianity had been 
brought to this tribe. He explained to an interviewer how he reconciled 
this statement with the fact that of the once numerous Narrinyeris (sic) 
only thirty full-blooded representatives remain. The missionary, he 
said, had come too late. He had been preceded by the careless drovers 
and the bushmen, who had seen no harm in giving rum to the 
aborigines. Almost as great a foe to the tribe had been the pointing 
stick, and with rum on top of that superstition the natives of the lower 
Murray had been nearly annihilated. Great efforts had been made by 
the missionaries to save the remnant of the tribe, but the difficulties 
were great. 
`I do not believe, ' said the native prince, `that because aborigines 
become civilized and live in houses they will die rapidly. It was the 
chopping and changing about that reduced the numbers... If the 
remnant of the tribe had been allowed either to live in the primitive 
state or had adopted European methods thoroughly, it would have 
increased instead of decreasing. 
`You must leave the full-blood in the primitive state or take him right 
away from the bush. For my part I would sooner be working in an 
engineering shop in the city than living in the bush. I would not care if 
I never saw the bush from one month's end to the other. It would be 
far better for the full bloods if they were working in a city. They 
would have so many things to see and think about that their hereditary 
instincts would weaken. ' 
David Unaipon does not think the aboriginal race is doomed. Half 
measures, he fears, will kill them; but if they are placed in a proper 
environment, which he describes as `right away from the bush, ' he 
believes that they will increase. He has adopted European methods 
right up to the hilt and says he is a better man than one who goes only 
half way. 
Several times in the course of the interview he emphasized the view 
that it would be better to leave the full-bloods alone than to half 
civilize them... Environment, he declared, was greater than heredity, 
and a different environment would produce a different man... As for 
the half-castes, the call of the wild was not so strong in them, and they 
would be likely to do best on a farm. 
In spite of some of the problematic formulations in this piece, one thing that is 
clear is that David Unaipon intervenes in the nature/culture debate by arguing, ahead of 
his time, that race, or at least the attribution of certain characteristics to it, is an 
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extremely unstable category, which is not fixed, and is largely determined by 
environment. There is also the suggestion, at other times contradicted, that Aborigines 
should either be left alone, or fully assimilated, which would include citizenship rights, 
the right to freedom of movement, and the right to employment, all of which Aborigines 
were, at the time, denied. It has to be remembered that this interview took place the year 
after the 1913 Royal Commission, and although the most important issue from the 
perspective of the commissioners was the `problem' of the proliferation of mixed-race 
children, according to Jenkin, `from the Ngarrindjeri point of view, the two most crucial 
questions for the commissioners to enquire into were the perennial problems of 
unemployment and shortage of land'(264). Although Ngarrindjeri shearers were 
considered the best workers, by the time of the commission, pressure from white 
labourers meant that even this source of employment, one of the most reliable for 
Ngarrindjeri people at the end of the nineteenth-century, had been denied to them. Work 
places were generally segregated, and by 1913, as Sexton reported to the Commission, 
the shearing sheds were `very largely closed against them'. " When questioned about 
the possibility of alternative rural employment, Sexton replied: 
We have men who go out from Pt. McLeay, but they are regarded as 
inferior labourers, and they get smaller wages. Then possibly you have 
an outcry against that state of things. They are driven back to the 
station and there is nothing for them to do... they really are in a most 
pitiable condition, and young men have spoken to me again and again 
if something could not be done so that they could obtain remunerative 
employment instead of depending on chanty. 58 
According to Sexton, the situation was no better in urban centres. Unaipon, also raised 
this point with the commission, claiming that: `Twenty years ago it was easier for us to 
live. There was more work to be got. We used to work then and were paid for it, and 
lived as a result of our own labour. Things have changed in that work is not now 
available. '59 Unaipon's comments in the interview in the Daily Telegraph the following 
year need to be seen in this context. 
57 Cited in Jenkin, p. 265. 
58 Cited in Jenkin, p. 265. 
S9 Cited in Jenkin, p. 266. 
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The Oedipalizing of David Unaipon 
One of the most important questions Unaipon's life and work raises concerns the 
production of subjectivity under colonial conditions. I have argued in the previous 
chapter that certain technologies, like the spread of alphabetic literacy-arid printing, and 
socio-political circumstances that centred on the concern with inheritances from the 
father intersected in Europe to produce an Oedipal subject. I have also argued that this 
subject, in its restricted identifications (oppressor/oppressed), and in its desire to 
eliminate otherness (which it sets up as uncivilized) for the surety of its own identity, is 
inherently colonizing. Colonialist metaphors to describe the relation of the id to the ego 
in psychoanalytic theory-pan-be thought of as one exemplification of this. Unaipon's life 
and work can be thought of as revealing the way in which colonialism seeks not merely 
to assimilate the other, but to reproduce in the colonies the Oedipalized psychic 
configuration that I have outlined in the previous chapter. Such a project of reproduction 
of the same in the colonial context can be seen in the visitor's book, at Raukkan, in 
which Prince Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, wrote on 11 November 1867, five years 
before Unaipon was born: 'May the-children who are now in your_schools grow up_to be 
good Christians, and may the aptitude you, of the present generation, shew to assume 
the manners and customs of the Colonists, be well marked in your successors. 960 
This process, however, 
_ 
is always deeply_ambivalent, largely because the 
Oedipalized subject always requires a form of otherness that can be incorporated into 
itself. So although,. as-we have seen, the post-Enlightenment Oedipalized subject is 
concerned, on the one hand, with the possibility of equality and liberation, this equality 
and liberation was always_predicated on the subjection, in the form of objectification 
and regulation, of the other. Although Unaipon believed, and probably quite rightly, that 
the only viable option for Aboriginal survival was to become `civilized', within the 
logic of civilization, as we have seen, the rhetoric of equality was extremely limited, 
and was always underpinned by_relations of subjection. Nonetheless, Unaippn can be 
seen as marking the emergence of a specific colonial subject in the Australian context, a 
60, cited-in rte, p. isr. --- 
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subject located in the interstice between pre- and post-colonization, caught on the cusp 
of changing epistemologies and technologies. 
Certainly Unaipon's commitment to both Aboriginal rights and to the progress 
of civilization and Christianity produced a deeply ambivalent discourse in relation to his 
own culture. His passionate advocacy for the rights of his people is haunted by a 
simultaneous disidentification, and reidentification with a Christian, rationalist and 
patriarchal system as perpetuated by the colonizer. His active participation, moreover, in 
the discourse of anthropology enacts that movement from being an object of 
anthropological knowledge to being both subject and object of his own knowledge. 
Unaipon's movement from objectification to subjectification can also be seen as 
being a form of Oedipalization. There are numerous examples of Unaipon appealing to 
a certain Oedipalized made of being, or what Unaipon refers to, in the interview in the 
Daily Telegraph, as his `mode of life', that is structured around the patriarchal nuclear 
family: 
`About a year ago I and another full-blooded native at the mission 
became sick with indigestion. With an aboriginal it is a grievous 
complaint. He was not nearly so bad as I. For sick weeks I had 
scarcely a wink of sleep. We both had wives. Now, the other man was 
different from me in that he had never fully adopted the European 
methods, nor had his wife. My wife was far advanced in civilization 
and was a good cook and nurse. He died, and I became as well as ever. 
It was simply because of the differences in our mode of life. '6 
In this quotation, we see the very sexual division of labour that characterized the 
seventeenth-century social contract (one of the conditions of the emergence of capitalist 
relations) and an appeal to a civilized European family to explain Unaipon's recovery. 
This is the only mention Unaipon ever makes of his wife, who occupies a strangely 
marginal place in narratives of his life, reflecting, one might say, the domestic sphere 
articulated by social contract theorists. 
It is certainly ironic, given that one of the central justifications for 
anthropological and administrative intervention in Aboriginal culture was protection of 
Aboriginal women from the aggressive sexuality of Aboriginal men, that the most so- 
61 `An Aboriginal Genius', p. 11 
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called `civilized' Aboriginal in Australia may have abused his wife. This is a suggestion 
made by both Philip Jones and Margaret Simons, who writes: `Little is known about his 
marriage, but there are reports that he abused his wife and locked her up'(20). It is 
worth remembering, though, that under South Australian law at the time, marital rape 
was sanctioned on the basis of a man's conjugal right, and in Britain, up until as late as 
1881, `husbands were allowed forcibly to imprison their wives in the matrimonial home 
to obtain their rights'. 62 If the Christian tradition that Unaipon married within claimed 
that marriage was a divine institution that united two individuals into a single person, 
then under English law, that person became the husband, and a wife's very existence 
was incorporated into that of her husband. Although anthropologists argued that pre- 
colonial Aboriginal relations between men and women were based on `violence and 
unwilling submission' rather than the `mutual affection and consent' of the `more 
advanced' English domestic relations, under English law at the time, the powers of a 
husband `included the right to vent aggressive impulses on [his wife's] person for the 
purpose of legitimate chastisement: he could beat her, so long as he did not do it in a 
"violent-or cruel manner"'. 63 
ThatUnaipon maintains some faith in the terms of such a civil fraternal contract, 
even if, in the Australian context at the time he wrote, Aboriginal people were quite 
explicitly denied participation in such a contract, can be seen in his articulation of his 
desires for his own son: `I want to see that boy well-educated.... I don't want him to be a 
parasite, and have to rely upon the Government or mission, but become an honourable 
citizen of South Australia'. M 
Perhaps the most striking example of Unaipon's Oedipalization, however, is his 
strong identification with his father, and how often he sees himself, and is seen as, 
continuing, or inheriting, the role of his father, a structural relationship central to 
reproducing capitalist institutions. Such a conception of inheritance is at work in 'the 
AFA Annual Review: 
62 Pateman, p. 123. For an extended discussion ofthe inarrmage contract, and its relation to the social 
contract, see Pateman, esp. chapter 5. 
6' Stocking, p. 198. 
64 `Aboriginal intellectual: David Unaipon', p, 46. 
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It was generally agreed that he is a splendid advocate of his race and a brilliant preacher for missions. In this Review, reference is made to 
David's father, who was the first evangelist to the Narrinyeri tribe, and it is evident that the spirit of the father has descended to the son, 
moving him to do whatever he can to promote the spreading of the 
Gospel among the people of his own race. 65 
This formulation is framed in quasi-mystical terms where Unaipon's `family' resonates 
with Trinitarian theology, and its reproduction in the image of an all-male and paternal 
`holy family' an image, one might well argue, that is echoed in the Oedipal triangle. 
Fathers and Sons 
Compared to the ghostly absence of Unaipon's wife, Unaipon's father, James 
Ngunaitponi, has a overwhelming presence in all versions of Unaipon's life. Jenkin 
describes him: `striding across the stage of time like some Greek hero, the monumental 
figure of James Ngunaitponi dominates the play... There seem to have been no known 
limit to his talents'(161). This is a curiously theatrical metaphor, a variant of the 
universal existential drama of the family triangle and brings to mind, in the context of 
my analysis, the theatrical model of the psyche, dominated by the Greek drama of 
Oedipus Rex, that Freud so often drew upon. 
James Ngunaitponi, the first convert and missionary for the AFA, consented to 
go to Raukkan with Taplin and arrived there in 1864. George Taplin, the first 
missionary to the Lower Murray region, became superintendent of the Port McLeay 
mission on behalf of the AFA. Just prior to taking on this post, Taplin had informed the 
AFA committee that he was hoping to train a certain James Reid for missionary work 
among the Ngarrindjeri. James Reid, however, was none other than James Ngunaitponi, 
who had adopted the name of the recently deceased Scottish missionary, James Reid, `in 
honour of the man who baptised him'. 66 Like Freud's name-change, James 
Ngunaitponi's change of name is an act of both an identification and disidentification, 
and not merely with cultural or racial groups, but also with structural relations. 
Certainly, James Ngunaitponi's position generated a great deal of hostility and 
uncertainty. Taplin's diaries report how Ngunaitponi faced ridicule and abuse from 
65 `The Intellectual and Artistic Gifts of Aborigines', AFA Annual Review, 1939, p. 41. 
66 Cited in Jenkin, p. 143. 
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whites, and persecution from Ngarrindjeris: `The principal cause of all the 
unpleasantness lately is, I believe, the fact of my shewing such kindness and favour to 
James Unaipon... I saw it the very next day after James came, and I believe they secretly 
and thoroughly hate him'. 67 According to Jenkin, when Unaipon `did forge family ties 
with the Karatindjeri [the local lakinyeri or clan] by marrying Nymbulda, the daughter 
of Pullum, the rupulle, James only invited more persecution because he married her in 
the Christian, rather than the traditional fashion'(162): 
As the years passed, the animosity which James had stoically endured, 
when he first settled at Raukkan, faded: and he became a leader for the 
people as a whole-not just for the young Christians. Because of this 
he succeeded in converting even some of the old conservatives to 
Christianity. This process was facilitated by the realisation by the 
older people that the control over the rising generation was 
diminishing rapidly, and that the ancient religion of their fathers had 
been effectively destroyed. (163) 
During 1873, Taplin worked on his acclaimed anthropological work, The 
Narrinyeri, which was published by the AFA, and provides the most detailed 
information there is on the pre-invasion life-style of the Ngarrindjeri. Much 
contemporary historiography and anthropology relies on this text, indeed I have relied 
on it, as has Graham Jenkin, who has provided the only historical account of the 
Ngarrindjeri which is, in itself, problematic. The Ngarrindjeri was reprinted in 1878 as 
part of a larger work, The Folklore, Manners, Customs and Languages of the South 
Australian Aborigines. 
According to Jenkin, who has read Taplin's dairies from the period of the 
writing of Folklore, Manners, Customs and Languages of the South Australian 
Aborigines, Unaipon's father, James, was an important contributor to this project: 
James Ngunaitponi played a significant role in assisting Taplin in his 
work on the Ngarrindjeri... Over a period of six years, James 
explained the social structure, recounted legends, taught the language, 
corrected translations, and recalled the recent history of the 
Ngarrindjeri. The journals from 1873 onwards show clearly how great 
a part James Ngunaitponi played in recording his own rich cultural 
and linguistic heritage. It was James, for instance, who first told 
Taplin about the Tendi and enabled him to see it in action, but no 
acknowledgement of this fact is given in The Narrinyeri. James 
67 Cited in Jenkin, p. 162. 
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acknowledgement of this fact is given in The Narrinyeri. James 
Ngunaitponi was certainly the assistant author, and could possibly 
have claimed to be co-author of this important work. (153) 
Needless to say, James Ngunaitponi did not appear as the text's co-author although, in 
Folklore, manners, customs and Languages of the South Australian Aborigines, there is 
an anthropological photo of Ngunaitponi, shirtless, standing beside a ruler. His name is 
not mentioned, and he is only referred to as a Narrinyeri Male (see Appendix 4). This 
photograph, the only photograph I have seen of James Ngunaitponi without a shirt, 
exemplifies the way in which Aboriginal subjects are turned into anthropological 
objects, and the particular is turned into the general. 
As we will see, such appropriation is not limited to James Ngunaitponi's life, 
and in this sense, David Unaipon can been seen as following in his father's footsteps in 
more ways than one. And just as David Unaipon will repeat and re-enact his father's 
position as object of exploitation, in an uncanny repetition of father and son narrative, 
characteristic of Oedipal culture, Taplin's own life is marred by allegations that his son, 
Frederick, had sexually assaulted a young Aboriginal girl on the mission. In a narrative 
with strange echoes of the story of the primal horde as told by Freud, it is said, 
according to Jenkin, that Taplin eventually died from the stress associated with the 
allegations that Frederick had sexually assaulted an Aboriginal girl on the mission. 
After the death of George Taplin, and in spite of continuing and regular allegations that 
his son was harassing Aboriginal women, and that he had even fathered a child to an 
Aboriginal woman, Frederick Taplin was appointed to the position of superintendent of 
the mission in 1879. In narratological terms, this is the story of the son who replaces the 
father, over the father's dead body, and, in replacing his father, gains sexual access to 
women. 68 
The Ngarrindjeri leaders had tried, unsuccessfully, to stop his appointment, and 
their complaints culminated in March 1889, when all the Senior Ngarrindjeri 
churchmen made a deputation to Adelaide to speak to the AFA committee and petition 
them for Taplin's removal. David Unaipon would have then been 17 years old at the 
" This story is told in detail by Jenkin, esp. chapter 7. See also Simons, pp. 19-20. 
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time, and, although no details remain of the inquiry that followed, his father would have 
very likely been part of this deputation. 
It was during this inquiry that Frederick Taplin met his death, when his lodging 
house was burned down mysteriously. Taplin was the only person to die in the blaze, 
although his bed and other articles in his room were untouched by smoke. There was a 
flat roof outside his window out of which he could have escaped easily. Lodgers 
suggested that he died trying to save others, although no-one reported being saved by 
him. Three years later, however, in the aptly-titled Christian Colonist, he was painted as 
a hero, and it was asserted that he had `gone up to Heaven in a chariot of fire'. 69 There 
was no mention of either the reason he was in Adelaide, nor the allegations he was 
facing. 
In their reporting of events, the Christian Colonist can be seen here as fulfilling 
the role of the epic poet who, according to Freud, `disguised the truth with lies in 
accordance with his longing'. 70 This was an advance of the imagination, according to 
Freud, over Totem-worshipping primitive societies: `Just as the father had been the 
boy's first ideal, so in the hero who aspires to the father's place the poet now created the 
first ego-ideal. 971 
Oedipalization and Autobiography 
If the process of Oedipalization is, as I have argued, a process of self-reflexive 
individualization around the question of a son's relation to the authority of the father, 
then part of the process of individualization is the production of an autobiographical 
subject. Although it is generally considered that the first autobiography is St 
Augustine's Confessions, Philip Barker locates the emergence of autobiography in 
Abelard's Historia Calamitatum in the twelfth century. According to Barker, 
Augustine's Confessions should not be considered autobiographical in the modem 
sense because it is mediated through God. Modem autobiography, by contrast, is only 
mediated through the text, the very object that enables the subject to reflect upon 
69 Cited in Jenkin, p. 117. 
70 Freud, `Group Psychology', p. 169. 
71 Freud, `Group Psychology', p. 169. 
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themselves. This modem technology of the self emerged at a specific historical juncture 
when, as we saw in the previous chapter, systems of primogeniture and the confessional 
practices, manifested in the Lateran Council, that emerged out of it, combined with the 
increasingly widespread use of alphabetic literacy to produce a subject that is situated 
around writing, interiority and relations of sexuality and inheritance. 
What distinguishes the modem autobiography, that Historic Calamitatum can be 
seen as representing, from previous similar textualities is that Abelard's autobiography 
is not just a collection of events that the subject has observed but, rather, that the subject 
reflects upon events at a chronological distance. Unlike other memoirs, moreover, only 
events the subject has directly participated in are included and reflected upon. Finally, 
the autobiographical subject, as it emerged in the twelfth century, is framed in relation 
to the theme of knowing oneself. It is not merely fortuitous that Abelard, the writer of 
the Historia Calamitatum, should also have written a book on ethics titled Know Thyself 
(Scito Te Ipsum), nor that Abelard's philosophy would break with Augustine's in so far 
as it advocated or privileged reason over faith and action over intention, a movement 
that can be seen as being from a focus on exteriority to interiority. 
Barker's Foucauldian reading of the emergence of the self-reflexive subject also 
argues that the demand for the production of a transparent voice that knows itself 
necessarily produces a subject that is never as sure of itself as it is meant to be. 
Abelard's logical and ethical work were situated in the medieval tradition of 
methodological scepticism, which can be thought of as a fore-runner to Descartes' 
methodological doubt. As Barker asserts: `On the one hand, [Abelard's] 
epistemological/ontological foundation demands the certainty of subjective experience, 
on the other, his methodology continually acts to undermine it'(131). Finally, according 
to Barker, the `question of sex is absolutely central to the Historia Calamitatum'(141), 
which was written after he seduced his student Heloise and was subsequently castrated, 
an act that, unsurprisingly, led to the re-examination of his life and even, Barker 
suggests, to psychotic tendencies. 72 In other words, the self-reflective subject and the 
72 For an elaboration of Abelard's life and work see Barker, esp. pp. 113-147 
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truth of the self that it seeks, as it emerges in the work of Abelard, is always threatened 
with the possibility-of incoherence. 
Psychoanalysis has a curious relation to this history of subjectivity. 
-Certainly, 
its 
epistemology has been enabled by autobiographical practices. The retrospective 
postscript to Freud's own Autobiograp_hical Study suggests as much: 
Two themes run through these pages: the story of my life and the 
history-of psychoanalysis. They are intimately interwoven. This 
Autobiographical Study shows how psychoanalysis came to be the 
whole content of my_life and rightly_assumes that no personal 
experiences of mine are of interest in comparison to my relations with 
that science: 73-- -- - 
On top of this, it can also be said that the Psychoanalytic patient is required to construct 
their own autobiography and then relate to it through the analyst. Psychoanalysis not 
only `presupposes the composing of the subject in. relation to a textual strategyLit is part 
of its clinical practice to make this its object of analysis, reconstituting and stabilising 
the relation between the subject and text'. 74 
Finally, psychoanalysis relies for its theories on a specific form of textuality. 
Not only, as we have seen in the previous chapter, does Freud's anthropological 
theorizing-emerge out of pre-existing textual practices-like those of Frazer, but its 
theories are constituted textually through mythical narratives, the most important of 
which is, as I have suggested, Sophocles' Oedipus__Rex whose self-blindingýFreud has 
asserted, `was simply a mitigated form of the of the punishment of castration'. 75 It is 
significant that Freud would resort to ancient Greek drama for his model of the psyche, 
especially as it `was the first Western verbal art form to be fully controlled by 
writing'. 76 It is in ancient Greek drama that the voice is both enabled and supplemented 
by the technology of writing. It is this structure of suppiementarity that. constitutes 
Western thought and subjectivity. When this technology intersected, in medieval times, 
with technologies of the self, _ a veryspecific subject emerged, the effects of which are 
73 Freud, 'Postscript', ArF K töbiö aphicaT Udns. B'yTames Strachey (Cöndön_Högarth Press, 
1950), pp. 131-32. 
74 Barker, p. 182. 
75 Freud, `The Uncanny', PFL 14, p. 352. 
760uS, p. 148. 
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still prevalent. As Barker suggests: `if modern subjectivity has inherited the self- 
reflexive tradition of Abelard and Descartes... then Freud and psychoanalysis are the 
modem interpreters of it par excellence'(1 82). 
It is from the conjunction of these technologies, methodologies and historical 
transformations that the Oedipal, self-reflective autobiographical subject emerged, and 
it is here, according to Barker, that `the Cartesian trap lies in wait': 
On the one hand, Descartes' project announces the possibility of a 
science of the subject as he dislocates it from the specific conditions 
of its emergence. On the other, in the face of the impossibility of a 
theogonical or theological defence in contemporary culture, this 
subject cannot have stability restored to it. It vacillates between doubt 
and certainty, producing in us the fault line that constitutes us as 
subjects-a faultline that runs from Abelard to Descartes, Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud, and simultaneously constitutes the 
possibility of disintegration and multiplicity as well as an impossible 
need for stability, rationality, metaphysics, essentialism and 
transcendentalism. (171-2) 
Given his history, and the monitoring and regulation of Aboriginality that has 
taken place for most of this century, it is not surprising that David Unaipon would 
produce an autobiographical narrative. Unaipon's `My Life Story', published in 1951, 
marks the emergence of the first autobiographical Aboriginal subject in Australia. The 
interesting thing about this life story is that it had apparently been related to the 
President of the AFA, Rev. Sexton, who then read it out at the Annual Meeting, before 
it was published in the report. It has, then, gone through a series of repetitions, and the 
voice of the `I' is an echo of an absent voice which haunts the story, surrounding it with 
uncertainty. This might explain the strangely ambivalent tone of `My Life Story'. It 
opens: 
The story of my life begins 78 years ago when I made my advent into 
this world in a native wurley, along the banks of the River Murray at 
Tailem bend. My father and mother were full-blood aborigines..., and 
we lived according to the customs of a primitive race. 77 
Apart from the fact that this is not true, that is, Unaipon was not born in a native wurley, 
and did not live according to the customs of a primitive : ace, what is striking about this 
n Unaipon, `My Life Story', AFA Annual Report, 1951, p. 10. Future references are to this edition, and 
are included in parentheses in the text. 
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passage is the self-reflexivity of its opening phrase. Unaipon, in other words, is telling a 
story, and it is his story, rather than his life, that begins 78 years previously. Advent, 
moreover, is a word associated with the coming of Christ, and Unaipon's claim that he 
was born `in a native wurley' extends this association. 
About processes of colonization, Unaipon's reflection on the processes of 
colonization reveals an ambivalence that are not as obvious in his earlier public 
statements: 
I can vividly recall those days of my youth, for our home life and the 
homes of others were greatly disturbed by the advent of the white man 
into tribal lands. All his movements were keenly watched and made 
known to the natives by means of smoke fires and other agencies... 
Through the want of understanding each other, white and black came 
into conflict. Spears were thrown, and the white man's superior 
weapons were used upon the natives with deadly effect. All this came 
about because the blackfellow did not understand the white man's 
aims, and neither side had a grasp of the language necessary for a 
proper understanding between them. (10) 
Although Unaipon puts conflict down to misunderstanding, he is also clearly aware of 
the unequal power relation between whites and blacks that could be effected materially. 
The `white man's aims', that Unaipon claims the blackfellow did not understand, are 
nowhere articulated. These uncertain aims hang, like a shadow, over the story. 
Unsurprisingly, much of this life story, presented to the AFA, expresses 
gratitude towards it, but given that the story opens with a clear non-factual statement, 
the status of the information in this story is always uncertain. Unaipon does, however, 
claim that the bad feeling between the colonizers and his people was ameliorated by the 
arrival of Taplin: `The aborigines greatly resented the incursion of the newcomer into 
their domains, and it was only when the Aborigines' Friends' Association sent Mr. 
Taplin among them as a missionary that there began a better feeling between the black 
and white race'(10). 
Unaipon's autobiography reiterates Unaipon's identificatory relation to his 
father: `On his arrival [Taplin] sought out the most intelligent natives and established 
good relations with them, and through them made known the tribes the nature of his 
mission. Among these leaders was my father, James Unaipon'(11). And again, in the 
same self-conscious narrative mode, Unaipon states: `In my life story I recall several 
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important influences which have shaped my career. One of these has been the Christian 
example of my father'(12). 
Apart from the opening paragraph that immediately calls into question the status 
of the information presented, Unaipon's narrative raises other questions. At one point he 
asserts that `I have everywhere received a sympathetic welcome and been given much 
encouragement in doing so by members of the white race'(12). On the following page, 
however, in discussing the `help' he received `from the study of the Bible', he claims: 
`It was in this Book I learned that God made all nations of one blood and that in Christ 
Jesus colour and racial distinctions disappeared. This helped me many times when I was 
refused accommodation because of my colour and race. '(13) 
The question of subjectivity is also raised in this autobiography: 
Mr. Taplin did not expect to change the lives of the older people, but 
centred his activities upon the younger generation. He established a 
school which I attended and there entered a new mental world. He 
associated with this a dormitory so that the boys and girls might be 
trained in civilized ways, and it was there I learned to use a knife and 
fork, say grace and adopt table manners. 78 
The suggestion is that Unaipon, and the lives of all the Aboriginal children in the 
mission, were changed, and that this change involved the entering of `a new mental 
world', that was fundamentally connected with `training' in civilization. In his 
narrative, Unaipon even refers to himself as `a product of missionary work', reiterating 
the production of subjectivity that was such a large component of the colonial project. 
Yet, `civilized ways', as I attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapter, are 
fundamentally `capitalist ways', and part of the problem for Unaipon, and Aborigines 
like him, was that they were neither able to participate in the sphere of work or 
production (however exploited it might be) or in the sphere of consumption. It is, 
perhaps, in this light that we can think about Unaipon's discussion of the `good' and 
`bad' in civilization in `An Aboriginal Pleads for his Race': 
78 Unaipon, `My Life Story', p. 11. See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners 
and State Formation and Civilization, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). This is a 
detailed study of the part played by manners in the signification of civilization, and it is striking to think 
that that is what `civilized ways' boils down to. 
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with the good influence of the missionary there also comes the 
influence of the lower type of civilization, and the pull downwards is 
greater than the lift upwards. 
This is the real problem. If the aborigine could see only the good 
points of civilization there would be no problem. But the uneducated, 
uncivilized aborigine thinks that whatever a white man does is good. 
He lacks the civilized man's power to distinguish between what is 
good and what is bad in civilization... 
If some sort of reserve were possible, in which only the good 
influences of civilization could be felt, a new civilized race could be 
built up. 79 
This ambivalent reference to civilization, and the missionary as the `good' aspect is 
belied by the fact, under civilization (the central component of which is capitalism), 
missionary enterprises, even by 1936 when this was written, were already outmoded 
and had already been replaced by the rationalized social authority of government 
bureaucratization characteristic of advanced capitalism. This was the cause of much of 
the hostility between missionaries and administrators/anthropologists. Contrary to 
Freud's account, where the barbaric aspects of civilization are the archaic vestiges of the 
primitive, Unaipon's account seems to be suggesting something fundamentally different 
which can be seen in his claim about the very difficulty of differentiating between the 
dual aspects of the phenomenon of civilization. There is no `good' and `bad' 
civilization. Rather, as I hope to have shown in my previous chapter, civilization is 
always haunted, and defines itself against, the savagery that it disavows and displaces. 80 
This is one of the insights of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus - that 
capitalism, both in the psyche and in society, under the `cash nexus', and dominated by 
the abstract demands of the market, aggressively eliminates all existing meanings and 
beliefs. This might explain Unaipon's commitment to Christianity as accompanying 
what is otherwise the merely rampant capitalist enterprise of colonialism: `the only 
79 Unaipon, `An Aboriginal Pleads for his Race', AFA Annual Review, 1936, p. 1. 
80 Even today, the `good' Aborigines are the ones who can get jobs, and `bad' Aborigines are the ones 
who fight for land-rights. I am referring here to an article I recently read in the Sydney Morning Herald 
about the `swift and disillusioning lesson in politics' for John Howard's `hand-picked head of ATSIC 
[Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islandei Commissioner], Gatjil Djerrkura. ' Howard's Government had 
manufactured the ousting of his outspoken predecessor. The article opens: `The prime minister must have 
thought he had found the perfect blackfella. Here was a temperate, Methodist mission-educated Aborigine 
and a self-made corporate success. A suit with an impressive track record brokering mining agreements. 
A family man with a wife from Melbourne... "He doesn't raise his voice, " noted the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, John Herron. ' Lauren Martin, `Irreconcilable Differences', Sydney Morning Herald, 8 
February 1999, p. 13. Like Unaipon before him, Djerrkura learnt the hard way about the path of 
moderation. 
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improvement of my race lies along the lines of properly conducted missionary 
enterprise, which goes down to the fundamental needs of the aborigines and gives them 
the inner power to reconstruct their lives which have become shattered by contact with 
white civilization' 81 
This suggests that Christianity provided Unaipon with a set of beliefs in the face 
of the demolition of Aboriginal beliefs and the increasing impersonal administrative 
bureaucratization and intrusion into Aboriginal lives. As a product of the missions, and 
excluded from white Australian society, Christianity was one of the few systems of 
meanings that Unaipon had access to. In `My Life Story', Unaipon speaks at length 
about the value of the Bible: 
As a native lad I found there was no information available about the 
past history of the human race except that which came down through 
the traditions of the old men of the tribes. In listening to the old men's 
stories I could not find any record of worthy achievements by the 
members of my race, but what a contrast I found when I opened the 
Bible. There I found thrilling stories of adventure and achievement 
which spurred to action. In various places of the Bible I found the 
blackfellow playing a part in life's programme. I found it was a 
blackfellow that befriended the prophet Jeremiah when he was 
unjustly cast into prison. It was a blackfellow who was there at the 
right moment to relieve Jesus by bearing the cross when the saviour 
fell beneath its weight. (13) 
This is an idiosyncratic reading of the Bible, where it is valued as a source of 
adventure stories and, in a prbto-postcolonial argument, positive role models for 
Aborigines, in the face of the destruction and humiliation of Aboriginal elders. 
Unaipon's claim that such role models do not exist in Aboriginal stories, may well be 
due to Aboriginal stories not having the same kind of cross-cultural and racialized 
referents that the Bible contains. The Bible then is valuable, because it shows blacks to 
be of value in a multi-racial society, the kind of society that Australia had rapidly 
become, and the kind of society in which Unaipon hoped Aborigines would come to be 
equally valued. 
The final paragraphs of `My Life Story' are concerned with race relations in 
Australia: 
81 Unaipon, `My Life Story', pp. 13-14. 
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I have often been asked the best method of dealing with the aboriginal 
problem. I have carefully studied the plans adopted for the 
advancement of the aborigines, and I see no way out but in co- 
operation between the white and black races. Colour and race 
prejudice should be laid aside and equal rights given to both black and 
white Australians. (13) 
Unaipon's claim, `I see no way out but... ', is the kind of acting within constraints that I 
hoped to point out through my contextualization of his life and work. For Unaipon, the 
only solution is equal rights, and such rights require co-operation. Unaipon's statement 
brings to mind Fanon's assertion, published the year after Unaipon's autobiographical 
narrative: `However painful it may be for me to accept this conclusion, I am obliged to 
state it: for the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white'(9). 
`Leaves of Memory', Unaipon's second autobiographical piece, was written in 
1953 when Unaipon was 80 years old, and was spoken directly by Unaipon to the AFA. 
There is something more obviously metaphorical about this rewriting. The `leaves' 
perhaps refer to the leaves of a page upon which memories are inscribed, revealing the 
extent of Unaipon's interiorization of the textual practices out of which autobiographies 
are constituted. There is also a sense in this title that, perhaps, after eighty years, David 
Unaipon knew he was leaving. The autobiographical moment is a graphic moment, and 
memory becomes something material that is inscribed on leaves, and is then, in death, 
left behind. `Leaves of Memory' presupposes and points to that moment, that 
impending yet still future historical event when all that will be left of Unaipon, all that 
will be remembered of him, will be these material traces that he leaves on paper. It is as 
if this emerging self-reflexive subject, writing his second autobiographical narrative in 
the space of two years, is committed to reiterating his life and self in order to confirm its 
existence because, for the autobiographical subject, this is the only way in which one's 
existence can be confirmed. 
`Leaves of Memory' also has a slightly different tone to the earlier story. 
Unaipon opens by expressing his gratitude for being invited to speak and being able to 
`take the opportunity of recalling some of my many memories of the early days of the 
S 
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Mission at Pt. McLeay founded by the Association, and where I was born in 18721.82 
Already there is a divergence from the previous story, with Unaipon claiming that he 
was born at Pt. McLeay Mission. In this narrative, moreover, he is much less 
conciliatory towards white settlers who he claims `invaded the tribal territories', and he 
states, in the most uncompromising language that he has ever used, that `much 
bitterness sprang up between the black and white race in the south, when the white 
settlers invaded the tribal territories... and appropriated the land to their own use, and 
several tragedies resulted'(6). In this narrative, bitterness is not caused by mutual 
misunderstanding but by unilateral invasion. 
Even Unaipon's descriptions of missionary benefits, and the role of Taplin, are 
down-played in this latter piece: 
This bitter feeling of resentment and opposition was relieved by the 
coming of the missionaries... A new state of affairs began when 
[Taplin] settled at Pt. McLeay, as he gradually persuaded the natives 
to adopt civilized ways and leave their old-fashioned wurlies and live 
in houses like the white people. He also gave special attention to the 
young natives by opening a school for their education, and a 
dormitory for them to live in where they were trained in civilized 
ways ... To 
do these things, Mr. Taplin consulted the old men of the 
tribes, and gradually secured their co-operation. Among those men 
was my father, James Unaipon. (6) 
Resentment here is only relieved rather than removed, and the persuasion of natives to 
leave their life-styles and co-operate with the missionaries is only gradual, with even the 
suggestion that it was somewhat coercive. Similarly, Unaipon implies that it was only 
through consultation with the old men that Taplin's project could be undertaken at all. 
Unlike `My Life Story', the later life narrative's attitude to Bible stories has 
shifted even more radically which, in this account, `resemble' tribal lore, rather than 
being preferable to it: `The natives were particularly fond of some of the Bible stories... 
[which] bore some resemblance to items in their own tribal lore'(7). Although in `My 
Life Story', Unaipon states that one of the things he liked about the Bible was `the 
blackfellow playing a part in life's programme', in `Leaves of Memory', he states that 
what the `natives were particularly fond of' as `the graphic stories of the flight of the 
82 Unaipon, `Leaves of Memory', AFA Annual Report, 1953, p. 6. Future references are to this edition, 
and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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children of Israel from Egyptian bondage, and their forty years walkabout in the 
wilderness'(7). Whether or not Unaipon is also referring to himself here is unclear, but 
this lack of clarity can be read as a blurring of boundaries between himself and other 
Aborigines that, at other times in his life, he was eager to maintain. 
Once again, Unaipon refers to himself as `as one who is a product of the Pt. 
McLeay Mission' and then states that, as this product, he `would like to say that as time 
advanced I began to feel that I should Alike to move about in the white man's world. 
Efforts were made to detain me at the Mission... but my desire persisted for a walkabout 
among the white race'(8). This statement suggests that while missionaries were 
producing certain kinds of subjects-Christian, `civilized', Oedipal-the modes of 
being that that we take for granted as characterizing the modem subject-free choice, 
self-determination, education-remained off limits to Unaipon, even by the 
missionaries. What is also striking is that Unaipon uses a word with strong Aboriginal 
significations, `walkabout', to describe the activities he devoted his life to. Perhaps it is 
in this light that we can think about the following, rather shrewd paragraph: 
I made up my mind to find out the secret of perpetual motion. The 
idea occupied my mind day and night and I conceived the idea of 
inventing a machine to demonstrate my theory. Through the assistance 
of this Association I had an instrument made which I showed to 
University Professors and students. This aroused their interest, 
particularly I think, because a blackfellow should reverse the ancient 
practice of the tribes in encouraging inactivity, by trying to find out 
the secret of perpetual motion. (8-9) 
In this way, a connection can be made between the Aboriginal practice of walkabout 
with the scientific investigation of perpetual motion, confusing the anthropological 
association of Aborigines with indolence, and civilization both with activity and with 
scientific knowledge. 
This memory of arousing the interest of University Professors, and Unaipon's 
challenge to their entrenched stereotyping of Aborigines as only being objects of 
knowledge rather than subjects of it, may also have been an oblique reference to the fact 
that in November, 1926, Unaipon was arrested and held on vagrancy charges, an event 
which was reported in the Adelaide Advertiser at the time: 
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The well-known full-blooded Aborigine, Mr. David Unaipon, is in 
Adelaide, and when interviewed on Wednesday he expressed strong 
resentment of the impression conveyed by a report that he had been 
`disciplined' for idleness... He had been visiting the mission and was 
questioned by the superintendent regarding his reasons for being there. 
He replied that he was gathering information for articles and stories he 
was compiling. The police was called in and he was put in goal for 
idleness. He understood that a person could not be arrested and 
imprisoned for vagrancy when he could prove that he had adequate 
lawful means of support. At the time he was arrested he had pounds 3 
in his pocket. 83 
The story reports how, in response to these charges, Unaipon exhibited a pile of type- 
written documents, a portion of the work upon which he was engaged, and asserted: `An 
idle man ... does not produce work such as that'. This article highlights the impossible 
position that Aborigines were placed in. Prevented from selling his labour power, 
always able to be legally detained by the police and removed from Government land (he 
was, in fact, at Raukkan at the time, the place of his birth) Unaipon's intimidation by 
white authorities is a recurring story for Aboriginal people in Australia. 
Unaipon's interest in Aboriginal mythology, however, can be dated from around 
this time, and in the Observer interview published in 1925, he explained how his 
anthropological interest had come about: 
at present... I am studying our Aboriginal folklore. I should probably 
never have thought of doing so but for an offer from Angus and 
Robertson, but I have become extremely interested in it. I am now 
collecting folk legends for a book, and they are going to publish it. 84 
The History of William Ramsay Smith 
While Unaipon was in negotiations with the Melbourne-based publisher, Angus 
and Robertson, Angus and Robertson, unbeknownst to Unaipon, was in negotiations 
with William Ramsay Smith, a prominent anthropologist who was interested in a 
collection of Aboriginal myths. 
William Ramsay Smith was born in Aberdeenshire in 1859. He studied at 
Edinburgh University, graduating in almost every branch of his Arts course, gaining 
honours in natural science, and he was prizeman in mathematics and logic. He then took 
the degree of Bachelor of Science and, in 1884, won a medical scholarship and entered 
83 `The Aborigines: Mr. Unaipon's Views', Advertiser [Adelaide], 18 November 1926, p. 15. 
"'Aboriginal Intellectual: David Unaipon', p. 46. 
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upon the study of medicine, completing the course several years before he graduated in 
1892. He was an Assistant-Professor of Natural History and Senior Demonstrator of 
zoology from 1885-1890, as well as being an examiner for the Royal College of 
Surgeons and Physicians. In 1892, he entered private practice and also undertook 
sanitary work for the Local Government Board of Scotland. In 1889, he married 
Margaret MacKenzie of Ross-shire. 85 This brief history of Ramsay Smith's training 
indicates that he was an extremely brilliant man, and that he was an example of that all- 
inclusive epistemological project that characterized, particularly in Scotland, the post- 
Enlightenment man. 
Ramsay Smith arrived in South Australia in July 1896, to take up the position of 
a senior physician to the Royal Adelaide Hospital after the honorary medical staff had 
resigned over a dispute with the Government. Although the British Medical Association 
had warned physicians not to accept any of the advertised posts, Ramsay Smith defied 
their cautions, and his conduct was viewed by the BMA as `highly- dishonourable and 
unprofessional'. 86 In 1897 he was expelled from the organization and never re-admitted. 
He did however, retain his post-at the Royal Adelaide Hospital until 1903 as well as 
being Inspector of Anatomy and Superintendent of the University School of Anatomy 
from 1899 to 1903. 
We know little of the details of Ramsay Smith's life, but the incident with the 
BMA is not the only event that brought him into disrepute. The few textual fragments 
we do have suggest that Ramsay Smith was a man with many enemies, and he clearly 
was both authoritarian and simultaneously disrespectful of authority. 87 
8 Mcse details come-fim the entry ünd-er S-iruW W li iTLämsäy by lýonaIcfCrEImsfid and Susan 
Nance in the Australian Dictionary ofBiography, Vol. 11: 1891-1931 ed. Geoffrey Serie (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1988), pp. 674-5; The Cyclopedia of South Australia, ed. T. H. Burgess 
(Adelaide: The Cyclopedia Company, nd), pp. 318-9; and Ramsay Smith's obituary in the Proceedings of 
the Royal Society ofEdfnburgh, 57 (1936-37), p. 436. 
86 This saga is reported in the 1896-97 volumes of the British Medical Journal. 
$' Ramsay Smith had been the focus of an inquiry after complaints were made against him by nurses 
working under him during the war. The inquiry found that the friction 'arose from Lieut. Colonel Ramsay 
Smith trying to impose a system of command in an arbitrary and tactless manner on a body of men [sic] 
who were not accustomed to military discipline'. Jan Bassett and Bryan Egan, `Doctors and Nurses at 
War. No. 1 Australian General Hospital, Cairo, 1915', Journal of the Australian War Memorial, 22 
(1993), p. 16. After the reorganization of the armed forces in South Australia, Ramsay Smith was 
appointed Surgeon-Captain, and attached to the field artillery. At the outbreak of war in South Africa in 
1899, the same year that he had been appointed President for the Central Board of Health in South 
Australia, he took over the command of the field artillery and saw active service as Surgeon-Captain of 
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Ramsay Smith and the Subject of Anthropology 
Ramsay Smith, however, became and remained one of the most respected and 
influential members of the anthropological community of South Australia to which his 
interest in comparative anatomy in particular, allowed him access. As Marc Manganaro 
has asserted: 
An influence on comparative philology, and_a fundamental 
predecessor of the comparative method in evolutionary anthropology, 
was the comparative anatomy _and_biology-of 
the early part of the 
nineteenth century, especially as embodied in the work of Georges 
Cuvier and, later of course, Charles Darwin. Comparative anatomy 
enjoyed great status in the first half of the nineteenth century: Edwin 
Ackerknecht has referred to it as `the glamour science of the day. ' Of 
course, the increasingly evolutionary character of the field had a great 
impact upon the institutionalisation of anthropology. as_a discipline. 
Physical anthropology, separating from cultural anthropology in, the 
middle of the century, was really -a 
direct descendent of comparative 
anatomy, and yet both physical and cultural anthropology became 
evolutionist mainly underth ' comparative-anatomy. 88__ 
That these intellectual and evolutionary allegiances had effects in Australia, and that 
Ramsay Smith was a recognized authority, is clear from McGregor's study of the 
`doomed race' theory, Imagined Destinies: 
For the scientist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
one of the most appealing features of evolutionary theory _lay 
in its 
capacity to encompass the entire range of human attributes in a single 
bio-social law. Thus a specialist-in kinship-systems, like Howitt, could 
weave a racial theme through his analyses; while on the other hand a 
specialist in anatomy, like the Adelaide scientist Dr William Ramsay 
Smith, could write authoritatively on both Aboriginal physical 
characteristics and their cultural practices. (37-38) 
the Imperial Bushmen's Corps, and was special öfter Iör prägüe ädhiiMstratiön ih So-uth-Afdcä `He- was 
awarded the war medal with two clasps in 1901, in 1903 he was appointed Major, and in 1906, 
Lieutenant-Colonel and principal medical officer of the Commonwealth military forces in South Africa. 
Ramsay Smith left Australia for Egypt in December, 1914 and it was here that a bitter battle between 
himself and principal matron of No. 1 AGH. She made complaints against him because he had `taken 
control of the allocation of nursing staff from her, humiliated her in public over arrangements for sick 
nurses; given her "peremptory instruction in regard to the Nurses' mess" which caused nurses who were 
late by only a few minutes to miss meals; reprimanded nurses in front of patients; not allowed her 
authority over visitors wishing to see nurses who were on duty; made the house matron responsible to 
himself rather than to Miss Bell; and ordered her (Miss Bell) to report two nurses-for a breach of 
discipline when they had mistakenly used the wrong room for visitors'(14). In the interviews that 
followed, Miss Bell was supported in virtually every instance, and both Bell and Ramsay Smith were 
recalled to Australia 
"'Marc Manganaro, Myth, Rhetoric and the Voice ofAuthority: a Critique of Frazer. Eliot, Frye and 
Campbell (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 11 
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And write authoritatively he indeed did, especially in his capacity as President of the 
Anthropology Section of the Australian Association of the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS). Not only had he given a paper at the 11ý' Meeting of the AAAS in 1907, 
another address at the 14th meeting in 1913, and written the entry on `The Aborigines of 
Australia' for the Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1910, but he 
also co-wrote the Aborigines entry in the Australian Encyclopedia with Baldwin 
Spencer in 1927. William Ramsay Smith was one of Australia's most authoritative 
voices on Aboriginality and, in his many articles, he shows himself to be a cautious and 
thorough scholar. Ramsay Smith reiterates, solemnly and approvingly, Marett's claim 
that, `Anthropology is the child of Darwin. Darwin makes it possible. Reject the 
Darwinian point of view, and you must reject Anthropology also. '89 Like other 
anthropologists of his day, he believed that anthropology was intimately linked with 
evolution. The status of what McGregor, following Foucault, calls a `single bio-social 
law' can be seen in the claims that Ramsay Smith makes for the all-inclusive 
epistemological realm of anthropology: 
Anthropology comes into touch with all things human. For it deals 
with man's body and mind, and all that these include and imply; with 
his physical structure and bodily functions; with his intellect, emotions 
and will; with his languages, religions and customs, social conditions, 
habits instincts appetites, and activities. It deals with all human 
activities past and present, with everything in the Universe that is 
related to man or that influences him in any way, and with the manner 
and extent of the influence. 90 
Ramsay Smith certainly makes great claims for anthropology and it is possibly 
for this reason that he takes the status of anthropological expertise so seriously. He was 
a strong advocate of the professionalization of anthropology, and he was careful to 
dissociate himself from the many amateur anthropologists and naturalists that were so 
numerous at the time. 91 For Ramsay Smith, anthropology was serious scientific 
business: 
89 William Ramsay Smith, `Ethnology and Anthropology', Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the 
Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, 1913, p. 369. 
90 Ramsay Smith, `Ethnology and Anthropology', p. 367 
91 See Tom Griffiths, Hunters and Collectors: The Antiquarian Imagination in Australia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). Griffiths explores in detail the place of amateur antiquarians in 
Australian colonial history. 
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The people forming the great majority to whom the science is a 
recreation might surely unite in an effort to supply materials to those 
workers who apply themselves closely to what is an arduous and 
sometimes, unfortunately, an expensive task .... In the universal 'grab- all' for door-mats be graciously pleased to pay some respect to the 
altar cloths of the anthropologists. 2 
It was only the trained and professional anthropologist that could interpret artifacts and, 
for Ramsay Smith, this took on a moral imperative: `Not everyone... can say what is 
normal or abnormal, trivial or important, commonplace or unique in any particular 
skull; and the moral, therefore, is-Bring everything in the way of teeth and skulls 
under the notice of the anthropological expert'. 93 
Like Herbert Basedow, with whom he was acquainted, Ramsay Smith 
subscribed to the belief in Aboriginal primitivity. As he states, `the Australian 
aboriginals have furnished the largest number of ape-like characters. The more one 
investigates the more confirmation does this statement receive' 94 He did, however, 
accept the relation of the Aboriginal to the Caucasian, which many in Australia's 
colonial community at the time found intolerable. According to Ramsay Smith it 
`appears established that the aboriginals are an homogeneous race, unmixed in descent, 
of Caucasian stock, not negro or negrito-a primitive race, a relic of the oldest human 
stock' 95 
Ramsay Smith, like other anthropologists who considered themselves not only 
scientific observers, but also humanists, strove to undo the equation of primitivity with 
degradation: 
The Australian aboriginals are a primitive race. This established and 
accepted fact, taken in conjunction with superficial observations of 
early explorers, the misrepresentations of some of the early settlers, 
and inaccurate reports of later writers, has given rise to an impression 
that they are a degraded race. But primitiveness and degradation are 
not synonymous.... And here one must record definitely and 
emphatically that the Australian race is not a degraded one, physically, 
mentally or morally. Some tribes and some individuals may exhibit 
92 Ramsay Smith, 'The Place of the Aboriginal in Recent Anthropological Research', Report of the 
Eleventh Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, 1907, p. 576. " William Ramsay Smith, `The Place of the Aboriginal in Recent Anthropological Research', p. 566 
94 William Ramsay Smith, `The Aborigines of Australia', Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, No. 3 (Melbourne: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1910), p. 158. 
95 Ramsay Smith, `The Aborigines of Australia', p. 158. 
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inferior and degraded traits, but as a race it shows no signs of 
retrocession, degeneration, or degradation. 96 
One of the interesting yet disturbing things to note about Ramsay Smith, in the 
light of the work done in the previous chapter, is the way in which an off-hand, 
institutional anti-Semitism pervades his work. At one stage he claims, in the vaguest of 
terms, that from his knowledge of Aborigines, a `Jewish cast of countenance, possibly 
more apparent than real, is frequently and widely met with'. 97 What such a statement 
might mean is a difficult question. In another odd analogy between Jews and 
Aborigines, Ramsay Smith writes: 
Judging from this standpoint we must allow that the more we know of 
the blackfellow the more we are constrained to say that he is saturated 
with religion; but writers have been calling it sorcery, witchcraft, 
superstition and such-like names... For instance, we recognise that the 
morality or religion of the early Jew was to be gauged by his attitude 
towards the law... blessings or curses as the case might be, and these 
of an arbitrary sort, until he evolved a higher sort of religion. The hope 
or fear of these consequences was the motive power. The aboriginal 
has systems of sanitation not only comparable to the Mosaic, which is 
still the wonder of the world, but superior to it in two ways: firstly, 
because in many respects they are more comprehensive and detailed, 
and secondly, because the motive power appeals much more to him- 
his fear of wrong doing may be a lower motive than the Jew's hope of 
worldly success for well-doing; but it is certainly a stronger one. 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this anti-Semitism is that, as late as 1979, Graham 
Jenkin refers to Ramsay Smith in order to explicate Aboriginal laws of sanitation: 
`Parallels can be found for [practical and logical purposes of sanitation laws] elsewhere, 
such as the Judaic and Islamic religions: and Dr Ramsay Smith illustrates the point by 
comparing the Mosaic laws with the Aboriginal laws (which he considers superior) 
regarding systems of sanitation'(16). 
Ramsay Smith's relation to the doomed race theory is more complex than the 
other populist assumption of the inevitable demise of Aborigines. He closes his article 
entitled `The Aborigines of Australia' with the claim that: `the problem of what to do 
with the race, the most interesting at present on earth, and the least deserving to be 
exterminated by us, and the most wronged at our hands, is not a difficult one to solve, 
% Ramsay Smith, 'The Aborigines of Australia', p. 162-63. 
97 Ramsay Smith, `The Aborigines of Australia', p. 163; Emphasis added. 
98 Ramsay Smith, 'The Aborigines of Australia', p. 173. 
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were a solution really desired'(175). In other words, for Ramsay Smith, extinction is not 
an inevitability, but something that could be averted by effort and intervention. 
However, Ramsay Smith's anthropological writings suggest that the welfare and 
protection that he advocated were not to help the Aborigines per se. His belief in the 
one-race theory, and the relatedness of Aborigines and Caucasians, `enhances the 
interest in the aboriginal, and brings the subject of the ethnology and anthropology of 
the black nearer home to us'. 99 For Ramsay Smith, the study of Aboriginality was 
crucial because, with that strange allochronic logic that marks early anthropology, 
contemporary aborigines were ourselves in a prior life. As he argued for the 
continuation of his version of anthropology, he declared that `almost every part of the 
anatomy of the aboriginal is being examined and re-examined with the view of 
discovering keys that will open up the secrets of human origin and racial affinities. 
"00 
The primary purpose of the study of Aboriginal society, according to Ramsay 
Smith, was to promote a deeper understanding of Western civilization. The 
anthropological object of knowledge is, in effect, oneself, and it comes as no surprise 
that Ramsay Smith would allude to the Delphic Oracle, `Know Thyself, as the 
epistemological justification of the anthropological project; nor that he would quote one 
of those founders of self-reflexivity, St Augustine: 
The injunction of the oracle, `Know Thyself, ' written over the gates at 
the temple at Delphi, has been accepted as the text of all religions, and 
the motto of all philosophies. Expressed in modem scientific thought- 
currency, it is `Study Anthropology. ' Anthropology, in helping man to 
know himself, is concerned with the questions-What are we ? 
Whence are we ? How are we ? For it deals with man, present-day 
man, individually and in bulk, with the rock out of which he was hewn 
or the pit out of which he was digged, and with the process of the 
making or the moulding. It imposes on the searcher an inquiry into 
ancestry, relatives and relationships. To echo metaphysics, 
Anthropology studies man in the phases of being and becoming. To 
borrow a phrase from a religious book, it deals with how man works 
out his own salvation. It is also prompted to ask whither, as a race, we 
are going, and how we can affect our destination, or our destiny, and 
control the conditions of the journey. 
The indifference of the natural man to this study, absolutely and 
relatively, has been set forth by St. Augustine: `men go and gaze 
wonderingly at the lofty mountain peaks, the great sea billows, the 
" Ramsay Smith, `The Place of the Aboriginal in Recent Anthropological Research', p. 575. 
100 Ramsay Smith, `The Place of the Aboriginal in Recent Anthropological Research', p. 558. 
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deep flowing rivers, and the stars in their courses, and take no stock in 
themselves, see nothing worth looking at. 'toi 
This conjunction of Augustine's self-reflexivity and the injunction of the Delphic 
Oracle to know oneself, brings to mind Abelard's book on ethics, Know Thyself (Scito 
Te Ipsum). Ramsay Smith's discourse can be located in that space between the religious 
and the secular, the space out of which anthropology, as a secular and rational discourse 
on the human being as both subject and object of its own knowledge, came into being. 
In anthropology, as in psychoanalysis, knowledge is self-knowledge, and the self is the 
foundation of knowledge. Yet this belief in the foundation of knowledge at the origin of 
the self is itself constituted by a series of textually-constituted repetitions-`the 
injunction of the origin'; `to echo metaphysics'; `to borrow a phrase'. 
It is for this reason, as McGregor has argued, that the `most common 
accompaniment [of the doomed race theory] was not an explication of the process, but a 
plea for research to be conducted promptly, before the most primitive of races vanished 
forever'. 102 Ramsay Smith exemplifies this position, and he does so with recourse to the 
most extraordinarily ambivalent textual metaphor: `The primitive pages are here in 
abundance, but only for a little while. The Sibylline books are presented open to us as a 
gift; and, as a people, we can't be bothered. ' 103 In Greek and Roman mythology, the 
sibyl is one of many women in ancient times that uttered oracles and prophecies, the 
most famous of which led Aeneas into the underworld. Sibylline books, as an extension 
of this, refers to a collection of oracles belonging to the ancient Roman state. Sibylline 
books are therefore located in the space between the mythological and the historical, 
and the mythological world of the Sibyl becomes the basis for the foundation of the law, 
and the guidance that the law provides. It is in the mythological story of the Sibyl that 
anthropology finds its theoretical justification. For Ramsay Smith, Aboriginal people 
are a kind of textual gift, and they can function as the oracle, less predicting the future, 
than confirming the past: 
'°' Ramsay Smith, `Ethnology and Anthropology', p. 366. 
1°2 McGregor, pp. 56-57. 
103 Ramsay Smith, 'Ethnology and Anthropology', p. 374. 
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Centuries ago, nature `side-tracked' a race in Australia. At the present 
time, despite some drawbacks or interference from outside, that race 
remains, to a large extent, in primitive conditions. It is capable of 
casting light on the evolution of human races in a way, and to an 
extent, that probably no other can equal. It gives us the key, from a 
study of present customs, to the origin and meaning of the mythology 
of the Greeks and the Romans, and of mythology generally. ' 
The Myths of Ramsay Smith 
It is perhaps this reasoning that explains Ramsay Smith's interest in Aboriginal 
mythology and folklore, even if, in a circle of logic reminiscent of Freud, he draws upon 
mythical reasoning to elucidate his aims: 
Folk-lore is usually defined as including such traditional or archaic 
beliefs, customs, superstitions, legends, or tales as have become 
obsolete or are no longer believed. 
The aboriginal, like every other citizen of the world, has his stock of 
fables, for the benefit of the youth principally-stories obviously 
intentionally invented for the purpose of pointing a moral or enforcing 
some useful truth or precept. He also has his parables of the same 
nature and for the like purpose. His legends, using the term in a 
somewhat loose sense, are fairly numerous. It is when we come to 
mythology, however, that real interest is aroused and practical 
difficulty arises in connection with the aboriginal's beliefs. If we 
accept a myth as `a tale handed down from primitive times, and in 
form historical, but in reality involving elements of early religious 
views, as respecting the origins of things, the powers of nature and 
their workings, the rise of institutions, the history of races and 
communities and the like, ' then we find that in dealing with the 
aboriginal we are studying `folk-lore in the making. ' This is where the 
interest lies. The difficulty arises when we try to determine how much 
of the material is actual belief influencing the native's thought, action, 
conduct, life, i. e., how much comes within the category of religion; 
and how much has become mere tradition, interesting only as history 
or amusement, i. e., what comes within the category of folk-lore. The 
task of the apostle of anthropology is to resolve the literary nebula into 
`gospel' on the one hand and the `old wives' fables' on the other. 105 
The task that Ramsay Smith is setting both himself and anthropology more generally 
here is analogous to the task Freud set himself, explored in the footnote examined in the 
previous chapter, where he has to decide whether to `regard the present state of things as 
a true picture of the significant features of the past or as a secondary distortion of them'. 
Ramsay Smith's strangely gendered Christian metaphor, where anthropology's task is a 
hermeneutically theological one, almost in the biblical tradition, where the 
104 Ramsay Smith, `Ethnology and Anthropology', p. 374. 
105 essay Smith, `The Aborigines of Australia', p. 174. 
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anthropologist has to differentiate between the truth and gossip, the original and its 
corruption. It is at the point of the origin that such truth resides. 
It is, perhaps, this conjunction of anthropology and mythology that Ramsay 
Smith is here stressing that led to the beginning of his correspondence with George 
Robertson, of the publishers, Angus and Robertson. On January 22,1925, Ramsay 
Smith wrote to Robertson, telling him that a Mr Harrap of Harrap Publications in 
London had asked him to write a volume on Australian Aboriginal myths to complete 
his series: `After very serious agitation', he claims, `I said I would undertake the work'. 
He mentions casually to Robertson, `I thought of David Unaipon, whom I have known 
well for upwards of 20 years'. 106 
It is difficult to say when Ramsay Smith may first have met Unaipon, although 
there is evidence that he did visit Raukkan in 1907 in his role as the Head of Public 
Health in South Australia. Ramsay Smith had been sent to Raukkan to investigate the 
causes of several deaths of Aboriginal children. Ramsay Smith came to the conclusion 
that the children were being `overtaxed', and he recommended that school hours should 
be shortened and standards lowered. Ramsay Smith's suggestions were implemented in 
1909, and in 1910 books and slates were abolished in a effort to control the spread of 
consumption. Loose paper, which could be destroyed at the end of the day, became the 
only material used for reading or writing. Of these suggestions, Jenkin, in Conquest of 
the Ngarrindjeri wrote: 
These measures were designed with the best of intentions, for the 
aborigines have had few stronger advocates than Ramsay Smith. 
Nevertheless, from that time on, the expected levels of attainment at 
Raukkan were to decline, and inspectors were to make allowance in 
their reports for the fact that the children were `only aborigines'. (198) 
Even as late as 1979, in one of the few available histories of Unaipon's community, 
Ramsay Smith was considered a prime advocate of Aboriginal advancement. Perhaps 
one way of thinking about this is by thinking through the ambiguous legislative 
implications of the word advocate-one who speaks in the place of another; one who 
106 Angus and Robertson Papers, Mitchell Library, Sydney, 22 January 1925. All future references to 
these papers are from this collection. 
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pleads for the other. Such a concept inevitably raises the question of authorization. Who 
authorized Ramsay Smith's benevolent advocacy? There is, moreover, a disturbing 
irony in Ramsay Smith's self-authorized advocacy of the removal of writing materials 
from the Aboriginal school that Unaipon had attended, when it is Unaipon's writings 
that he will later so blatantly consume. 
It is speculation to wonder whether or not Ramsay Smith knew of David 
Unaipon's collecting of Aboriginal legends, or even if he knew of the negotiations 
under way between Unaipon and Angus and Robertson. Certainly both Unaipon and 
Ramsay Smith were members of the Aborigines' Protection League, a breakaway group 
from the AFA that was formed by Colonel J. C. Genders, in 1925.1925 was the year 
that Ramsay Smith initiated his correspondence with Angus and Robertson over the 
issue of myths and legends. Could it be that Ramsay Smith was able to exploit 
Unaipon's negotiations through their mutual membership in the Aborigines Protection 
League? 107 
George Robertson's reply to Ramsay Smith stated: `My first feeling was that of 
being an intruder in your cabbage patch, but on second thought I came to the conclusion 
that our little book, with Unaipon's portrait, will help your more ambitious volume by 
preparing the way. I did not mention your letter to our dusky author.. ' 108 
Unaipon, presumably the `dusky author' referred to in the letter, is uninformed 
of these developments, although it does seem, at this stage, as if Angus and Robertson 
are still intending to publish Unaipon's work under his own name. Robertson's `first 
feeling' of being an `intruder' in Ramsay Smith's domain reveals the extent to which 
Aboriginal mythologies are conceived of, not as Aboriginal structures of belief, but as 
objects waiting to be made meaningful by anthropologists. Robertson's metaphor, 
moreover, suggests the way in which objects of knowledge are considered in territorial 
107 By September 1926, the provisional committee of the League included Basedow, Ramsay Smith and 
Unaipon. In 1927, the League submitted a petition, with 7000 signatures to the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives, calling for the creation of a Model Aboriginal state. For a discussion of the founding of 
the Aborigines Protection League, see McGregor, pp. 118-120. 
103 Angus and Robertson Papers, 6 February 1925. 
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terms, revealing the extent to which a colonial mentality structures even those domains 
considered to be the neutral domain of science. 
It is difficult to say how comprehensive the Angus and Robertson 
correspondence actually is. None the less of that, it does manage to give a somewhat 
fragmented account of the subsequent unfolding of negotiations between Ramsay Smith 
and George Robertson. Ramsay Smith wrote back to George Robertson some nineteen 
months after George Robertson's guilty reply: `To resume a somewhat ancient story', 
Ramsay Smith writes, `Yesterday David Unaipon called on me'. 109 It seems, where the 
question of Aborigines is concerned, the ancient is rarely far away. Ramsay Smith 
claims in this letter that Unaipon had called to ask for his help: `From an extensive 
knowledge of him, I did subscribe, hoping for nothing in return. ' Ramsay Smith 
continues: 
The glamour was gone; he was badly dressed, as I had never seen him 
before. There was no word of quid pro quo; I thought he was out for 
`quids for nothing'. He opened business by saying he wanted to know 
if I could help him to have a manuscript typed. He said nothing about 
previous interviews, but not knowing what he might be after I raised 
the subject of contributions by asking him how he stood with you. 
Ramsay Smith is insistent here that he wants `nothing' from Unaipon. On the 
contrary, he suggests, Unaipon wants something for nothing from him. Ramsay Smith's 
suspicion is clear from his phrase, `not knowing what he might be after', but the cause 
of his suspicion is a mystery. Ramsay Smith includes in this letter a dialogue that his 
secretary had taken down from his previous meeting with Unaipon from over a year 
ago: 
`Angus and Robertson have got all the MSS that you are going to 
publish?... ' `Yes' 
`Do you think that you can collect other legends and myths in the 
North and else where, and if so, are you going to use them?... I 
'No I am not going to Published (sic) what I collect. I thought that I 
could help you.... ' 
109 Angus and Robertson Papers, 5 November 1926. In this letter, Ramsay Smith claims that he had not 
seen Unaipon since 2 October 1925, over a year before this letter was written. According to this 
correspondence, David Unaipon, at this last meeting, had called on Ramsay Smith to ask for help. 
Ramsay, in his correspondence to George Robertson, states: `From an extensive knowledge of him, I did 
subscribe, hoping for nothing in return. ' According to Ramsay Smith's letter, he had heard nothing more 
of Unaipon until the day before he wrote the present letter, 4 November 1926. This, however, does seem 
somewhat hard to believe, after all, both men were members of the provisional committee of the 
Aborigines' Protection League formed in 1925. 
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`Then will you let me have the legends when you return?... ' `Yes. ' `I may make some compensation afterwards... ' `Thank you, Sir. ' 
This staging of what could almost be thought of as a theatrical event can, in line with 
the theatre model of the psyche that pervades Freudian psychoanalysis, be conceived of 
as that form of psychic compensation for anxiety that Freud describes in his grandson's 
`self staging' of the disappearance and return of his mother. Given the way events 
subsequently unfold, it is almost as if Ramsay Smith is `acting out' that which he will 
repeat, and feeling pre-emptive anxiety that he projects on to Unaipon. Ramsay Smith's 
final sentence reiterates this impression: `I think I led you to understand that I had 
known David of old. Though in some, if not most, ways he is a bad egg he is "good in 
parts", or rather there is some corn among the chaff if one knows how to winnow. ' 
Ramsay Smith is here re-enacting what he has earlier claimed to be the task of 
anthropology to divide truth from lies, the good from the bad. He is, moreover, 
claiming to be the privileged apostle who is most in a position to undertake this 
dissection. The metaphor of winnowing is central here. Winnowing is a categorical task: 
to weed out rubbish, to clear of refuse or inferior specimens. Yet, it is also the task of 
Freudian psychoanalysis, to sift through evidence and decode distortions in order to 
produce or uncover the truth. It was an uncanny experience, a sobering reminder of the 
premises of archival research, to be sitting in the Mitchell Library and reading Ramsay 
Smith's letters and having much the same desire to winnow. 
Angus and Robertson replied to Ramsay Smith a week later with the following 
offer: 
By arrangement Unaipon collected and wrote up for us a number of 
aboriginal legends and we bought the copyright for £2/2/- per 
thousand words, the sum-total amounting to about £150. Quite a 
charming book can be made of them, and we intended asking 
Professor Tucker to prepare it for the press. If, however, you want 
them, we will transfer the copyright to you for what it cost us 
furnishing you with a typewritten copy and reserving the original MS. 
for ourselves. 110 
1 10 Angus and Robertson Papers, 9 November 1926. This letter was signed by a man called Paul 
Shenstone on behalf of Angus and Robertson, through whom most of the negotiations subsequently took 
place. 
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This is an offer that Ramsay Smith accepts: `I have to thank you for your letter of 9th 
November which straightens out all matters concerning my old friend David, and leaves 
a clear field for operations. ' Ramsay Smith, `on considering matters from every point of 
view [he] can think of, accepts the offer. He closes the letter by stating, `I am glad to 
have Mr Robertson's literary valuation of the manuscript and I shall use my best 
endeavour to see that it does not lose by any editing to which I may subject it'. 111 Once 
again, information and knowledge is conceived of in territorial terms, and Ramsay 
Smith's noun, endeavour, which can be traced to the Latin `to owe', indicates the way 
in which Robertson's `valuation' accrues a debt for Ramsay Smith. The quantitative and 
abstract valuations of the market place (£2/2/- per thousand words) are disguised by a 
weak appeal to some kind of unspecified aesthetic code that is characteristic of what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the strange mixture of cynicism and factitious piety that 
permeates capitalist relations. 112 
That this cycle is to continue can be seen in Ramsay Smith's letter to Angus and 
Robertson on 24 January, 1927. Ramsay Smith's acknowledgement of the receipt of his 
first batch of manuscripts, expresses his gratitude in similar terms: `I realise that 
whatever place such a book may take among anthropological publications, and I shall 
do my best to make it worthy, almost everything may be traced to Mr. Robertson's 
generous action. ' 113 In a later letter to the publishing company, Ramsay Smith writes: `I 
11' Angus and Robertson Papers, 16 November 1926. Angus and Robertson's return post, dated 15 
January 1927, includes a list of stories written by Unaipon, the copyright of which they have transferred 
to Ramsay Smith, including three stories that had been posted by Unaipon to George Robertson. These 
are 'The Sun, a Goddess and a Creation'; `Chirr Bookie (Blue Crane)"; and 'Perindi and Harrimiah' 
There is no original manuscript for these last three stories in the Mitchell Library, although they are 
included in Ramsay Smith's edition. In this letter of 16 November, Angus and Robertson inform Ramsay 
Smith that: 'In our letter which was returned unclaimed we told [Unaipon] not to send any more, and we 
think you may prefer to arrange direct with him for these. If he raises the point, you may tell him not to 
bother with the £6 we advanced. Apart from that, the £5 which we paid him towards the cost of some 
photographs, we paid him in all £167.50; but we shall be satisfied with the amount stated in the previous 
letter (£ 150), and shall send you copies of all the legends which we have. ' This 'unclaimed letter' was 
supposedly sent on 25 October, 1926, although the Angus and Robertson papers suggest it was never 
sent. 
"2 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 225. Here Deleuze and Guattari are incorporating a 
Nietzschean-inspired analysis of debt and guilt to Marx's analysis. of exploitation. 
13 Angus and Robertson Papers, 24 January 1927. Ramsay Smith received Unaipon's stories in two 
batches from Angus and Robertson dated 25 January, 1927 and 11 February, 1927. On 10 March, 1927, 
the sale of the copyright of Unaipon's stories went through: Angus and Robertson `do now sell and assign 
to the said Dr William Ramsay Smith the copyright of the undermentioned stories and articles by David 
Unaipon which the said David Unaipon has sold and assigned to the said Angus and Robertson Ltd by 
virtue of documents executed by him on the undermentioned dates, namely: 8 January 1925; 12 January 
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shall take an opportunity of writing to Mr. Robertson and telling him how this 
transaction has simplified my work of preparation of the volume of Myths, and has 
made it possible to give a view of Australian Aboriginal myths that I take as quite new 
in literature. ' I is 
Just how much this transaction simplified his work can be seen in the 
publication, in 1930, by Harrap publishers of London, of a book called Myths and 
Legends of the Australian Aboriginals, by William Ramsay Smith. Most of this text 
consists of Unaipon's stories (either given or sold to Angus and Robertson, presumably 
to be published under his own name). Myths and Legends of the Australian Aboriginals 
was republished in 1974 in Boston by the Johnson Reprint Company; a Japanese edition 
was published in 1985 by Oseana Shuppan; in 1996, Myths and Legends of the 
Australian Aboriginals was republished in London under the title of Aborigine by 
Random House under its Senate Imprint, and in 1997, Tiger Books in Middlesex 
republished Aborigine in full. All of these editions are attributed to Ramsay Smith; none 
mention Unaipon. 115 In his final letter to Angus and Robertson, informing them that he 
had just despatched his own manuscript to Mr Harrap of Harrap publications, Ramsay 
Smith wrote: `The book has cost an enormous amount of pains-taking work, but I think 
the literary result will prove that it is worth writing. You know something of the 
pecuniary cost: I say I spent a good deal more in the same line before it was finished. ' 116 
It is the nature of this `pains-taking work' that I will now discuss. 
1925; 14 January 1925; 16 January 1925; 21 January 1925; 6 February 1925; 23 February 1925; 11 
March 1925; 15 April 1925; 15 May 1925; 15 June 1925; 30 June 1925; 3 July 1925. ' There is, however, 
no record of any documents confirming that Unaipon had sold and assigned his myths to Angus and 
Robertson. According to Ramsay Smith, in October 1925 `when [Unaipon] called on me about his 
expedition he told me you were going to give him 2 guineas per 1000 words and that he had then finished 
or would finish by December [1925], 2 volumes of 50000 words each. ' Given that Ramsay Smith told 
Angus and Robertson that Unaipon said, on 4 November 1926, that he had not heard from Angus and 
Robertson in a year, it is possible that such transactions never took place: `Yesterday I [Ramsay Smith] 
told him I would write to you to ask how matters stood between you. He said he had sent you all the 
manuscript he had promised and that he had heared (sic) nothing from you for 12 months. I said that until 
I knew exactly how things were with you I could say nothing about helping him with any typing of 
manuscripts or of buying anything he had for sale. ' 
14 Angus and Robertson Papers, 11 February 1927. '15 A publication of Unaipon's work, under his own name, is presently being prepared by two Australian 
academics, Stephen Muecke and Adam Shoemaker. It is hoped that a biography of Unaipon will be out 
within the next three years. On top of this, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Arts Corporation are 
in the process of mounting a legal case to reimburse the Ngarrindjeri community for money lost through 
the violation of copyright. The outcome of this case is yet to be determined. 
116 Angus and Robertson Papers, 16 September 1927 
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Cross-Cultural Comparisons 
The extent of Ramsay Smith's appropriation of Unaipon's material can only be 
seen by comparing Myths and Legends of the Australian Aboriginals with Unaipon's 
original manuscripts in the Mitchell Library in Sydney, which were given to the library 
by Angus and Robertson. Perhaps, initially, the most striking difference between the 
two texts occurs in that strange space occupied by the preface which I explored in the 
context of Freud's preface to the Hebrew edition of Totem and Taboo. David Unaipon's 
preface, dated 1924-35, begins with the words: 
My race-the Aborigines of Australia-has a vast tradition of 
legends, myths and folklore stories. These, which they delight in 
telling to the younger members of the tribe, have been handed down 
orally for thousands of years. In fact, all tribal laws and customs are, 
first of all, told to the children of the tribes in the form of stories just 
as the white Australian mother first instructs her children with nursery 
stories. Of course, the mothers and the old men, in telling these 
stories, drag them out to a great length, putting in every detail with 
much gesture and acting, but in writing them down for our white 
friends I have used the simplest forms of expression in order that the 
neither the meaning nor the `atmosphere' may be lost. 
As a full-blooded member of my race I think I may be the first, but I 
hope not the last to produce an enduring record of our customs, belief 
and imaginings. ýl7 
This preface begins with a strong assertion of Aboriginal identification. It does, 
moreover, claim a double motivation; these myths are told to teach and instruct young 
Aboriginal children, and, as a result, meanings and values are inscribed within them. 
Yet Unaipon also makes clear that the intended audience of these written versions of 
oral performances are his `white friends', one of whom, perhaps, is Ramsay Smith 
himself. Under the guise of teaching and instructing Aboriginal children, these myths 
are also teaching and instructing white Australia, to prove to white Australia that, just as 
they have transmitted techniques for learning and reproducing culture, Aboriginal 
culture is learned as well, and thereby value-laden. Unaipon's Legendary Tales, by 
analogizing Aboriginal and white Australia, acts as a corrective to those views that see 
Aboriginal culture as natural and instinctive, in opposition to the civilized culture of 
white Australia. The other significant thing about this preface is that it suggests that 
1 17 Angus and Robertson Papers. The manuscripts of Unaipon's myths have no dates or page references. 
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these tales need to be simplified if a non-Aboriginal person is to understand them, that 
the process of transcription necessarily involves a transformation. The myths being read 
are already different from themselves. Part of this difference, moreover, is the 
elimination of the somatic and gestural multi-dimensional textuality of the myths as 
performed. Finally, Unaipon, in his preface, makes a claim about his own project, that 
he is the first Aboriginal person to produce an 'enduring-pecord' of Aboriginal -culture. 
Yet, although the record has definitely been enduring, both in its intransitive sense of 
remaining in existence, the sense in which Unaipon probably used it, and also its 
transitive sense of undergoing a hardship. Unaipon can be thought of as signalling the 
movement from an Aboriginal subjectivity (whatever that might beLto European 
subjectivity. Yet this European subjectivity is bound by a market-driven notion of 
ownership, out of which legislation like copyrights that secured the word as a 
commodity, came into being. It was print technology, moreover, that enabled such a 
conception of textuality, and the first known `royal_decree or priyilegium was often 
secured forbidding the reprinting of a printed book by others than the original publisher' 
in 1518. It was much earlier than this, however, that the ancient Latin poet Martial uses 
the word plagiarius-a torturer, a plunderer, an oppressor-to refer to someone who 
appropriates another's writing. '' 
Even as the network of colonialism acts to produce certain kinds of subjects (we 
might want to call this psychic colonialism), colonial forces (plunderers and oppressors) 
denied Unaipon, the emerging colonial subject, the_very_advantagesthis subjectivity 
supposedly provided, including protection under copyright as the sovereign author of 
one's own work. Although it is. argued tliat_western epistemology Pxcludes others unless 
they assimilate forms of knowing that have been accorded universal status, the cynicism 
and piety structuring the neurotic and Oedipalized colonizing_subject ensures that it 
both does and does not seek to transform the colony in its own image. 
Smith's preface begins on a completelydiff_erent note, reconstituting_Unaipon's 
myths as anthropological objects: `The mythology of any and every people has become 
"8SceOng, p. 131 
-- -- 
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a subject of profound and meaningful interest to anthropologists. ' 119 It is clear that, for 
Ramsay Smith, these myths are, so to speak, anthropological data, and it is this which 
gives them both meaning and interest. Although both prefaces claim to want to teach 
Europeans about Aboriginal culture, Ramsay Smith's preface, in contrast to Unaipon's 
preface, suggests that it is only through his anthropological interventions that 
Aboriginal myths produce meaning, and that Aboriginal culture, prior to this 
intervention, does not already have mechanisms for the production of meaning. The 
movement, moreover, from Aboriginal myths to the `mythology of any and every 
people' is that movement from the particular to the general that Barthes finds so 
colonizing in mythology. For Barthes, `myth is speech stolen and restored. Only speech 
which is restored is no longer quite that which was stolen: when it was brought back it 
was not put exactly in its place' (136). Barthes' definition of myth as `robbery by 
colonization' is painfully accurate in Ramsay Smith's preface (143). 
Ramsay Smith claims, moreover, that his book is `a collection of narratives as 
told by pure-blooded aboriginals of various tribes who have been conversant with the 
subject since childhood'(7). Of the changes he made to the narratives, he claims they are 
`few and slight, and do not go beyond what were to be considered necessary in order to 
make clear the meaning, or to give some degree of grammatical correctness to the text 
without changing the "aroma" of the story when using equivalent English terms or 
phrases'(7). This strangely apostrophied `aroma' presumably replacing Unaipon's 
apostrophed `atmosphere' can perhaps be explained in the light of the association of the 
sense of smell, in evolutionary terms, with the heightened sexuality of a more primitive 
stage. In a footnote in Civilization and its Discontents, Freud argues that `the diminution 
of the olfactory sense seems itself to be a consequence a man's raising himself from the 
ground, of his assumption of an upright gait; this made his genitals, which were 
previously concealed, visible and in need of protection... The fateful process of 
civilization would thus have set in with man's adoption of an erect posture'(288-89). 
For Freud, the `undeniable depreciation of olfactory stimuli' is linked to `the sexual 
119 William Ramsay Smith, Myths and Legends of the Australian Aboriginals (London: Harrap, 1930), p. 
7. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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repression which advances along with civilization'(296). Furthermore, this olfactory 
reference adds to the lack of mediation that Ramsay Smith hopes to present these myths 
as being constituted by: 
The myths as they were told are allowed to speak for themselves. 
There has been no searching evidence either to support or to disprove 
any anthropological or other theories. On the other hand, no pains 
have been spared in the endeavour to find out accurately what was in 
the minds of the narrators... _ 
A good deal of what is set forth relates 
more or less intimately to the physical conditions of the country and to 
the habits, religion, customs, observances, relationships, occupations 
and recreations that go to make up the life of the aboriginal... 
Although these in some instances may not give the actual words of the 
`actors' in the incidents or of their conversations, they sound natural, 
as if they were the language of the reciter of the story. They help to 
give a physical setting and a local colour, and to provide a human 
atmosphere. (8-9) 
Ramsay Smith's narrative is a mythical production. in_itself. Part of the myth that he 
seeks to perpetuate, in contradistinction to Unaipon, is that Aboriginal culture is pre- 
culturalr hence his attempt_to make the-'actors' in-the, story `sound natural_'_ This preface 
gestures towards a relocalization of the text to its natural place in oral performance, 
denying_the fact they were actually constituted by a prior-written text-Unaipon's. 
Ramsay Smith hopes to create the illusion that he is starting from scratch; rather than 
entering a field of textuality, he is entering an experience which requires, for it to be 
sustained, the complete erasure of Unaipon whose name appears at no stage in the work. 
Although Ramsay Smith states that the stories cannot be. used to prove or disprove any 
anthropological theory, they, in themselves, remain the object of anthropological 
interest. This seems to contradict the `apostolic task' that Ramsay Smith had set 
himself. to establish truth from falsehood, `gospel' from `old wives' fables'. Ramsay 
Smith's rhetorical pose, positioning himself as collector of facts, and minimizing his 
role as theorist, enables him to construct, empirically, the Aboriginal object of 
knowledge as transparent and himself as privileged conduit through which the reader 
can enter `the minds of the narrators' . Ramsay Smith, quite explicitly, claims that the 
gathering of these facts/narratives/data was his own experience as ethnological 
anthropologist. 
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While Unaipon had been both the subject and object of his mythological 
investigations, Ramsay Smith, by offering an interpretation of Unaipon's myths as 
transparent and unmediated, as `speaking for themselves', simultaneously delegates the 
place of Aborigines to objectivity, as well as obscuring the relations of power through 
which such a construction of the Aborigine as object of knowledge was able to take 
place. 
This is interesting because, when questioned in the Observer article about the 
process of collecting myths, Unaipon admitted that his task of collection was difficult, 
`but not as difficult as it would be to a European': 
`I have the totem system to help me', he said. `The totem binds us 
together much as masonry does Europeans. My first duty when I go 
into a strange tribe is to ask for a totem. 
`Then, if they say, for instance, "that man is a swan, " I say that my 
mother was also a swan, and he treats me as a relative, and tells me 
what I want to know. Or I find a man who is a kangaroo, the totem of 
my father... ' 120 
Leaving aside the troubling implications of this mode of collection, and the ambivalent 
status Unaipon occupies as a kind of `native informant', Unaipon's writing up of the 
myths has a methodological precedent, less in traditional Aboriginal culture, than in 
comparative anthropology of the kind practised by James Frazer. Unaipon, it seems, 
subscribes to the anthropological view of myths, and his methodology can be thought of 
as following from this pseudo-scientific perspective. As he writes in his introduction to 
`Totemism', published later, under Unaipon's name, in 1929: 
`Totemism' is one of the most ancient customs instituted by the 
Primitive Man. The practice of it among the Australian Aborigines 
and its adaptation owes its origin in a Mythological conception during 
the Neolithic Age. The function of mythology is admitted by science 
to be an attempt of the Primitive Man to explain the religious and 
physical phenomena. (4) 
Marc Manganaro has argued that Frazer's comparative method in The Golden 
Bough, which `is literally bursting with previous writings and points of view... 
proliferates voices in order to control them and protect the author'. 12' Manganaro claims 
120 'Aboriginal Intellectual', p. 46. 
121 Manganaro, p. 6. 
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that `such openness is integrally tied to appropriative cultural representation, that a will 
to power operates not only within but because of the profusion of source and voice in 
these comparative texts. '123 Unaipon's emulation of this methodology, however, 
produces something far more ambiguous.. In so doingjnot only is he making Judeo- 
Christian mythology an object of study comparable to Aboriginal mythology, his re- 
positioning of himself as an Aboriginal anthropologjst, who also studies European 
mythology, can be seen as a major reversal in the operation of power in Australia, and 
in anthropology more_generally. This is not to suggest that Unaipon's movement from 
object of knowledge to subject of knowledge is unproblematic, nor that it is not only so 
enmeshed in different and repressive technologies of power, but it is to summt that 
Unaipon's position as an Aboriginal anthropologist is a de-stabilizing one. As Eric 
Wilmot has argued, himself an Aboriginal scientist and writer, `Unaipon was... the first 
Aboriginal scientist who concentrated his investigations upon Europeans,. 124 
One of the reasons, I have claimed, the Bible is of interest to Unaipon is that, 
unlike Aboriginal mythology, it is multi-racial, and offers precedents for the relation 
between cultures. As he wrote of the Bible in 'My-Life Story': 'It-was in this Book I 
learned that God made all nations of one blood and that in Christ Jesus colour and racial 
distinctions disappeared'(13). This is why, perhaps, Unaipon provides so much cross- 
cultural analysis in his own re-telling of Aboriginal myths. Western Christian culture 
therefore becomes an object of study, and Aboriginal _culture 
is placed alongside it, 
rather than necessarily being inferior to it, or being a forefather of it. The way Unaipon 
talks about the Bible in Aboriginal Legends, _is not as 
the Word of God, and, in line with 
the anthropological thinking of the day, more as a series of narratives. 
One of the ironies of Ramsay Smith's rewritings of Unaipon's Legendary Tales 
is that although he has hoped to retain the `aroma' of unmediated Aboriginality, he very 
much emulated Unaipon's prose style, a style that was inherited from the work of 
Milton, Bunyan and the King James Bible. The prior textuality that Ramsay Smith went 
its Manganaro, p. 6. 
124 Cited in Susan Rintoul,. `The Inaugural David Unaipon Lecture'! South Australian Teacher's Journal, 
21.10 (1989), p. 14. 
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to such lengths to erase returns as the colonial voice anyway, under the guise of being 
Aboriginal, removing it even further from the Aboriginal immediacy it seeks to 
embody. Ramsay Smith's Myths and Legends can be read as, in a rather complicated 
formulation, the attempt to produce an unmediated Aboriginal voice as object of 
anthropological knowledge, by rewriting myths written by a Western-educated 
Aborigine who was emulating the culture from which Ramsay Smith himself had 
emerged. Ramsay Smith's myths are mythological in the sense that they do not lead 
back to Aboriginal voices as he suggests, 
_but 
to other texts, and those are the textual 
practices and methodologies of his own cultural inheritance. The question of how 
Aboriginal these myths actually are and where they come from which, as we will see, 
has dominated much Unaipon criticism, is one that I am not concerned with here, partly 
because I am incapable of answering it=_but also because it reproduces the kind of 
`apostolic' methodological inquiry that desires to know and believes that it can find the 
truth at the origin. 
The nature of the changes-that Ramsay. Smith made to Unaipon'smanuscript are 
worth examining in detail, and such an examination has never been undertaken. I will 
merely give a general idea of the way_ in which Unaipon's versions of the myths were 
transformed by Ramsay Smith. What is most striking about such a comparison is 
Ramsay Smith's removal of Unaipon's_ interpretative voice and cross-cultural 
comparisons, comparisons that, in Unaipon's version, are an integral part of the project. 
Ramsay Smith's rewriting-maintains the illusion that there is no interpretative voice. It 
would be difficult to argue, however, that, in Ramsay Smith's re-writing, there was 
anything like a coherent strategy at work. Unlike Unaipon's_ manuscripts, which used 
and translated into English Aboriginal vocabulary, in Ramsay Smith's rewriting, the 
process of translation has been hidden, and all Aboriginal vocabulary has been removed. 
Much is merely copied verbatim straight from Unaipon's manuscript. 
In his preface, Ramsay Smith states: `_A certain amount of information on these 
subjects is required for an intelligent understanding of the mythology and a proper 
appreciation of its meaning and its moral value. This desideratum is supplied partly in 
the narratives and partly in the notes. ' For Ramsay Smith, once again, it is the task of 
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the anthropologist to produce meaning out of Aboriginal myths. What Ramsay Smith 
refers to as desideratum, which, to cite the Oxford English Dictionary, can be defined as 
`a thing for which desire is felt, a thing lacked and wanted' 124, are actually notes taken 
from within Unaipon's own narratives and placed as footnotes in Ramsay Smith's. 
The opening chapter of Ramsay Smith's Myths and Legends, entitled `Origins: 
The Customs and Traditions of Aboriginals', although repeated almost word-for-word 
from the introduction to Unaipon's manuscript, was also published in the Daily 
Telegraph in 1924.125 Although Unaipon refers throughout to either `my race' or, when 
referring to historical instances, `my ancestors', Ramsay Smith replaces, as scientific 
observer, both these terms with the ahistorical `they', thereby erasing the temporal 
differentiation that Unaipon's narratives seek to maintain. What in Unaipon is 
historically specific becomes, in Ramsay Smith's rewriting, timeless. In this way, in a 
movement reminiscent of Freud, Ramsay Smith is relegating contemporary myths to a 
kind of unconscious and primitive space. According to Freud, the processes of the 
unconscious are timeless, `i. e. they are ordered temporally, are not altered by the 
passage of time; they have no reference to time at all'. 126 
The political implications of such an ahistorical perspective can be seen in the 
changes Ramsay Smith makes to Unaipon's story `Yana-ma yha-who' which retains that 
title in Ramsay Smith's version. Unaipon opens: `There were many strange beings who 
lived along while ago, many, many years before Captain Cook found a landing at 
Kernell. ' Ramsay Smith, who prefers the ahistorical, mythical mode, writes: `There 
were many strange beings who lived along while ago, many, many years before the 
white man came to Australia'(342). This is the kind of transformation of history into 
nature that Barthes claims myth is characterized by. Unaipon's version, on the other 
hand, incorporates aspects of both the mythological `many, many years' and the 
historical `Captain Cook found a landing at Kernell'. In Unaipon's version, myth does 
not oppose history in the way that Rahv and Barthes suggest. 
124 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 645. 
'u Unaipon, `Aboriginals: Their Traditions and Customs', Daily Telegraph, 2 August 1924, p. 13. 
126 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 191 
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Unaipon's version of the arrival of Aborigines in Australia in `Origins', in both 
the manuscript and the newspaper article, also deals with another figure who `found a 
landing' : 
The tradition implies that we arrived in Australia from another land in 
the North-West. The way of our coming was probably over an isthmus 
that has long since been sunk under the sea... This seems to agree with 
science, that Australia was once part of a large and ancient continent 
called Lemuria... The traditions also relate that the aboriginals were 
driven into Australia by a plague of fierce ants, or by a pre-historic 
race as fierce and innumerable as ants... Like the Israelites, the 
aboriginals seem to have had a Moses, a law-giver, a leader, who 
guided them in their Exodus from Lemuria. His name is Nar-ran- 
darrie. 
Adam Shoemaker argues that the `obvious aim' of this passage `is to achieve a 
synthesis with Christian-specifically Old Testament - narrative'. 
127 I am less certain of 
the obviousness of this aim, which strikes me as less an attempt at synthesis, than an act 
of comparative anthropology, which is why, perhaps, Ramsay Smith erases this from his 
version. Unaipon's reference to the entry of a law-giver, a leader, seems to indicate, in a 
way that Ramsay Smith erases, that all myths of the origin of the state require the arrival 
of a legislator. Geoffrey Bennington refers to this necessity in an article on, among 
other things, Freud's Moses and Monotheism: `As the legislator is the necessary 
moment of the foundation of any state whatsoever, and as this must be therefore be true 
of the first state too, then the legislator is not so much an empirical foreigner as a figure 
of absolute exteriority. ' 128 Ramsay Smith merely writes: `Traditions say that 
Aboriginals came to Australia from another land in the north-west'(17). Ramsay Smith 
not only needs to erase the `scientific' aspect of Unaipon's narratives, and Unaipon's 
discussion of the relation between ancient tradition and modem scientific opinion, but 
he also needs to erase the narrative of a prior law-giver, even a prior state, because, in 
Ramsay Smith's version, he turns himself into that figure of absolute exteriority that 
founds the law, the law of the anthropological colonizer. In spite of this erasure, 
Ramsay Smith, somewhat strangely, retains much of Unaipon's archaic language, and, 
127 Adam Shoemaker, Black Words, White Page, 1929-88 (St. Lucia, Que: nsland: University of 
Queensland Press, 1989), p. 46 
128 Geoffrey Bennington, `Mosaic Fragment: If Derrida were an Egyptian', in Legislations: The Politics 
of Deconstruction (London: Verso, 1944), p. 219. 
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following Unaipon, refers to young Aboriginal men and women as `youths and 
maidens'. 
A few more comparisons will suffice to make the point. In a story entitled `Why 
Frogs Jump into the Water', Unaipon writes that: 'My people delight to give a reason 
for everything they observe as well as to draw a moral lesson from it all. ' Unaipon's 
version begins: `This is one of the many stories of a strange being who came into 
existence through the agency of a spirit of water. ' Ramsay Smith's version, which 
shares the same title, begins: `This is the story of the green frog, who came into 
existence through the agency of a spirit of water'(111). In an accompanying footnote, 
what might, in Ramsay Smith's words, be referred to as `desideratum', he writes: `This 
is one of several stories of a strange being that came into existence'. Ramsay Smith 
seems to hope to retain the illusion that it is his own anthropological work, as opposed 
to the myth's narrator, that produces knowledge of variations, multiplicities that 
Unaipon, in his own cross-cultural methodology, has reproduced within the text. What 
Ramsay Smith implies, through the use of footnotes, is lacking but desired, he actually 
dissimulates as lacking through his own desire. It is this lack that he, through his 
anthropological methodology, is able to fill with the reasoned interpretative analysis 
that he can only to attribute to the anthropologist. 
One of Unaipon's longest stories, `The Mischievous Crow and the Good he 
Did', also opens comparatively: 
I suppose our ancestors in those times immemorial always 
experienced the ruling forces of Good and Evil. According to the 
Bible story, there was a time when our first parents were only 
conscious of all good, and evil was foreign to their nature, which was 
perfect in all ways... The Great Author of life and creation was pleased 
with His work, that he declared it was good. And it was His delight to 
come into the Garden of Eden in the cool of the evening and converse 
with Adam and Eve, and to inform him that... he shall eat of all the 
fruit of the garden, except the one in the midst of the garden.... 
But somewhere out of space there arrived in that beautiful and happy 
home a visitant.... The visitant did not tell from whence he came or 
what his mission was, but simply looked on with envy upon the 
beautiful work of the good spirit. Then one day he took upon himself 
the form of a serpent, and waited by the forbidden tree. Presently Eve 
came along, happy to be enjoying life... 
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The outcome of story is well known, and Unaipon briefly rehearses it before coming to 
his point: 
And since this allegorical teaching, we inherit not only the voice of the 
Good Spirit, but the evil whispering of the Serpent to-day.... Now to 
an enlightened age Evil still presents himself as the Serpent. He comes 
to us with that fascinating power and cunning of the snake. Sometimes 
he comes as an angel. To each nationality he comes in all kinds of 
forms. But to the Aborigine he comes as a Crow, or, in other words, 
he is personified to us in the bird body of the Crow... Now the crow 
plays an important part in the tradition and legend of my race. 
Although he is the embodiment of all that is evil and mischievous, yet 
there are some very good and great things he has taught us, and one of 
the greatest teachings of the Crow was the immortality of the soul.... 
There are many different stories of the Crow as a legend or a nursery 
story. There are many stories told of the crow by different tribes. I 
shall attempt to deal with him from the Narrinyur tribe's standpoint. 
What is most fascinating about this introduction is that Unaipon insists on the 
allegorical nature of both the Bible and Ngarrindjeri stories. He does, moreover, suggest 
that the enlightened age is chronological, not geographical, undoing that theoretical 
manoeuvre discussed in the previous chapter whereby Europe's past is displaced on to a 
geographical axis. According to Unaipon, both Christians and Aborigines understand, 
because of the age we all live in, that we are dealing with allegories, with cultural 
narratives to explain the nature of evil, and that these, like cultures, vary. It is almost too 
obvious to mention the radically different conception of evil that Unaipon's story points 
to. It is hard to imagine the Biblical Satan being referred to as just a bit cheeky. 
Ramsay Smith's rewriting of this story begins at the point after Unaipon's cross- 
cultural introduction, but, once again, a cross-cultural analysis similar to Unaipon's is 
made via a footnote. Such a transformation is again seen in the re-writing of Unaipon's 
narrative, `Belief of the Aborigine in a Great Spirit', which opens: 
The belief in a Supreme Being and the religious instruction, as well as 
religious ceremonies and worship, are not the experience of the Jew 
and Mohammedan alone. Neither did it belong to one particular age or 
place, but it is universal and belongs to every age. This wonderful 
experience of a longing for something beautiful and noble, something 
spiritually Divine, lives within the bosom of the nations of the past as 
it does to-day. 
Wonderful is the soul of man. A capacity for the Great Spirit of the 
Eternal God. Go back into those ancient civilizations and review the 
wonders. Those sensational discoveries in the valley of the Nile or in 
the jungles of Indo-China, or let your mind be carried away to far-off 
Peru or Yucatan, or think of the grandeur that once was Rome's, the 
glories that once belonged to Greece. Amongst these ruins are 
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monuments and fragments of magnificent temples erected to their 
gods. These are evidences that go to prove that man is a worshipping 
creature irrespective of colour, language or clime. The only difference 
is, as a nation's conception of the Great Spirit, so is their form of 
worship. 
Unaipon then goes on to describe synagogues, mosques, churches and cathedrals, before 
stating that `we build no places of worship, nor do we erect altars for the offering of 
sacrifice'. This, as it turns out, is Ramsay Smith's opening line, again replacing the `we' 
of Unaipon with `they'. Once again, Unaipon's voice is erased, as is his attempt to 
analyze Aboriginal cultural practices in relation to other systems of belief. 
Unaipon's Legendary Tales also contain a range of stories that might be called 
`ethnographic'. One is titled `Sport', another `Hunting', and another `Fishing'. In 
`Sport' Unaipon's version opens: 
The Spirit of sport is universal you will witness it among all 
nationalities and colour and language and in all climes. There are 
many different forms of sport. The English speaking race, the school 
boy's and girls, youth and maiden with their cricket outfit, their tennis 
balls and racquet, Lacrosse, Golf, Football, rowing and yachting... 
Wrestling and running I suppose are the most ancient of sport. These 
two forms of sport can be traced right back to the Roman; (sic) 
At this point, Unaipon begins to talk about Aboriginal sporting events, which is the 
same point at which Ramsay Smith's narrative begins. A similar thing happens in 
Unaipon's story entitled `Hunting'. Ramsay Smith's repeats Unaipon's claim that the 
aborigine `has developed the art of tracking the human footprint to the highest degree. 
There is a whole science in the footprint'. Ramsay Smith, however, excludes Unaipon's 
following sentence: `Footprints are the same evidence to a bush native as fingerprints 
are to a court of law. ' Like his erasure of reference to law-givers, Ramsay Smith usually 
erases references to the law, which are often replaced by the word `custom'. Aborigines, 
it seems, are not subject to laws in the same way, Ramsay Smith is suggesting, 
including, one supposes, laws governing copyright. 
My final example of Ramsay Smith's rewriting is of the story `Pan Parl Lowa'. 
Unaipon opens this story as follows: 
Several traditional customs stand out more prominently than others. 
The first is `Pan Parl Lowa' which may be literally translated as `Do 
unto others as you would that they do unto you. ' I feel safe in stating 
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that this golden rule is taught by people irrespective of colour, creed, 
or religion, primitive or civilized. As in my Race, that rule exists. 
According to Freud, in Civilization and its Discontents, the `greatest hindrance to 
civilization' is `the constitutional inclinations of human beings to be aggressive towards 
one another'(336). In thinking through the implications of such a hindrance, and the 
possibility of over coming it, Freud writes: 
The clue may be supplied by one of the ideal commands, as we have 
called them, of civilized society. It runs: `Thou shalt love thy 
neighbour as thyself. ' It is known throughout the world and is 
undoubtedly older than Christianity, which puts it forward as its 
proudest claim. Yet it is certainly not very old; even in historical times 
it was strange to mankind. (299) 
What Freud refers to as `probably the most recent of the cultural commands of the 
super-ego'(336), becomes in Unaipon's story a `golden rule [that] is taught by people 
irrespective of colour, creed, or religion, primitive or civilized'. Little wonder, then, that 
Ramsay Smith would turn Unaipon's musings into a footnote, take away the cross- 
cultural aspect, and rename the story, which otherwise remains the same, `The Spirit of 
Help Among the Aboriginals'. 
Ramsay Smith and the Colonizing Oedipal Subject 
How are we to think about Ramsay Smith's appropriation of Unaipon's stories, 
and the changes that he makes to them? How might we explain the complete erasure of 
Unaipon's name in the text? Certainly, Ramsay Smith was not always an ungenerous 
man regarding attributions, and in closing one article he writes: `I undertook to write the 
paper because I was asked to do so, and because I thought it required to be done; not 
because I was infatuated with the subject. It has entailed much work on me, and a great 
deal of inconvenience on others-particularly Dr. Rogers, who, I think, deserves to be 
regarded as a joint author. ' 129 
It is certainly Ramsay Smith's dissimulation that produces his anthropological 
authority in Myths and Legends, yet as I tried to suggest in my previous chapter, such 
anthropological authority is an effect of a specifically Oedipalized psychic economy. 
129 Ramsay Smith, `The Place of the Aboriginal in Recent Anthropological Research', p. 576. 
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Freud suggests, in Moses and Monotheism, that `[I]n its implications the distortions of a 
text resembles a murder-- the difficulty is not in perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid 
of its traces'(283). Perhaps psychoanalysis, and Freud's concepts of identification and 
distortion, provide us with a possible way of thinking about Ramsay Smith's 
appropriation, and his desire to get rid of the traces of the deed. 
In my re-reading of Totem and Taboo, I considered Weber's re-reading of the 
Freudian idea of distortion (entstellung), an idea that is also central to mythology. 
Samuel Weber, you will recall, argued that interpretation, as a movement of distortion, 
`must be conceived not as a more or less faithful reproduction or re-presentation of an 
antecedent, self-identical object, meanin&or "presence, " but as a process of repetition 
and dislocation' . 
13 1 The role of distortion in the production and interpretation of 
mythology is something that myth critics have often attempted to deny, a position that is 
exemplified by Susanne Langer: `Myths are not bound to any particular words, not even 
to language, but may be told or painted, acted or danced, without suffering-degradation 
or distortion. ' 132 
Certainly, the example of Unaipon and Ramsay Smith, and the necessity of 
examining the historical relation between versions of myth, in order to try to understand 
the specific conditions of retellings of myths, makes Langer's position untenable. 
Furthermore, Ramsay Smith's erasure of the historically specific moment of invasion in 
the form of the name of Captain Cook landin&at Kernell Bay, belies a similar desire to 
the one motivating Langer, even if he claimed the `task of anthropology' was to 
distinguish `Gospel fromold wives' fables'. Ramsay Smith, in retelling Unaipon's 
myths, is, as I have argued at the beginning of this chapter, using the language of 
myth/truth to avoid the problem of history. This is not to claim that Unaipon's 
mythography is the `truer' of the two. Indeed, Unaipon's own re-tellings of the stories 
are- inescapably distorted as-well, as- I have already tried to demonstrate_ In this-way, 
Ramsay Smith, the committed and objective scientist, attempts to escape his own 
history and culture, only to be returned back there in a distorted form. 
131 Weber, Institution and Interpretation, p. 80. 
132 Suzanne K Langer, Feeling and Form (New York, Scribner's, _ 
1953), p_ 160_ 
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To reiterate from the previous chapter, Freud uses the term distortion in two 
senses: to change the appearance of something, and put in another place, displace. 
Interpretation, moreover, on which both the practices of psychoanalysis and 
anthropology depend, is always a process of repetition and dislocation. Myths, as I tried 
to argue earlier, offer the illusion of a stability and transparency unaffected by this 
process, which can be seen at work in Ramsay Smith's preface. Just as myths embody 
the desire for the wholeness of the point of the origin, Ramsay Smith's preface, and his 
systematic erasure of Unaipon's cross-cultural analysis attempts to place him in that 
originary place. As with the manifest content of dreams, the distortion of Ramsay 
Smith's `timeless' myths, one might say his secondary elaboration, is camouflaged by a 
representational facade which smoothes over the processes of history and colonization, 
and the figure of Unaipon himself, that Ramsay Smith seeks to hide. Myth, and the 
textual search for origins that accompany it, like the spectre of the savage analyzed in 
my reading of Totem and Taboo, are characterized, in both Unaipon's and Ramsay 
Smith's myths, by the absence of the foundational object desired. Myth, then, like the 
savage, functions in Ramsay Smith's own work. as a site of displacement. 
According to Freud, an understanding of displacement can always be found, in 
the Oedipalized subject at least, in an ambivalent relation to the father. Given that, for 
Ramsay Smith, Unaipon was his father, in an evolutionary sense, perhaps we can think 
about Ramsay Smith's appropriation of Unaipon's myths by thinking about his 
relationship to Unaipon as identificatory in the Oedipal sense in which Freud uses it in 
Totem and Taboo, where the son's ambivalent identification with the father involves 
both feelings of love and hate, but also desires to replace the father. For the Oedipal 
subject, the desire to acquire an identity is directed towards the incorporation and 
assimilation of the other. In this sense, Ramsay Smith's anthropological dedication to 
exploring Aboriginality, and his elimination of Unaipon's name from his work, can 
perhaps be thought of as the same kind of exploration and annihilation that marks the 
Oedipalized subject. 
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It is interesting that even in Ramsay Smith's anthropological writings, 
Unaipon's name seems to be repressed. In `The Aborigines of Australia', for example, 
he writes: 
The ordinary blackfellow is as good at figures as his white brother. 
Some become great in oratory and speak English chastely and 
beautifully. Some train themselves in music and can play classical 
choruses and such-like pieces on the organ with great skill and 
expression. Some show great mechanical ingenuity, and read and 
understand books on mechanics and physics. (164) 
This seems to be a description of Unaipon, whose name is repressed. In a sense, just as 
the primal sons divided up the body of the father, so that they could each incorporate a 
piece of him, and to ensure that the absolute authority that he held could not be 
transferred to a single individual, Ramsay Smith divides up all the characteristics that 
Unaipon was most known for, into different individual Aborigines, to neutralize 
Unaipon's power, and to also cover up the traces of his own incorporative deed. 
Ramsay Smith's desire to both preserve and eliminate Aboriginality can be seen 
not only in his preservation of Unaipon's myths while simultaneously repressing 
Unaipon's name, it can also be thought about in terms of what James Clifford, in 
Writing Culture, describes as the `allegory of salvage' which perpetuates the value of 
anthropology by saying `the other is lost, in disintegrating time and space, but saved in 
the text'. 132 In this context, Ramsay Smith's reference to Sybilline books is noteworthy, 
as are his calls for the increasing professionalization and institutionalization of the 
discipline of anthropology through which Ramsay Smith, as collector of Aboriginal 
myths, takes the place of authority, the place, in the case of Myths and Legends, of 
Unaipon. Just as the son, in Freud's schema, desires to usurp the place of the father, 
Ramsay Smith desires to usurp the place of, and supercede Unaipon, his evolutionary 
forefather. In a sense, this act of Oedipalized identification, which, I have argued, is 
necessarily colonizing, is distorted through the lens of anthropology, which makes 
'32 James Clifford, `On Ethnographic Allegory' in Writing Culture: the Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography, ed. James Clifford and George E. Markus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
p. 112. 
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claims to be representing knowledge, reason and the progress of civilization which 
enables its own inherent cannibalization of the other to be disavowed and repressed. 
Unaipon's Myths 
In 1929, the year before the publication of Ramsay Smith's Myths and Legends, 
Unaipon published a 15-page AFA-sponsored booklet called Native Legends. 133 There 
is some confusion about the eventual publication date, but it is presumed to be in 
1929.134 Native Legends comprises two `legends', `The Release of the Dragon-Flies by 
the Fairy Sun Beam' and `Your Goona the Cockatoo'; two shorter pieces that could be 
considered more anthropological and mythological, `Totemism' and `Pah Kowie-the 
Creature Cell of Life and Intelligence'; and a piece called `Hungarrda-Jew Lizard' 
which is a psalm-like vision of creation and evolution, and which is partly reprinted, 
under the name `Ngunaitponi', in Les Murray's edition of The New Oxford Book of 
Australian Verse. 135 
In the light of the events just described, it is interesting to look at just one story 
in particular in this booklet. `The Release of the Dragon-Flies by the Fairy Sun Beam' 
relates the story of the release from captivity of the water grubs by the fairy sun beam, 
enabling them to `fulfil their mission by transformation [into Dragon-flies] and so 
demonstrating the greatness and wisdom of their Designer'(3). Its opening description is 
of an idyllic pool that is also `the prison home of the Dragon Flies. It was wonderfully 
designed by the cunning and wicked old Froggies'(1). The pool is guarded by a `well- 
equipped' army of `Bull Froggies', and there is also a band of Frog Ventriloquists 
producing `unearthly sounds' like the `voice of the Bunyip in rage, a Mythological 
Monster and Beast which no one has ever seen which nevertheless is greatly feared'(1). 
This serves successfully to scare all the other animals away from what they believe is a 
haunted country. After a while, the Bull Frogs realize their plan has been successful, 
and that they `need no longer... strictly guard the Water Grubs'(2). The Fairy Sun 
133 Unaipon, Native Legends (Adelaide: Hunkin, Ellis and King Ltd, n. d. ). Future page references are to 
this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
134 See Beston, p. 337, n. 6. 
135 Ngunaitponi, `The Song of Hungarrda', in The New Oxford Book ofAustralian Verse, ed. Les Murray 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 94-94. 
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Beams sing the Frogs to sleep, and the Queen Sun Beam releases the spirits of the 
Dragon Flies trapped within the_bodies of the Water Grubs, and sets them all free. When 
the Frogs wake up and see the `liberated Dragon Flies'(2), they `seized their 
boomerangs to slay the harmless Dragon Flies'(2)_At this point, the Fairy Sun Beams 
stir up a `great whirlwind... The Frogs in their terror beheld the anger of the mighty 
Wind_ Then, for the first time in their history they- saw a Force and Power greater than 
they possessed, which came to intervene and protect the weaker ones'(3). `Then a guilty 
conscience smote them one and all; -for the wrong-they 
did unto the helpless, harmless 
Water Grubs who did need the help; the strong should give'(3). 
Just-as stories-of Unaigon's_ life vary-widely, so too do responses to his work. 
For the few people that have actually written about Unaipon's work, the experience of 
reading is clearly disturbing, and raises anumber of extremely complex questions most 
of which get resolved in one of two positions exemplified in the work of John Beston 
and Adam Shoemaker. I hope to avoid either of these_positions, _while. still trying to 
maintain a sensitivity to the very unsettling, uneven and contradictory quality that 
pervades Unaipon'a work. Beston's_work, _tho earlier of the two, 
dates- back twenty 
years to an article on Unaipon in a journal called Southerly. Beston recognized 
Unaipon's style as that of the-'seventeenth century, -suggestive, of the 
King James-Bible, 
Bunyan, and Milton'(345). Yet he also claimed that his `Christianizing of the legends 
somewhat obscures- his-strong=underlying sense of Aboriginal identity and allegiance. 
Unaipon was by no means a white man's puppet'(345). 
For Shoemaker in marked contrastta Beston, ihere is no underlyingsense of 
Aboriginal identity and allegiance, and he dismisses Beston's assessment as `limited 
and too forgiving'. 137 Rather, Shoemaker's question is: `Was Unaipon so fully 
indoctrinated into the Western,. Christian lifestyle that he renounced his independence 
and his Aboriginality? ' Shoemaker's answer to this rather complex question seems to be 
yes, and he finds: 
Beston's_contention that' [Unaipon'slChristianizing. of the-legends 
somewhat obscures his strong underlying sense of Aboriginal identity 
137 Shoemaker, p. 49. 
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and allegiance' somewhat difficult to accept. Beston implies that, at base, Unaipon was faithful to his Aboriginal heritage above all else, 
whereas the evidence seems to indicate that he was so fully indoctrinated by the AFA that an Aboriginal world view was 
encouraged and permitted only so long as it did not conflict with 
Christian religious tenets. (44) 
Shoemaker does, however, acknowledge the contradictory nature of Unaipon's work: 
When one examines Unaipon's entire corpus of work, it becomes clear 
that his story-telling is uneven, inconsistent, and is frequently fraught 
with tension between the Aboriginal and white Christian worlds. One 
receives the impression that Unaipon did not have a very great 
knowledge of traditional Aboriginal matters, and this might partly 
explain why his legendary stories often take such a sanitised, 
European form. (49) 
For Shoemaker, the mixture of the European and the Aboriginal is unsuccessful: `the 
atmosphere of his stories occasionally borders upon the schizophrenic, for the Christian/ 
Aboriginal synthesis which he repeatedly sought is not always achieved without 
considerable effort and is sometimes realised at the expense of logic'(45). Yet to think 
about the Christian / Aboriginal synthesis as schizophrenic seems to me to miss the 
point. The way in which Deleuze and Guattari use the term schizophrenia might be 
helpful here. For Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is not a psychiatric diagnosis, nor 
a disease characterizing schizophrenics, it is a broad socio-economic and historical 
phenomenon that is fostered by capitalism's quantitative calculations replacing belief 
systems. It is this, I argued earlier, that might explain Unaipon's belief in the 
`missionary enterprise, which... gives [Aborigines] the inner power to reconstruct their 
lives which have become shattered by contact with white civilization. ' 137 From this 
perspective, it is not so much the Christian/ Aboriginal synthesis that produces 
schizophrenia, but rather that the Christian/Aboriginal synthesis is an attempt to 
reinstate values and meanings that were being continually shattered as colonialism (as a 
territorial off-shoot of capitalism) extended further and further, both geographically and 
psychically, into Aboriginal territory, acting as a palimpsest over all previous meanings 
that lay in its path, in very much the same way as Ramsay Smith had written over 
Unaipon's meaning to produce an anthropological commodity. Colonialism introduced 
137 Unaipon, `My Life Story', pp. 13-14. 
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into Australia the idea of labour power as a commodity, and then, in the case of Ramsay 
Smith's appropriation of Unaipon's myths, takes away the only things that labour 
power, as commodity, is worth, that is, money. 
Both Beston and Shoemaker also note the similarity of these legends to the 
fairytale. Beston, for example, writes: 
Not only has `The Release of the Dragon Flies' been Christianized, 
but it has also been `Marchenized', made to fit the mould of the 
Germanic Marchen or fairy tale: the reference to the Queen of the Sun 
Beams (who are all Fairies) is in the manner of the Grimm Brothers, 
not at all in the manner of Aboriginal legends. Again one is struck by 
the power of the white culture to dominate the indigenous culture. 
Unaipon takes the `Marchenizing' process still further when he refers 
a number of times to the Frogs as `Froggies', thereby directing the tale 
to children. Of all treatments of Aboriginal legends, this reduction of 
the legends to children's stories is the most unfortunate... Such a 
presentation of these legends perpetuates the notion of the Aboriginals 
as a primitive and childlike people, a notion that the Aboriginals 
themselves have at time accepted. (342-3) 
According to Shoemaker, `Unaipon's more juvenile stories often owe as much to Aesop 
and Kipling's `just-so' stories as they do to the Brother's Grimm'(48). Certainly the 
influence of the European folkloric tradition is evident in `The Release of the Dragon 
Flies' but, perhaps a hermeneutic that seeks to discover the extent of the Aboriginality 
of Unaipon's myths, or the extent of non-Aboriginal influences, is an exercise in 
futility. Rather, the legend of `The Release of the Dragon-Flies by the Fairy Sun Beam' 
can be read as the mythologizing of the appropriation of Unaipon's own myths, and 
contemporary conditions of Aboriginal people in Australia. The motif of imprisonment 
and release is a recurring one in Aboriginal literature, as is the function of well- 
equipped bullies, and constant surveillance. The description of `well-equipped bullies' 
certainly is one that could be applicable both to the colonizer in general, and to Ramsay 
Smith and Angus and Robertson in particular. Such a reading is further enhanced by the 
weapon that the bullies used to such effect; their talent for deception, and their ability to 
dominate the scene, lay in ventriloquism. In this reading, Unaipon's story is not merely 
an unfortunate example, as it is for Beston and Shoemaker, of the `power of the white 
culture to dominate the indigenous culture'; Unaipon's story enacts and performs that 
domination. 
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Dismembering Aboriginality 
Even as Ramsay Smith was considered one of Australia's most respected 
authorities on Aboriginality, the erasure of Unaipon, and the regulative dissection of his 
mythical work, has a precedent in his own history. In August 1903, Ramsay Smith, then 
Adelaide City Coroner and Inspector of Anatomy, was suspended from his coronial 
duties following charges under the Anatomy act, of `several counts' of mutilating 
corpses, which included the `illegal despatch' of the bodies of a Chinese man, an 
Aborigine, and a `negro' which had been `taken contrary to law and not for the purposes 
of aiding medical students in the state'. 139 
Although these were reported in the local papers, and the South Australian 
Government set up a board of enquiry, the details of this inquiry are shrouded in 
secrecy. The Advertiser reported it in the following way: 
A gentleman who professed, like `Sergius, the High Pontiff for 
wisdom far renowned', to be thoroughly acquainted with all the facts, 
shook his head in a mournful way, and not only answered in the words 
of the classic authority quoted, `I know but may not tell' but hinted 
that the exact story was of `too awful a kind to be repeated'.... A city 
undertaker, when asked, protested that he had `given a sacred pledge 
not to utter a word of what had occurred. ' 139 
The Adelaide Register later reported that the Board of Enquiry had decided `to acquit 
that officer of anything more serious than the display of undue zeal in dealing with the 
corpse of the Aboriginal Tommy Walker. 140 While remaining coroner and head of the 
Health Department, however, Ramsay Smith had to relinquish his hospital and other 
duties because of a possible conflict of interests. 
What might be the relation between the preserving of Aboriginal specimens and 
the recording of Aboriginal customs? Certainly Ramsay Smith was not alone in thinking 
about Aboriginal people as specimens, and in the Observer article, Unaipon himself is 
referred to in this way: `A full-blooded aboriginal, Mr. Unaipon presents in physical 
structure an unmistakable resemblance to those reconstructions of the older human 
types which scientists have sometimes supplied with the help of a tooth and a 
138 `Corpses for Dissection: The Ramsay Smith Inquiry', Australasian, 12 September 1903, p. 610. 
139 'Dr Ramsay Smith: Suspended from Duty', Advertiser [Adelaide], 14 August, 1903, p. 4. 
"'The Ramsay Smith Inquiry', Adelaide Register, 23 September, 1903, p. 4. 
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mouldering jawbone. ' 141 That the two events, the appropriation and dissection of 
Aboriginal bodies and the appropriation and dissection of Aboriginal myths, are 
somehow linked is revealed in Ramsay Smith's dedication in his Myths and Legends of 
the Australian Aborigines: 
TO THE MEMORY OF 
GREATLY VALUED AND REVERED FRIENDS 
PRINCIPAL SIR WILLIAM TURNER 
AND 
PROFESSOR D. J. CUNNINGHAM 
WITH WHOM I WAS PRIVILEGED TO BE A FELLOW-WORKER 
IN AUSTRALIAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
THIS REGARDFUL OFFERING IS DEDICATED 
Sir William Turner, whom he at one stage refers to as his teacher, and Professor 
Cunningham were both comparative anatomists with whom Ramsay Smith regularly 
exchanged skulls and information, and he quotes both of these men in abundance in his 
anthropological writings. This `regardful offering' can be seen as an extension of this 
relationship, and the religious tone of the dedication to the memory of the dead serves 
as a means of forgetting the dead whom they dismembered, as well as Unaipon himself, 
whose own offering of myths is erased. In his 1907 article, `The Place of the Australian 
Aboriginal in Recent Anthropological Research', he writes, in a seeming attempt to 
justify his collecting of corpses: `Some years ago it became known, in connection with 
certain criminal trials in Adelaide, that I had more than a general interest in skulls'(559). 
In this article, Ramsay Smith reveals that he sent skulls to Turner, adding: 
I hardly need remind you that it was he who was entrusted with the 
task of describing the Challenger collection of osteology, and that the 
investigations he made and the result he published then and since then 
have become landmarks in the field of anthropological research and 
models for future investigation. It will be evident that any opinions or inquiries coming from such an investigator are entitled to the highest 
respect and consideration. (558-59) 
Like the staged dialogue he cites between himself and Unaipon in his correspondence 
with George Robertson, Ramsay Smith then goes on to quote a letter from Turner, dated 
July 1899, in which he is procuring `specimens': `Anything you can send illustrating the 
141 `Aboriginal intellectual: David Unaipon', p. 46. 
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osteology of the Australian will be very acceptable... I shall be glad to be made the 
custodian of such specimens as you may be able to send'(559). He also quotes from 
letters between himself and Cunningham, and his mentors' words pervade his own. 
It seems to me that both the processes of specimen collection and myth 
collection, and the analogous dismemberment of both kinds of artefacts, reveal the 
ambivalence at work here. Both activities are marked by the promise of and desire for a 
return to the origin; Ramsay Smith's revealing phrase is that there is a `universal 
craving' for specimens. 142 Both his descriptions of skulls and his descriptions of myths 
erase the pre-collection existence of the stories and people as well as the conditions 
under which they came into being as objects of anthropological knowledge. It is the 
anthropologist that dissects and dismembers, and then, through his own work, it is the 
anthropologist that re-members, but it is a specific form of re-membering that aids 
forgetting. What gets remembered is the work of the anthropologist, and his glory, as 
can be seen in Ramsay Smith's dedication, and in the fact that eventually the Board of 
Inquiry set up to investigate the initial claims ultimately commended Ramsay Smith for 
his work. '43 
In Freudian psychoanalysis, dismemberment inevitably produces an uncanny 
(unheimlich) effect. Freud's essay, `The "Uncanny"', defines in detail the range of 
meanings to which the `Uncanny' lays claim, before concluding that: `heimlich is a 
word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally 
coincides with its opposite, unheimlich'. 144 Other uncanny effects, according to Freud, 
include secrecy (concealment and revealment) and doubling. Certainly, the secrecy 
surrounding the Inquiry as reported in the newspapers, and Ramsay Smith's subsequent 
public justification of his actions in an anthropological context, reveal such a process of 
concealment and revelation. Furthermore, the doubling effect characteristic of the 
`uncanny' can be seen in Ramsay Smith's analogous appropriation and dismembering 
of both human and textual bodies. 
142 Ramsay Smith, `Ethnology and Anthropology', p. 374. 
103 `The Ramsay Smith Inquiry', p. 4. 
1" Freud, `The "Uncanny"', p. 347. 
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Given my argument that Ramsay Smith's appropriation of Unaipon's myths can 
perhaps be seen as an act of Oedipalized identification that seeks to incorporate the 
other (the father) in order to take his place, Freud's conception that the uncanniness of 
dismembered limbs `springs from its proximity to the castration complex' is indeed 
146 The threat of castration is, for Freud, the threat of the authority of the 
father, itself a phantasy that relies on the discovery of anatomical differences that 
Ramsay Smith, as a comparative anatomist, devoted much of his life to. 147 It is the 
discovery of anatomical differences that actualizes the threat-real or phantasized-of 
castration. According to Freud, it is this threat that marks the terminal crisis of the 
Oedipus complex, inaugurates the period of latency, and precipitates the formation of 
the superego: `Under the impression of the danger of losing his penis, the Oedipus 
complex is abandoned, repressed, and, in the most normal cases, entirely destroyed, and 
a severe super-ego set up as its heir. ' 148 Although, for Freud, the child cannot transcend 
the Oedipus complex and achieve identification with the father without first having 
overcome the castration complex, `fear of castration is one of the commonest and 
strongest motives for repression and thus for the formation of neuroses'. 149 
Perhaps one way of thinking about Ramsay Smith's dismemberment of corpses 
is as the neurotic manifestation of castration anxieties, anxieties that are repressed and 
enacted through his own dis-memberment of those he considers to be his evolutionary 
forefathers. From this perspective, Ramsay Smith's dismemberment of bodies is an 
expression of a castration complex which will then develop into the Oedipalized 
identification that, I have tried to argue, characterizes his relationship to Unaipon, a 
relationship, moreover, that characterizes more generally the processes of colonization. 
146 Freud, 'The "Uncanny"', p. 366. 
147 The anatomical differences that Freud refers to are, of course, between boys and girls. Even still, it is 
interesting that comparative anatomy and the Freudian concern with anatomical differences share such 
fundamental epistemological territory. See Freud, `Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical 
Distinction between the Sexes' (1925), in The Essentials of Psycho analysis, pp. 402-10. 148 Freud, `Femininity', p. 163. 
149 Freud, `Anxiety and Instinctual Life' (1933 [1932]), PFL, 2, p. 119. 
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Unaipon and the Coronation Medal 
The questions raised here, about the nature of collecting, preserving and 
memorializing are again raised in a different context in relation to Unaipon's life. One 
of the things Unaipon was most famous for was that, in 1953, at the age of 81, he was 
awarded a Queen's Coronation Medal. Coronationl Medals, to commemorate the 
crowning of Elizabeth II, were presented on 2 June 1953, to 138214 `selected persons' 
as personal souvenirs. They were awarded to the Royal Family, officers of state, 
officials and servants of the royal household, ministers, government officials, mayors, 
public servants, local government officials, members of the navy, army, air force and 
police in Britain, her colonies, and in Canada. To give a brief physical description, on 
the obverse of the medal is a crowned effigy of Queen Elizabeth II, in a high-collared 
ermine cloak and wearing the collar of the Garter and Badge of the Bath, and facing 
right. The reverse shows the Royal Cypher EIIR surmounted by a large crown. The 
legend around the edge reads: QUEEN ELIZABETH II CROWNED 2nd JUNE 1953 
(see Appendix 5). 
Louis Marin's work on French Royal Medals is pertinent here, and particularly 
his discussion of the effects of uniting both portrait and discourse, effigy and legend, 
`picture' and `narrative' in an inscription of Royal power. According to Mann, Royal 
Medals are `situated at the frontier of the readable and the visible, which might, as such, 
realize this locus of contact and interference. Such a product would bring about a double 
effect, inverted and reciprocal, of one apparatus in the other and would thereby be the 
monumental sign of absolute political power in its representation'. 149 
For Marin, commemorative medals, such as the one issued to Unaipon in 1953, 
in their double representation, become a monument for making one remember a 
glorious imperial and monarchical moment, while simultaneously constituting it as such 
a moment. `In representing the event, the representation represents itself in the process 
of auto-constitution and self-sufficiency: the reflexive dimension of auto-foundation 
149 Louis Marin, 'The Inscription of the King's Memory: On the Metallic History of Louis XIV', Yale 
French Studies, 59, (1980), p. 22. Future page references are to this edition, and are included in 
parentheses in the text. 
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appears in and through its transitive dimension. It is an act that brings the event into 
being through its grandeur. To erect the monument of history is to give history a 
monumental being. "50 Certainly, such meanings were ascribed to this moment as a 
glance at the `Approved Souvenir Programme' reveals: 
A Coronation is a nation's birthday. It is the day on which its people 
celebrate the union that makes them one. Of that union the crown is 
the symbol... In this ancient nation-one in which deep-rooted 
patriotism has again and again saved both us and others-the Crown 
has played the chief part in keeping us one... For a nation is a union in 
both time and space. We are not compatriots only of those who live a 
long way away, but of those who lived before us and of those who will 
live after us... Our Queen is not only the symbol of a union in time. 
She is the symbol of one in space. The Coronation of the first 
Elizabeth was of the Sovereign of one Nation. The Coronation of 
Elizabeth II is of the Sovereign of many Nations... And as head of the 
Commonwealth she is the sole symbol of the free association of the 
eight Sovereign nations that form the largest political group in the 
world. In that great union... there is no binding or coercive force: only 
the free will of its members to be associated with one another and their 
acknowledgement of that solitary and seemingly powerless, but 
beloved, human figure as its Head. 151 
The Coronation is conceived of as a moment that unifies the Commonwealth of 
Nations, and this unity takes place across time and space. This bringing together of all 
the past and all the future over this global geographical space effects the erasure of the 
pre-imperial past of contemporary commonwealth nations. The commemorative medal 
as a monument further constitutes a memory of the Queen that would transcend both 
time and space. To refer, in 1953, to no coercive force in the context of Australia is, 
moreover, to deny a pre-imperial past, but also to deny that Australia's colonization was 
the effect of an invading and colonizing force. 
The Queen's power in a parliamentary monarchy however, is more complicated 
than the instances of French monarchical power on which Marin's analysis focuses. The 
Souvenir Programme, for example, refers to the `seemingly powerless' figure of the 
Queen. What this phrase suggests is that although, in the narrowly political sense of the 
word, the Queen does not have power, such powerlessness is only `seeming' because 
the love the Queen's subjects have for her; the love that both constitutes her power over 
150 Marin, p. 30. 
151 Arthur Bryant, `The Queen's Majesty', in The Coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth 11,2 June 
1953 Approved Souvenir Programme (London: King George's Jubilee Trust, 1953), pp. 8-9. 
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her subjects, and its seeming powerlessness. It is the power of love that is enacted 
through the Queen's gratuitous gift, and it is love and devotion that is exchanged: `the 
counterpart of this gratuitous gift is the contemplation of royal history's event on its 
reverse and, obverse, the contemplation of the subject of this act in his feature and 
name; a contemplation in which recognition is acquired thanks to the beauty of the 
product'. '52 
Why might such a gratuitous gift be given to Unaipon, as a representative of his 
race? According to Marin, `to have a medal is to be constrained to recognize the 
[Queen] as the subject of history and the historical event as the present manifestation of 
[her] power'(29). The commemorative royal medal, then, simultaneously constitutes and 
perpetuates the power of the sovereign, a sovereignty that over-rides everything else, 
including colonization which is effaced in the act of incorporating Aborigines into 
Britain's imperial history, with the Queen as its subject. In receiving commemorative 
medals, the Queen's subjects recognize the monumentalized truth of this history, and its 
authentication: `Medals provide the true legitimate and fixed representation for the 
transmission of historical events to the authority's subjects, present and future. ' 153 
This is where the contradiction resides, because in 1953, as an Aboriginal 
Australian, Unaipon was not even an Australian citizen, nor, in effect, the Queen's 
subject. It was not until 1967 that Aborigines were awarded citizenship. Unaipon 
thereby becomes subject to British imperial history, even if this very history, and his 
non-constitution as a subject of it, are denied. 
Just as Unaipon's own Legendary Tales became a palimpsest for Ramsay 
Smith's Myths and Legends, the Queen's legend on the Coronation Medal, and what it 
represents, becomes a palimpsest for Australia's pre-invasion history that is written over 
through the linking of Australia, as part of a commonwealth, to the enduring memory of 
a Queen who is unified through, and thereby transcends, time and space. 
The commemorative medal, though similar to the function of the coin, is also 
different. It is, Marin argues, like the coin in so far as it bears the imprint of sovereign 
152 Marin, p. 29. 
153 Marin, p. 28. 
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authority, and it is this same effigy of Queen Elizabeth II that is still on contemporary 
Australian coinage. It is the effigy of the Queen, in other words, that ensures the public 
value of the coin. On the reverse side, however, the mark of the coin and its value is 
substituted with the representation of the singular historical moment of the event, which 
is thereby constituted as all-valuable and simultaneously beyond valuation because such 
value is incalculable. Although the historical event being memorialized is given the 
nationally recognized value of the coin, this value is not the stable and constant value of 
exchange: `It is now a matter of a singular historical event valued for its difference from 
others, incomparable, but its truth and authenticity will be universally and identically 
recognized by their inscription in a similar form to that of money. ' 154 
Unaipon as Currency 
Mann's analysis assumes that it is the sovereign that retains the right to both 
mint coins and assign them their value; Australian coinage is minted, and its value set, 
by the Australian Reserve bank, under the Reserve Bank Act of 1959. The Reserve 
Bank is not only responsible for issuing bank notes, but also for their design. In the 
early 1990s, in the midst of Australia's increasing push towards republicanism, the then 
Labour Government issued a new series of Australian bank notes. According to the 
Reserve Bank of Australia's web-site: 
In deciding themes, the Bank, with the assistance of design 
consultants, uses the opportunity of a new series to honour past 
Australians who have made an important contribution to Australia. 
Along with the portrait of the person, other design elements are 
included that relate to the person's particular achievements. '55 
In keeping with this sentiment, the Australian $50 note, issued on October 4,1995, 
contains, in the place where Queen Elizabeth II's effigy once was, a portrait of David 
Unaipon. 
The legend on this note, which `relate the person's particular achievement', is a 
small extract from the hand-written manuscript held in the Mitchell Library in Sydney, 
'54 Marin, p. 28. 
us 'How are Australia's Currency Notes Made? ' [online], Available: httv: //www. rba. eov. au/ 
poly/yo 14. html (19 July 1999) 
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Legendary Tales of the Australian Aborigines, that still remains unpublished in his own 
name. This legend, like the legend on the Coronation Medal, also marks an important 
historical event. The legend is the final line of his unpublished preface, and it includes 
both the spelling error, and its correction that accompanies the original: `As a full- 
blooded member of my race I think I may be the first, but I hope not the last, to produce 
an enduring record of our customs, belief and imaginings' (see Appendix 6). 
Given that this legend, and the text it prefaces, have never been published as 
Unaipon's work, it is hard to believe that Unaipon's own writings are the historically 
significant contribution that the Reserve Bank refers to. It seems to me that the event 
being commemorated here is less Unaipon's contribution as a writer, and more the 
successful production, under colonization, of an Aboriginal subject that functions as a 
mirror image of the colonizer. It is not only a particular kind of inscription that is being 
commemorated here, but also a particular kind of subjectivity, the very Oedipalized 
autobiographical self-reflexive subject, the subject, I have argued, that enabled the 
successful colonization of Australia. And, if it seems rather far-fetched to suggest that 
the psychoanalytic familial structure would pervade the production of something as 
banal as bank-notes, the Reserve Bank's web-site will dispel such hesitation. As the site 
proudly asserts: `Once themes have been established, designers are commissioned to 
develop the designs. Through collaboration, various common threads are established to 
create a "family" feel to the series, yet still allow each design to have its own 
character. ' 57 
In this way, the Reserve-Bank's-web-site enacts and encapsulates that 
segregation and re-integration of the private and public spheres that, as I hoped to 
demonstrate in my first chapter, have characterized capitalist relations sincetheir 
emergence. On the one hand social production takes place in the public sphere; on the 
other biological reproduction takes place in the private or domestic sphere. In the public 
sphere the term governing social relations is abstract, that is money; in the private 
sphere, the training ground for capitalist relations individual egos (with `their own 
157 'How are Australia's Currency Notes Made? ' 
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character'), are produced within the nuclear family which will then be commodified as 
labour power upon entry into the public sphere. 
The historical event that Unaipon's portrait on money both represents, 
commemorates, and is an example of, is the substitution of qualitative codes, based on 
meanings and beliefs, that organized pre-invasion social life symbolically with an 
abstract quantitative calculus based on necessarily temporary valuations which are 
calculated economically to produce surplus-value. Unaipon's portrait on money 
represents the success of contemporary capitalism as the most highly advanced system 
of exchange, over pre-existing forms of exchange, as well as the erasure of these forms 
of exchange, and the history of colonization that was both motivated by capitalism and 
enabled it. 
The image of Unaipon on the Australian `money form of value' which, to use 
Marx's formulation, confuses the means of exchange (money) with the thing to be 
exchanged (commodities with a certain use value), and the `form' of exchange 
(commodities) with the `content' of the thing exchanged (their labour-value which gives 
them their use-value), is particularly ironic because, while Unaipon was alive his 
capacity to produce commodities, by his own labour, with use values, like, for example, 
educative myths and legends, was continually denied to him. 
None of this, of course, appears in the biography of Unaipon on the Reserve 
Bank of Australia's web-site. Although it mentions that in 1909 `he patented an 
improved handpiece for sheep-shearing', and that his `writings were included in Myths 
and Legends of the Australian Aboriginals (London, 1930)', it does not mention that he 
neither has ownership of these commodity-producing labours, nor did he benefit 
materially from their exchange for currency. The biography, however, still hopes to 
constitute Unaipon as a symbol of reconciliation: `While on his travels, Unaipon 
lectured on his ideas, preached sermons and spoke about Aboriginal legends and 
customs. He also spoke of the need for "Sympathetic co-operation" between whites and 
blacks, and for equal rights for both black and white Australians. ' 157 Unaipon's portrait 
157 Reserve Bank of Australia, `Australians On Our Notes [online]', Available: leap: /Av wNv. rba. gov. au/ 
polypo_l. n ho. hunl (19 July 1999) 
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on the $50 note can perhaps also be seen, less optimistically, as a commemoration of the 
historical victory of colonization, not merely economically and territorially, but also 
psychically, where the colonizer looks with success on the production of the colonized 
subject in its own image. 
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Chapter 3: Re-Reading My Place 
The Reception of My Place 
If David Unaipon's narratives have been all but neglected in contemporary 
Australia, Sally Morgan's My Place, published in 1987, has rapidly entered the 
Australian psyche. It has become, as David McCooey argues, `a national text; a spoken 
account of `unspoken' history'. ' Commercially, it is the most successful Australian 
autobiography ever published, and it has come to take a central place in the history of 
Aboriginal writing in Australia and Michelle Grossman has argued: 
since its publication, this narrative of origins has in turn come to 
figure centrally in a meta-textual narrative of origins about both the 
`birth' of contemporary Aboriginal women's writing and the 
increasing profile such work has developed among non-Indigenous 
readers, both domestically and internationally. 2 
Published the year before Australia's bi-centennial, a time of national reflection and 
celebration, My Place has been credited with `creating a new space within Australian 
literary culture for discovery of Aboriginality and for repudiation of all that has obliged 
its invisibility and silence'. 
A cursory glance at the fragments of the selection of reviews on its back cover 
reveals just how firmly My Place has been situated as a narrative of redemption for a 
traumatized culture where, in the words of Leo Bersani, `[t]he catastrophes of history 
matter much less if they are somehow compensated for in art'. In the case of My Place, 
the history of Australia is redeemed by Morgan's self-representation through 
autobiography: 
... a celebratory work and profoundly moving... all 
Australians should 
read this... Helen Daniel, The Age. 
I David McCooey, Artful Histories: Modern Australian Autobiography (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 104. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in 
the text. 
2 Michelle Grossman, `Out of the Salon and into the Streets: Contextualizing Australian Indigenous 
Women's Writing', Women's Writing, 5.2 (1998), p. 169. 
3 Tim Rowse, `The Aboriginal Subject in Autobiography: Ruby Langford's Don't Take Your Love to 
Town', Australian Literary Studies, 16.1 (1993), p, 14. 
° Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), p. 1. 
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... a triumphant story that makes you glad it's at last been told... 
Mark 
MacLeod, Times on Sunday. 
... the sort of Australian 
history which hasn't been written before, and 
which we desperately need... Barbara Jefferis, The Weekend 
Australian. 
... a moving and quite remarkable account of personal 
discovery... 
Dianne Johnson, Sydney Morning Herald. 
A gift to the reader ... (that) one feels enormously privileged to 
receive... Judith Brett, Australian Book Review. 
This book is great ... a triumph ... Moya Costello, 
Author's Proof, 
Radio 5UV. 
This text, the back cover, provides an abundance of significations which prefigure the 
framework into which My Place has been inserted. The back cover of My Place tells a 
story of personal discovery, that gives rise to a redemptive national celebration. Yet the 
word `triumph', with its etymological resonances of imperial victories, is cause for 
caution, a cause to question why Morgan's My Place has taken on the position of 
national homecoming, where not just Morgan and Aboriginal communities, but all 
Australians have a place and are also, somehow, redeemed by Morgan's act of 
generosity. 
In the light of this, it is not surprising that some critics have been uncomfortable 
with the reception of My Place. This has meant that while, in some cases, My Place 
occupies a valorized position, it is simultaneously criticized for occupying that same 
position. Stephen Muecke exemplifies this in his assertion that the `ease of acceptance 
[of My Place] can only make the radical critic uneasy' 
5, a position that Eric Michaels, 
Arlene Elder and, more recently, Bain Attwood and Jackie Huggins subscribe to. 
6 While 
I think there are good reasons to be wary of the hyperbolic admiration that Morgan's 
story seems to have inspired, this wariness has always been directed against Morgan 
s Stephen Muecke, Textual Spaces: Aboriginality and Cultural Studies (Sydney: University of New South 
Wales Press: 1992), p. 135. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the 
text. 
6 See Eric Michaels, `Para-Ethnography', Art and Text, 30, Sept-Nov (1988), 42-5 1; Arlene E. Elder; 
`Silence as Expression: Sally Morgan's A' Place', Kunapipi 14.1 (1992): 16-24; See also the ongoing 
debate that took place in Australian Historical Studies. Bain Attwood, `Portrait of an Aboriginal as an 
Artist: Sally Morgan and the Construction of Aboriginality', Australian Historical Studies, 25.99 (1993) 
302-18; This article provoked a range of responses, which included Jackie Huggins, `Always was Always 
Will Be', Australian Historical Studies 25.99 (1993), 459-64; Tim Rowse, `Sally Morgan's Kaftan', 
Australian Historical Studies 25.99 (1993), 465-8; Tony Birch, `Half-Caste: A Response to Bain 
Attwood', Australian Historical Studies, 25.99 (1993) 458. Elizabeth Reed, Sally Morgan: A Black Tall 
Poppy? ', Australian Historical Studies 25.101 (1993): 637-9; Isobel Tarrago, `Response to "Sally 
Morgan and the Construction of Aboriginality"', Australian Historical Studies 25.100 (1993): 469. Future 
references are to these editions, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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and her text, making her fully responsible for ways it has been read. Ironically, these 
textually-minded critics tend to reproduce Author-centred readings of My Place that 
turn a text that, for me, is extremely disturbing into something sentimental and 
uncontentious. I would argue that the overwhelming acceptance of My Place can also b,: 
thought of as masking the profound anxieties generated by its implications, implications 
that its critics have also ignored. In this chapter, I hope to offer a less comfortable 
reading of My Place, a reading, I think, My Place invites us to perform, and a reading 
which cannot be readily recuperated into a celebratory, nationalist narrative. My 
reading, however, makes no claims as to whether or not my own interpretations are 
`true' reflections of Morgan's and her family's historical reality. 
My Place tells the story of a young woman and the discovery of her 
Aboriginality, something that she only came to know, after years of denial, in her early 
twenties. It is a multi-layered and fragmented autobiography in that it tells four people's 
stories, all in the first person. The first is Sally Morgan's own story which occupies 
most of the book. This is followed by Morgan's great-uncle's story, Arthur Corunna, 
the full brother of Morgan's maternal grandmother Daisy. Then Morgan's mother, 
Gladys Milroy, tells her story. Finally, the shortest story is that of Daisy Corunna, or 
Nan. All these narratives are separated and held together by Morgan's narrative which is 
self-referential in so far as it tells the story of how the stories came to be articulated. In 
this sense, Morgan's narrative is not just the story of her gradual identification with 
Aboriginality, but also the story of writing the story of this identification. In this sense, 
identification and textualization are concomitant events that mutually constitute and 
enable each other. It is half way through the narrative that Morgan's character states: 
"`I'm going to write a book. " It was the beginning of 1979, a good time for 
resolutions'(150). My Place, the story we are reading, is that book. My Place, then, is a 
part of that complex self-reflexive process through which stories of selfhood are 
remembered and repeated. 
The complexities surrounding autobiography are many, and readings of My 
Place are generally located within debates about the status of autobiography which 
focus on the tension between historical experience, or the real, and its mediation 
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through language, narration, and structures of fiction. The genre, if it can be called that,? 
makes it possible to assume a unified and authoritative `I' who holds the details 
together. However, as I have tried to outline in the previous chapter, this `I' can itself be 
seen as an historical effect. 
Redemptive readings of My Place have generally read it as a transparent account 
of reality by a unified self. Critical readings, rather than reading it differently, suggest 
that such a transparent account and such a unified self are Western constructs, thereby 
problematizing the Aboriginality and authenticity of Morgan's story. Certainly 
Morgan's autobiography shares the strategies of autobiography in general, and it is 
possible to trace a trajectory from that historical juncture some time in the 12`h century, 
discussed in the previous chapter, to Morgan's reflection upon herself through the 
medium of a text. As you will recall, autobiography is, among other things, framed in 
relation to the theme of knowing oneself, that is, one's interiority, and that it is enabled 
by certain technological and institutional conditions of reproducability. As I have tried 
to argue, autobiography, and the subject that it supports, is an effect of, to use 
Foucauldian terminology, power/knowledge, and if Morgan's text speaks to more 
readers than other less self-reflective Aboriginal narratives (and its international success 
would suggest that it does) it is less because of its universalism, than because of its 
particularity as an effect of historical events. This includes the event of colonization 
that, as I have suggested, seeks to constitute and reproduce in the colonies the very 
historically specific Western subject. 
Reading My Place is both complicated and fragmented by the fact that the three 
additional first-person narratives are oral histories transcribed from tape-recordings, 
blurring the boundaries between orality and writing. This not only situates My Place 
within a growing interest in Aboriginal culture and autobiography, but also within the 
methodological work of anthropology and the social sciences which deals with the use 
of life-history and biographical materials. As can be seen in the quotations that I opened 
7 See Paul de Man, `Autobiography as De-facement', Modern Language Notes, 4.5 (1979), pp. 919-30. 
De Man argues that `the distinction between fiction and autobiography is not an either/or polarity but that 
it is undecidable'(921). 
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with, radical political claims are made for oral histories of this kind and these excerpts 
reinforce a reading of My Place that sees it as providing a hearing for the previously 
unheard. It is this tension between history and its constitution by accepted myths that I 
explored in the previous chapter. It is interesting that the reception of the oral in My 
Place usually ignores the technological conditions of existence (the tape-recorder, for 
instance) of its transcription and reproducability, and the impact of this on our 
conception of what oral literature is, and the kinds of subjects it produces. 
Significantly, the location of My Place as a part of Australia's literary 
inheritance is denied in the process of anthropological claims about its challenge to 
history. Joan Newman exemplifies this position when she writes that `it seems likely 
that Sally Morgan's My Place will long be regarded as a landmark text in Australian 
writing. Why should this be so? My Place is not a majestic narrative on a grand canvas, 
nor is it a work of intellectual brilliance or dazzlingly experimental'! 
Newman's reading assumes, as is common in responses to autobiography as a 
narrative account of the past, that textual mediation and even construction are rendered 
unproblematic and that the language employed is literal .9 Yet, as Hayden White has 
suggested, histories `ought never to be read as unambiguous signs of the events they 
report, but rather as symbolic structures, extended metaphors, that liken the events 
reported in them to some form with which we have already become familiar in our 
literary culture'. 10 To read My Place literally, where its meaning is simply taken for 
granted, constitutes a failure of interpretation, or a failure to recognize that such a 
reading is already an interpretation. What I want to suggest here is that to read My Place 
is to participate in the process through which its meanings are constituted; to read it, in 
other words, is to interpret it, and to interpret is to lead us not only to the self (auto) and 
Joan Newman, 'Race, Gender and Identity: My Place as Autobiography', in Whose Place? A Study of 
Sally Morgan's Afy Place, ed. Delys Bird and Dennis Haskell (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1992), p. 
66. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
See John Murphy, 'The Voice of Memory: History, Autobiography and Oral Memory', Historical 
Studies, 22.87 (1986), pp. 157-175. 
10 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), p. 91. 
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to the life (bios), but into language (graphe), and language is both inescapably 
figurative and unavoidably mediated. " 
My interpretation, then, reads My Place figuratively, where events are not only 
given importance in themselves but in the metaphors that reading them might produce. 12 
This is where the potential for an alternative reading lies, that does not rehash the same 
old question of whether My Place is true or not and whether, by extension, Morgan is a 
real Aborigine or not. Sally's mother, Gladys, in her narrative within the narrative, 
points to the inevitability of proliferation and the movement away from the self as the 
basis of knowing when she alludes to anxieties about the dispersal of meaning that 
language inevitably instigates: 
It hasn't been an easy task, baring my soul. I'd rather have kept hidden 
things which have now seen the light of day. But, like everything else 
in my life, I knew I had to do it. I find I'm embarrassed sometimes by 
what I have told, but I know I cannot retract what has been written, 
it's no longer mine. (306) 
My Place and Psychoanalysis 
One possible reading of My Place, a reading that has been performed by Fran de 
Groen, is modelled on psychoanalysis. This, it would seem, is particularly valid, and 
there are many aspects of the narrative that lend themselves to such a reading. To speak 
of memory and redemption in the autobiographical mode is, as I tried to suggest in my 
reading of Totem and Taboo, to bring us into recognizably psychoanalytic territory, the 
realm of the `talking cure', as it was so famously baptized by Freud's first patient, Anna 
0. Like psychoanalytic therapy, autobiography is a textually-constituted self-reflexive 
form of self-narrativizing, and it is significant that My Place is often read as a 
therapeutic exercise, thereby conforming to a certain psychoanalytic model of 
knowledge as self-knowledge, and self-knowledge as healing, a model, I tried to suggest 
in the previous chapter, that also pervades the anthropological exercise manifest in 
11 As Paul de Man remarks, tropes are not `a derived, marginal, or aberrant form of language but the 
linguistic paradigm par excellence'. Figurative language 'characterizes language as such. ' Paul de Man, 
Allegories of Reading: Figurative Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), p. 105. 
12 As Paul Ricoeur has asserted, 'metaphor creates the resemblance rather than fording and expressing it. ' 
Paul Ricoeur, Rules of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language, 
trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1986), p. 74. 
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Ramsay Smith's injunction of the Delphic oracle-`Know Thyself'. Psychoanalysis, 
and the psychoanalytic subject, in my reading, emerged out of, and were enabled and 
constituted by their autobiographical predecessor. 
The relation between the psychoanalytic/therapeutic and the autobiographical 
modes is made explicit in many readings ofMy Place. As de Groen asserts: `The notion 
of social healing has been an important element in the critical reception ofMy Place. ' 13 
Robyn Dizard, moreover, claims: 
The book is curative and enlightening, because the author uses home 
truths to heal colonial schizophrenia. In individual pathology, 
schizophrenia is manifested by withdrawn, bizarre and sometimes 
delusional behaviour. When a society acts schizophrenically, the 
pathology lodges in its institutions. ' 
Like Dizard, de Groen extends the therapeutic model to the role of the reader, 
exemplifying that movement described in the opening of this chapter where both 
Morgan and her readers are redeemed by her text: `Reading My Place involves us 
imaginatively in this same process of renewal. The book's redemptive power lies in the 
way it makes the experience of the characters' psychic healing available to the 
reader'(34). For de Groen, what characterizes My Place as particularly therapeutic is the 
recovery of traumatic memories: `The recovery of the lost or suppressed aspects of 
personal identity can be a healing process, as My Place so movingly documents. Like 
some forms of psychotherapy it involves the passage from silence about troubling 
experiences to story'(33). 
What is lacking in these kinds of readings is the recognition of the problematic 
status of the `I' and its constitution through memory. If we are to take seriously the 
psychoanalytic model, we must also accept that the notion of the `I' is extremely 
troubling. As I have already argued, the medieval tradition of methodological 
skepticism that characterized the emerging self-reflexive subject meant that the subject 
was never as sure of itself as it would like to believe. Although autobiography demands 
the production of a transparent voice, such a voice always strains coherence and is 
13 Fran De Groen, 'Healing, Wholeness and Holiness in My Place, ' in Bird and Haskell, p. 32. 
14 Robyn Dizard, 'My Place and the Healing Art of Autobiography', Australian Studies, 4, (1990), p. 134. 
Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
173 
always associated with the possibility of incoherence and fragmentation. It is this 
fundamental contradiction within the modem Western self-reflexive subject that Freud 
has attempted to theorize, thereby dismantling the illusion of the sovereignty of the self, 
and access to the truth of the self, that redemptive readings of My Place adhere to. 
The Quest Narrative 
Related to this psychoanalytic reading, the reading of My Place that has received 
most prominence, a reading which is itself metaphorical, is that of the Quest. As Bob 
Hodge and Vijay Mishra have argued, My Place `is organised by the classic theme of 
the Quest... in search of a Secret that is nothing less than the key to personal identity 
and establishment of genealogy and inheritance'. 15 Once again, the narrative can be said 
to support this reading. When, in her final year of high school, Sally's mother asks her 
what she has to worry about, Morgan, as narratorial voice, replies: 
How could I tell her that it was me, and her and Nan. The sum total of 
all the things I didn't understand about them or myself. The feeling 
that a very vital part of myself was missing and that I'd never belong 
anywhere. Never resolve anything. 
I suppose it wasn't surprising that I returned to my final year in high 
school with a rather depressed attitude. This naturally led to a great 
deal of initial truanting, which both helped and hindered the inner 
search I seemed to have unwittingly begun on. (106) 
In the last third of the book, and at this stage the writing of the book as part of 
the narrative action is well under way, the quest narrative that My Place follows comes 
to a moment of temporary conclusion. Sally, her mother Gladys, and her partner and 
children go on a trip to Corunna where Daisy, Sally's grandmother, was born. This trip 
enacts an epiphany where Morgan declares: `It was like all the pieces of a huge jigsaw 
were finally fitting together'(232). Significantly, it is from this section of the book, that 
the epigraph of My Place comes: 
We were... overwhelmed at the thought that we nearly hadn't come. 
How deprived we would have been if we had been willing to let things 
stay as they were. We would have survived, but not as a whole people. 
We would never have known our place. (233) 
'5 Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, The Dark Side of the Dream: Australian Literature and the Postcolonial 
Mind (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990), p. 98-99. Future references are to this edition, and are included 
in parentheses in the text. 
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It is unusual that a story's epigraph comes from the story itself, and it suggests perhaps 
that straining of coherence and the threat of fragmentation that I will argue permeates 
the entire book. This threat can also be seen in the movement from the plural possessive 
pronoun `our' in the passage, to the singular possessive pronoun, `my' in the text's title. 
Stephen Muecke argues that `[t]he text's rhetoric is based on a slippage between "my" 
and "our" such that the autobiographic account of self-discovery is joined to the 
liberation of the race or at least the family'(126). However, this movement can be read 
more ambivalently as a tension between the singular and stable subject of the 
autobiographical `I', and the more fragmented effect of the text's collaboration and the 
multiple and intertwined articulations that comprise and pervade it. This tension 
between singularity and multiplicity is re-enacted in the odd phrase, `a whole people', 
which incorporates the singular indefinite article `a', and a collective noun. This 
moment of wholeness, arriving two-thirds of the way into the book, is already, in its 
very articulation, under threat. 
It is this quest for Morgan's past that has led many commentators to describe My 
Place, generically, as a detective story. Nancy Kessing, on the inside cover of My Place, 
is quoted as saying that the story is `as compelling and impossible to put down as a 
detective story'. Hodge and Mishra state that the Quest structure `underlies the genre of 
detective fiction, so Sally Morgan's story makes sense to nonAborigines as a satisfying 
version of that familiar form'(100). Bain Attwood argues, quite systematically, that My 
Place can `be likened to a detective novel'(305). He elaborates on this by claiming there 
are three senses in which this is true. First, there is a mystery about individual identity; 
second, there are obstacles and false clues which hamper the detective in the search for 
`the truth' behind the mystery; and third, there is `an ending in which all the loose ends 
are tied up and all the disturbing questions answered'(305). Although more will be said 
of this detective story structure later, it is significant that Attwood's proof of his third 
assertion comes from the jigsaw metaphor cited above, which occurs two-thirds of the 
way into the story. 
It is these arguments that enable David McCooey to conclude that `My Place 
figures the tension between different versions of the past in apparently "novelistic" 
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terms'(102). It begins `with an original secret; the secret is revealed in the telling of the 
story, thereby transfiguring, or disfiguring, the protagonist'. 16 But McCooey also 
admits, as have many other commentators, that `the "silence" of the hidden past comes 
as no surprise to the reader who has been attending to the clues Morgan leaves'(102). 
This raises the question: is My Place no more than the story of a discovery that the 
reader already knows from the beginning? Is it merely the telling of a secret that was 
never really a secret after all? 
History and Secrets 
I would argue that it is not, and that the discovery of Morgan's Aboriginal 
heritage, as the supposedly central secret of the story, the telling of which redeems 
Morgan (and Australia), is constantly undermined by the secrets that remain secret, the 
secrets the reader is never fully told. Just as the back cover of the text of My Place is, as 
we have seen, full of redemptive significations, it is also characterized by ellipses which 
signify the gaps, the silences, the unsaid and the unsayable that constantly subvert the 
redemptive possibilities inscribed within the text. 
Much has been made of the status of secrets in My Place. It has been argued, by 
Stephen Muecke and Arlene Elder in particular, that the trope of secrecy functions to 
authorize the text's and, in particular, Nan's Aboriginality, and that through secrecy, 
`the genuine Aboriginal nature of this narrative' may emerge. '7 Elder argues that Nan's 
silence is an instance of Aboriginal decorum and what she calls the `secret-sacred'. 
Muecke interprets the secret as being to traditional Aboriginality what the confessional 
is to contemporary Western culture: 
On the surface it would seem that the difficulty would once more be 
an index of liberation, as well as a delaying device in the narrative. 
But if we take into account the fact that the shift from Sally to her 
grandmother represents a shift to more traditional Aboriginality, then 
could it be the case that the grandmother is resisting the very form of 
the confessional (a non-Aboriginal genre) and the very power relations 
that it implies? And there is yet another more positive angle on this-a 
possible Aboriginal discursive strategy which would take the form of 
non-disclosure in the face of the demand to speak. (128) 
16 MCCooey, p. 102. 
"Elder, p. 20. 
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Elder, following on from this, maintains that `Nan's insistence on secrecy' rather than 
being seen `as evidence of her continuing fear of white authority and her socially- 
induced shame of her Aboriginal origins' can, `most fruitfully' be seen as 
`representative of the older tradition that she represents'(22): 
My argument is that Daisy considers her known life every bit as 
sacred, therefore parts of it secret, as Sally considers her previously 
unknown life psychologically and politically important and, because 
of her western schooling, appropriate as the subject of public scrutiny. 
(22) 
Following Muecke, Elder argues that the silence of Sally's grandmother, Nan, 
`represents most surely the traditional Aboriginal heritage that Morgan wishes to 
uncover and convey'. 18 
These arguments, like the secrets they refer to, are compelling. There is, 
however, little by way of textual evidence to support this view and it can even be 
thought of as a form of romanticization that denies the effects of the trauma that the 
secrets are concealing. Despite the obvious impact, in the narrative structure, of silences 
and repression on Morgan and her mother and even sister, within a formulation like 
Elder's and Muecke's, the very act of telling the story denies not only the validity of 
Morgan's Aboriginal heritage, but also the effect of her family's repression. Such denial 
is present in many, particularly academic, responses to the text. Bob Hodge and Vijay 
Mishra state that some have said Morgan's Aboriginality is `more vicarious than real' 
and Muecke asserts that `Aboriginality in the case of this novel [sic] is more a genetic 
inheritance than a set of social practices to be engaged with'. 19 Bain Attwood's 
reasoning of why Morgan's `forbears' past lacks valency for Morgan-and it is a rather 
obvious one-is that it is not particularly relevant to the conditions of her own life. 
Their histories explain their lives, not hers'(314). 
Yet, the dichotomy between history and silence that the text sets up, and that 
readers of the text have been quick to reproduce is, I would like to suggest, a false one. 
The two are not as mutually exclusive as Arthur seems to suggest when he claims that 
18 Elder, p. 17. 
19 Hodge and Mishra, p. 98; Muecke, p. 129. 
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Nan `is funny about secrets. She doesn't understand history'(165). Rather, secrets and 
history are deeply interwoven in the narrative. I want to suggest that the history that My 
Place elaborates is a history of secrets within Australian history, and it is this very 
secrecy, and its effects, that Morgan inherits-the repression of the secret sexual abuse 
of Aboriginal women by settler men. When Gladys Milroy defends her daughter's 
project of writing a book, she argues: "`Why shouldn't she write a book?... There's 
been nothing written about people like us, all the history's about the white man. There's 
nothing about Aboriginal people and what they've been through "'(161). Of course, 
Gladys Milroy has a valid point, but what is also of interest is Gladys' slippage between 
the first person plural (us), and the third-person plural (they). This acts as a reminder 
that Aboriginal history and settler colonial history are more intimately connected than 
traditional Australian history, with its silence on the question of the impact of invasion 
on indigenous Australians, and the mixed-race offspring that invasion produced, has 
wanted to acknowledge. 20 
The tension between secrets and history is most clearly elaborated in the role of 
Sally's great-uncle and Nan's brother, Arthur. He is portrayed as being extremely eager 
to tell his stories, and his role functions in opposition to Nan's reluctance: 
Nan maintained a position of non-co-operation, insisting that the 
things she knew were secrets and not to be shared with others. Arthur 
always countered this statement with, `It's history, that's what it is. 
We're talking history. ' (163) 
Yet Arthur's own faithfulness to the role of history is problematized by his insistence 
that he does not want his story "`mixed up with the Drake-Brockmans'. If you're goin' 
to write their story as well, I'll have none of it. Let them write their own story "'(164). 
What the reader comes to learn, however, is that Howden Drake-Brockman is Arthur's 
father, thereby confronting Arthur with a difficulty. How do you tell your story without 
it getting `mixed up' with the story of your father? Colonialism has made it impossible 
for the stories of Arthur and Drake-Brockman not to be mixed up, which is what the 
20 Henry Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1983) can be thought of 
as marking a major shift in Australian historiography towards considering Aboriginal history and 
Aboriginal responses to invasion. 
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narrative proceeds to both reveal and repress. Arthur's story is just as surely the story of 
Drake-Brockman as it is the story of his Aboriginal mother, Annie Padewani, and 
Arthur's story unfolds from this relation. Morgan is right to claim, in her conversation 
with Arthur, that: 
there's almost nothing written from a personal point of view about 
Aboriginal people. All our history is written about the white man. No 
one knows what it was like for us. A lot of our history has been lost, 
people have been too frightened to say anything. There's a lot of 
history we can't even get at. (163) 
Yet, this `Aboriginal' history is also the history of the white man, and the desire of 
white men for Aboriginal women is part of the history of colonialism in Australia, an 
aspect of colonial relations that history has served to repress. 
Repression, and the burden of secrets, run all the way through the text, and in 
one sense, the narrative of My Place can be read as an effect of that repression. For 
although Morgan's Aboriginality is only repressed early in her life, and although the 
text in many ways is about the undoing of this repression, a strain of denial runs through 
My Place which is never fully resolved. After reading the story, it is difficult to accept 
that, on some level, Sally was not aware of her Aboriginal inheritance, an inheritance 
that her younger sister Jill was acutely aware of. This ambivalence between knowing 
and not knowing can be seen in Sally's description of herself as a young child at school 
as a `non-descript brown face amongst a sea of forty knowing smiles'(25). It is striking 
that Morgan would use a `descriptor' of racial difference (brown) immediately after the 
claim that she had no distinguishing features (non-descript). 
In the narrative, it was only in her early school life that Sally realized that she 
exhibited the signs of difference: `The kids at school had also begun asking what 
country we came from. This puzzled me because, up until then, I'd thought we were the 
same as them'(38). Sally then asked her mother where they were from, and her mother 
replied: "Tell them you're Indian"(38). But even at this early stage, there is some textual 
evidence to suggest that the young Sally is aware that things are probably not as simple 
as she claims she believes. Early in the book, Nan's brother Arthur, whose narrative will 
later form part of the story, visits Sally's family, bringing with him some of their 
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cousins who are described as `a small group of dark children'(47). This visit clearly had 
an impact upon Sally, or her reconstruction of the events: 
I don't remember ever seeing them again while I was a child, but the 
image of their smiling faces lodged deep in my memory. I often 
wondered about them. I wanted them to teach me Indian. I never said 
anything to Mum. I knew, instinctively, that if I asked about them, she 
wouldn't tell me anything. (47) 
This `instinctive' knowledge that Sally remembers possessing even as a young child, 
combined with the ambivalent metaphor of lodging, reveals the extent to which Sally's 
sense of who she is is constituted through repression. 
It is nearly a third of the way into the book in a chapter called `A Black 
Grandmother', that a turning point takes place in the narrative. It is when Sally first 
realizes that her grandmother is black, although it will be some time again before she 
makes the further connection between blackness and Aboriginality. One afternoon, 
when she is fifteen, Sally arrives home from school to find her grandmother crying, a 
scene she has never witnessed before. When the young Sally asks her why she is crying, 
she replies: "`You bloody kids don't want me, you want a bloody white grandmother, 
I'm black. Do you hear, black, black, black! "'(97). 
Sally's response to this outburst is astonishing: `For the first time in my fifteen 
years, I was conscious of Nan's colouring. She was right, she wasn't white. Well, I 
thought logically, if she wasn't white, then neither were we. What did that make us, 
what did that make me? I never thought of myself as being black before'(97; Emphasis 
added). The tension in this section resides in the word `conscious'. It implies an 
unconscious that was aware of her grandmother's, and, by extension, her own 
blackness. Blackness then, in this context, signifies not only what Nan and Sally's 
mother refuse to tell her, but also what she `knows' (and I use this term tentatively, tied 
up as it is with the rational cogito) but refuses to admit to consciousness. 
This impression that Sally `knew' but denied her Aboriginality is reinforced by a 
conversation that Sally has with her sister that evening: 
'Jill ... did you 
know Nan was black? ' 
`Course I did. ' 
`I didn't, I just found out. ' 
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`I know you didn't. You're really dumb sometimes. God, you reckon I'm gullible, some things you just don't see. ' (97) 
Jill's response of an almost nonchalant understanding of the obvious ('Course') 
functions in contrast to Sally's lack of consciousness. The passage that follows reveals 
the extent to which Sally has repressed her knowledge of her family's heritage and its 
broader implications in an institutional setting. Jill goes on to explain to Sally: 
`You know what we are, don't you? ' 
`No, what? ff 
'Boongs, we're Boongs! '.... 
`What's a Boong? ' 
`A Boong. You know, Aboriginal. God, of all things, we're 
Aboriginal! ' 
`Oh. ' I suddenly understood. There was a great deal of social stigma 
attached to being Aboriginal at our school. 
`I can't believe you've never heard the word Boong', she muttered in 
disgust. `Haven't you ever listened to the kids at school? If they want 
to run you down, they say, `Ahh, ya just a Boong'. Honestly, Sally, 
you live the whole of your life in a daze! ' 
Jill was right, I did live in a world of my own. (98) 
How, one might ask, was it possible for Sally to get to this stage of her education (age 
15) without being aware of a common term of racial abuse used against Aborigines, 
even as she understood that there was `social stigma' attached to being Aboriginal. 
How, moreover, was she not aware that this term had been directed against her and her 
sister? I suspect there is something more than mere vagueness at work here, as signified 
by the use of the word `daze' which provokes her sister's disgust. Sally's 
acknowledgment that she lives in a world of her own may well be a symptom of her 
extreme detachment from a situation that her sister is only too aware of. Perhaps it has 
something to do with the uncertain memory that Sally is haunted by that evening: 
I settled back into the mattress and began to think about the past. Were 
we Aboriginal? I sighed and closed my eyes. A mental picture flashed 
vividly before me. I was a little girl again, and Nan and I were 
squatting in the sand near the back steps. 
`This is a track, Sally. See how they go. ' I watched, entranced as she 
made the pattern of a kangaroo. `Now, this is a goanna and here are 
emu tracks. You see, they all different. You got to know all of them if 
you want to catch tucker. ' 
I opened my eyes, and, just as suddenly, the picture vanished. Had I 
remembered something important? I didn't know. That was the 
trouble, I knew nothing about Aboriginal people. I was clutching at 
straws. (99-100) 
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This recollection is framed in terms of recursive traces. As a piece of writing, it 
is a trace, in the Derridean sense, that brings to mind the part played by the other in the 
structure of difference that is the sign. As the textualization of a memory, it can be 
thought of as of what Freud might have called a `memory trace', a metaphor that, 
suggests that the structure of the psyche, like the psyche of the sign, carries within itself 
the trace of alterity. 21 Yet, this trace of a trace signifies another trace; Sally's double 
trace is of traces of kangaroos inscribed by her grandmother in the sand. This flash of 
memory, this trace of a trace of a trace that is inscribed within the narrative of My 
Place, disrupts the wholeness and self-presence attributed to the text by its supporters 
and detractors alike. 
The mechanisms by which the young Sally repressed her family's Aboriginal 
heritage can, in another recursion, be seen as re-enactments of her mother's life where 
repression is also internalized. In this sense, Muecke's assertion that Morgan's 
Aboriginality `is more a genetic inheritance than a set of social practices to be engaged 
with' (a phrase cited approvingly by both Attwood and Elder) neglects the fact that one 
of the social practices that Aborigines were actively encouraged to cultivate, under 
colonial structures, was denial of their own status as Aborigines, a denial that enables 
statements like Muecke's. It is social practices such as these, moreover, that constitute 
specific kinds of subjects. As Gladys Milroy claims in her narrative, during her time at 
Parkerville, the children's home in which she was raised, she was taught `never to talk 
openly about being Aboriginal. It was something we were made to feel ashamed 
of'(264). It is this social practice, and the concomitant repression and denial that it 
produces, that can be thought of as Sally's inheritance, and it would be profoundly 
ahistorical to neglect the impact of this practice on contemporary conceptions of 
Aboriginality. 
This sense of the inheritance of repression is also articulated in Gladys's 
narrative when she recalls meeting a woman on the bus who asked her where she was 
21 See Derrida, `Freud and the Scene of Writing' in Writing and Difference, pp. 196-231. 
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from. When Gladys replied that she was Aboriginal, the woman replied: "`Oh you poor 
thing_ what on earth are yougoing_to do? "': 
I didn't know what to say. She looked at me with such pity, I felt 
really embarrassed. I wondered what was wrong with being 
Aboriginal. I wondered what she expected me to do about it. 
I talked to Mum [Nan] about it and she told-me I must. never tell 
anyone what I was. She made me really frightened... (278) 
The words that Gladys then uses to describe a realization about her own mother are very 
similar to the terms in which Sally's own repression and its abreaction had been 
articulated: `It was harder for Muni, than-for mebecause- she was so broadfeatured that 
she couldn't pass for anything else. I started noticing that, when she went out, people 
stared at her, I hadn't realised that befbre'(279; Emphasis-added). 
The response of the woman on the bus echoes responses to Sally's gradual 
process of identification, responses-which-had- come earlier. in the_ narrative, but-which 
are temporally displaced (and I will return to the question of temporal displacement) in 
so far asr chronologically, they come after- the- event that Gladys was recalling: 
Sometimes people would say, `But you're lucky, you'd never know 
you were_thacyou could pass for anything'. Many students reacted 
with an embarrassed silence. Perhaps that was the worst reaction of 
all- It was like we'd said a forbidden word. (139) 
The Place of Patriarchy in My P/ace 
This so-called forbidden wordAborigine, is, as I have argued, not as forbidden 
as the narrative seems to imply. The process through which Morgan comes to 
acknowledge her Aboriginal heritage is represented and read as a slow dawning 
realization of the already obvious. Morgan's eventual recognition occurs when she 
realizes that Nan had been `buttering up the rentman' in order to avoid eviction. When 
Morgan tells her grandmother that there is no way they can be legally evicted, her 
grandmother replies: 
`You don't know nothin', girl. You don't know what it's like for 
people like us. We're like those Jews, we got to look out for 
ourselves. ' 
`What do you mean people like us? We're just like anybody else 
aren't we. I didn't even know you knew Jews existed, how on earth 
could we be the same as them? ' 
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... Nan`s remark about the Jews had confused me .... I knew a lot about the Jews because of the war and Dad. In my mind, there was no 
possible comparison between them and us. (105) 
It is significant that Nan's remarks analogizing her own experience as an 
Aboriginal person with that of Jews should bring to Morgan's mind her father. This 
seems to illustrate the ambivalent and marginal place occupied by him within the 
narrative. For the story of Morgan's Aboriginal ancestors, her maternal line, is haunted 
by the secrets surrounding Morgan's paternal ancestry, which the text itself, and 
interpretations of it, have displaced on to the supposed secret of Morgan's 
Aboriginality. Given that the text was reconstituted in the light of a search for 
Aboriginality, the extended description of Sally's relationship to her father at the 
beginning of the text signifies the strange place in which the paternal is inscribed in the 
book. It is through exploring this strange and marginal place occupied by figure of the 
father that ways of reading My Place can be rethought. 
In general, this early section of the narrative is read as prosaic. Carolyn See's 
review in the New York Times Book Review exemplifies this position: 
My Place is an immensely moving book but part of its triumph lies in 
its diction. Ms. Morgan's early memories of a disconnected childhood 
are rendered in artless primer prose. Then, as the burdens of 
adulthood, education and the past come upon her, the writins 
straightens out, shapes itself into beginnings, middles, ends. 
Judith Brett holds a similar position in her review in Australian Book Review: 
My Place starts off as a fairly conventional account of growing up, 
withfragments of memories of early childhood... About a third of the 
way through,... the book is transformed from an entertaining, 
anecdotal autobiography into a book of great courage and power. 23 
Carolyn Bliss's assertions in the New Literatures Review recapitulates the point: `Nearly 
half of the book is devoted to often dull and sometimes precious anecdotes of Morgan's 
life before the momentous discovery of Aboriginality. i24 
u Carolyn See, `Why Australian Writers Keep Their Heads Down', New York Times Book Review, 14 
May, 1989, p. 37; Emphasis added. 
23 Judith Brett, 'Breaking the Silence: A Gift to the Reader', Australian Book Review, 93, (1987), p. 9; 
Emphasis added. 
24 Carolyn Bliss, `The Mythology of Family: Three Texts of Popular Australian Culture', New Literatures 
Review, 18 (1989), p. 62. 
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The use of words like `disconnected', `fragments of memories', `often dull' 
indicate that this early part of the narrative is somewhat out of place, and not part of the 
narrative of finding a place, in so far as the story of the emergence of Sally's selfhood is 
told-in terms of her identification with her matrilineal Aboriginal inheritance, The 
absence or peripherality of Sally's father in terms of Morgan's identification is 
repeatedly questioned and criticized- As David Mc_Cooey has- noted: 
Whilst the matrilineal nature of the work has been often noted, 
discussion-of the war experiences of Morgan's father is mostly 
avoided, even though much of the first part of the work is concerned 
with his difficulty in coping-with the past. The father's hidden past is 
virtually ignored, and finds its way into the narrative only through an 
interpolation by the mother, Gladys Milroy, into her own story. (102) 
McCooey's loaded language of intentionality-'avoided', `ignored'-characterizes 
readings of the absence of the father as a deliberate narrative strategy, and a form of 
disingenuousness that Morgan utilizes to emphasize her Aboriginality. McCooey goes 
onto argue: 
Given the importance of the `voice' and its connections to the past, the 
absence of the father's voice is striking. Bill Morgan's history, 
embedded in Gladys Morgan's, is no less shocking than the others (in 
some ways it is more so); but it is incidental to the confession, not, 
central to it. Rather than being read in terms of the national past (as 
the other narrators are), Bill Morgan's war experiences are seen to 
account for hinpersonal behaviour,. his drinking and early death. (104) 
Muecke's response also reads the absence of the father as `avoidance': 
[My Place] describe[s]the emergence of Aboriginality in the effective 
absence of patriarchal or European agency. The filiation is... through 
themothers- line, thus_avoiding_whatmight be more contradictory 
(and perhaps interesting) accounts of how patriarchal social 
formations might have had to be worked through and against. (126) 
Eric Michaels' reproduction of what is by now an insistent theme in Morgan criticism 
claims that Morgan is-interesting and poignant: 
when describing her father and his weaknesses, but he remains an 
outsider... One only wishes that the duality of cultural heritage and its 
consequences had been more frankly described. What a great 
contribution such a. treatment_would be, and how much-more 
successfully the contradictions of her own history might have been 
resolved. (46) 
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Bain Attwood quotes both Michaels and Muecke in a footnote to support his own 
argument about the text, and claims that Morgan's `racial determinism' leads her to 
`deny her white side'(318). 
These criticisms that desire to hear the name of the father are themselves 
ambivalent. For McCooey and Michaels, Bill Milroy is `incidental'; an `outsider'. For 
Muecke, an exploration of `patriarchal or European agency' would have made the text 
more contradictory, for Michaels less so, although why the successful resolution of 
contradictions in Morgan's history would be a `great contribution', and for whom, is 
never elaborated upon. What I want to suggest is that Bill Milroy's story can be read as 
standing in a synecdochic relationship to the place of the paternal in the text and, by 
extension, to the place from which colonial settler anxieties are both articulated and 
repressed. The criticism of Morgan by Muecke, McCooey, Michaels and Attwood, 
moreover, can perhaps be read, meta-textually, as extensions of this anxiety. I will 
further argue that the hidden history of Bill Milroy, so commented upon by so many 
critics, is a metaphor for the hidden history, not of Aboriginal Australia, but of colonial 
anxieties and desires. This is perhaps why the role played by Sally's father is that of a 
peripheral haunting which is never really incorporated into the patterns of meaning that 
emerge in the rest of the narrative. This undermines the centralizing authority of 
patriarchy, an undermining that clearly produces anxieties in, particularly male, 
responses to the text. 
My Place opens with the words, `The hospital again', where Sally, as `a grubby 
five-year-old in an alien environment'(11), has come to visit her sick father. From the 
very first words of the text, Sally's father, and the patriarchal world which he occupies, 
are situated as `alien' and are associated with, and even constituted by, hauntings, 
ghosts, silences and fragmentation. Sally recalls, for example, her mother trying to 
prompt her to talk to her father in the hospital: `My silences were embarrassing to Mum. 
She usually covered up for me by telling everyone I was shy. Actually, I was more 
scared than shy. I felt if I said anything at all, I'd just fall apart. There'd be me, in pieces 
on the floor. I was full of secret fears'(12). Sally's fear of fragmentation in the presence 
of her father has a ghostly resonance which is reiterated when Sally is paralyzed by the 
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offer of a sweet by another war veteran in the hospital: `I couldn't move even if I'd 
wanted to. This man reminded me of a ghost'(12). Just as Sally fears her own dispersal 
in this environment, the men in the veteran's hospital are threatened with fragmentation. 
Looking at the old soldiers in the ward, the young Sally `found it hard to comprehend 
that you could have so many parts missing and still live'(12). Significantly, in the light 
of the story that unfolds, the world that the paternal occupies is, from the outset, a space 
marked by denial: `Sometimes, I pretended Dad wasn't really sick'(11). My Place, then, 
begins with a patriarchy in pieces, in the aftermath of a war against itself, but it is a 
beginning that is itself denied, for it is not until some years later, half-way into the text 
when Sally first comes to acknowledge and recognize her Aboriginal heritage, that the 
narrative includes a chapter called `A Beginning'(145). This chapter is the point in the 
narrative where Sally's family openly admit their Aboriginal ancestry. 
This early fragmentation, denial, and repression contrast with and complicate the 
later models of selfhood that are characterized by expression, wholeness and 
redemption, models, moreover, which are the basis for criticisms of Morgan by 
Attwood, Muecke and Michaels. In contrast to the world of the father, the world of the 
maternal line, and particularly Sally's grandmother, her mother's mother, is the realm of 
nature. Yet Nan, as a character, is introduced in this opening section, and it is significant 
that she first `appears' in the form of a memory, as Sally is in the hospitals amidst the 
ghosts. For Sally, Nan's world is a world of dreaming, a haven away from the 
fragmentation of the patriarchal world.: 
It was such an optimistically beautiful day I felt like crying. Spring 
was always an emotional experience for me. It was for Nan, too. Only 
yesterday, she'd awakened me to view her latest discovery. I had been 
in a deep sleep, but somehow her voice had penetrated my dreams. 
(13) 
It is during this recounted memory, of a penetrated dream, (a day-dream that will itself 
be penetrated by the nervous reality of the hospital) that the bird-call, which will come 
to have so much significance at the book's conclusion, is introduced as a signifier for 
the grandmother's world: 
I felt excited, but it wasn't the thought of the bullfrog that excited me. 
This morning, I was waiting for the birdcall. Nan called it her special 
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bird, nobody had heard it but her. This morning I was going to hear it, 
too. 
Still no bird. I squirmed impatiently. Nan poked her stick in the dirt 
and said, `It'll be here soon'. She spoke with certainty. 
Suddenly, 
__the_yardf 
lled_with a high_trillingRound-My-eyes-searched 
the trees. I couldn't see the bird, but his call was there. The music 
stopped- as abruptly as it had begun. 
Nan smiled at me, `Did you hear him? Did you hear the bird call? T 
'I heard_him, 
_Nan', _Lwhispered 
in_awe. 
What a magical moment it had been. I sighed. I was with Dad now, 
and there was no room for magic in hospitals. I pressed my teeth 
together and, resting my chin on my chest, I peered back at Mum and 
Dad-They bothseemednervous_Lwondered how long-Ed-been day- 
dreaming. (14) 
So, from the very beginning-of the narrative, this myth of wholeness isý. like all myths of 
wholeness, necessarily haunted by absence, fragmentation and dispersal. This is 
exacerbated-by the kinds of-dislocations-produced-by colonialism where-there- is an 
ever-increasing anxiety about racial amalgamation. And it is through the character of 
Bill Milroy that anxieties about miscegenation, and the question of an illegitimate 
desire, are introduced, and simultaneously denied. As the young Sally comments of her 
father's parents: `It wasn't that our grandparents_ disliked us. In_fact, they always treated 
us kindly, in their own way. After all, half of us belonged to Dad. It was the other half 
they were worried about'(53). It is this anxiety about miscegenation, coupled with the 
concomitant denial of white male desire for black women, that institute the story of My 
Place, and its continuing significance is highlighted by the anxieties and denials 
surrounding the Stolen Generation debate presently taking place in Australia. 
It is from the perspective of this anxiety that we can consider the legislation 
introduced in Western Australia that constituted the kinds of fragmented subjects that 
Sally Morgan, her mother and-her-grandmother-were. subjected to.. This-legislation is 
referred to marginally in My Place in the footnoted reference to Neville: `A. O. Neville, 
Chief Protector of Natives, Western Australia,. 1915-1940. Widely credited as a 
principal advocate and force behind an active policy of miscegenation in Western 
Australia through. the 1930s_ The_ legal removal of `half-caste' Aboriginal children from 
their mothers was part of this policy'(21 1). 25 
u For an excellent, detailed study of the history of the Western Australia Government policy in relation to 
Aborigines, see Anna Haebich, For their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the South West of 
Western Australia, 1900-1940 (Nedlands, WA: University of Western AustraliaPress. 1988). 
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Although the removal of `part-Aboriginal' children was practised prior to 1905, 
the 1905 Aborigines Act made it law and gave the Aborigines' `protectors' greater 
incentive and justification in the enforcement of the Act. The law was amended in 1936, 
under A. O. Neville, enabling even tighter controls and broadening the definition of 
Aboriginal so that many so-called `half-castes' and `quadroons', who were previously 
exempt from the act, were now controlled by it. The law and its amendments meant that 
Aborigines previously controlled by criminal codes were now incorporated in into a 
welfare enclave, into an enclave, in other words, dominated by the ideology of 
paternalism. Anxieties about miscegenation were effectively utilized in Australia's 
emerging capitalist economy in so far as so-called `half-caste' children were `defined by 
their paternity as sufficiently white to be taken from their Aboriginal mothers, but by 
their maternity as sufficiently black never to have a place in white society beyond 
servant or farm-hand status, and usually they were sent away altogether'. 26 
Beyond this pragmatism, the Aborigines Act of 1905 was deeply contradictory. 
Primarily concerned to limit miscegenation, it was simultaneously assimilationist and 
segregationist and this very contradiction is an indication of the way mixed-race 
children, and Morgan's grandmother was one of them, represented something, some 
desire, in white colonial consciousness that it would not, and still will not, acknowledge. 
Morgan's description of herself as `non-descript', explored earlier, has interesting 
resonances considered from this perspective. Non-descript is a word that emerged out of 
the discourse of natural history and was used to define things that were not easily 
described, `neither one thing nor the other'. 27 Although the ideology of the Act was 
instituted by the desire to maintain neat racial boundaries, the act of colonization 
generated obstacles to the neat racial boundaries desired in the form of the production of 
an expanding `mixed- race' Population. 2' The very existence of the so-called half-caste 
bears witness to the mixing of communities that imperialism seeks to evade and deny. 
26 Chris Prentice, `The Interplay of Place and Placelessness in the Subject of the Postcolonial Fiction', 
SPAN, 31(1991), p. 79. 
27 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 1410. 
28 For a discussion of the issues surrounding miscegenation, see Gillian Cowlishaw, Black, White or 
Brindle: Race in Rural Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Nicholas Thomas, 
Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); and Fernando 
Henriques, Children of Cali ban (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1974). 
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Production of half-caste children, therefore, in their very existence, challenges the 
premises of racist ideology, an ideology that led to the attempted denial of the existence 
of these children. 
The growing population of `mixed-blood' children in the 1920s and 3 0s alarmed 
Aboriginal administrators and the public alike. `That these children were the result of 
sexual liaisons between, most commonly, white men and black women was often 
ignored. '29 As Robert Young argues, `anxiety about hybridity reflected the desire to 
keep races separate, which meant that attention was immediately focused on the mixed 
race offspring that resulted from inter-racial sexual intercourse, the proliferating, 
embodied, living legacies that abrupt, casual, often coerced, unions had left behind' 30 
In an Oedipalized imperial culture that is not only concerned with a fixed notion of race, 
but also with a fixed relation to the father, and fixing inheritances (material, biological 
and psychic) from him, mixed-race children occupied an extremely marginalized 
position, bearing witness to the instability of both race and paternity. Certainly, in My 
Place, the troubling intersection of race and paternity around sexual desire remains the 
unsaid of the text. What legislation like Neville's seeks to evade, and the evasion is seen 
throughout My Place, is sexual desire, and the male settler/colonizer's predatory 
aggression. 
From within this growing welfare enclave, patriarchal law ensured that 
biological paternity could be displaced on to institutionalized paternalism: 
Legally it was also very difficult to prove paternity, as an Aboriginal 
woman's sworn statement was not enough to incriminate a white man 
as the father of the child. The Native Welfare Department was 
therefore increasingly burdened by the cost of providing for the 
swelling half-caste population. 31 
This very legislation, it would seem, is designed to both legitimate sexual relations 
between settler men, as dominant holders of the law, and Aboriginal women, and 
simultaneously enable their denial. 
Z' Haebich, pp. 48-50. 
30 Young, Colonial Desire, p. 25. 
31 Haebich, p. 111. 
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Joan Newman, in her reading of My Place, notes, in line with many other 
responses that, in `identifying with her matrilineal heritage, Morgan avoids the focus 
upon "the name of the Father" which is commonly emphasized in European 
autobiography'(72). Yet the name of the father, as both a material and psychic 
inheritance, is extremely complex for half-caste children in Australia. As Arthur relates 
in his narrative, when he and Daisy were taken away from their mother to the Swan 
Native and Half-Caste Mission, `[t]he first thing they did was Christen us... We were 
Christened Corunna, they didn't give us our father's name'(183). The irony of being 
named after a piece of land taken from one's indigenous community by the very man 
who disowns his position as father is striking here. So too is the fact that they were 
named after a piece of land, which had already been renamed after an English poem by 
C. Wolfe, `The Burial of Sir John Moore at Corunna' 32 Corunna, so The Golden 
Treasury of English Verse tells us, was the burial place of Sir J. Moore who `was killed 
whilst covering the embarkation of his troops'(487) when retreating from Napoleon's 
army after his capture of Madrid. In his critique, Attwood claims that the chapter of My 
Place called `Return to Corunna', is `significantly entitled'(305), presumably because 
such a `return' fulfills the `tradition of another literary genre, that of quest literature 
[where] the search for a real self culminates in a journey or pilgrimage'(305). Yet, for 
me, the significance of this chapter title, which Attwood does not elaborate on, is that 
Morgan's return is to a place which commemorates the burial place of an English 
soldier who died, on foreign territory, in a battle against a foreign invader. This naming, 
in effect, writes over the land of Australia (the North-West of Australia in this case) as a 
burial place for the many Aboriginal people killed during the invasion of Australia by 
Britain. In other words, the chapter title recognizes that the `return to Corunna' can 
never culminate, in spite of Attwood's insistence, in the unproblematic return to a place 
of spiritual belonging prior to invasion. 
32 C. Wolfe, `The Burial of Sir John Moore at Corunna', Book IV, The Golden Treasury of English Verse 
(1861), ed. Francis Turner Palgrave (1-iarmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), p. 243. I am grateful to Angela 
Smith for bringing this poem to my attention. 
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Arthur's narrative about his removal from Corunna also reveals the increasing 
anxiety and absurdity of legislation surrounding definitions of Aboriginality in Australia 
when he recalls the effects of a visit by Governor Bedford: 
After his visit, the darker kids were separated from the lighter kids. He 
didn't like us being together.... Funny thing was, they put Freddy 
Lockyer in with the white kids. He had fair hair and fair skin, but 
really, he was a white blackfella. He didn't want to go, he wanted to 
stay with us blackies, he belonged to us but they made him go. I said 
to him, `You're not black enough to stay with us, you have to go'. I 
felt sorry for him. He really was one of us. (184) 
The impact of this legislation on Daisy Corunna's life is also forcefully articulated in 
the story, and reveals the extent to which this supposedly racialized legislation was 
always sexualized and gendered: 
In those days, it was considered a privilege for a white man to want 
you, but if you had children, you weren't allowed to keep them. You 
were only allowed to keep the black ones. They took the white ones 
off you `cause you weren't considered fit to raise a child with white 
blood. (336) 
That the effects of this legislation also haunted the lives of Daisy's daughters is 
exemplified in the threat that Gladys' husband Bill, Sally's father, used to ensure her 
obedience: 
`Nobody will let someone like you bring up kids and you know it. ' I 
knew what he meant. I always had a sinking feeling in my stomach 
when he said that. Aboriginal women weren't allowed to keep 
children fathered by a white man.... I couldn't take the chance of 
losing them. (310) 
The placement of the modifier, `always', suggests that this threat was a recurring one. 
Yet, even as anxieties surrounding miscegenation are prefigured by Bill Milroy, it is 
through the Drake-Brockman family, the influential settler family, headed by the arch- 
patriarch Alfred Howden Drake-Brockman, that these anxieties are both articulated and 
repressed. It is in the locus of the Drake-Brockman family that anxieties surrounding 
paternity and miscegenation intersect. 
The Drake-Brockman family are first mentioned fairly early in the book. We 
only learn about them peripherally, as secret knowledge, from an exchange Sally 
overhears as a child: 
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I remember, at one stage, we were really desperate. Mum and Nan 
kept talking in whispers. They decided to write a letter to Alice Drake- 
Brockman in Sydney to see if her family could lend us some money. 
They were really disappointed when the reply came; it said that they 
were broke, too, and couldn't lend us anything. Nan was very bitter. 
She said she didn't care they were bankrupt, they owed her. I didn't 
know what she was talking about. (54; Emphasis added) 
At this stage of the narrative, neither does the reader, but the talking in whispers 
suggests something of a secret nature, and the reference to bankruptcy not only signifies 
the failure of capitalism as an economic system, but also the ethical bankruptcy of the 
paternalist settler culture that it supports. Initially, then, the Drake-Brockman family are 
a haunting presence, introduced in whispered tones, in much the same way that Bill 
Milroy was, and it is only as the story unfolds that allusions to the significance of the 
Drake-Brockman begin to emerge. 
After the Quest for Aboriginality has been completed, the major preoccupation 
of the latter part of the novel is with Daisy Corunna's and Gladys Milroy's paternity. It 
is this preoccupation to which the narrative surrounding Bill Milroy can be read as 
standing in a synecdochic relationship. Around the question of Morgan's white 
ancestry, Hodge and Mishra assert: 
It is paradoxical that Sally Morgan's search for her Aboriginal- identity 
is accomplished primarily by disclosing her white ancestors, 
paradoxical since it is this search that allows her to come to terms with 
her Aboriginality in a way that Nan herself found too hard. In the 
process she discloses to nonAborigines a pattern of White complicity 
in the destruction of Aboriginal society that is its own buried secret: 
sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women- (100) 
This paradox, however, is, as I have tried to suggest, less a paradox than a displacement. 
Morgan's search for her Aboriginal identity in the text displaces the white complicity in 
the sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women. If Bill Milroy stands in a metaphoric or 
synecdochic relationship to paternity in general, we can think differently about why Bill 
Milroy cannot fully disclose the content of the nightmares he suffers: `there were some 
things that were too degrading for him to share'(282). 
Given this preoccupation with paternity, Morgan's search for a maternal 
Aboriginal identity can be read as the unspoken search for a settler paternity that has 
been repressed, and that the secrets surrounding this paternity have been displaced on to 
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claims about the supposedly secret nature of Aboriginality. Arthur, Nan's brother, 
claims unequivocally that both his and Daisy's father is Howden Drake-Brockman, the 
owner of Corunna Downs, the station where both Arthur and Daisy were born, and the 
home in which Daisy later became an unpaid domestic servant. Arthur's reminder to 
Sally and her mother, Gladys, brings to mind anxieties about miscegenation, and denial 
about sexual relations between white men and Aboriginal women: 
`[D]on't forget Alice was Howden's second wife and they had the 
Victorian way of thinking in those days. Before there were white 
women, our father owned us, we went by his name, but later, after he 
married his first wife, Nell, he changed our names... He didn't want to 
own us no more. They were real fuddy-duddies in those days. No 
white man wants to have black kids runnin' round the place with his 
name. And Howden's mother and father, they were real religious 
types, I bet they didn't know about no black kids that belonged to 
them. ' (157) 
This disowning of his own children is in stark contrast to the welcome reception 
that Morgan and her family receive within their Aboriginal community when they 
return to Corunna Downs. Much is made of where each of them, including Morgan's 
non-Aboriginal husband, belong in the community, and there is a marked contrast 
between the hierarchical and patriarchal denial on the part of the Drake-Brockmans, and 
the horizontal, and less rigid, structures that the aboriginal community welcome them 
into, where a person's place within the structure is not determined by the relation to the 
father. The important thing, it seems, is the multiplicitous relation they have to each 
other and to place. For example, when Sally and her family meet a man called Jack, and 
ask him if they are related to him, he replies: "`Well, now, which way do you go by, the 
blackfella's way or the white man's way? "' (219). 
Yet, even on this journey, where Sally and her family are so readily accepted 
into the Aboriginal community, the question of both Nan's and Gladys' paternity is 
never far away. One of the men they meet, Roy, suggests that Drake-Brockman could 
be Nan's father, and, in so doing, alludes to the excessive half-caste population that 
station owners both produced and denied. In response to the question of who Nan's 
father might be, Roy replies, "`Could have been the station owner. Plenty of black kids 
belong to them, but they don't own them "'(223). 
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The Place of Incest in My Place 
Just as Morgan's father functions synecdochically for anxieties about 
miscegenation, it is also through Bill Milroy that anxieties about incestuous child abuse 
are introduced as a narrative fragment which, like the figure of Bill Milroy, is never 
incorporated into the narrative's pattern of meaning. `[S]ome elderly friends' of Sally's 
father, who her and her siblings called `Uncle and Aunty'(81), open up a central 
concern of the narrative that will later be repressed. It was their father's friend, their 
metaphorical `uncle', who tries to bribe Sally and her sister Jill with gifts in exchange 
for sexual favours: 
`You can have the necklace. I might even give you the bracelet as 
well. ' I backed up against the wall. Uncle moved closer and tried to 
put his hand down my pants. I shoved him away, he fell over and 
landed on his tool-box... I warned Jill never to go up to his shed 
again. 
I was frightened for her, yet I couldn't explain what I was frightened 
of. She disregarded my warning. On two occasions, I caught her 
plodding along silently after Uncle. I caught up with her and distracted 
her with something else. (82) 
This episode is neither introduced nor mentioned again, and the fear that Sally 
experiences, which she is unable to explain, is reproduced hauntingly within the 
narrative. Like so much of the incestuous abuse within the narrative, we never find out 
what happened on the occasions that Sally was not there to distract Jill with something 
else. Sally's and Jill's contrasting awareness of the- dangers of sexual abuse act as mirror 
reflections of their contrasting awareness of their Aboriginality. On the one hand, Sally 
is extremely vigilant about the sexual abuse and Jill is extremely naive. On the other 
hand, Sally's non-recognition of Aboriginality is described as the effect of being in a 
`daze', while Jill is totally aware of it.. It is almost as if the burdensome weight of this 
dual awareness cannot be held within the same frame, a weight, moreover, that prevents 
them from coming together within the narrative. 
Although this episode is not mentioned again, it does prefigure another secret 
incestuous relationship surrounding the question of Gladys' paternity. Nan refuses to 
reveal this secret closing her narrative with: `Well, Sal, that's all I'm gunna tell ya ... I 
got my secrets, I'll take them to the grave. Some things, I can't talk `bout'(349). The 
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text, however, reveals the secret in spite of itself, and throughout the course of the latter 
sections of the story it becomes increasingly clear that not only is Drake-Brockman 
Daisy's father, he is Gladys' father as well, and that he also fathered another child to 
Daisy that was taken away from her, a second child that is only vaguely alluded to: 
`Before I had Gladdie, I was carryin' another child, but I wasn't allowed to keep it. That 
was the way of it, then. They took our children one way or another. I never told anyone 
I was carryin' Gladdie'(340). 
Like the episode with the `uncle', this second child is not mentioned again, 
although Jack, the man they had met in Corunna did `recall meeting a Daisy in `23... 
Never seen her before. It was like she appeared outa nowhere. Took her from Hillside to 
stay at Corunna. She had family there she wanted to visit... She was pregnant, baby 
must have been near due'(221). Sally replies that she does not think it could be the same 
Daisy, but perhaps this figure, appearing out of nowhere, can be read as a metaphor for 
the unrepresentability of the disseminatory excess of colonial desire. Daisy, in her 
narrative, also alludes to this disseminatory excess: `Aah, that colour business is a funny 
thing. Our colour goes away. You mix us with white man, and pretty soon, you got no 
blackfellas left. Some of these whitefellas you see walkin' around, they really black 
underneath. You see, you never can tell'(326). 
The unfolding of the textual evidence for a reading of Drake-Brockman as both 
the father and grandfather of Gladys plays a significant role in the narrative, particularly 
because it is never explicitly referred to. Its unfolding is full of gaps, denials and 
repressions. Even in Nan's narrative, she alludes to the possibility that there might be 
reasons that she was taken from Corunna that she is not aware of. `Funny how I was the 
only half-caste they took from Corunna. Drake-Brockman's left the others and took me. 
Maybe Howden took me `cause I was his daughter, I don't know'(333). Nan's `I don't 
know' is a repeated response in reference to the question of her own and Gladys' 
paternity. 
From about half-way through the narrative, from the moment that the family's 
Aboriginality had been acknowledged, in the chapter following the chapter titled `A 
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Beginning', Sally begins to question her reluctant mother and grandmother about who 
her mother's father is. Gladys replies: 
`When I was little, I used to ask about my father, but she wouldn't tell 
me anything. In the end, I gave up. ' 
`Who was your father? T 
'Oh, I don't know', she replied sadly, `Nan just said he was a white 
man who died when I was very small. ' 
I felt sad then. I promised myself that, one day, I would find out who 
her father was. She had a right to know. (145) 
This promise, which is also a promise to the reader, is an ambiguous one in terms of the 
narrative. Daisy dies at the end of the narrative, taking her secrets to the grave. Yet, in 
another sense, it can be argued that Sally does fulfil this promise she makes to herself, 
even as the narrative denies it. Sally begins by checking her mother's birth certificate, 
only to find that there is a blank where Gladys' father's name should be, a blank that 
can be thought of metaphorically as the position paternity occupies within the text. As 
Gladys remarks: `Just a blank. That's awful, like nobody owns me'(152). 
It is from this blank that the narrative slowly suggests who Gladys' father might 
be. The first suggestion of the implication of the Drake-Brockman family in Gladys' 
paternity comes from Gladys when she claims that she `had asked Judy Drake- 
Brockman [Howden and Alice Drake-Brockman's daughter] once and she kept saying, 
"It's in the blood", whatever that means'(153). Like Nan's `I don't know', this 
`whatever that means' acts as a kind of repressive closure, indicating an unwillingness, 
for obvious reasons, to pursue what Judy Drake-Brockman might have meant. Sally 
suggests this herself, as well as suggesting the differential structure of the psyche, two 
pages earlier in response to Gladys' claim that she doesn't know anything: `You only 
THINK you don't know anything. I'm sure if you searched those hidden recesses of 
your mind you'd come up with something'(151). 
Soon after this, Sally and Gladys ask Arthur if he can tell them who Gladys' 
father is: 
He was silent for a moment, thoughtful. Then he said, `I'd like to. I 
really would, but it'd be breakin' a trust. Some things `bout her I can't 
tell. It wouldn't be right. She could tell you everything you want to 
know. You see, Howden was a lonely man. I know, one night at 
Ivanhoe, we both got drunk together and he told me all his troubles. 
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He used to go down to Daisy's room at night and talk to her. I can't 
say no more. You'll have to ask her. ' (158) 
That same evening, after Arthur had gone home, Sally and Gladys continued talking 
about who Gladys' father might. Strangely, their dialogue does not mention any of the 
possible implications, for instance what Howden Drake-Brockman's loneliness and trips 
to Daisy's room at night might have involved, of what Arthur had told them: 
`Howden may have been her father, but there could be something else, 
some secret he wants to keep, that is somehow tied in with all of this. 
Perhaps that's why he didn't look us in the eye. ' 
`Yes, that's possible, too. And I can't see why he wouldn't tell us the 
truth, because he knows how much it means to us. I don't think we'll 
ever know that full story. I think we're going to have to be satisfied 
with guesses. ' 
`It makes me sad to think that no one wants to own our family. ' 
`I know, Mum... that's all we can go on then, possibilities. Now Judy 
said Jack Grime was your father, but maybe he wasn't. He was living 
at Ivanhoe at the time you were born, but that doesn't necessarily 
mean he fathered you, does it? ff 
'Oh God, Sally', Mum laughed, `let's not get in any deeper. I've had 
enough for one night. ' (158-59) 
This passage is striking for the extent to which it enacts its repression. Their 
unwillingness to pursue Arthur's hints, and Gladys' desire to `not get any deeper' is 
indicative of the fear of what such depth might reveal. Even Sally's assertion that they 
will never `know the full story' is a disavowal of both the story that she is 
simultaneously revealing and the promise she had made to herself and her mother 
earlier. 
The implication that Howden Drake-Brockman is Gladys' father is again made 
during Arthur's narrative: 
In 1927, I got a letter from Howden... The letter asked if I'd like to 
have Daisy with me. It said they didn't want her no more and they 
wondered if I could come and get her.... 
I... was all set to go get Daisy when another letter arrived. It said 
they'd changed their minds and I couldn't have her after all... 
In December 1927, I heard Daisy had had a baby girl. It was news to 
me. I wondered, then, if that was why they'd changed their minds. 
They must have found out she was pregnant... 
Early in 1928, Howden died. He'd been a sick man for some time... 
Howden saw Daisy's baby before he died. They called her Gladys. He 
held her in his arms and said, `She's very beautiful'. She was one of 
the most beautiful babies I'd ever seen. (203) 
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The most revealing passage, however, on the question of Gladys' paternity, comes after 
Arthur's narrative, and just before Gladys begins her own, in a dialogue between Sally 
and Gladys that is remarkable for the extent to which it reveals the simultaneous 
blindness and insight that the story as a whole is characterized by. It is worth quoting at 
length. They begin with a discussion of who Nan's father might be that quickly returns 
to the question of who Gladys' father is: 
`Probably, we'll never really know who fathered her. ' 
`Do you reckon Jack Grime really is your father? ff 
'Oh, I don't know, Sally', Mum sighed. `When I was little, I always 
thought Howden was my father, isn't that silly? ' 
`Howden? Why did you think that? ff 
'I suppose because he was Judy and June and Dick's father. I guess, 
because I was little and didn't understand, I assumed he was my 
father, too. You know how it is when you're a kid. ' 
`Yeah, I could see how you might think that. You were all living there 
at Ivanhoe. ' 
`Yes. ' 
`Aunty Judy said you're the image of Jack Grime, though, that'd be 
some sort of proof, wouldn't it? 
`Oh, I don't know, people can look like one another, but it doesn't 
mean they're related.! 
'Yeah. Hey, I know. I've got a photo of Jack, a big one, why don't we 
look at it, see if you do look alike? ' 
`I don't want to do that. ' 
`Go on! We'll hold it up to the big mirror in my room, you can put 
your head next to it and we'll see if you look like him. ' 
`Oh, all right', Mum giggled, `why not? ff 
'Within minutes, Mum and I and the photo were all facing the large 
mirrors in the doors of my wardrobe. 
`Well, that was a dead loss. You don't look anything like him... 
There's no resemblance there at all. ' 
`He doesn't look like any of you kids, either, does he? ' 
`Naafi', I agreed. `Hang on a tick and I'll get another picture. ' 
I returned quickly. `Okay', I said, `face the mirror. ' 
Mum fronted up to the mirror and tried not to laugh. She felt silly. 
Suddenly, I held up a photograph of Howden as a young man next to 
her face. We both fell into silence. 
`My God', I whispered. `Give him black, curly hair and a big bust and 
he's the spitting image of you! ' 
Mum was shocked. `I can't believe it', she said. `Why haven't I ever 
noticed this before, I've seen that picture hundreds of times. ' 
`I suppose it never occurred to you', I replied. 
`You don't think it's possible he was my father? ff 
'Anything's possible. But he couldn't be yours as well as Nan's. You 
know, features can skip a generation. Say he was Nan's father, well 
you could have inherited those looks from that. ' 
`Oh, I don't know, Sally', Mum sighed. `It's such a puzzle. You 
know, for nearly all my life, I've desperately wanted to know who my 
father was, now I couldn t care less. Why should I bother with 
whoever it was, they never bothered with me. ' 
`But that's been the recent history of Aboriginal people all along, 
Mum. Kids running around, not knowing who fathered them. Those 
early pioneers, they've got a lot to answer for. ' 
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`Yes, I know, I know, but I think now I'm better off without all that business. All those wonderful people up North, they all claimed me. 
Well, that's all I want. That's enough, you see. I don't want to belong 
to anyone else. ' 
`Me either. ' (236-7) 
This is one of the most significant passages in the entire text. It begins with 
hesitation on Gladys' part ('I don't want to do that'). When Gladys finally sees the 
similarity between herself and Drake-Brockman, she wonders why she had not realized 
this earlier, a situation which repeats a pattern of denial that has unfolded during the 
narrative ('Why haven't I ever noticed this before'; `I suppose it never occurred to 
you'). There is also the simultaneous investigation of the possibility of incest, and a 
disavowal of that same possibility, although no grounds are given for this disavowal 
('You don't think it's possible he was my father? '/ `Anything's possible. But he 
couldn't be yours as well as Nan's'). In spite of the fact that the mystery of Gladys' 
paternity has occupied, and will continue to occupy, a major part of the text, and in spite 
of Sally's promise, it is at the point of discovery that both Gladys and Sally decide that 
they do not really care who Gladys' father is (`for nearly all my life, I've desperately 
wanted to know who my father was, now I couldn't care less'; `I think now I'm better 
off without all that business'). Visually also, this passage is significant, permeated as it 
is by mirror reflections and photographic images, that allow for recognitions and 
misrecognitions. Such images are explicitly linked here to the question of inheritance: 
`You know, features can skip a generation. Say he was Nan's father, well you could 
have inherited those looks from that. ' This section of the text alternates between the 
explicit and the unvocalized, an alternation which underpins its willed and anxious 
ignorance. 
Daisy refers, also to Howden Drake-Brockman in her short narrative, without 
ever explicitly calling him Gladys' father. What is revealed, however, is that the secret 
of Gladys' father was simultaneously both widely known and widely repressed: `Now 
how this all came about, that's my business, I'll only tell a little. Everyone knew who 
the father was, but they all pretended they didn't know. Aah, they knew, they knew. 
You didn't talk `bout things, then. You hid the truth'(340). What Daisy does make 
explicit, however, is the extent to which Aboriginal women in unpaid domestic service, 
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women like herself, were particularly vulnerable to the `forced' sexual advances of their 
masters: `We had no protection when we was in service. I know a lot of native servants 
had kids to white men because they were forced. Makes you want to cry to think how 
black women have been treated in this country'(337). Daisy's ambivalent and unstable 
identification with `native servants' that she has known also acts as both an 
identification and disidentification. Judith Butler eloquently describes the complexity of 
this process, and it is worth quoting at length: 
it may be that certain identifications and affiliations are made, certain 
sympathetic connections amplified, precisely in order to institute a 
disidentification with a position that seems too saturated with injury or 
aggression, one that might, as a consequence, be occupiable only 
through imagining the loss of viable identity altogether. Hence, the 
peculiar logic in the sympathetic gesture by which one objects to an 
injury done to another to deflect attention from an injury done to 
oneself, a gesture that then becomes the vehicle of displacement by 
which one feels for oneself through and as the other. Inhibited from 
petitioning the injury in one's own name (for fear of being steeped in 
that very abjection and/or launched infelicitously into rage), one 
makes the petition in the name of another... 
Daisy enacts such a gesture in her narrative, the shortness of which, in relation to the 
text as a whole (25 pages of a 358 page book) may well indicate the unoccupiability of 
her own life-story, and its saturation with suffering. 
In reference to the birth of her daughter, Gladys, although without ever 
explaining the relevance of the connection, she states: `Howden died not long after she 
was born. When I came home from hospital, he said, "Bring her here, let me hold her". 
He wanted to nurse Gladdie before he died'(340). This is significant in so far as all 
Daisy ever told Gladys about her father was that `he was a white man who died when 
[she] was very small'(145). 
The Seduction Theory and the Oedipus Complex 
This displacement of the perpetrator of incestuous sexual abuse on to an `uncle' 
or `family friend', in the case of My Place it is both, is a distinctly Freudian manoeuvre. 
At the turn of the century, Freud hoped to discover the cause of hysteria, the archetypal 
33 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York and London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 100. 
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female neurosis of the time. Again and again, Freud's early female patients described 
sexual encounters with men they had trusted. Freud initially believed his patients. In 
1896, in `The Aetiology of Hysteria and Studies on Hysteria', Freud announced that at 
the origin of hysteria was a childhood sexual trauma. 34 
The prevalence of these reports of incestuous sexual abuse must have been 
extremely disturbing to Freud. Perhaps recognizing the challenge not only to patriarchal 
authority but also to social stability within the patriarchal society that he was analyzing, 
Freud refused to identify fathers publicly as sexual aggressors. Though in private 
correspondence he cited `seduction by the father' as the `essential point' in hysteria, he 
did not make this statement in public. So Freud falsified his cases by identifying others 
as the offenders. In `Studies on Hysteria', Freud named the uncle as the seducer in two 
cases: `Many years later, Freud acknowledged that the "uncles" who had molested 
Rosalie and Katharina were in fact their fathers. Though he had shown little reluctance 
to shock prudish sensibilities in other matters, Freud claimed that "discretion" had led 
him to suppress this essential information. ' 35 
Within a year, Freud repudiated his theory of childhood seduction in favour of 
the Oedipus complex, which is now a central tenet of psychoanalytic thought. He 
concluded that his patients' numerous reports were untrue: 
In the period in which the main interest was directed to discovering 
infantile sexual traumas, almost all my women patients told me that 
they had been seduced by their father. I was driven to recognise in the 
end that these reports were untrue and so came to understand that the 
hysterical symptoms are derived from fantasies and not from real 
occurrences. It was only later that I was able to recognize in this 
phantasy of being seduced by6the father the expression of the typical 
Oedipus complex in women. 
Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory is certainly problematic, and 
perhaps motivated by anxieties about the nature of the patriarchal family that Freud and, 
as we have seen, many others, had already decided was representative of the most 
advanced stage of civilization. Perhaps Freud's later attempt in Totem and Taboo to 
34 See Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, Studies on Hysteria (1895), SE 2, for detailed case studies of 
hysteria and childhood sexual trauma. 
3 Ann Scott, Real Events Revisited: Fantasy, Memory and Psychoanalysis (London: Virago, 1996), p. 9. 
36 Freud, `Femininity', p. 154. 
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universalize the Oedipus complex and ground it in pre-history was a way of displacing 
the effects of a distinctly modern-familial- structure. The individual, in a segregated 
institution of reproduction under capitalism, is provided with only one of two subject 
positions with which to identify, and these positions are grounded not only in gender but 
also in a prohibitor/prohibited dichotomy. In this sense, Freud's abandonment of the 
Seduction Theory can be thought-of as a denial of the effects of capitalist modernity. 
There is, however, another way of thinking about this transition that founds 
psychoanalysis- Freud's investigations into childhood sexual trauma have produced 
some important insights, the most significant of which, in the context of my argument, 
is the concept of deferred action. (Nachträglichkeit)_ According to Freud, deferred action 
ensures that the experience of childhood sexual trauma overwhelms the individual in 
such away that the event-is no longer available- for- remembrance and integration into a 
sense of self, and that the cause of the trauma resides in the gap between the events and 
its deferred rememoration, which can only, because of its traumatic nature, be partial, 
uncertain and fragmented. This tension between the memory and the original experience 
is analogous to, or rather an extreme form of, the tension between the. mediatory and 
constitutive nature of language and the real to which it attempts to refer, a tension that is 
at work in both the writing and the readings ofMy Place. If nothing else, what 
psychoanalysis teaches us is that the relationship between memory and the events it 
refers to is extremely complex, and it is the disturbances, distortions, omissions and 
displacements that offer interpretive clues. 
Although the notion of deferred action is deeply troubling for a conception of 
historical truth, Cathy Caruth has argued that it is in the `widespread and bewildering 
encounter with trauma-both in its occurrence, and in the attempt to understand it-that 
we can begin to recognize the possibility of a history which is no longer 
straightforwardly referential'. 37 Caruth's re-reading of Moses and Monotheism, and 
Freud's discussion of trauma in it, suggests that trauma is experienced after an interval 
of time has elapsed, requiring `a rethinking of reference... not aimed at eliminating 
37 Cathy Caruth, 'Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History', Yale French Studies, 79 
(1991), p. 182. 
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history, but at resituating it in our understanding, that is, of precisely permitting history 
to emerge where immediate understanding may not'. 8 Historical and personal truth, in 
this conception of trauma, is bound up with a crisis of truth, and an inability to locate, 
because of the insight of deferred action, where and when such truth might be located. 
Trauma disrupts the possibility of articulating events in a narrative formulation. 
In the light of Freud's shift from the Seduction Theory to the Oedipus, which 
was also the shift towards the idea of deferred action, perhaps it is possible to resituate 
My Place in the gap between Freud's theory of childhood seduction and his later 
theorization of the Oedipus complex, bringing them together in a way that Freud's 
analysis split them apart. In one sense, My Place even replays the debates, surrounding 
the founding moments of psychoanalysis, between childhood seduction and the Oedipus 
complex. In My Place, however, both the reality of the violence of child sexual abuse, 
and the impossibility of ever giving testimony to that reality in anything but a 
fragmented and disjointed form, is made manifest. The narrative of My Place is also the 
narrative of that which overwhelms modes of narrativity. 
My Place as Detective Story. 
Although many critics have claimed that My Place is an expression of the 
historically recent genre of detective fiction, generally considered to have begun in 1841 
with Edgar Allen Poe's The Murders in the Rue Morgue, there is another even older 
literary analogue that resembles My Place, Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, one of the earliest 
known detective stories, where the enigma is the enigma of the self. 39 As Laura Mulvey 
has argued, the `unravelling of the enigma is essential to the Oedipus story in its own 
right' 40 Morgan, like Oedipus, takes on the role of both investigator and story-teller, 
promising to find the cause of her family's, and, by extension, her country's distress. 
Although women are extremely marginal to the Oedipus story, Morgan's own story is 
centred around the maternal line and seems to enact more closely, in spite of similarities 
38 Caruth, 'Unclaimed Experience', p. 182. 
39 See Ong, pp. 143-148. 
40 Laura Mulvey, The Oedipus Myth: Beyond the Riddles of the Sphinx', in Psychoanalysis and Cultural 
Theory: Thresholds, ed. James Donald (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 33. 
204 
to the Oedipus story, the theory of childhood seduction, even if it can be seen 
simultaneously as an instance of deferred action. In this way, Morgan's narrative can be 
thought of as challenging the movement in Freudian theory from childhood seduction to 
the Oedipus complex, and even the movement that accompanies it from a maternal to a 
paternal social order and identification. 41 The social and historical problem of 
inheritance that has pervaded the modern subject under a patriarchal order is subverted 
here. 
In this sense, in spite of the fact that My Place remains a self-reflexive 
autobiographical narrative, a narratorial and subjective position that, I have argued, is 
deeply implicated in the Oedipalizing of western culture, this intersection of the 
autobiographical subject with the colonized subject profoundly disrupts not only its own 
narrative structure, but also the universal and ahistorical narrative of the subject 
provided by psychoanalysis. 
It is with these thoughts in mind that we can perhaps think of My Place in terms 
of both the seduction theory and deferred action, where memory, in the form of either 
history or autobiography, is already troubled by the secret nature of trauma. The 
traumatic events of Nan's life are that which is not experienced or assimilated by the 
subject at the time or in the place of their occurrence. In this sense, the title My Place is 
a jolting reminder that trauma has no place, floating somewhere between the events and 
(in this case) their transgenerational, yet still repressed, interpretation. It is not so much, 
as Chris Prentice has argued, that Morgan `strategically re-identifies with her 
Aboriginal heritage to recuperate a sense of place', but that it is impossible to identify, 
strategically or otherwise, with that part of her heritage that is non-Aboriginal 42 In this 
way, My Place is less a cure for Australia's violent past, as psychoanalytic readings 
have tended to read it, and more a symptom of repression and denial. 
Certainly, the narrative is full of fragmented and unacknowledged disjunctive 
moments which challenge references to wholeness in the overarching narrative. At one 
stage, Morgan decides `to give it all up... I didn't think my family would care what I 
41 Mulvey, The Oedipus Myth', p. 27. 
42 Prentice, p. 79. 
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did... They could all go on being what they'd been for years, they wouldn't have to cope 
with a crazy member of the family who didn't know who she was... '(141). At another 
stage, during the trip to Corunna when they meet some of their relatives, Morgan states: 
Gladys [a relative] and I had tears in our eyes, but we managed not to 
break down... we were all just managing to hold ourselves together. I 
tried not to look at Gladys as she explained things, because I was 
trying to keep a tight lid on my emotions. It wasn't that I would have 
minded crying, it was just that I knew if I began, I wouldn't be able to 
stop. It was the only way to cope. (228) 
Such emotional scenes, where the fear of fragmentation is always close at hand, one 
minute laughing and one minute crying, permeate the text. 
Responses to Incest 
Most commentators on My Place have noted this incestuous relationship, and it 
is one of the most significant aspects of responses to My Place that the symptomatic 
repression of incestuous sexual abuse is reproduced meta-textually, where readings rely 
on a straight-forward relationship between events, the memory of these events, and their 
interpretation and narration, which ignore the place of dislocation and distortion that is 
characteristic of traumatic histories. The result of this reduction involves a relation to 
the text which is either one of believing or disbelieving. Just as My Place glides over the 
shadow of incest in the text, only alluding to it obliquely, so too have critical responses 
to the text. Both Robyn Dizard and Kathryn Trees admit that the narrative indicates the 
family secret is incest, but do not elaborate on what that might mean or even who it is 
between. Jodi Broun writes that My Place alludes to the issue of incest by the 
`implication of Drake-Brockman as Nan's father, and perhaps Glad's father as 
well! '(27-28). Apart from this exclamatory statement, no more about this is mentioned. 
Jan Larbalestier merely states that there `are hints in the narrative that Howden himself 
may have fathered his own daughter's child'. 43 Tamsin Donaldson, in an otherwise 
fascinating reading, reproduces the denial within the text which she masks with the 
claim of irrelevance when she argues that the `hardest of the revelations to make, and by 
43 Jan Larbalestier, `Through their own Eyes: An Interpretation of Aboriginal Women's Writing', in 
Intersexions: Gender/Class/Culture/Ethnicity, ed. Gill Bottomley, Marie de Lepervanche and Jeannie 
Martin (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991), p. 89. 
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the same token the one ultimately judged least relevant to the reworking of identities is 
that Howden Drake-Brockman may be the father of both Nan and Mum... '44 
I only quote from these responses to illustrate the extent to which the incestuous 
relationship that is repressed within the narrative, an index, I would have thought, of its 
significance, is then so casually dismissed in responses to the text. Sometimes the terms 
within which this dismissal is articulated are particularly revealing of the kinds of 
anxieties that lie behind this lack of recognition. In a curiously unguarded metaphor of 
seduction, Hodge and Mishra, in discussing the secret of Gladys' father, claim that 
although Nan dies without giving his name, `the clues mount and the book leads us 
tantalisingly close to an unspoken and unspeakable final secret. Aboriginal rules of 
secrecy coincide with White laws of libel to ensure that this meaning (if it exists) does 
not enter into text'(100). 
Like Hodge and Mishra, Kateryna Longley refers to the unspeakable within the 
text, and states: 
Much of the unspeakable is related to landowners' violation of white 
and Aboriginal laws, including those relating to incest, in their sexual 
abuse of Aboriginal women. These blank moments remind both the 
reader and the writer of the crudeness and invasiveness of the genre of 
transcribed autobiography when compared with the oral tradition of 
shared stories told on tribal lands a central communal activity that 
these people can still remember. 43 
Longley's reading seems to me to be a complete displacement of the issues raised by the 
incestuous abuse that she refers to. For Longley, the `blank moments' do not remind the 
reader of the sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women as part of the colonial project, 
but rather `of the crudeness and invasiveness of the genre of transcribed autobiography'. 
Incredibly, in Longley's reading, it is Morgan herself, and the genre she uses in My 
Place, that Arthur finds `crude and invasive', not the sexual abuse, incestuous or 
otherwise, of Aboriginal women. 
44 Tamsin Donaldson, 'Australian Tales of Mystery and Miscegenation' Meanjin, 50, (1991), p. 38. 45 Kateryna Olijnyk Longley, `Story-Telling by Australian Aboriginal Women', in DelColonizing the 
Subject: The Politics of Gender in Women's Autobiography, ed. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota press, 1992), p. 378. 
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Given the dislocated place of incestuous sexual abuse within the narrative, it is 
difficult to understand how Bain Attwood could claim that My Place has `an ending in 
which all the loose ends are tied up and all the disturbing questions answered'(305). 
This is especially surprising given that Attwood begins his own reading, in 
psychoanalytic terms, by asking: `What is the unconscious (or conscious) problem that 
belief in her Aboriginality solves for Morgan, or what wishes or desires does this belief 
satisfy? '(303). One might well turn just such a question on to Attwood himself and ask 
what unconscious (or conscious) problem is solved for Attwood by reading My Place in 
such a way that all the `disturbing questions' are considered answered, by not 
addressing the question of incestuous sexual abuse that pervades the text, and by 
claiming dismissively that Morgan's `forbears have not been oppressed as much as most 
Aborigines were'(313)! How much worse, one might ask, does it need to have been. 46 
Attwood's blindness around the issue of sexual abuse, which he does not mention, is 
revealed most tellingly in his observations of Daisy's relationship with the Drake- 
Brockman family: 
[Daisy] returned to the Drake-Brockmans' employment more than 
once, and this - along with other evidence - [which is uncited] 
suggests that she was both proud to be a loyal servant to an upper- 
class family, and that she saw herself as one of the family - and, 
indeed, that she was comparatively well treated by them... In the 
present, Daisy apparently resents the Drake-Brockmans' failure to 
honour the obligations she believes they had incurred, and this leads 
her necessarily to deny her earlier feelings of warmth and affection for 
them as well as to vent some of the hostility she might also have felt at 
the time, but had to suppress. (312) 
It is strange, given Attwood's awareness of the constraints on Aboriginal 
movement earlier this century (he is, after all, a historian), and his occasional gestures 
towards Foucault, that Daisy's choices are read so unproblematically. Even stranger that 
he would criticize Morgan for `her inability to historicise her past more 
thoroughly'(318). He may well castigate her, in a profoundly ahistorical gesture, for 
06 I can't help feeling that Attwood's reading of Morgan is wilfully ungenerous. For example, he writes 
that Morgan `states her belief in the "complete truth" of [Arthur's] and other family members' oral 
testimony (pp. 154,158)'. I could not find any reference to the "complete truth" on page 154, and the 
reference on page 158 reads as follows: `We were very confused, we knew that the small pieces of 
information we now possessed weren't the complete truth. ' 
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reproducing a Western subjectivity, that is, the autobiographical subject (as if she could 
have produced any other subjectivity) yet he locates himself within an historical 
tradition that, as I have tried to suggest, produces the very same subject. Attwood is 
right that Morgan's conception of Aboriginality is a discursive construct (which means, 
although he is not explicit about it, that it is thoroughly enmeshed in power-knowledge 
regimes), yet so too is his own conception of Aboriginality and historical praxis. As 
Annabel Cooper argues of his critique, Attwood `assumes the post-structural suspicion 
of the autobiographer as knowing subject and replaces it with the critic as knowing 
subject, the one who knows the other'. 7 
The hostility of Attwood's review can perhaps be explained in a number of 
ways. I can only wonder if it is fortuitous that the three white, male critics most hostile 
to the text, and most desiring of a more frank portrayal of her `white side', should, none 
of them, mention the question of the sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women by settler 
men. Could there be a displacement at work here on the part of settler men? 
Attwood's biggest problem with the text, however, surrounds the issue of 
passing. Attwood claims that this was a pragmatic decision, but then adds `although this 
should not lead us to overlook that they had already chosen to pass (and that other 
Aborigines in the same circumstances did not choose to do so)'(313). He then goes on 
to state that Morgan too `has been an accomplice in "the crime", although, unlike her 
mother and grandmother, Morgan seems unable to accept her own responsibility for this 
denial and so displaces it. This results in her hounding her family to confess their 
Aboriginality'(314). This leaves Morgan in the impossible position that, whether she 
chooses to pass or not, either way she is committing a `crime'. So, although in his 
lengthy article, Attwood nowhere refers to the crime of sexual exploitation, the only 
crime, it seems, is Morgan's and her family's. It is hard to know exactly what 
Attwood's scare quotes around the word crime intend to signify, but to me they signify 
Attwood's own denial of the sexual crimes that instituted the traumatic story of My 
Place. 
47 Annabel Cooper, `Talking about My Place /My Place: Feminism, Criticism and Other's 
Autobiography, Southern Review, 28, (1995), p. 143. 
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Incest and the Repression of Aboriginality 
Given Attwood's condemnation of the act of passing as it takes place in the text, 
it is interesting to look at the event that instigated Gladys' decision not to tell her 
children about their Aboriginal ancestry: 
Bill had only been dead a short time when a Welfare lady came out to 
visit us. I was really frightened because I thought, if she realised we 
were Aboriginal, she might have the children taken away. We only 
had two bedrooms and there were five children, as well as Mum and 
me. 
This woman turned out to be a real bitch... She asked where we all 
slept, and when I told her Helen slept with me, she was absolutely 
furious. She said, `You are to get that child out of your bed, we will 
not stand for that. ' (304) 
What is it, one might ask, that the Welfare lady would not stand for? What is it 
that made her `absolutely furious'? That is a question the text does not address, but we 
are told that it was `after the visit from the welfare lady that Mum and I decided we 
would definitely never tell the children they were Aboriginal'(305). Gladys and Daisy 
decide to repress their own Aboriginality in response to paternalistic (I am referring to 
the Welfare lady's institutional affiliation rather than her gender) anxieties about 
incestuous desire, that culminated in the threat of their children being taken away from 
them. In this way, the Welfare lady effects an anxious displacement of the incestuous 
sexual desire of settler men in the text on to Aboriginal women. This is most striking 
because it was the anxious Oedipal repression of such desires that instituted, both in the 
text and in the history of Australia that it refers to, the repression of Aboriginality. So, 
My Place can be read as a place that repeats and yet simultaneously reveals the 
displacement of the secret of the terrifying spectre of patriarchal and colonial desire on 
to the supposed secret of Aboriginality. 
This projection of anxieties about incest, which are so characteristic of the 
Oedipalized family, has a long history in psychoanalytic and anthropological thought, 
with the two disciplines coming together, as we saw in Chapter One, around the 
question of the prohibition of incest. Charles Darwin, whom Freud saw as his 
predecessor, and who was the major influence on early evolutionary anthropology, 
addressed the question of the `curious problem' of how the prohibition of incest `arose 
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during early and barbarous times. '48 According to Freud, man's earliest desires were 
incestuous and have to be repressed to enable the growth of civilization and the species, 
which reaches its zenith in the patriarchal family. In Totem and Taboo, Freud uses the 
anthropological evidence of Spencer and Gillen to support his argument: 
For our purpose it is enough to draw attention to the great care which 
is devoted by the Australians, as well as by other savage peoples, to 
the prevention of incest. It must be admitted that these savages are 
even more sensitive on the subject of incest than we are. They are 
probably liable to a greater temptation to it and for that reason stand in 
need of fuller protection. (9) 
Here Freud seems to be arguing that it is Aborigines who are in `immediate 
peril' of committing incest, against which `the most severe measures of defence must be 
enforced'(17). This is odd, given that consanguineous marriages were an issue for both 
Darwin and Freud. Darwin, like his older sister, had entered into a consanguineous 
marriage with a Wedgwood first cousin, and although Freud did not enter such a 
marriage, the Freud family had proposed one for him with his niece Pauline Freud, 
daughter of his older half-brother Emmanuel: `It was to encourage such a marriage and 
a possible business career with Pauline's father that Freud visited with his half-brothers 
in Manchester upon finishing Gymnasium. '49 
What My Place reveals, however, through the anxiety about incest that surrounds 
it, and is repressed by it, is that, in the context of Australian colonialism, it was settler 
men who committed incest. In Freud's text, as in Morgan's own and responses to it, 
anxieties about the modern patriarchal nuclear family, and their repres^ive and limited 
Oedipalized identifications, are projected on to Aboriginal Australians. 
To read My Place as redemptive or comforting is not only to devalue the 
traumatic and unspeakable status of historical experience; it is to displace on to a 
redemptive Aboriginal self-knowledge the terrifying spectre of colonial oppression 
within the text which manifests itself as a haunting presence through which, I would 
like to suggest, patriarchal and colonial authority are undermined. 
48 Darwin, The Variation ofAnimals and Plants under Domestication 2 Vols. (London: John Murray, 
1905) Vol. 2, p. 127. 
49 Ritvo, pp. 105-06. 
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Gods and Hauntings 
In the light of this, however, perhaps the most unsettling aspect of My Place 
involves the ambiguity that emerges in the tension between the authority of a patriarchal 
Christian God and a destabilizing dispersive spirituality that the narrative is permeated 
by, which can be thought of as undermining the Christian onto-theology of the text. 
The chapter called `What People are We? ', the same chapter in which Nan 
analogizes her experience as an Aborigine in Australia with that of Jews, and the 
chapter in which, you will recall, Morgan's father was reintroduced, begins with a 
revelation. The young Morgan is at a Youth meeting in a church hall: 
Suddenly, there was someone talking to me... I looked around in a 
furtive kind of way, trying to see who it was. All eyes were fixed on 
the speaker, there was no one new in the room. 
`Who are you? ' I asked mentally. 
With a sudden dreadful insight I knew it was God. 
`What are you doing here? ' I asked... 
It had to be Him because the voice seemed to come from without not 
within, it transcended the reality of the room... I was having an 
audience with Him whom I dreaded. The mental images that I had 
built up of Him so far in my life began to dissolve, and in their place 
came a new image. A person, overwhelming love, acceptance and 
humour... In an instant I became what others refer to as a believer. 
(102; Emphasis added) 
This is clearly an extraordinary experience that Sally is describing and it has peculiar 
resonances to other parts of the narrative. Like the vision of her grandmother tracing 
lines in the sand, it involves the emergence and dissolution of mental images. Yet, this 
experience of God, with its dissolution of mental images, can also be thought of as 
providing the narrative with a site of stability that restores wholeness and authority to a 
fragmented patriarchy, but also establishes an ultimate and stable meaning that the text 
and characters, otherwise in danger of falling apart altogether, might adhere to. In other 
words, this vision of God which transcends reality can perhaps be read as the relocation 
of the anxiety that Sally's reality is characterized by. God, here, is not only the ultimate 
patriarch but also the transcendental signified. 
The later image of her grandmother, however, and its multilayered and 
disseminatory recursive textuality will radically call this stability into question. In some 
ways this tension can be thought of as re-enacting, on an onto-theological level, the 
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unstable authority of patriarchy in the story. The fragmentation and ghostly presence of 
the father at the beginning of the story are quickly compensated for by the return of the 
authority of the father as God, where God might be, as Freud has suggested, `a father- 
substitute; or, more correctly... an exalted father'. 50 It is also worth noting that in the 
autobiographical tradition as instigated by Saint Augustine (as opposed to the more 
secular autobiography of Abelard), the point was not only to search for the truth of the 
self, but to search for God as well. This return of patriarchal authority, however, is 
already undermined on the very same page as Morgan's epiphany, when the deacon at 
the church, the deacon whose voice was drowned out by the voice of God, asks Sally, 
after the service, to stop mixing with his daughter. Although the deacon claims that this 
is because Sally is a `bad influence', there are clear racist overtones to the request, 
undermining the image of love and acceptance that Morgan has just experienced. 
Arthur's story also reveals the ambiguous place occupied in the narrative by the 
Christian god. He finishes his story on a religiously Trinitarian note: `God is the only 
friend we got. God the father, God the son and God the Holy Spirit. You stick to Him, 
He's the only one'(213). Yet, his invocation of God the father has unsettling substitutive 
resonances if we recall his opening refusal to have his own story mixed up with that of 
his biological father, Howden Drake-Brockman. 
Daisy's narrative is decidedly less Christian than those of the other narrators, 
and an event early in the text reveals the equation of settler patriarchal authority with 
God. In this event, Sally overhears a conversation between Nan and the rentman, in 
which Nan eulogizes over the power of God to create nature. Sally is disturbed and 
bewildered when she hears Nan say, `here are you and I, both white, and we couldn't do 
that! '(107). Sally asks herself: 'Why did she want to be white? Did she really equate 
being white with the power of God, or was it just a slip of the tongue? '(107). 
Gladys' narrative also reproduces this same unsettling ambiguity. On the one 
hand, she is avowedly Christian and claims that her healing power `comes from 
God'(301). On the other hand, her own practice of Christianity, what she calls her 
so Freud, 'A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis', PFL, 14, p. 399. 
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`secret weapon' (against what? one might ask) is deeply unstable, crossing 
denominational boundaries: 
[Gladys] supplemented her prayers by taking us to every religious 
meeting imaginable. That was one thing you could say about Mum, 
she wasn't biased when it came to religion. We attended the Roman 
Catholic, Baptist, Anglican, Church of Christ and Seventh Day 
Adventist churches. (62) 
Nan's description of Gladys' interest in religion, moreover, would be anathema to 
orthodox Christian onto-theology: 
Gladdie was silly in those days, always wantin' to know the future. 
She didn't know what she was meddlin' with. You leave the spirits 
alone, you mess with them, you get burnt. She had her palm read, her 
tea leaves read, I don't know what she didn't read. I never went with 
her to any of these fortune tellers. They give you a funny feeling 
inside. Blackfellas know all `bout spirits. We brought up with them. 
That's where the white man's stupid. He only believes what he can 
see. He needs to get educated. He's only livin' half a life. (344) 
This description points to the spectral as it comes increasingly to inhabit the text 
where the notion of a Christian god is itself haunted by ghosts, phantoms and visions. 
These spectres, it could be argued, represent those aspects of the text, and the surface 
stability of its meanings, which exceed the self-identicality of language, memory and 
the subject of autobiography, and can be thought of as occupying a realm of other 
modes of knowing. 
One possible way of looking at the phantoms that inhabit the text is through 
Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok's discussion of transgenerational haunting and 
phantom effects. Abraham and Torok postulate that some people inherit the secret 
psychic substance of their ancestors' lives. Abraham's theory of the phantom enlarges 
upon Freud's metapsychology by suggesting that the unsettling disruptions in the 
psychic life of one person can adversely and unconsciously affect someone else. 
Abraham likens the foreign presence to ventriloquism and calls it a `phantom', a 
`haunting' or a `phantomatic haunting'. 51 
51 Nicholas Abraham, `Notes on the Phantom: A Complement to Freud's Metapsychology' in The Shell 
and the Kernel, ed. and trans. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), p. 166. Future references are to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
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Abraham in `Notes on the Phantom: A Complement to Freud's 
Metapsychology' begins with the idea that `the theme of the dead-who, having 
suffered repression by their family or society, cannot enjoy, even in death, a state of 
authenticity-appears to be omnipresent (whether overtly expressed or disguised) on 
the fringes of religions and, failing that, in rational systems'(171). Abraham suggests: 
That the spirits of the dead can return to haunt the living exists either 
as an accepted tenet or as a marginal conviction in all civilizations, 
ancient and modern... To be sure, all the departed may return, but 
some are destined to haunt: the dead who were shamed during their 
lifetime or those who took unspeakable secrets to the grave. (171) 
For Abraham and Torok, the dead do not return, but their lives' unfinished business is 
unconsciously handed down to their descendants. So, phantom effects, like those in My 
Place, for instance, arise if `the dead were shamed during their lifetime or... took 
unspeakable secrets to the grave'. The phantom is an invention of the living in so far as 
it embodies the consequences of silence where `what haunts are not the dead, but the 
gaps left within us by the secrets of others'(171). 
Just as in that other literary instance of transgenerational haunting that Abraham 
and Torok use to illustrate their theory, Hamlet, the prince of a rotten state, My Place 
opens with the ghost of patriarchy, to remind us that, like Hamlet's state of Denmark, 
Australia is inhabited by a foreign and devious occupier. 
Once again, Bill Milroy, Morgan's father, is the site from which all of these 
tensions are prefigured. Gladys' narrative includes the story of a visitation: 
New year's eve, 1960, was one I've never forgotten. I awoke 
suddenly, feeling frightened. There was a light in the corner of the 
bedroom, it was the spirit of Christ. I'd never seen Him in the spirit 
form before, His arms were outstretched as though He'd come for 
someone. I screamed and told him to go away, I knew I was looking at 
death. I knew I wouldn't have Bill much longer. (301) 
It was ten months after this that Bill died, from what, it is suggested, might be an 
intentional overdose. Haunted by her own religious education, Gladys fears that he may 
have gone to hell as a result: `I didn't want him to go to hell, I started to cry, I felt so 
depressed'(302). It is at this moment that Gladys sees a vision of Bill: 
standing in a garden near a tree, he looked confused. Then, I saw 
Jesus, in a long, white robe, beckon to him... He spoke to Bill and 
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suddenly Bill wasn't lost anymore, he was happy... When the vision 
finished, I was surrounded by a glow of pure love, I was so happy. I 
knew Bill was all right. (302) 
Yet even though this vision relies, for its effectivity, upon Christian theology, earlier in 
this same section of the narrative we are told that that the swamp near the Milroy family 
home had been haunted, up until the death of Bill, by the ghosts of Aborigines 
performing corroborees (292). Gladys recalls how she often sat with her mother and 
listened to the music: 
I've never been to a corroboree, but that music had always been inside 
of me. When I was little I was told Aboriginal music was heathen 
music. I thought it was beautiful music; whenever I heard it, it was 
like a message, like I was being supported, protected. (292) 
As Daisy later asserts, about the sound of Aboriginal music, in her narrative: 
See, we was hearin' the people from long ago. Our people who used to 
live here before the white man came. Funny, they stopped playin' after 
your father died. I think now they was protectin' us. Fancy, eh? Those 
dear old people. You see, the blackfella knows all `bout spirits. (347) 
Although Nan possesses a secret that she was too ashamed to reveal while she 
was alive, the extended focus on the ghost of Bill after he died, and the description of 
Aboriginal ghosts who protected his family from his violence while he was alive, are 
ways of both addressing the shameful secret of an abusive patriarchy in Australian 
history and culture, and at the same time, not addressing the issues of incest and sexual 
abuse, that Daisy had not been protected from, that the narrative tries so hard to repress. 
According to Abraham and Torok, this is how the transgenerational phantom manifests 
itself in its descendants, through the simultaneous unveiling and obscuring of the 
phantom's secret: 
Produced by the secret, the gaps and the impediments in our 
communication with the love object create a two-fold and contrary 
effect: the prohibition of knowledge coupled with an unconscious 
investigation. As a result, `haunted' individuals are caught between 
two inclinations. They must at all costs maintain their ignorance of a 
loved one's secret; hence the semblance of unawareness (nescience) 
concerning it. At the same time they must eliminate the state of 
secrecy; hence the reconstruction of the secret in the form of 
unconscious knowledge. (188) 
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This formulation of a `prohibition of knowledge coupled with an unconscious 
investigation' accurately describes the ambivalence that My Place is constituted by. 
This ambivalence and two-fold effect does not focus around the question of 
Aboriginality but around the question of Drake-Brockman's incestuous relationship 
with his daughter. This two-fold effect, moreover, is articulated most memorably in the 
scene I quoted at length where Sally `suddenly' holds up the ghostly photograph of 
Drake-Brockman to the mirror image of her mother, and they are both silenced by the 
uncanny resemblance. The words between Sally and Gladys that follow, like the words 
used by the phantom, `point to a gap, they refer to the unspeakable'. 52 In this sense, it is 
the tensions surrounding colonial desire that are inscribed and enacted, phantom-like, 
within the text. Although Nan might be too ashamed to tell Gladys who her father is, the 
shameful secret that Gladys and Sally inherit is just as surely Howden Drake- 
Brockman's. 
According to Abraham and Torok, analyses involving phantom effects are 
particularly difficult: 
The special difficulty of these analyses lies in the patient's horror at 
violating a parent's or a family's guarded secret, even though the 
secret text and context are inscribed within the patient's own 
unconscious. The horror of transgression, in the strict sense of the 
term, is compounded by the risk of undermining the fictitious yet 
necessary integrity of the parental figure in question. (174) 
This horror of transgression is exemplified in the occasional references in critical 
responses to the text of the fear of saying anything libellous about the Drake-Brockman 
family. You will recall Hodge and Mishra's claim that `Aboriginal rules of secrecy 
coincide with White laws of libel to ensure that this meaning (if it exists) does not enter 
into text'(100). It seems that the refusal to speak about the incestuous relationship 
within the text does not only avoid facing Daisy's shame, but also avoids confronting 
the transgression of the settler patriarch, Howden Drake-Brockman. 
Abraham and Torok argue that transgenerational haunting is inscribed by `the 
fact that parents are not at all the gods of coherence and consistency, courage and power 
52 Abraham, p. 174 
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that their young offspring would wish'(180). It is perhaps the disavowal of paternity on 
the part of Drake-Brockman that leads to the somewhat ambivalent reliance on the 
Christian god of coherence and consistency. 
Perhaps what is most unsatisfying in Abraham and Torok's formulation is, as 
Jacques Derrida alludes to in Spectres of Marx, the role of exorcism within their theory: 
`Yes, the shameful and therefore concealed secret always does return to haunt. To 
exorcise it one must express it in words. t53 This, it would seem, is in keeping with 
Abraham and Torok's psychoanalytic framework. Yet, as Derrida asserts, the question 
of spectres and their exorcism is necessarily the question of justice and responsibility. 
Derrida's reformulation of the spectre as an imperative of justice, is particularly 
resonant in the context of contemporary Australian politics where the ghost of the past 
has continued to haunt, a ghost which the present Howard Government seems intent on 
trying to conjure away by its refusal to acknowledge or apologize for the effects of the 
past the scattered and fragmented individuals who were taken from their mothers at 
birth and thrust into an alien community. As Amnesty International has stated in their 
recent report on the horrific treatment of Aboriginal children, this legacy will continue 
to haunt Australia `until the government stops evading its responsibility to adequately 
respond to the "Stolen Children" inquiry'. 54 It is equally important then, for the sake of 
justice, that, in reading My Place, we do not exorcise the ghosts that haunt it and turn it 
into a narrative of Australia's redemption. 
In this light, it is interesting to re-read the first spectral vision in the narrative of 
My Place. It occurs soon after Sally has begun, tentatively, to identify with 
Aboriginality. In order to do this, Sally applies for an Aboriginal scholarship: `It wasn't 
the money I was after ... I desperately wanted to 
do something to identify with my new- 
found heritage and that was the only thing I could think of (137). It is soon after that the 
University challenges her Aboriginal status, and therefore her eligibility to retain an 
53 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: the State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, 
trans. Peggy Kauruf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 188. . Future references are to this 
edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
54 testy International, `Australia: Government Silence on Stolen Children', News Release Issued by 
the International Secretariat of Amnesty International, AIINDEX. " ASA 12 May 1998. 
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Aboriginal scholarship. It is at the early stages of this process of identification that she 
discovers that `Aborigine' is like `a forbidden word'(139): 
It hadn't been so easy trying to identify with being Aboriginal. No one 
was sympathetic... no one understood why it was so important.... 
I wanted to cry. I hated myself when I got like that. I never cried, and 
yet, since all this has been going on, I'd wanted to cry often. It wasn't 
something I could control. Sometimes when I looked at Nan, I just 
wanted to cry. It was absurd. There was so much about myself that I 
didn't understand... 
Had I been dishonest with myself? What did it really mean to be 
Aboriginal? I'd never lived off the land and been a hunter and 
gatherer. I'd never participated in corroborees or heard stories of the 
Dreamtime. I'd lived all my life in suburbia and told everyone I was 
Indian. I hardly knew any Aboriginal people. What did it mean for 
someone like me?... 
I decided to give it all up... I didn't think my family would care what I 
did, they'd probably be relieved that I wasn't going to rock the boat 
any more. They could all go on being what they'd been for years, they 
wouldn't have to cope with a crazy member of the family who didn't 
know who she was.... 
Just then, for some reason, I could see Nan. She was standing in front 
of me, looking at me. Her eyes were sad, `Oh Nan', I sighed, `why did 
you have to turn up now, of all times'. She vanished as quickly as 
she'd come. I knew then, that for some reason, it was very important I 
stay on the scholarship. If I denied my tentative identification with the 
past now, I'd be denying her as well. (141) 
In this spectral vision, Sally is confronted by the responsibility she has towards 
her grandmother, even as her grandmother refuses to tell her the secret that she insists 
on taking to her grave. This vision of Nan reminds us of the necessity of remembering 
Nan's life and death, of the necessity of learning to live with spectres, and, as Derrida 
has phrased it, `this being-with spectres would also be, not only but also, a politics of 
memory, of inheritance, and of generations': 
It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed, to the ghost and with it, 
from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or 
not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognise in 
its principle the respect for others who are no longer or for those 
others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already 
dead or not yet born. No justice-let us not say no law and once again 
we are not speaking of laws-seems possible or thinkable without the 
principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that 
which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are 
not yet born or who are already dead... (xix) 
The novel ends at the secret moment par excellence. The death of Nan is 
prefigured by the bird-call, the call that, you will remember, was introduced at the very 
beginning of the narrative in a daydream that Sally had while visiting her sick father. 
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`I heard the bird call. ' It was Jill's voice. 
`What bird call? ' 
"This morning, about five o'clock. I heard it, Sally. It was a weird 
sound like a bird call, only it wasn't. It was something spiritual, 
something out of this world. I think she'll be going soon. ' 
After breakfast, I hurried over... 
`Nan ... about that call, you weren't frightened when you heard it, were 
you? T 
'Ooh, no', she scoffed, `it was the Aboriginal bird, Sally. God sent 
him to tell me I'm going home soon. Home to my own land and my 
own people. ' (356-7) 
What remains of Nan at the end of the narrative is the promise of this bird-call, 
what Derrida might call `a certain experience of the emancipatory promise'(59). In the 
opening chapter of the narrative, you will recall, the young Sally recalled the memory of 
hearing the bird-call with her grandmother which drew her away, dream-like, from the 
fragmented and haunted world of patriarchy that she was forced to inhabit. The bird-call 
as emancipatory promise also recalls the promise that Sally had made to herself that she 
would find out who her mother's father was. 
The following morning, Nan dies, and it is with the sound of the bird-call that 
the narrative closes: 
For some reason, Jill's words from the previous day began echoing 
inside of me. I heard the bird call, I heard the bird call. Around and 
around. 
`Oh, Nan', I cried with sudden certainty, `I heard it, too. In my heart I 
heard it. ' (358) 
The bird call, the echo which Sally hears belatedly, [nachträglich] at the close of 
the narrative: 
carries life beyond present life or its actual being-there, its empirical 
and ontological actuality: not toward death but toward a living-on 
[sur-vie], namely a trace of which life and death would themselves be 
but traces and traces of traces, a survival whose possibility in advance 
comes to disjoin or dis-adjust the identity to itself of the living present 
as well as of any effectivity. There is then some spirit. Spirits. And 
one must reckon with them. " 
So Morgan's narrative ends in the shadow of death, with the reminder of the necessity 
of remembering the life. For if Nan and her story are forgotten, and if Morgan is, 
through a variety of critical tools, denied her Aboriginality, then the policies of A. O. 
55 Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p. xx. 
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Neville have been successful, and the stories retold in that act of just remembering that 
is the report into the Stolen Generation, will be forgotten. The uncanny bird call that 
haunts the final lines of My Place are a reminder that, in the words of Derrida: 
`Inheritance is never given, it is always a task'(54). This is the task presently 
confronting Australia. 
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Chapter 4: Re-reading Mudrooroo 
Identity Crisis 
One of the most vociferous of Morgan's critics has been Mudrooroo, perhaps 
Australia's most well-known and prolific Aboriginal writer. His position on My Place 
has long been that it is `not really an Aboriginal book-it's coming from outside and 
exploring our Aboriginality, and that's where the problems lie'. ' In July 1996, many 
believed he had received his just deserts when the Australian Magazine published an 
article by Victoria Laurie, titled `Identity Crisis', which called into question 
Mudrooroo's status as an Aboriginal Australian, and claimed that he was, in fact, the 
descendent of an African American. The opening sentence reveals the oppositions 
between appearance and reality around which Laurie's narrative is structured: `The 
author of Wild Cat Falling, Australia's first published Aboriginal novel, would seem to 
have little left to prove to anyone these days'(28). It is the implications of this seems 
that the article proceeds to elaborate on. 
Laurie asks rhetorically: `What more could he want? ' before replying: `Probably 
that the past would stop trying to reclaim him. Specifically that his older sister [Betty 
Polglaze], whom he hardly knows, would abandon her obsessive search for identity that, 
with every birth certificate, every faded photograph she accumulates, threatens to 
damage the fabric of his public identity'(28). There is a curious contradiction within this 
statement: while Laurie clearly privileges Polglaze's speech as that of the truth-seeker 
who is present to herself, her `obsessive search for identity' is both facilitated and 
haunted by a series of substitutions-faded photographs, birth certificates-texts within 
which the impossibility of the self-presence they desire is inscribed. Polglaze's self- 
knowledge, then, that which allows her to know who she is, springs out of the very 
structure of di, fferance where the desire to uncover an origin is inevitably tangled up in 
textual complications. 
1 Cited in Laurie, `Identity Crisis', Australian Magazine, July 20-21,1996: 32. 
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The publication of this article, and the ambiguous logic within which it is 
inserted, have generated much debate and disturbing silences in Australia. As Graeme 
Dixon has asserted in one of the few public responses to the situation: `The authenticity 
of the Aboriginality of contemporary Australian writer Mudrooroo is causing quite a 
dilemma in the Aboriginal community, academic and literary circles. '2 Mudrooroo's 
response to this dilemma, so far, has been to ask other questions: 
When, in 1996, it was declared that Mudrooroo was of negro ancestry, 
thus negating thirty years of being an Aborigine, it necessitated some 
identity searching: what did this mean to me? I had discovered that 
identity is a fragile thing and can be taken away, just as it can be 
given. As I had not confronted such a crisis before, did it mean that 
through a genetic oversight I had lost my culture and become 
inauthentic? 3 
These questions, in turn, invite a response which would not function as a narrative of 
origin; Mudrooroo's alienating reference to himself in the third person already signals 
the impossibility of sich a return. 
Identity and Identification 
Perhaps one response is to think through the relation between identity and 
identification. This term, identification, although often unspoken, has been crucial to the 
discussion generated by the debate. Graeme Dixon, for example, states: `It may be true 
that Mudrooroo's institutionalized childhood caused him to relate to [identify with] 
Aboriginal people, but if so for the good of all he should come clean and tell the true 
story of Colin Johnson'(6). Tom and Lorna Little make the further claim that an 
argument for Mudrooroo's Aboriginality: 
could be made if, by virtue of the fact that his experience of 
institutionalisation is so similar to that of so many members of the 
`Lost Generation', he has come to identify strongly with the Nyoongar 
community and has no concept of his true identity, although the 
question of Nyoongar blood still remains. 
2 Graeme Dixon, `The Mudrooroo Dilemma', Westerly, 3, (1996), p. 5.. Future references are to this 
edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
3 Mudrooroo, `Afterword: "Tell them You're Indian"', in Race Matters, ed. G. Cowlishaw and B. Morris 
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1997), p. 263. 
4 Tom Little and Loma Little, `The Mudrooroo Dilemma', Westerly, 3, Spring, (1996), p. 7. 
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Laurie's article, while on the one hand pursuing the question of Mudrooroo's `true 
identity', also reiterates this distinction by attempting to map Mudrooroo's 
identification with Aboriginality: 
If it is possible to pinpoint Johnson's transformation into Mudrooroo, 
it may have happened within the cramped confines of Fremantle 
prison, a 19th-century building of grim inhumanity. The `coloured 
boy' of indeterminate origins had become an angry young black man, 
hardened by poverty, family separation and jail, an experience shared 
by so many of his Aboriginal inmates [sic]. (31) 
These arguments point to, and simultaneously elide, the complexity of processes 
of identification; they imply that identification is of a different order, in that it is 
historically determined, to the ontological `truth' of identity, a truth that is associated 
with blood. Yet, by rethinking identity in the way that Diana Fuss does in Identification 
Papers, it is possible to think of our identities as never `true' as such; rather, it is 
identifications which make identity possible. These identifications, moreover, while not 
predetermined, do not operate outside history and culture. According to Fuss, 
identification `names the entry of history and culture into the subject, a subject that must 
bear the traces of each and every encounter with the external world'. 5 Mudrooroo's 
response to the issues raised by Laurie seems to pre-empt this position: `Identity, for 
me, [was] like a shroud and part of the weave of that shroud was an early history similar 
to those Aborigines I knew. '6 
Even as identifications make identity possible, they also unsettle the `I' of 
identity because our sense of who we are is constituted by identifying with others, that 
is, by identifying with what we are not; this is the complexity of identity. So, although 
identification is the psychical mechanism that produces self-recognition, it also 
`operates as a mark of self-difference, opening up a space for the self to relate to itself 
as a self, a self that is perpetually other'. 7 Identification, then, although making possible 
the illusion of identity as secure and immediate simultaneously prevents our identities 
from ever being identical with what we can only problematically call, ourselves. 
s Diana Fuss, Identification Papers (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 3. Future references are 
to this edition, and are included in parentheses in the text. 
6 Mudrooroo, "'Tell them You're Indian"', p. 264. 
7 Fuss, p. 2. 
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Identification, as it is understood psychoanalytically, is structured around a 
conception of substitution and loss .8 Freud's theorization of identification, moreover, as 
you will recall, emerges out of a colonialist epistemology, that is Totem and Taboo, and 
Freud's hypothesis of the primal parricide. After the murder, the sons cannibalized the 
powerful father as a means of identification. Because of the ambivalent structure of the 
instincts, however, the brothers felt both love and hate for their father which encouraged 
guilt and remorse in the post-parricide world. They therefore set him up as a totem, and 
incorporated his terror within them. Thus, as with the development of the individual's 
superego, what had been an external authority became incorporated internally as a sense 
of legislative guilt. This instituted the Oedipal moment through a paternal identification 
which engendered the unconscious through repression. 
What is interesting, from my perspective, is that Freud's theory of identification 
`is entirely predicated on a logic of metaphoric exchange and displacement' .9 As a 
result, it cannot help but exceed itself in the way that Borch-Jacobsen has described. 
Borch-Jacobsen's reading of the Freudian subject demonstrates the way in which this 
subject is inevitably haunted by otherness, and the identity it claims for itself is always 
already an `improbable' one, an `eccentric... distorted (displaced, dissimulated) subject 
in all sorts of identificatory roles and figures'. 1° The potentially infinitely proliferating 
order of metaphor, the substitution of the one for the other, is internal both to the work 
of identification and language, and it is no coincidence that, as you will recall from 
Chapter One, in Freud's account in Totem and Taboo, these two substitutive processes 
should emerge simultaneously. As Fuss has argued, `Psychoanalysis, at least where the 
theory of identification is concerned, can actually be understood as a scientific discourse 
on the very problem of metaphorization'(6). This places the psychical mechanism of 
identification within a space of inscription. " l As Fuss argues, Freud's concept of 
8 `If one has lost a love-object, the most obvious reaction is to identify oneself with it, to replace it, as it 
were, from within by identification. ' Freud, Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 62. 
9 Fuss, p. 6. 
10 Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, p. 54. 
't See Derrida, `Freud and the Scene of Writing' in Writing and Difference, pp. 196-231. Derrida claims 
that `it is no accident that Freud, at the decisive moments of his itinerary, has recourse to metaphorical 
models which are borrowed not from spoken language or from verbal forms, nor even from phonetic 
writing, but from a script which is never subject to, never exterior and posterior to, the spoken 
word'(199). On the basis of this, Derrida asks, `what is a text, and what must the psyche be if it can be 
225 
identification `fundamentally presupposes the possibility of metaphoricity-of 
iterability, redoubling, translation and transposition'(6). Mudrooroo has made explicit 
this connection in his response to Laurie's article when he refers to his identity or 
identification as emerging out of a process of textualization, undertaken by his 
benefactor, Mary Durack, who wrote the foreword to Mudrooroo's first novel, Wild Cat 
Falling: 
In a sense, I had been textualised by Mary Durack and given a race 
which did not affect my being in the slightest, but did affect my work 
when I went on to write my novel which was about a part-Aborig2 al 
youth and which was edited into publishability by Mary Durack. 
This is an ambiguous assertion. It suggests that prior to the publication of this novel, 
Mudrooroo had not perceived himself as an Aborigine, and it was only through the 
writing by Durack of the foreword to his novel, that a racial identity actually emerged, a 
suggestion that is contradicted by other assertions about an earlier identification with 
Aboriginality. It is interesting, in the light of this, that Durack, in the foreword, 
described the then Colin Johnson, as a `nineteen year old, and part Aboriginal, though 
his features would not have betrayed him'. 13 The question of Mudrooroo's identification 
with Aboriginality exemplifies the complexity of identification. 
This complexity may explain why uncertainty surrounding Mudrooroo's identity 
should impact upon the reception of his work. It is certainly the case that the status of 
Mudrooroo's writings is one of the central issues at stake in Laurie's article. As Tom 
and Loma Little assert: `If Mudrooroo is proven to be non-Aboriginal, non-Aboriginal 
academics will then have to decide whether his writing is of sufficient merit to stand 
alone in a separate genre to Aboriginal writings. ' 14 
Leaving aside, for a moment, this authoritarian recourse to generic distinctions 
determined by racial identity, it is worth reconsidering what such a reassessment would 
involve, and perhaps one way of approaching this is through a re-reading of Mudrooroo 
represented by a text? For if there is neither machine nor text without psychical origin, there is no domain 
of the psychic without text. Finally, what must be the relationship between psyche, writing and spacing 
for such a metaphoric transition to be possible, not only, nor primarily, within theoretical discourse, but 
within the history of psyche, text and technology? '(199). 
12 Mudrooroo, `Afterword', p. 262-63. 
13 Mary Durack, `Foreword', in Wild Cat Falling (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1965), p. v. 
14 Little, p. S. 
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rewritings, particularly his 1991 novel Master of the Ghost Dreaming, itself an unstable 
reiteration of the earlier Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of 
the World. This process of reiteration is further complicated when we think through the 
implications of the former novel being an historical novel, with all the central characters 
being historical figures, and with much of the text making use of historical and archival 
research. Dr. Wooreddy's Prescription narrates events that took place in Tasmania in 
the middle of the nineteenth-century and, more specifically, the deluded attempt by the 
missionary, George Augustus Robinson, to civilize and Christianize the Aboriginal 
communities of the island. Both texts refer explicitly to that shadowy part of 
Tasmania's history when the entire Aboriginal population was rounded up and placed 
on a reserve on Flinder's Island, a small island north of Tasmania. 15 Much of Dr. 
Wooreddy s Prescription is set on Flinder's Island. Master of the Ghost Dreaming, in 
line with its even less realistic framework, is merely set on what is called Island. The 
two central Aboriginal characters, Wooreddy and Trugernanna, reappear in Master of 
the Ghost Dreaming as Jangamuttuk and Ludgee and much of this novel's action takes 
place on another plane of consciousness where the Aboriginal characters can move 
around freely with the help of their Dreaming companions. 
Fada's Identifications 
I want to begin by re-reading the character of Fada in Master of the Ghost 
Dreaming, a reworking of the historical figure of the British missionary and colonial 
administrator, George Augustus Robinson, already fictionalized by Mudrooroo in Dr. 
Wooreddy s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World. Fada provides us with 
the perfect model of the Oedipalized subject. The structure of colonial authority resides 
in what Deleuze and Guattari call the `tripartite formula-the Oedipal, neurotic one: 
daddy-mommy-me'. 16 Colonial society, in this novel, and the authority upon which it is 
structured, operate at the level of the family and are only made up of three characters 
called Fada, Mada and Sonny. Fada and Sonny's relation could be characterized, in 
15 For a brief account of this period, see Stocking, esp. pp. 275-283. 
16 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 23. 
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Freudian terms, as an unresolved Oedipal one: `Sonny writhed nervously under his 
father's gaze. Somehow his father always made him feel like a small boy. And always, 
he had to answer, had to find words and more words'(73). 
This Oedipal world that the novel opens in to, like the Freudian subject Borch- 
Jacobsen describes, is haunted and fragmented. The patriarchal world of colonialism 
that the reader is introduced to from page one of the novel is described as `the realm of 
the ghosts', a description with resonances of the opening hospital scene in My Place. As 
we learn about the characters of Fada and Mada, and their complex histories, we see the 
extent to which their own identities are constructed differentially by that which they 
deny in themselves: 
Being the superintendent (he had changed it to commandant because it 
had a much more authoritative ring) was a position from which to look 
back at the ragged child in the East End of London having to scrabble 
in the dirt and garbage heaps for a morsel of food. No one understood 
that ugly existence. The so-called gentlemen of this world turned their 
noses up at you, not knowing what it was like to struggle, to fight to 
escape that shithole into which he had been dropped at birth. Fada had 
never considered the proposition that the people he had come to help, 
hinder and change, might try and accommodate his hidden rancour by 
creating a myth in which his white race were seen as ghosts, and 
London as a cold forbidding realm filled with so much suffering that a 
human could not survive it. (32) 
What the novel points towards, and here I think it is an illustration of the logic of the 
anthropology that haunts Totem and Taboo, is the way in which the colonial characters 
repress what they are most afraid of in themselves by displacing it on to the Aboriginal 
community whom they construct as savages and then attempt to `civilize'. Certainly the 
descriptions of savages that Fada utilizes are ones that, at the time, would also have 
been applied to him as a member of the working classes of London. 17 Mada also enacts 
this displacement when she describes the indigenous community as `savages'. On the 
very same page, the reader witnesses her digging her husband in the ribs `savagely'(9). 
This displacement is then made even more explicit when Mada hits Fada `savagely 
across the nose. Startled, he sat up wildly. Aghast at her action, she sought a victim and 
17 See Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the "Fin, de Siecle" (London: 
Bloosmbury, 1991), p. 6. Showalter's study examines the way in which metaphors of race and 
colonialism were often used at the turn of the century to analyze class encounters in Britain where the 
African jungle and the Urban jungle became interchangeable. 
228 
settled on the convenient victims caterwauling the night away with their pagan 
cries'(10). 
This repressed structure of difference that the colonizer is haunted by is dealt 
with through reinvoking a nostalgic past. Mada reiterates the paternal identification 
through an unresolved Oedipalized nostalgia. She attributes her own gift for 
accountancy to her father: `Thank God, her daddy had been a shopkeeper and had made 
sure that everyone in the family could figure. If it wasn't for her father, God rest his 
soul, and herself, that worthless man would have stayed the bricklayer he was meant to 
be'(8-9). 
Reading the novel, however, we later learn that Mada: 
had the gift of falsity and over the years her origins had risen to be far 
above her husband's, but if the truth were known, her father was the 
proprietor of a pub in a very, very rough neighbourhood, who 
demonstrated by his foul language and physical aggression that he was 
the master of his territory which included his slovenly wife and his 
sluttish daughter. (34) 
The brutality of this Oedipal triangle is distorted through memory as `[o]ver the years 
her memories of London had dimmed. Now it was a fairyland free from suffering'(6). 
Like the process of remembering trauma analyzed in the previous chapter, Mada's 
memory is as much about concealment as recollection, and the `fairyland' she yearns for 
can be thought of as a form of mourning for that which never existed. Even as she longs 
for this non-existent time and place, the brutality she was exposed to is reproduced 
within her relationship to Fada. 
The narrative of the identificatory processes through which Fada attains his 
position of authority is equally striking, and likewise marked by repression: 
Fada covered his tracks so successfully that even in his thoughts he 
could no longer be honest. What had happened was that the young 
chap had caught the fancy of a toff who liked what would later be 
referred to as rough trade. Well, this toff had picked up the young 
Cockney, and had given him a long and loving bath, in the course of 
which certain intimacies were shared. This notwithstanding, the 
gentleman was an extremely devout Christian and saved the youth 
from the life of a bricklayer. (33) 
In one sense, Fada's personal development echoes Freud's articulations of the 
ontological status of phylogenesis. In Totem and Taboo, the mythological basis of 
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culture, in the conjectured period after the murder of the father but before the 
establishment of the internalized law, emerges through homosociality replacing 
homosexuality. The organization that made the primal sons strong in this period, Freud 
hypothesizes, `may have been based on homosexual feelings and acts'(144). According 
to Freud, once the father had been incorporated as the law, the exchange of women was 
able to take place. Fada's Oedipalized development, likewise, takes place through the 
repression of the homosexual relation of young Fada to his benefactor. In so doing, not 
only is Fada's relationship to Mada instituted, his imperializing and civilizing mission 
can be undertaken. 
Fada's justification for his mission, moreover, follows closely the argument set 
out by Freud of the necessity of the repression of the instincts, and the re-channelling of 
sublimated sexual energy, for the work of civilization. Fada's justification, moreover, 
comes at a point in the narrative when he is trying to control his own desire for 
Aboriginal women: 
It was difficult to understand the workings of the native mind, 
especially that of a woman. Indeed, if he knew anything of their 
sexuality, the men simply took it when the urge rose. So unlike 
civilised behaviour, but somehow so romantic for all that. Civilisation 
imposed restraints which were often impossible to keep. But then what 
was he thinking? Such restraints were what made the British empire 
great. Such restraints were derived from the teaching of his religion. 
(49) 
Like Freud's description of the `savage' in Totem and Taboo, Fada conceives of the 
Aborigine, or at least Aboriginal men, as uninhibited; actions are unmediated by 
thoughts. Fada's desire for Ludgee is characterized by a nostalgia for the psychic 
wholeness he presumes exists before the splitting of the subject imposed by the 
civilization. This Oedipalized ordering of his own desire pushes the question of the 
legitimacy of invasion out of sight, and it does so through recourse to the prior authority 
of God, as the ultimate, and absent, father figure. 
Identification and Textuality 
But perhaps what is most significant about Fada's attempt to acquire an identity 
is that it is enabled and, in a sense, constituted through textualization, a suggestion with 
230 
troubling echoes of Mudrooroo's own textualization by his benefactor. It was Fada's 
benefactor, `the good Christian who created Fada even to the extent of teaching him 
how to read (the bible) and then to write'(33). This parenthetical reference to the Bible 
exposes the kinds of anxieties about authority that mark the ability to read and write. 
The benefactor has to teach Fada how to read and write so that the authentic truth of the 
Word of God can be transmitted, and the authority of Christianity maintained and 
disseminated through his missionary role in the colonies. In so doing, however, the 
benefactor's authority is placed at risk, for Fada, in learning to read and write, can re- 
read and re-write anything, which, as we shall see, he does. After Fada leaves Britain, 
he continues to correspond with his benefactor who becomes a figure of authority and 
law and a repository for guilt, very much the same role played by the absent dead father 
of the primal parricide: `Over the years in letter after letter, he would confess his 
peccadilloes to this person who would come to see him as a son'(37). In psychoanalytic 
terms, this is the place of the father internalized as the superego: `Fads, as much as he 
was able (which was a great deal), took the gentleman for his model, even to the extent 
of adopting his Christianity and his writing style'(33). Fada's identification with his 
benefactor is double-pronged and deeply ambivalent. Although harking back to an 
originary father figure, that is represented through Christianity, this identification is 
simultaneously undermined through the dispersal of authority that writing is 
characterized by. 
Identification and Anthropology 
Fada's ability to read and write enables an anthropological voyeurism 
manifested as constant reiterative inscriptions and descriptions of Aboriginality. These 
inscriptions are almost always sexualized. This anthropologizing, moreover, can itself 
be seen as a form of identificatory practice for Fada's inscriptions of Aboriginality, like 
William Ramsay Smith's, are partly motivated by his desire for that very psychic 
wholeness that he attributes to the Aboriginal community, his ancestral forefathers. 
Master of the Ghost Dreaming in particular interrogates the complicity of anthropology, 
and the discourses of race attached to it, in the production of narratives of fantasy and 
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sexual desire. At every opportunity, Fada sketches Ludgee naked for his `definitive 
work' on Aborigines: 
Fada was not to be denied his little pleasures and Ludgee was to 
perform for him yet again. The excuse, for father was one for excuses, 
was to sketch a primitive scene for the chapter on food gathering in his 
definitive work. (51) 
It is significant that Fada's voyeurism is described using a metaphor of 
cannibalization, the very first act of identification: `Fada feasted on her body, his eyes 
misting with memories... A forbidden memory of his youth on the East End of London 
came to him'(53). Gazing at Ludgee's body, however, brings to mind forbidden 
memories that he quickly represses, but that unconsciously make their way back into his 
anthropologized portrait of Ludgee. 
Ludgee, in order to escape from this static construction of herself as an object of 
knowledge, dives into the water. This scene serves as a reminder that, in the words of 
James Clifford: 
`Cultures' do not hold still for their portraits. Attempts to make them 
do so always involve simplification and exclusion, selection of a 
temporal focus, the construction of a particular self-other relationship, 
and the imposition or negotiation of a power relationship. 18 
Fada continues his sketching, and through this continued activity, the novel questions 
the status of the knowledge produced by the discipline of anthropology as already being 
constituted through a displaced Oedipalized desire. In a hermeneutically closed circle of 
logic, these anthropological knowledges, as we have seen, constituted the premises for 
Freud's elaboration of the concept of identification. 
Fada, immersed in his own collecting of knowledge, saw nothing. He 
had frowned when the woman had deserted her pose to dive into the 
ocean. Now he was intent on sketching the memory of her form. 
Swiftly, he sketched in the heavy breasts, hesitated over the groin and 
left it bare and sexless. More often than not, no, always, the dictates of 
polite behaviour and decorum had to be observed in illustration as 
well as words. He was illustrating an anthropological text and not the 
sort of pornography which was sold on the streets of London. He 
moved away from that train of thought and continued on with the 
sketch, little realising that unconscious memories had taken over his 
illustration. (60) 
'8 James Clifford, `Introduction: Partial Truths', in Clifford and Markus, p. 10. 
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It is hardly surprising that Fada later `glanced down at his disguised sketch of a naked 
English prostitute'(62). When Ludgee finally emerges from the ocean, Fada is 
`entranced'. It is while being in this trance-like state that Fada thinks to himself: `Such a 
primal scene. If only there was some way of capturing it for research'(63). 
Primal Scenes 
Not only is the use of the word `primal' part of the process of capturing Ludgee 
as an object trapped in the evolutionary past, 19 Fada's reference to a `primal scene' has 
distinct psychoanalytic resonances as well. In `The Sexual Theories of Children' Freud 
describes the primal scene claiming that children's `perceptions of what is happening 
are bound, however, to be only very incomplete'. 20 Given the incompleteness of Fada's 
sketch through the removal of Ludgee's genitalia, `primal scene' is an apt description. 
Like the discussion of trauma in the previous chapter, the primal scene reminds us of 
the highly problematical nature of constructed scenes from our pasts, and the knowledge 
we produce out of them. This sketching scene, moreover, addresses the complexity of 
the status of memory in its relation to the real, linked inextricably as it is to the 
problematic of desire. In Freud's conception of the primal scene, memory, as 
reconstruction, is not about revealing, it is about concealment. In this sense, we can look 
at both Mada's and Fada's reconstructions of their personal histories as primal scenes. 
Ned Lukacher, in his book Primal Scenes, offers an interesting reading of the 
function of primal scenes in the history of Western metaphysics, a reading that is 
extremely relevant to the kinds of concerns that I am attempting to raise. Lukacher does 
not only use the concept of the primal scene to refer to the conventional psychoanalytic 
understanding of the term, where the child's witnessing of the sexual act subsequently 
plays a traumatic role in his or her psychosexual life: 
"The anthropologist W. E. H. Stanner, puts it in these terms. When writers use words like 'primal' they 
`take over from W. K. Hancock his thesis that "in truth, a hunting and pastoral economy cannot co-exist 
within the same bounds", but they do not like his plain language, and they prefer to say that "the twentieth 
century and the Stone Age cannot live together. "' W. E. H. Stanner, After The Dreaming: Black and White 
Australians: an Anthropologist's View (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1969), p. 22. 
Johannes Fabian makes the further claim that discourses of the `primal' are not about `real' people, but 
`about the primitive as internal referent of a discourse or as a scientifically constituted object of a 
discourse or as a scientifically constituted object of a discipline'(77). 
20 Freud, `The Sexual Theories of Children' (1908), in The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, ed. Anna Freud, 
trans. James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 385. 
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Rather, the `primal scene' becomes an intertextual event that displaces 
the notion of the event from the ground of ontology. It calls the 
event's relation to the Real into question in an entirely new way. 
Rather than signifying the child's observation of sexual intercourse, 
the primal scene comes to signify an ontologically undecidable 
intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between 
historical memory and imaginative reconstruction, between archival 
verification and interpretive free play. 21 
Such a conception of the primal scene is particularly pertinent to Master of the 
Ghost Dreaming, where, as we have seen, there is such a `differential space between 
historical memory and imaginative reconstruction'. Laurie's article, moreover, can be 
considered in terms of Lukacher's formulation. Laurie's assertion that Mudrooroo's last 
wish would be that the past would stop trying to reclaim him assumes that the past is a 
stable and accessible place, an assumption that is, however, already undermined by the 
problematical nature of the `re-' in reclaim. Similarly, this is a gesture that responses to 
My Place, explored in the previous chapter, which assume an unproblematic relation 
between memory and its reconstruction, tend to reproduce. 
The primal scene is relevant to our reading of both Mudrooroo's texts and the 
textual event that is Mudrooroo's life because the primal scene is a textual scene; it is, 
according to Lukacher, a figure for `the "already written, " for what has already been 
inscribed within and between texts'(43). Fada's `anthropological sketch', as the 
`disguised sketch of a naked English prostitute' is precisely that which is `already 
written'. Even as Fada perceives what he thinks of as a primal scene, such a perception 
is already thrown into doubt, and his vague acknowledgement of the inability of ever 
capturing such a scene, of ever really knowing such a scene, is testimony to that 
ontological undecidability that primal scenes are marked by, an undecidability that 
moves through all the textual events that this thesis has explored. 
What is interesting, however, about this primal scene, and Fada's attempts to 
record it as inscription, is that it is out of such primal scenes that Fada's anthropological 
text is to be produced. The reader learns early on that Fada is `in the midst of writing the 
definitive text about [the Tasmanian Aborigines]'(10). Yet, at the same time, the novel 
21 Ned Lukacher, Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p. 24. 
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undermines the possibility that such anthropological knowledge can ever be definitive, 
that such knowledge is, like the construction of the primal scene, a form of 
concealment. Lukacher points out that Freud, in `From the History of an Infantile 
Neurosis', resorts to an anthropological explanation for that which he sometimes is able 
to admit is inexplicable. As we saw in Chapter One, Freud argues that the Wolf-Man's 
repression of the primal scene reveals a phylogenetic mechanism, and claims that this 
mechanism is so primitive that it may well mark the point at which the human is linked 
to the `instinctual world of animal behaviour'. 22 
Fada reproduces this manoeuvre in order to provide some kind of ontological 
stability in his desire for an explanatory point of origin, yet this is what the Aboriginal 
community attempt to resist. For them, Fada's inscriptions are threatening, and point to 
the ambivalent status of inscription within the novel. For Ludgee and Jangamuttuk, 
Fada's inscriptions are a form of capture, because of his belief in their definitiveness 
and power: `I want you to pose for me, ' Fada says when he wants to draw Ludgee 
naked, `I'll put you down on paper. ' Ludgee, in response to this, whispers to herself, 
`Capture my soul'(53). Jangamuttuk later worries that `when we die, he binds us to him. 
He writes us down in that big book of his and we are trapped forever'(29-30). 
Colonization and the Power of Writing 
Such fears emerge out of the exploitation, by both Robinson in Dr Wooreddy's 
Prescription and Fada in the Master of the Ghost Dreaming, of the power their own 
form of graphic representation (what we traditionally think of as writing) gives them in 
the colonial context. As the narrative makes clear, it is Fada's ability to write that 
enables him to become a colonizer, and the ability of writing to control and oppress is 
repeatedly referred to in both texts as a source of almost magical power. In Dr. 
Wooreddy, Robinson tells Wooreddy that the letter he was writing, which would enable 
the Aboriginal community to leave Flinder's Island and return to Tasmania, was magic 
and so was the bark called `paper'. Wooreddy, in response to this: 
22 Freud, `From the History of an Infantile Neurosis', p. 120. 
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acknowledged the magic of the symbols scratched onto a thin sheet of 
bark with a stick dipped in charcoal. They might well be magic, he 
thought, declarinj `Neire this paper, neire this letter; good this letter, 
good this paper. ' 
Yet the `magical properties' that Robinson attributes to his own inscriptions are 
incapable of fulfilling his needs of the Aboriginal community. Later, when Trugernanna 
was to be interviewed by the Governor, `she passed into a room in which a ghost was 
bent over a table making those strange marks on that strange bark or skin, which Meeter 
Rob-in-un was always doing and which he said was magic'(50). 
Master focuses less on the `magical properties' of writing and more on the 
power of writing as a means of colonial domination, particularly over Wadawaka, the 
African slave who first makes an appearance as a character in Master of the Ghost 
Dreaming. Fada tells his son, `Make [Wadawaka] aware of his position and how I hold 
his freedom in the ink of this pen'(72). Later, Fada tells Wadawaka himself. 
`I won't have insolence, sir. That I won't. Take Care, I have your 
future in the ink of my pen. ' 
It was true, and a suddenly apprehensive Wadawaka bowed his head 
as if awaiting punishment. (75) 
Barbara Johnson's interrogation of the effects of claims of indigenous orality is 
pertinent in this context. She argues that Derrida's critique of the metaphysics which 
privileges the presence of speech over the materiality of writing, has never been a 
privilege devoid of ambiguity: 
An equal but more covert privilege of writing has also been operative. 
One of the ways in which colonial powers succeeded in imposing their 
domination over other peoples was precisely through writing... And 
indeed, when comparing itself to other cultures, European culture has 
always seen its own form of literacy as a sign of superiority. The 
hidden but ineradicable importance of writing that Derrida uncovers in 
23 Mudrooroo, Dr Wooreddy's Prescription, p. 37. This corresponds closely to a scene described by 
Robinson in the diaries: `Upon the return of TRUGERNANNA and PAGERLY, WOORRADY who had 
during their absence been very desponding, seemed immediately to revive and become animated and 
cheerful-he had frequently importuned me to dispatch a messenger with my paper, meaning a letter, 
with a view to facilitate the return of the aboriginal natives. Upon acquainting WOORRADY, who was 
in the natives' hut, with their arrival, a circumstance which to a barbarous mind might be easily imputed 
to the specific virtue of the paper, his joy was truly rapturous. He put his arms around my waist and 
hugged me and danced around me calling "NEIRE (good) paper, NEIRE Mr. Robinson"... I had 
previously told him that I would bring them back by force of that piece of paper which I transmitted to the 
managing whalers, the magic properties of which he fully credited when the author of his anxiety was so 
shortly afterwards presented to his sight. ' N. B. J. Plomley (ed. ), Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian 
Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834 (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research 
Association, 1966), p. 80. 
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his readings of logocentric texts in fact reflects an unacknowledged, or 
`repressed' graphocentrism 24 
It is perhaps for this reason that both Robinson and Fada refuse to acknowledge 
Aboriginal forms of textual representation and signifying practices, even as the texts 
repeatedly establish these. For, to acknowledge these inscriptions and this textuality 
would be to undermine Fada's own authority within the community. In Dr. Wooreddy's 
Prescription, for example, Maree, an Aboriginal woman, begins to explain to Robinson 
`how the men carved images on trees, but seeing that he did not understand her she 
stopped'(173). At another stage of the novel, Wooreddy is accompanying Robinson on 
a mission. Unbeknownst to Robinson, Wooreddy had already been in communication 
with the local Aboriginal community. Wooreddy `pointed out some line drawings of 
kangaroo and some symbols to Ballawine [Robinson] without telling him that a sign had 
been left behind telling him to continue along the track, but slowly'(119). This is a form 
of inscription that Robinson not only does not comprehend, but does not even 
acknowledge as existing. 
Other forms of Aboriginal inscription pervade the text. Early in Dr. Wooreddy's 
Prescription, Mangana, Trugernanna's father, `took up the subject of his daughter. With 
a fmger he painted in the soft ashes at the edge of the fire her symbol and her 
actions'(23). The importance of writing as a means of communication is also 
emphasized in the meeting of Wooreddy and Ummarrah: 
Wooreddy and the stranger, who had been eyeing and weighing each 
other... now took the opportunity to introduce themselves formally. 
Wooreddy... removed his shirt to show the marks of his initiation and 
the stranger did likewise. (60) 
These forms of bodily inscription, and their signifying power, are an aspect of 
Aboriginal inscription that both texts repeatedly emphasize. As early as page four of Dr 
Wooreddy's Prescription, even before Wooreddy engages in any dialogue, he is `written 
on' in an initiation ceremony and has to `endure a series of parallel slashes across his 
chest'(4). After the rape and murder of his wife, Mangana realized that he was `at the 
24 Barbara Johnson, `Writing', in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas 
McLaughlin (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 47. 
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mercy of forces which he could only try and propitiate through magic. He snatched up a 
sharp pebble and slashed at his chest'(10). For Wooreddy also, `what could he do but 
chant the old protection spells, gash into his body extra-potent strength marks, carry 
about relics of the long dead, and hope'(28). Robinson's diaries, although denying the 
Aborigines any form of graphic representation, also describe this process: `if they feel 
any inward affliction or pain they cut themselves with sharp stones or shells, supposing 
the affliction is caused by RAGEAWRAPPER or evil spirit and by making an incision 
imagine a speedy cure'. 25 
Master of the Ghost Dreaming emphasizes even more than the previous text, the 
importance of Aboriginal inscriptions in the form of scarification and body drawings, 
and how powerful these inscriptions actually are. Jangamuttuk's first trip into the 
alternative plane that much of the novel's action takes place in takes him to a place of 
magical inscription: `The smooth surfaces were covered in designs and figures of such 
mystical intent, that he wished he had the time to draw some, but he had to hurry 
onwards'(14). His dreaming companion, moreover, his mode of transport in this other 
realm, is also marked by inscriptions: `The back of Goanna was ancient and even his 
sacred skin patterns were faded. Jangamuttuk could remember his first journeys with 
him, then the patterns were clear and well marked. They had gone to form his most 
sacred body paintings'(13). 
These instances of Aboriginal inscription are examples of the way so-called oral 
cultures use language. Deleuze and Guattari argue in Anti-Oedipus that oral cultures are 
only called oral `because they possess a graphic system that is independent of the voice, 
a system that is not aligned on the voice and not subordinate to it, co-ordinated "in an 
organization that is radiating, as it were" and multi-dimensional'(118). The kind of 
writing inscribed in Wooreddy's body, for example, and its relation to the voice, 
constitute a completely different form of representation from phonetic languages like 
English. In English, a form of representation that Deleuze and Guattari call `despotic', 
the graphic sign is deprived of its multiple connotations and made a one-dimensional 
25 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p. 57. 
238 
transcription of the voice. 26 In other words, sounds are given meaning, not by multiple 
networks of connotation, but by the reduction of meaning to linguistic regularity, 
dominated by the ideal of a fixed one-to-one relationship between each sound and its 
corresponding concept. 
But Robinson's non-recognition of Aboriginal inscriptions is not just about not 
understanding a different mode of inscription. It is also, quite clearly, the result of an 
anxiety about the transmission of knowledge and dispersal of authority, those anxieties 
that I have already discussed in the context of Fada's relation to his benefactor. 
Although in Dr Wooreddy s Prescription, the Aboriginal community are taught to read 
and write, in the rewriting that is Master, this opportunity is never made available. Dr. 
Wooreddy s Prescription refers to The Flinders Island Weekly Chronicle, a journal that 
was produced on Flinder's Island under Robinson, a copy of which can be found in the 
Mitchell Library in Sydney. Sitting in those archives it is possible to read the stated aim 
of the journal: to `promote Christianity, civilisation and learning among the Aboriginal 
inhabitants'. Profits arising from the journal were `to be equally divided amongst the 
writers which, it is hoped, may produce Emmulation (sic) in writing'. The journal was 
`under the sanction of the Commandant', and proof sheets were `to be submitted to the 
Commandant for correction before publishing'. 7 Just as in Mudrooroo's fictional 
account of Fada's relation to his benefactor, this historical document suggests the way 
in which teaching alphabetic writing also functioned as an identificatory practice that 
was to be emulated. 
In a similar way, teaching the Aborigines to read and write enable the initiation 
and production of a mode of history-making that also function as a monument to none 
other than Robinson, the beloved father, himself: 
In commencing our journal agreeable to the prospectus we cannot 
look back on the events connected with our history. This we leave 
with the divine blessing to the heart and head that has been 
instrumental in uniting us together... 
We date our history of events from the month of October 1835 when 
our beloved father made his appearance among us dispelling the 
darkness. 
26 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 206. 
27 The William Thomas Papers, The Mitchell Library of New South Wales. 
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We had been in a deplorable state, we looked for a better day and it has arrived. What a contrast between the present and the past 28 
In Mudrooroo's fictionalized account of the production of this journal, the anxieties 
around teaching Aborigines to write are explored as Wooreddy `watched Macy, a young 
Aborigine, copy it out from a draft supplied by Robinson and had heard him repeat each 
word and sentence as he wrote them'(145). Just as Derrida asserts, the `father is always 
suspicious and watchful toward writing'. 29 
It is perhaps for this reason that, in the latter text, Fada teaches the Aborigines as 
little about alphabetic writing as possible. When, for example, Fada claims, in a re- 
enactment of a scene from Dr. Wooreddy's Prescription, he has written a document that 
would ensure the Aboriginal community on the Island would be saved from destruction, 
the fact that none of the Aboriginal community can read and write English, ensures their 
obedience: `You know that paper tell `em story. I send to Governor. He reads it and 
sends things.. . Now I write important story on paper. Strong story to get you all away 
from this island... Need you all to sign, to make mark on paper'(67). 
The other significant feature of Fada's ability to write in Master of the Ghost 
Dreaming is the way such a tool enables him to fictionalize his own account of his life. 
Even as Fada believes in the ontological truth status of, for example, the anthropological 
texts he is producing, and even as he is deeply attached to the idea of some kind of 
transcendental ground, the place of God, or even of civilization, which gives meaning to 
his experiences, the novel also makes explicit how difficult it is for Fada to ever return 
to a truth that is commensurate with historical fact. Fada's textual mediations constantly 
fictionalize his own experiences. Examples abound in Master of the Ghost Dreaming. 
Immediately after an argument with his wife about why she is not teaching the natives 
household duties, Fada sits down to write in his journal: 
The commandant... bent over his journal, his pen busily scrawling 
across the page as he wrote: My wife has been of constant help to me. She is teaching a number of the native women household duties. 
Ludgee, a faithful companion and the wife of Jangamuttuk who 
accompanied me on my dangerous missions of reconciliation which 
29The William Thomas Papers, 
2' Derrida, `Plato's Pharmacy' in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 
1993), p. 76. 
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enabled the remnants of a once proud people to be saved, is an apt 
pupil. (44) 
While never explicitly stating that Fada is a liar, the novel belies Fada's observation. 
Fada's obsession with writing in his journal, moreover, reveals both a desire for, and a 
simultaneous moving away from unmediated truth that characterize Lukacher's analysis 
of the primal scene. Fada's rationalization for why he writes journals, `Gentlemen wrote 
journals and so he wrote not one journal but journal after journal'(42), reveals that 
concealment of his own history that he cannot help but repress. When his wife becomes 
exasperated about his constant journal writing, he replies: 
"`One moment while I finish off this entry. It is most important as a 
record. " 
The commandant ignored his still furious wife while he wrote: taking 
with me the petition duly signed (thumb printed) by all of the natives. 
They will be of great help as agents of civilisation among the savage 
tribes which still inhabit the mainland. (43) 
Mudrooroo and the Making of History 
What, for me, is most interesting about this comment is that the copious journals 
of the historical figure of George Augustus Robinson, and they number well over one 
thousand pages, have been, and continue to be used as important historical records, 
records that Mudrooroo clearly drew upon in his writing of his Tasmanian novels. The 
editor of Robinson's journals was faced with much the same problem confronting Freud 
in his analysis of the primal scene. Brain Plomley, as a traditional historian, does not 
know how to deal with the fact that his own historical research points towards the fact 
that George Augustus Robinson was constantly engaged in the process of fictionalizing 
himself through his journals. In his article `Who was the Real Robinson? ', Plomley 
acknowledges that there are `inconsistencies' between official and private 
correspondence, and that the official reports were `often deliberately misleading'. 0 He 
then tries to explain the situation that `led to the absurdity of [Robinson's] statements 
and to the falsity of the public record': `Although no excuse for Robinson's excesses, it 
must be pointed out that the whole Flinder's Island record is bedevilled by untruths and 
30 Plomley, `Who was the Real Robinson? ', Overland, 111 (1988), p. 54 
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exaggerations. 31 In spite of this acknowledgement, Plomley's historical reconstruction 
engages in the production of the truth effects of historical discourse using exact 
chronology (he fords this difficult), cross-referencing to `official' sources, and 
ethnocentric selection of detail, as `the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned, [and] the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth' 32 Mudrooroo's 
fiction exploits the problematics of history through the portrayal of a deluded medium. 
This is history that does not claim to understand the truth, but instead politicizes the 
practice of history-making, enabling the tactical use of historical knowledge. Although 
he does not use a different class of documents, Mudrooroo reads the documents in a 
different way, in much the same way that Freud attempts to read the events of the 
primal scene. Unlike Plomley's editorial work, and even Robinson's journals, these 
novels investigate the production of meaning which much of particularly Master of the 
Ghost Dreaming is concerned with. 
Master of the Ghost Dreaming also enacts this genealogical challenge to history- 
making through a disguised reference to the first historical painting in Australia, 
Benjamin Duterrau's The Conciliation (see Appendix 7). As a publicly sponsored 
national historical painting, The Conciliation commemorates the work of Robinson's 
mission where not only is there a strong dichotomy between the civilized and the 
savage, but where Robinson is positioned centrally as the pacifier, domesticator and 
protector of an acquiescent group of Aborigines. According to Tim Bonyhady, this 
`meeting was to be treated as an heroic moment in modem British history rather than as 
an event of national significance for Australia'. 33 Bonyhady also claims that `Duterrau 
was endeavouring to elevate ethnographic description to the status of high art'(78). This 
intersection of art and ethnography is particularly significant in the light of the previous 
discussion of the primal scene because, when looking at the painting, like the 
31 Plomley, `Who was the Real Robinson? ', p. 56. 
32 Foucault, `Neitzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 131. 
33 Tim Bonyhady, Australian Colonial Paintings in the Australian National Gallery (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p. 84. 
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descriptions Fada gives of his own paintings, the genitals of the Aborigines have been 
effaced. 
The Conciliation is presently displayed in the Tasmanian Museum and Art 
Gallery, and Geoff Parr, in his commentary on the painting, describes how he felt when 
he first saw it: `There, without a context, it appeared as an exotic and enigmatic 
painting. 34 If, as Michel de Certeau argues, `[r]epresentations are authorised to speak in 
the name of the "real" only if they are successful in obliterating any memory of the 
conditions under which they were produced'35, then the act of recuperating this context 
is a strategy that, to some extent, deauthorizes Eurocentric representations of 
Aboriginality. Master recontextualizes the painting, bringing to the surface the erasure 
of the production of knowledge that history involves, as the reader witnesses Fada's 
constructed fame: 
It was as he had always imagined it-the shepherd at the head of his 
newly saved flock. Feverishly, he began storing the aspects of the 
image in his head. It should, and must be, the subject of a painting. 
(130) 
Again, `subject' is used here to connote both the subject-matter of the painting, 
and the colonial subjection of Aborigines to such representations. In this way, 
Mudrooroo's fiction is able to exploit uncertainties around conceptions of textuality, 
truth, history, power and knowledge. Moreover, his novels, unlike Robinson's journal, 
Plomley's editorial work and Duterrau's painting, explore the relation between the 
production of meaning and the production of subjectivity or identity on which it 
depends. 
Identificatory Practices 
This concern with the production of meaning is evident from the beginning of 
the novel when the Aboriginal community are about to undergo an alternative 
identificatory practice, a practice made necessary by the historical conditions of 
34 Geoff Parr, `Benjamin Duterrau: The Conciliation', in Considering Art in Tasmania (Sydney: The Fine 
Arts Press, 1985), p. 500; Emphasis added. 
35 Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. Brian Massumi (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 208. 
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invasion. It is ironic that at this moment, when the Aboriginal community of the Island 
are in the process of radically altering their modes of identification, Fada is engaging in 
his anthropological colonizing in order to capture, as a form of knowledge in his 
`definitive text', some kind of timeless primordial Aboriginal identity. Master of the 
Ghost Dreaming opens with a dangerous ritualized attempt by the Aboriginal 
community to understand and resist the power the `ghosts' (the colonizers) had over 
them. It is little wonder then that the ritual which opens Master of the Ghost Dreaming 
should be accompanied by an image of cannibalization, an image reminiscent of 
William Ramsay Smith's dismemberment of bodies: `Our spirits become their play 
things; our bodies their food, to be ripped apart, and our gnawed bones are scattered'(1). 
In Freud's story, it is cannibalism that characterizes identification which `operates on 
one level as an endless process of violent negation, a process of killing off the other to 
usurp the other's place, the place where the subject desires to be' 36 
It is this violent negation that the identificatory battles enacted in this opening 
ritual are designed to counter. Unlike Freud's originary story of identification, the 
Island community's identificatory ritual takes place in another realm. In this realm, 
otherness is not repressed but harnessed through altered states of consciousness. The 
Aboriginal community are dressed up as Europeans in an attempt to release them from 
the world of the ghosts in which they are trapped. The ritual is designed to take them 
into another plane of existence where they meet their dreaming companions, 
companions that enable them to journey through this other plane. It is in this plane, a 
plane that exists only for Mada and Fada in dreams, that the battle to save the 
community will take place. 
Fada disbands the ritual after being woken up `savagely' by Mada who in turn 
was woken by the ritual singing of English ballads. Fada's response reveals his deluded 
anthropological construction of Aboriginality. What the narrator had described as the 
`ultimate in a sign system'(3), Fada reads as a `travesty of the central ritual of a popish 
mass'(16). It is his reading that goes towards the production of the Aborigine as object 
36 Fuss, p. 9. 
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of anthropological knowledge: `On the way back to the house... he began to plan out an 
interesting paper for the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society'(18). This is 
genealogy in Foucault's strictest sense, not just a rewriting but `a form of history which 
can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc'. 7 
This opening ritual, `the ultimate in a sign system', involves the singing of 
ballads of loneliness and alienation in a faraway place, but the narrative also makes 
clear that Jangamuttuk was `not after a realist copy, after all he had no intention of 
aping the Europeans, but sought for an adaptation of these alien cultural forms 
appropriate to his own cultural matrix. It was an exciting concept; but it was more than 
this. There was a ritual need for it to be done'(3). What becomes increasingly clear is 
that this ritual is not simply about mimicry or imitation. It seems to me to follow a much 
more complicated theorization of identification which involves taking the place of the 
other, and usurping their power. It is through this ritual that Jangamuttuk is able to enter 
the altered plane of Mada's existence through her repressed dreams and desires. This is 
possibly what could be thought of as Mada's unconscious world, a world that she has no 
access to. 
This battle is re-enacted within Mada's own body, which is constructed as a 
war-zone. Her body was `constantly wracked by pain. In fact it felt as though it was the 
battle field between constantly warring groups of organs... What could she do but seek 
to bring a truce in the warfare, and to pacify all the combatants by using the haphazard 
supply of medicines which arrived on the supply vessel? One medicine above all she 
valued as a pacifier, laudanum'(7). 
For Jangamuttuk, laudanum comes to be seen as the source of health and the 
elixir of life. In the opening identificatory ritual, in their desire to be in the place of the 
other, the place of seeming good health in contrast to the disease the Aboriginal 
community are suffering from, Jangamuttuk and Wadawaka enter this altered plane in 
order to reach the laudanum: `Her longing extruded from her to fix his attention on a 
37 Foucault, `Neitzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 117. 
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small table within reach of her groping hand. On it stood a golden flask. The source of 
her good health. Before the hand could clasp it, Jangamuttuk snatched it up'(15). 
In order to perform this ritual, Jangamuttuk had to master the Dreaming of the 
Ghosts. As the narrator states, Jangamuttuk: 
the shaman, and purported master of the Ghost Dreaming, was about 
to undertake entry into the realm of the ghosts. Not only was he to 
attempt the act of possession, but he hoped to bring all of his people 
into contact with the ghost realm so they could all capture the essence 
of health and well-being, and then break back safely into their own 
culture and society. This was the purpose of the ceremony. (4) 
Jangamuttuk, then, is the purported master, and the ambivalence of the word 
`purported' signals the very contradictions that such identificatory practices are 
constituted by. In the Oxford English Dictionary, `purported' has a range of meanings 
all of which we can bring to bear on our understanding of Jangamuttuk's mastery. For 
not only does `purported' signify that which is conveyed or expressed and that which is 
intended to be done or effected by something, it also refers to that which is merely 
alleged or ostensible. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of `purportless', 
moreover, signifies that which is without sense or meaning. 8 Jangamuttuk's mastery 
can therefore be seen as a performative position that attempts to produce meaning or 
sense out of the chaos of invasion. As a performative position it produces mastery by 
professing it. The ritual involves the repetitive singing of English ballads in a new 
context, and Jangamuttuk's mastery, it seems, is a result of destabilizing the master's 
identificatory mastery using the same processes through which it is stabilized and 
consolidated, that is, citing it repeatedly. Through reiteration, Jangamuttuk is able to 
open the constitutive instabilities within the colonizer's citations thereby enabling entry 
into the realm of the ghosts. 
This ritualized identification, then, is subject to the logic of iterability and falls 
within Judith Butler's definition of identification as a ritualized production, a ritual 
reiterated under and through constraint 39 It is clear that this ritual is not only produced 
under considerable constraint, but is potentially life-threatening to Jangamuttuk, which 
38 See The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 2421. 39 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 95. 
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invokes both the necessity and danger of identification, and is a reminder that every 
identification involves a measure of temporary mastery and possession which enable the 
subject. The ritual, moreover, points to the contradiction at the heart of identification: 
by identifying with the other, we lose ourselves through the very gesture by which we 
attempt to constitute ourselves as free autonomous subjects. This dangerous 
contradiction, and the tenuousness of processes of identification, are made explicit 
towards the end of the book when the reader is told that the bottle of laudanum `which 
Jangamuttuk on his last visit had mistaken as the elixir of all health' was, `he realised, a 
deadly drug responsible for the prison in which the poor female lay'(112). 
With this in mind, I want to be clear that I am not advocating a celebratory 
identification politics to replace what I see as the problems of a celebratory identity 
politics. 40 This opening identificatory ritual, its dangers and its errors, are sufficient 
reminder that such a celebration is not possible. What I am trying to say is that this 
ritual, and the issues that motivated Laurie's article, provide opportunities to rethink 
identity and identification, and to explore possible ways of reworking them. 
Like the identifications of the colonizer, Jangamuttuk's opening ritual is self- 
authorizing. The difference, however, is that his self-authorizing ritual, unlike Fada's 
which can be traced back through his benefactor to the ultimate and originary father, is 
not constituted through recourse to an imagined origin. Jangamuttuk is the `creator and 
choreographer' of his ritual, authoring and authorizing it, in a self-conscious manner in 
response to the historical fact of invasion. 
These differences in the authorizing logics of colonial society and the Aboriginal 
community can be seen in the naming rituals that are enacted in both texts. In Dr 
Wooreddy's Prescription, Robinson baptizes the Aborigines saying, `to signify your 
rebirth you will be Christened anew'(139). In this ritualized reiteration of identity, `it is 
precisely through the infinite deferral of authority to an irrecoverable past that authority 
40 As Diana Fuss argues, `the unconscious plays a formative role in the production of identifications, and 
it is a formidable (not to say impossible) task for the political subject to exert any steady or lasting control 
over them. Given the capacity of identifications to evolve and change, to slip and shift under the weight 
of fantasy and ideology, the task of harnessing a complex and protean set of emotional ties for specific 
social ends cannot help but to pose intractable problems for politics'(9). 
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itself is constituted' 41 The authority resides only in the very practice of citation, which 
would explain why Robinson attempts to cement his authority, while revealing the 
anxieties attached to such a groundless practice, by forcing the Aborigines `to repeat 
their names until he was satisfied that they had the proper pronunciation'(1 3 9). The 
authority of these baptisms `works only by reworking a set of already operative 
conventions. And these conventions are grounded in no other legitimating authority 
than the echo-chain of their own reinvocation' 42 
Naming rituals are also enacted by the Aboriginal community in Master of the 
Ghost Dreaming. Apart from the renaming of Wooreddy, Trugernanna and George 
Augustus Robinson from the previous text to Jangamuttuk, Ludgee and Fada, 
Jangamuttuk and Wadawaka, the African convict, undertake the initiation of two young 
Aboriginal boys. This initiation does not involve, in spite of what Fada thinks, training 
in the `arts of civilisation', nor does it coincide with traditional Aboriginal law, but is, 
as Ludgee asserts, `what [Jangamuttuk] calls the new Law'(50). Just before Fada leaves 
the Island, Jangamuttuk renames the initiates, George and Augustus, harking back not 
just to the figure of Robinson in the prior text, but also to the historical figure of George 
Augustus Robinson, causing the text to exceed its own limits, a reminder of the way in 
which texts refuse to be self-enclosed systems of meaning. 
During the initiation, Wadawaka claims, "`Can't be calling `em boys after this. 
They gotta have new names"'. Jangamuttuk replies, "`New names, ghost names, signify 
something you know"'(125). What this something might be remains unarticulated, but 
we do know that it is through Jangamuttuk's rituals that Fada is eventually forced to 
leave the Island, ultimately liberating the Aboriginal community from Fada's control: 
Only the natives had cause for celebration, especially the shaman 
Jangamuttuk who it may now be revealed had orchestrated things so 
that Fada would need to retreat to the capital. How he had done this 
remains somewhat of a mystery, but Jangamuttuk needed the absence 
of Fada and the ascendancy of his son to fulfil a certain operation he 
had in mind. (129) 
41 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 10.8. 
42 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 107. 
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After Fada and Mada leave Sonny and the Island behind, Sonny begins drinking and 
sobbing: `There was no mother or father to listen or to come to his aid. There was no 
one'(142). What Deleuze and Guattari call the `analytic imperialism of the Oedipus 
complex' is dismantled. 43 In the final scene of Master of the Ghost Dreaming as Fada 
sailed away leaving Sonny to inherit his authority, the wind `whipped' up an `inventory' 
that Sonny was `trying to divine' and `took [it] out to sea'(137). While the two initiates 
fill the corporeal space left by Fada, Mudrooroo himself might perhaps be seen as a 
third initiate whose inventive novel fills the space left by the inability of Sonny, as the 
aftermath of a ruptured Oedipal triangle, to control the wind-blown dissemination of the 
authorizing `inventory' that could not be contained by the divine logos of the Father. 
The text of Master of the Ghost Dreaming might then be seen as the new `inventory', 
with its ambiguous resonances of both a totalizing list of goods, and the unpredictability 
of self-conscious fictional inventions, through which Mudrooroo, as writer, 
performatively identifies. It is significant that it is only after Fada disappears that this 
disseminatory space for writing is opened. As Derrida has asserted: The specificity of 
writing [is] intimately bound to the absence of the father'. " 
Mudrooroo's Past 
How might we think about Colin Johnson re-naming himself Mudrooroo, the 
Nyoogah equivalent of the English word for `paperback', in 1988, partly in response to 
Australia's bicentennial? The extent to which paperbark is invested with power within 
texts written by Mudrooroo is striking In Dr. Wooreddy, as we have seen, `this letter' 
was magic and so was the bark called `paper'(37). In Master of the Ghost Dreaming, 
when Jangamuttuk is undertaking his entry into Mada's room in the opening 
identificatory ritual, the power he derives from the ritual ensures that `the walls were 
thin as paperback to him'(13). Mudrooroo is thereby constructing his own identification 
with Aboriginality through a totem of inscription that he has invested with penetrative 
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 23. 
" Derrida, `Plato's Pharmacy', p. 77. 
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power. According to Mudrooroo, `this has become our Dreaming, or our secondary 
totem or our functional dreaming'. 45 
Such an identification with writing can be seen as a simultaneous 
disidentification with another story of a violent colonizing paternity that Victoria 
Laurie's article narrates. Laurie alleges that Mudrooroo's father `was Thomas Johnson, 
an American Negro, though thought to be of mixed origins or Creole'(29). She also 
asserts that Edward Barron senior, Colin/Mudrooroo's great-great grandfather on his 
mother's side, was a colonialist in Western Australia who had instigated an Aboriginal 
massacre: 
That attack by white troops at Pinjarra in 1834 had killed a dozen 
Aborigines, in part a reprisal for the murder of a settler, Hugh Nesbitt, 
by Aborigines South of Perth. His companion had been speared three 
times but escaped to raise the alarm. The companion was retired army 
sergeant Edward Barron senior, the father of the first white colonial 
child and Colin/Mudrooroo's great-great grandfather. (30) 
Laurie makes the point that the Johnson children `were directly descended from the first 
white child born on the shores of the Swan River colony in 1829. In a classic display of 
Western Australia's proximity to its past, the generational link from first white colonists 
to celebrated Aboriginal writer spanned just five families'(30). 
There are a number of reasons, however, why Mudrooroo's mother could not 
share in the inheritance of this wealthy settler family: `His mother, Elizabeth Barron, 
who was ostracized after having an affair with a male relative, a child born out of 
wedlock, and then marriage to a dark-skinned man, had been born on a wealthy pastoral 
property just outside Narrogin, but the family fortune had passed into the hands of a 
male heir'(29-30). Elizabeth Barron's status as a daughter ensured her exclusion from 
the inherited wealth and power that is transmitted from father to son in Oedipalized, 
patriarchal cultures. 
Elizabeth Barron's relationship with Thomas Johnson, and the anxieties caused 
by this union, also contributed to her disinheritance. It is in this relationship that race 
45 Mudrooroo, 'Paperbark', in Crisis and Creativity in the New Literatures in English, ed. Geoffrey V. 
Davis and Hena Maes-Jelinek (Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1990), p. 389. Here Mudrooroo is also 
referring to Oodgeroo Noonuccal. who also changed her name from Kath Walker to the Noonuccal word 
for 'paperbark' in 1988. 
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and sexuality intersect, and where anxieties about miscegenation, and the accompanying 
threat to inheritance, bloodlines and racial purity are played out. It was in this 
intersection that the greatest fears of empire would be located. In the face of a global 
racial inter-mixing lay the fear that the empire was being undermined by racial 
degeneration and the rebellion of the lower races. As Robert Young describes in detail 
in Colonial Desire, the early science of anthropology spent much of its energy 
attempting to establish the legitimacy of racial differentiation and hierarchy. Elaine 
Showalter argues: 
Racial boundaries were among the most important lines of 
demarcation for English society; fears not only of colonial rebellion 
but also of racial mingling, crossbreeding and intermarriage, fuelled 
scientific and political interest in establishing clear lines of 
demarcation between black and white, East and West. (5) 
It was such boundaries that led to the contradictory policies of assimilation and 
segregation described in the previous chapter. And it was these policies that caused 
what has now become known as the Stolen Generation, resulting in a dispersed and 
often untraceable mixed-race population, an ungovernable excess that subverts official 
and institutional recuperative gestures of mastery, an historical practice of which 
Mudrooroo is a specific effect. 
These gestures are evident in Laurie's archival research into the records of 
Clontarf Boy's Home where Mudrooroo had been sent as a child. This research reveals 
the extent to which, as early as 1955, uncertainties about Mudrooroo's origins and 
identity were in circulation: `The confusion about the boy's origins prompted a diligent 
clerk in 1955 to contact the Department of Native Affairs [D. N. A] which, he noted in a 
handwritten memo, "advised me, this a. m., lad not known at all to D. N. A. "'(31). Since 
the publication of Laurie's article, Mudrooroo has argued for the importance of 
theorizing the ways in which mixed race people destabilize simplistic notions of 
identity. Quoting Gerard Vizenor, he claims that `mixed bloods loosen the seams in the 
shrouds of identity' and that `the crossblood exists at the edges of identity and his 
identity is always open to doubt' 46 
46 Cited in Mudrooroo, `"Tell them You're Indian"', p. 262-63. 
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Identification with Writing 
Mudrooroo has never identified with the narrative of paternity represented by his 
maternal grandparents as told by Laurie. Rather, after his father's death, Mudrooroo was 
put into welfare, and took on the status of an orphan, the same status that Jacques 
Derrida attributes to writing [graphein] which, `being nobody's son at the instant it 
reaches inscription, scarcely remains a son at all and no longer recognizes its origins, 
whether legally or morally'. 47 For Derrida, the position of writing with regard to the 
legitimate family line, takes on the status, like Mudrooroo, of an orphan, one whose 
`welfare cannot be assured by any attendance or assistance'(77). According to Derrida, 
it is for this reason, its illegitimacy, that writing has been repressed in Western culture. 
Its effect is to break those ties of paternal sanction and filial obligation that serve to 
ensure the authorized transmission of authentic truth from each generation to the next. 
Because it challenges this self-perpetuation of the truth, it becomes an orphan deprived 
of all natural, hereditary rights. 
Perhaps it is the anxiety produced through the unauthorized and dispersive 
transmission that inscriptions are characterized by that has led to this position being 
reproduced in critical responses to Mudrooroo's work from within the authorizing 
regime of the academy. Even prior to Laurie's revelations, Mudrooroo's work was 
called into question on the basis of a putative inauthenticity often on the basis merely 
that he writes. In one sense, it all seems hopelessly overdetermined. From the 
publication of Mudrooroo's first novel, Wild Cat Falling, Mudrooroo has been haunted 
by the spectre of inauthenticity. Xavier Pons, for example, in his response to Master of 
the Ghost Dreaming, claims, `Writing itself is the first problem since Aboriginal culture 
was essentially oral' 48 Kateryna Arthur sees writing as `alien to Aboriginal culture', 
and claims that Mudrooroo's use of writing which, she informs us, is a non-Aboriginal 
enterprise, involves `multiple violations of the very thing that is being defended', and 
that this `popularisation is inevitably a form of betrayal, whether it is carried out by 
47 Jacques Derrida, `Plato's Pharmacy', p. 77. 
43 Pons, `Writing Koori', p. 101. 
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Europeans or Aborigines' 49 John Fielder claims that `Aboriginal writing addressed to 
white audiences will always be something of a compromised, hybridised process', 
implying that it is only in writing by Aboriginal people that such a process takes place 5° 
Gay Raines argues that writing itself is `a colonisation of Aboriginal culture, ' and cites 
Barry Blake's Australian Aboriginal Languages to support her case: `Any written 
representation is the work of Europeans or of Aborigines trained by Europeans. '5' 
Wadawaka 
Given the clear anxieties that the status of Mudrooroo's writings have occupied, 
coupled with the revelation of his African-American ancestry, how then can we think 
about the role of the orphan in Master of the Ghost Dreaming being filled by 
Wadawaka, the African slave who is `[n]ot only... an exile, but he had no country, no 
land of his own'? (85). It is certainly the case that Wadawaka has become an initiated 
Aborigine, and that this has involved ritual scarification. When Jangamuttuk suggests 
escaping from the Island, after the mistake over the laudanum, Wadawaka is not 
convinced of the possibility of such a plan. Jangamuttuk replies, and calls him uncle, 
stressing the kin relationship accepted by Wadawaka when he had been initiated into the 
community, "`I got this way of talkin' from you in the first place. Anyway, you uncle to 
these boys under our Law. You me same like that in our Law, since I cut you .. (83). 
Apart from his status as an initiated Aborigine, there is no doubt that 
Wadawaka's presence constitutes a profound disturbance to colonial and patriarchal 
authority: 
This, this rebel, [Fada] spluttered in his mind, might, for all he knew, 
be the cunning leader of the uprising which had threatened civilised 
culture and order in the Caribbean. For all his obsequiousness he was 
a dangerous threat to the stability of his noble experiment of bringing 
civilisation and Christianity to his sable friends on the island where 
they were safe from all disruptive forces. (76) 
49 Kateryna Arthur, `Fiction and the Rewriting of History: A Reading of Colin Johnson', Westerly, I 
(1985), p. 57. 
5°John Fielder, `Postcoloniality and Mudrooroo Narogin's Ideology of Aboriginality', SPAN, 32 (1991), 
50. 
Gay Raines, 'Aboriginal Writing as a Reassertion of Cultural Identity', Antipodes, 5.2 (1991), p. 102. 
253 
Not only is this remarkable for the extent to which it reveals Wadawaka as a disruptive 
force, but also for the image of Fada's inarticulate intrapsychic spluttering. Even these 
inarticulate moments reveal the impossibility of self-presence in the face of internal 
differentiation. 
It is also significant that Fada's anxiety over Wadawaka emerges at the point in 
the novel where Wadawaka seems to be usurping the authority of Sonny, undermining 
the Oedipalized transmission of authority: 
Fada noticed with pride that his son was the last one to leave his 
vessel.. .A large black man held the stem steering oar and led the 
singing. This was the duty of his son, but there he was, handling one 
of the oars just like a crew member. He would have a word about this 
at once. The structure of society must be maintained at all costs. It was 
like a ladder with each class having its own rung. Divinely ordered, it 
had stood the test of time. (70-71) 
Fada frames his anxiety about the Oedipalized transmission of authority through 
recourse to the arguments of evolutionary anthropology, itself an effect, as we have 
seen, of anxieties about the Oedipalized transmission of authority. It is at this stage that 
Fada sees for the first time the inscriptions on Wadawaka's chest, inscriptions by which 
he had not previously been identified: 
`Sir, ' he began carefully so as not to alann Wadawaka, `those 
markings on your chest. There appears to be no mention or description 
of them in your personal identification record. Sir, if I may say so, 
they bear an uncanny resemblance to the markings our own natives 
have on their chests and shoulders. Never in my wildest imagination 
did I believe that there existed a connection between this remote 
colony and Africa. Impossible, but it must be so, for I find it 
improbable that a man such as yourself who has had the benefits of the 
civilising process should revert to the darkest savagery of which these 
poor souls are still in thrall. Sir, I am well aware that Africa has been 
the cradle of ancient cultures. ' (76-7) 
Even as Fada desires a kind of undifferentiated primordiality in Wadawaka's 
inscriptions, a desire that is simultaneously disrupted through its uncanny repetition of 
Aboriginal inscriptions, this very desire is itself constituted and represented through an 
inscripted differentiation in his own mind: 
[H]e stared with amazement at the tribal markings, the cicatrices of 
adulthood on the African's chest, which were exactly the same as his 
own native community. Instantly, the outlines of a paper presented 
itself in headings, subheadings, paragraphs and even a few sentences 
in his mind. Eagerly, he inscribed the treasured paper on his memory 
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as he began to initiate an investigation which might prove a discovery 
of world importance. (76) 
Although Fada begins his own internalized differential psychic inscription of this 
discovery, he is still unable to conceive of Wadawaka's Aboriginal inscriptions as 
anything but originary. Wadawaka's bodily inscriptions thereby become inscribed in 
Fada's mind for `despotic' reproduction. What the text seems to suggest, however, is 
that Wadawaka's Aboriginal initiation, and the ritual scarification that it involved, 
works more `like the voice of an alliance', with the marks inscribed on the body being a 
graphics of `extended filiation". 52 These are forms of alliance that Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that Oedipalized capital, with its anxious modes of inheritance, seeks to dissolve. 
Fada needs the inscriptions to originate from Africa both to enable his upward 
movement on an intellectual hierarchy and so as not to disturb his own construction of a 
hierarchically organized aboriginality of racial purity: `He needed this person to have 
been born in Africa for the marks to be the initiating cicatrices of the tribal savage'(79). 
However, this is the kind of stable origin that both Wadawaka and the writing that is 
inscribed on his body, as Orphans, resist. Wadawaka, like Mudrooroo, poses such a 
threat because he does not take part in the established order of a colonial authority 
structured around paternal identifications, identifying instead with the status of orphan 
and writer, the identifications of which are structured more around a mutable and 
historically-determined conception of alliance. 
It is surely not a coincidence that the authority and law of paternal speech that 
exists in Fada would be undermined as a result of Wadawaka and Jangamuttuk's 
alliance, nor that it would be at the moment that he sees Wadawaka's ritual scars that he 
first begins to be unable to articulate himself: `Fada began to falter. Somehow the 
subject had escaped his control just when he was on the verge of a great discovery'(79). 
Here it is not just the subject under discussion that escapes him, but, in a sense also, his 
subjection of Wadawaka. As the novel moves to its provisional conclusion, Fada 
increasingly experiences a `fragmented period filled with alarming gaps and pieces of 
his own sentences commencing and drifting off into chaos'(92). When he is finally 
52 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 188 and 223. 
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leaving the Island, his `concentration had gone and with it the rest of his farewell 
address. Worst of all a memory lapse had occurred and he hadn't the foggiest idea what 
he had been going on about'(134). 
Mudrooroo: the Father of Aboriginal Literature 
Meta-textually, this usurpation of Fada's authority has had some unsettling 
consequences, and I am aware that my argument is complicated by Mudrooroo's often 
patriarchal and authoritative position with regard to other Aboriginal writers, and 
particularly women writers. It is interesting to speculate upon the extent to which 
Mudrooroo's vocal authorizing and deauthorizing of other writers were a catalyst for 
Laurie's article. Just as the publication of Sally Morgan's My Place can be read, meta- 
textually, as a narrative of origins of the birth of contemporary Aboriginal women's 
writing, Mudrooroo's writings had been inserted in a narrative of origins whereby 
Mudrooroo came to be seen (and perhaps saw himself), as the Father of Aboriginal 
literature, a manoeuvre that reincorporates everything into the patriarchal familial 
structure. Certainly, Mudrooroo's recent position at the head of the judging panel of the 
David Unaipon award for Aboriginal writing, inaugurated in 1988, seems to indicate 
this. There is, moreover, rarely any critical work done on Aboriginal writing in 
Australia, and even on Mudrooroo, that does not make the obligatory reference to Wild 
Cat Falling and the publication of the first Aboriginal novel. The opening sentence of 
Laurie's article participates in this kind of originary attribution: `The author of Wild Cat 
Falling, Australia's first published Aboriginal novel, would seem to have little left to 
prove to anyone these days'(28). 
It seems to me that while Mudrooroo's novels can be read, as I have attempted 
to do, as challenging patriarchal authority, his own critical writings can be read as 
reinstating this authority through his authorizing and deauthorizing of other Aboriginal 
identifications. Mudrooroo's critical texts are subject to the same processes of rewriting 
that his fictional texts are. Writing from the Fringe, published in 1991, was reworked 
and republished under the title, Milli Milli Wangka: The Indigenous Literature of 
Australia, in 1997. Both these projects are marked by an attempt to define, in an often 
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contradictory and uncompromising way, Aboriginal or Indigenous writing. Mudrooroo 
claims, for example, in Writing From the Fringe, that `just because something is written 
by a person who identifies as an Aborigine doesn't make it an Aboriginal work'(148). 
In the earlier text in particular, Mudrooroo's definitions of Aboriginality were so 
stringent that, as many critics have noted, few Aboriginal writers qualify as writers of 
Aboriginality. S3 In these texts, Mudrooroo swings between an evolutionary essentialism 
('In fact, even today, scratch many an Indigenous person and beneath his or her 
contemporary skin, or the persona he or she shows to the white world, you will still find 
the old hunter or gatherer')54and a postmodern non-essentialist Aboriginal subjectivity. 
In spite of the complex meanings that inscription is marked by in his novels, 
Mudrooroo's critical texts tend to privilege the oral and reinstate the logos that his 
fiction so profoundly calls into question. These critical texts also imply that some kind 
of essence of Aboriginality is identifiable in certain kinds of textualities. The rewriting 
that is Milli Milli Wangka argues for a category of Australian literature called 
Indigenous writing, which would be classified as Indigenous in so far as it adheres to 
what Mudrooroo calls Maban reality. This reality is presumably measured by the 
markers of oral discourse, which Mudrooroo contrasts with what he calls the `settler 
cultural patrix', implying that the use of writing is an identification with the father in 
contrast to the Aboriginal `matrix' of orality. Mudrooroo then designates certain texts as 
`Aboriginal' or `non-Aboriginal' on the basis of this. It is when Mudrooroo makes these 
kinds of pronouncements about what constitutes Aboriginal writing and orality that he 
is at his most authoritarian and patriarchal, most like Fada of Master of the Ghost 
Dreaming. 
33 See, in particular, Adam Shoemaker, Mudrooroo: A Critical Study (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1993), esp. Chapter 5; See also Eva Rask Knudsen, 'Fringe Finds Focus: Developments and Strategies in 
Aboriginal Writing in English', in European Perspectives: Contemporary Essays on Australian 
Literature, ed. Giovanna Capone (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1991), pp. 32- 
44; and Simon During, `How Aboriginal Is It? ', Australian Book Review, 118, (1990), pp. 21-23. ' Mudrooroo, Writing from the Fringe, A Study of Modern Aboriginal Literature (Melbourne: Hyland 
House, 1990), p. 39. 
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Mudrooroo's Place 
Possibly the most troubling aspect of Mudrooroo's critical writings has been his 
consistent attack on Sally Morgan and the popular success of My Place. This was 
mentioned in Laurie's article which quotes Mudrooroo in Writing from the Fringe as 
claiming that My Place is `not really an Aboriginal book-it's coming from outside and 
exploring our Aboriginality, and that's where the problems lie'. 55 Although Mudrooroo 
is claiming here that there is an inside and an outside to Aboriginality, and his use of the 
plural possessive pronoun `our' suggests that he considers himself to be on the inside, 
this chapter has tried to suggest that the ability to differentiate between inside and 
outside is extremely tenuous, not to mention ahistorical. Mudrooroo reduces the 
complexity of My Place to a caricature of what he calls `the battler' genre: `The plotline 
goes like this. Poor underprivileged person through the force of his or her own character 
makes it to the top through own efforts. 56 In Writing from the Fringe, Mudrooroo also 
argued that `Sally Morgan's book is a milepost in Aboriginal literature in that it marks a 
stage when it is considered O. K. to be Aboriginal as long as you are young, gifted and 
not very black'(149). Most responses to Laurie's article have raised this point. Graeme 
Dixon, for example, states: `Ironically, over the years Mudrooroo has become the 
arbitrator of what is and what is not the authentic style that an Aboriginal person uses 
when telling a story in the written form'(5). What is perhaps most striking about this 
attack is the way in which the story of Sally Morgan's life resonates in Mudrooroo's 
response to Laurie's article. The title of Mudrooroo's only published response is, in 
what seems to me to be an explicit, yet unacknowledged reference to Morgan's life 
narrative, "`Tell them you're Indian"'. The quotation-marks around this title enable 
Gladys Milroy's voice to intrude into Mudrooroo's response. In this article, Mudrooroo 
reiterates this connection, even if he does not mention My Place explicitly: "`Tell them 
you're Indian" was a response denied people of colour in the rural areas'(259). 
Moreover, in an article in the Brisbane newspaper, the Courier-Mail, it is stated 
that: `Prominent Aboriginal writer Mudrooroo has answered claims he is not really 
ss Cited in Laurie, p. 32. 
56 Mudrooroo, Writing from the Fringe, p. 149. 
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Aboriginal by saying his birth certificate was falsified to hide the identity of his real 
mother-who was actually his half-sister. '57 This reference to an incestuous 
relationship, and a mother that is also the half-sister of her daughter, echoes the story of 
abuse in My Place. Although Mudrooroo's half-sister, Joyreen Stamsfield, has 
vigorously denied Mudrooroo's allegations, it is remarkable that such a parallel 
narrative would emerge out of Laurie's article. Similarly, as in My Place, miscegenation 
and illegitimacy are central to the story of Mudrooroo's mother as told in Laurie's 
article. In many ways, the story of Sally Morgan and My Place haunts Mudrooroo's life 
narrative. Mudrooroo's claim, therefore, in Milli Milli Wangka that `what indigenality is 
in [My Place] has come from a white readership who found My Place mirrored their 
concerns about place in Australia'(195) is perhaps a displacement of the possibility that 
My Place articulates his own concerns about the fragility of Aboriginal identifications, 
as a combined effect of denial and Government policy, in contemporary Australia. After 
all, his own defence in "`Tell then You're Indian"' states that the `best white families in 
West Australia have a black side anyway'. 58 
It is odd that in an interview with Terry O'Connor in his first public response to 
Laurie's article, Mudrooroo would reiterate his position regarding Morgan: `Sally 
Morgan's book became the overall bestseller in Australia. It made it legitimate to have 
Aboriginal ancestors, especially when it didn't cause any political upsets. i59 But, as I 
have attempted to show, My Place is potentially extremely politically upsetting, even if 
this potential has been neutralized by critiques such as Mudrooroo's. Perhaps in 
Mudrooroo's paternalism towards Morgan we can see anxieties about his own position 
as father/originator of Aboriginal writing, a position that the popularity of My Place has 
threatened. 
If this questioning of Mudrooroo's identity, however, is an anti-patriarchal 
gesture, it is necessary to think through the way such a gesture may perhaps reinscribe 
57 Tent' O'Connor, `Author's Heritage Claims Split Family', Courier-Mail, 28 March 1998, p. 1 
58 Quoted in Terry O'Connor, `A Question of Race', Courier-Mail, 28 March 1998, p. 24. 
59 O'Connor, `A Question of Race', p. 24. 
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an even more insidious and anterior form of patriarchal imperialism that Laurie's article 
may have been designed to challenge. 
Crisis of Identity 
It is significant that the title of Victoria Laurie's article is `Identity Crisis'. Of 
course, the article attributes such a crisis to Mudrooroo. Yet, it is also possible to read 
the whole article, and the contradictions within it, as an expression of a crisis in a 
certain conception of identity. There are a number of ways of approaching such a crisis. 
One that has been suggested is that Mudrooroo submit to a DNA test to determine his 
identity. 60 Finally we have the technology that civilization has always dreamed of, that 
is, establishing the identity of the father with certainty. The question is, would such a 
test really establish who Mudrooroo is anyway? What could the results of such a test 
actually tell us? More importantly, what problems would this `solution' itself engender? 
Mudrooroo is right to remind us of `Victorian classifications of race' which culminated 
in the `genocidal practices of Auschwitz'. 61 We should be wary, I think, of emotive 
claims, like those of Robert Eggington, the co-ordinator of the Dumbartung Aboriginal 
Corporation in Western Australia, that suggest Mudrooroo's 'deception ... [is] a 
continuation of genocide'. 62 The Holocaust, after all, was the culmination of a 
conception of selfhood that seeks to eliminate otherness in the name of truth, purity and 
civilization. Surely such a test, while perhaps serving temporarily as a container for the 
anxieties produced in this crisis, would stand as a testament to the cruelties that sustain 
the fiction of coherent racially determined identities. 
At a time when the extreme right are gaining political ground in Australia, with 
an agenda which includes the policing of the boundaries of `real' Aborigines, we must 
ask whether testing Mudrooroo's DNA is the necessary and immediate political task. 
Surely there must be another way, that may be presented more in terms of a challenge 
than a solution. Perhaps, instead, we can think about the case of Mudrooroo as 
providing an opportunity to question the celebratory tone of contemporary identity- 
60 Terry O'Connor, 'Mudrooroo to Undergo DNA Test', Courier Mail, 30 March 1998, p. 1. 
61 Mudrooroo, '"Tell them You're Indian"', p. 262. 
62 Cited in Amanda Meade, 'Novelist Defends his Black Identity' Australian, 5-6 April 1997, p. 3. 
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politics that refuses to acknowledge the violence and alienation at the heart of our 
identities. In this way, we might be able to confront what a DNA test seeks to evade- 
that regardless of our genetic make-up, we are always exiles from ourselves, and that 
the repression of this internal division in an attempt to produce a coherent identity 
excludes the possibility of reworking identifications to produce alliances rather than 
merely exclusions. 
Perhaps it is through an acknowledgement of that unsettling space of otherness 
that orphans and writing inhabit, that such an identificatory politics might be initiated. 
Mudrooroo has gestured towards such a position: `A fixed identity really did not exist 
for writers such as myself who, every day, were creating identities in language. Identity 
itself, seeing as it could be given and taken away, was as much pastiche as any other 
contemporary structure'(263). The issue then is no longer the patriarchal and 
imperialistic formulation of whether Mudrooroo is still an Aboriginal writer (or 
whether, for that matter, My Place is really an Aboriginal book), but whether we can 
risk thinking about identification itself, like writing, as orphaned from a conception of 
an `aboriginality' of the kind constructed by Fada that is so deeply and neurotically 
attached to the origin embedded within it. 
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Conclusion 
This study has suggested one way in which we can think about the phenomenon 
of modem colonialism. It has long been argued that colonialism produces objects of 
knowledge, even if these are, like the spectre of the savage, phantasmatic. What I have 
tried to think about in this thesis is the way in which colonization also tries to produce 
certain kinds of subjects. It is for this reason that I have found psychoanalysis to be such 
an important and necessary conceptual tool for thinking through the psychic dimension 
of colonization. 
Yet, as I have tried to suggest, to use psychoanalysis to study colonization is 
rendered problematic by its own complicity in the production of colonial knowledges. I 
have attempted to negotiate this dilemma by historicizing the emergence not only of 
psychoanalysis and colonization as cultural institutions, but also the psychoanalytic 
subject. In this way, I hope to have opened up a way of thinking productively about 
both colonization and psychoanalysis, while simultaneously calling into question the 
naturalized status of the Western Oedipalized subject. 
This thesis suggests that it is, perhaps, possible that in the ongoing encounter 
with difference that is colonial and neo-colonial relations, re-reading Aboriginal texts 
may profoundly unsettle the subject of modern western colonialism, and its colonialist 
desire to produce subjects like itself. It is through such readings, and the intersubjective 
relations they require, that, even in spite of the asymmetrical power relations that 
colonization involves, the possibility of alternative non-Oedipalized subjectivities may 
be formulated. 
This thesis began with unease. It concludes with a similar feeling, although the 
source of this unease has no doubt shifted. Attempting to produce a conclusion requires 
the kind of mythologized thinking that this thesis has attempted to question. This is the 
teleological myth of the end-point, where the culmination of progress is finally realized, 
that the idea of civilization has depended on for its effectivity. A conclusion generally 
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requires that the conditions under which a piece of work was written are effaced in 
favour of a seamless, coherent and unified narrative. It is for this reason (however 
unreasonable) that I would like to consider the contingent nature of the work just 
presented. 
The chapter on Totem and Taboo, the first draft of which was written some two 
and a half years ago, was formulated in response to an invitation to present a paper at a 
conference with the spectral title of `Phantom FX'. I was reading Totem and Taboo at 
the time, and the chapter can be seen as an effect of thinking through the logic of 
spectrality in what is possibly Freud's strangest and most unsettling text. As I continued 
to think and write, although I never would have predicted it, the phantoms multiplied, 
and everywhere I looked, there were ghosts. 
The final chapter, researched and written in the last six months, came about in 
response to a newspaper article that a friend thought I might be interested in. On 
October 23,1998, the Scotsman reported the recent discovery of the appropriation of the 
work of David Unaipon by a little-known Scottish anthropologist, William Ramsay 
Smith. It seemed to me, upon reading this brief article, that this event brought together 
the concerns of my thesis and that Ramsay Smith could be thought of as exemplary of 
the colonizing subject. I decided to pursue this interest, and write my final chapter on 
Unaipon and William Ramsay Smith. 
This was the only chapter that involved extended archival research, most of 
which took place at the Mitchell Library in Sydney. This research exposed me to the 
unique pleasure of archival discovery. It was during this time, when I as wondering how 
to knit together the various threads of my argument, that I came to recognize the 
disturbing similarity of Ramsay Smith's intellectual endeavours and my own. Although 
I attempt to critique his appropriation, as I sat in the archives in the Mitchell Library, I 
was struck by the sense that my own project, like Ramsay Smith's, was a project of 
discovery and recovery, a project that sought to uncover the truth of the matter at its 
origin. Like Ramsay Smith, my project was motivated by the desire to know the 
unknown, to incorporate the unknown into the known. 
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There was also an uncanny sense of dejä vu as I sat in those archives. Another 
archival search had occurred in the very same place some ten years previously. At that 
time I had been searching for the truth of my own origins, and the past of my 
grandmother. That search produced nothing but the blank space on her birth certificate 
where her mother's name should have been. In some ways, this thesis enacts its own 
displacement, which is perhaps why it focuses on the disavowed, the familial, the secret 
and the spectral. 
In this way, the reasoned institutional concerns of this thesis intersect in a 
personal way with the concerns of my own history, a history that is also bound up with 
the history of Australia's colonization. Yet, given the history of the divide between the 
private and public domains that has been so central to both capitalism and colonialism 
that this thesis has tried to trace, such an intersection seems to me to be an important 
place from which alternative subjectivities may begin to be articulated. 
I hope to have avoided both the desire to recover the past and the desire to affirm 
the present. Rather, I hope to retain the question of how to remember the past, the 
legacy of colonialism which we all inherit, without assimilating it to ourselves. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
From Walter Baldwin Spencer's 1923 `Report on the Half-Castes and Aboriginals of 
the Southern Division of the Northern Territory'. 
ý.!!. 
Fr ., 
26, A/,.. r 
, r. 
... 
rer... 
265 
Appendix 2: 
From the Aborigines' Friends 'Association Annual Review, 1938. 
Full Blooded Australian Aboigines 
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A Study in Contrasts 
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already made contact with Malays, Japanese, and other races, 
than that they should he kept apart and not be allowed to establish 
contact with the best we have to offer in the way of British culture 
and "A F A. Review. " 
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Appendix 3: 
David Unaipon, `An Aboriginal Pleads for his Race', in the AFA Annual Review, 
1936 
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Appendix 4: 
From George Taplin, The Folklore, Manners, Customs and Languages of the South 
Australian Aborigines. 1878. 
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Appendix 5: 
1953 Coronation Medal. 
Appendix 6: 
Australian $50 note. 
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Appendix 7: 
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